COSMOLOGY AND THE POLIS

The Social Construction of Space and Time in the Tragedies of Aeschylus

RICHARD SEAFORD



CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE

more information - www.cambridge.org/9781107009271

COSMOLOGY AND THE POLIS

This book further develops Professor Seaford's innovative work on the study of ritual and money in the developing Greek polis. It employs the concept of the chronotope, which refers to the phenomenon whereby the spatial and temporal frameworks explicit or implicit in a text have the same structure, and uncovers various such chronotopes in Homer, the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, Presocratic philosophy and, in particular, the tragedies of Aeschylus. Mikhail Bakhtin's pioneering use of the chronotope was in literary analysis. This study by contrast derives the variety of chronotopes manifest in Greek texts from the variety of socially integrative practices in the developing polis – notably reciprocity, collective ritual and monetised exchange. In particular, the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus embody the reassuring absorption of the new and threatening monetised chronotope into the traditional chronotope that arises from collective ritual with its aetiological myth. This argument includes the first ever demonstration of the profound affinities between Aeschylus and the (Presocratic) philosophy of his time.

RICHARD SEAFORD is Professor of Ancient Greek at the University of Exeter. His publications range from Homer to the New Testament, and include commentaries on Euripides' *Cyclops* (1984) and Euripides' *Bacchae* (1996), *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy and the Developing City-State* (1994), *Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy* (2004) and *Dionysos* (2006). In 2009 he was President of the Classical Association.

COSMOLOGY AND THE POLIS

The Social Construction of Space and Time in the Tragedies of Aeschylus

RICHARD SEAFORD

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107009271

© Richard Seaford 2012

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2012

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Seaford, Richard.
Cosmology and the polis : the social construction of space and time in the tragedies
of Aeschylus / Richard Seaford.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-107-00927-1
1. Aeschylus – Criticism and interpretation. 2. Cosmology in literature. 3. Space and time in
literature. 4. Social interaction in literature. 5. Money in literature. 6. Ritual in literature.
7. Greek drama (Tragedy) – History and criticism. 8. Philosophy, Ancient. I. Title.
PA3829.S37 2012
882′.01 – dc23 2011041583

ISBN 978-1-107-00927-1 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to
in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For my daughter Artemis
ῥεῖά τ᾽ ἀριγνώτη πέλεται

Contents

List of maps *page* x
Preface xi
List of abbreviations xii

Introduction (A) Chronotopes and cosmology; (B) Chronotopes and history; (C) Previous treatments; (D) Summary 1

PART I THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE, TIME AND COSMOLOGY

1 Homer: the reciprocal chronotope (A) Homeric space; (B) Homeric time; (C) Social integration 13

2 *Demeter Hymn*: the aetiological chronotope (A) The space of ritual; (B) The emergence of the polis; (C) Shared space; (D) The outsider creates the community; (E) The aetiological chronotope; (F) The Iakchos procession; (G) Centre and periphery; (H) Conclusion 24

3 From reciprocity to money (A) Polis, cosmos and money; (B) Monetised geography; (C) Sixth-century Attica 52

PART II DIONYSIAC FESTIVALS

4 Royal household and public festival (A) The procession to the theatre; (B) Agora and hearth; (C) Athenian Prutaneion; (D) The advent of Dionysos; (E) Political sex; (F) Royal house and public cult; (G) The demolition of the royal house; (H) Conclusion: the genesis of tragedy in ambivalent make-believe 75

5 Aetiological chronotope and dramatic mimesis (A) Dionysia and dithyramb; (B) Thebes as aetiological elsewhere; (C) Conclusion 96

6 Monetisation and tragedy (A) The formalisation of the Dionysiac performance; (B) The combining of ritual genres; (C) Conclusion: competing chronotopes 106

PART III CONFRONTATIONAL AND AETIOLOGICAL SPACE IN AESCHYLUS

7 *Telos* and the unlimitedness of money (A) *Telos*; (B) Ritual and the unlimitedness of money 125

8 *Suppliants* (A) Confrontational space; (B) The deferral of *telos*; (C) Endogamy; (D) Why is the marriage resisted? 137

9 *Seven against Thebes* (A) Confrontational space; (B) The deferral and completion of *telos*; (C) Possession; (D) Cosmology 158

10 Confrontational space in *Oresteia* (A) *Agamemnon*; (B) *Choephoroi*; (C) *Eumenides* 178

11 The unlimited in *Oresteia* (A) *Agamemnon*: the deferral of ritual *telos*; (B) *Telos* and the unlimited; (C) Revenge and the accumulation of wealth 190

12 *Persians* (A) The setting; (B) The return of Dareios; (C) The return of Xerxes; (D) Processional endings; (E) Wealth 206

PART IV THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES

13 Form-parallelism and the unity of opposites (A) Form-parallelism; (B) The unity of opposites; (C) The scales of Zeus 225

14 Aeschylus and Herakleitos (A) The unity of opposites and the unlimited; (B) Metaphor and cosmology; (C) Monetisation and abstraction 240

15 From the unity of opposites to their differentiation (A) Aetiological and monetised chronotopes; (B) The opposites coalesce; (C) The opposites differentiated; (D) Democracy and eschatological community 258

PART V COSMOLOGY OF THE INTEGRATED POLIS

16 Metaphysics and the polis in Pythagoreanism (A) Various ways of being 'Pythagorean'; (B) The Pythagorean triad; (C) Pythagoreanism versus Herakleitos; (D) Economic and political conflict 281

17 Pythagoreanism in Aeschylus (A) The mediation of Pythagorean opposites in *Oresteia*; (B) The Pythagorean triad in *Oresteia*; (C) Pythagoreanism in the Danaid trilogy; (D) Zeus 293

18 Household, cosmos and polis (A) *Demeter Hymn* and Danaid trilogy; (B) Endogamy and polis; (C) Chronotopic variation according to location; (D) Aeschylean Thebes (E) Sophoklean Thebes 316

Appendix: was there a skēnē *for all the extant plays of Aeschylus?* 337
Bibliography 340
General index 355
Index of principal passages 361

Map

1 The Acropolis and the Agora in the classical period *page* 81

Preface

The book will give an initial impression of wide-ranging complexity. Indeed, it is not a *survey*. Aeschylus himself does not arrive until Chapter 8, and those interested in the relation of Aeschylus to Presocratic philosophy may even prefer to start with Chapter 14. Those who begin at the beginning and persevere will, I hope, be rewarded by the realisation that the book forms a single coherent argument.

They may also, I hope, receive the impression that the inventors of democracy still have, despite the primitive limitations of their form of it, much to teach us. We can for instance learn that the unlimited accumulation of individual wealth is incompatible with the democratic polis, or that the democratic polis depends on communal space. In our era of growing atomisation, Aeschylean drama expresses the idea of the common good with an aesthetic power well beyond what we are capable of producing. Ancient Greek culture is what I call a culture of limit, whereas consumer capitalism is a culture of the unlimited, by which our society and planet are being destroyed.

This is my third book about the radical transformation of Greek society and culture in the archaic and classical periods. *Reciprocity and Ritual* (1994) centred around the role of ritual in the development of the polis. *Money and the Early Greek Mind* (2004) related elements of the 'Greek miracle' (the genesis of philosophy and tragedy) to the fact that the Greek polis was the first pervasively monetised society in history. A central theme of *Cosmology and the Polis* is the interaction of ritual and money in the only Athenian literary texts that survive from the first half-century of Athenian democracy, the tragedies of Aeschylus.

My heartfelt thanks go to the Leverhulme Trust and to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for providing me with the time to write this book. I am grateful also for comments on it to David Wiles and John Wilkins, to Paul Curtis for checking the references, and to Cambridge University Press for their courteous efficiency.

Abbreviations

Plays cited without author are by Aeschylus. The presocratic philosophers are cited in DK. Tragic fragments are cited in *TGrF*. The lyric poets are cited in *PMG*, except for Sappho and Alkaios, who are cited in the edition of E.-M. Voigt (*Sappho et Alcaeus*, Amsterdam, 1971). Comic fragments are cited in the edition of R. Kassel and C. Austin (*Poetae Comici Graeci*, Berlin, 1983–).

Help in understanding abbreviations of ancient authors and works is to be found in the *Greek-English Lexicon* edited by Liddell and Scott, and of periodicals in *L'Année philologique*.

All dates are BC unless specified as AD.

*ARV*²	Beazley, J. D. (1963) *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters* (2nd edn). Oxford University Press.
Ath. pol.	*Constitution of the Athenians*, attributed to Aristotle.
DK	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (eds.) (1951) *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th edn). Berlin.
FJW	Friis Johansen, H. and Whittle, E. W. (1980) *Aeschylus: The Suppliants*. Aarhus University Press.
FGrH	Jacoby, F. (ed.) (1923–58) *Die Fragmente der griechischer Historiker*. Berlin and Leiden.
GIJ	Graf, F. and Iles Johnston, S. (2007) *Ritual Texts for the Afterlife*. London: Routledge.
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*.
KRS	Kirk, G. S., Raven, D. and Schofield, M. (1983). *The Presocratric Philosophers* (2nd edn). Cambridge University Press.
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (1981–99). Zurich: Artemis.
LSCG	Sokolowski, F. (ed.) (1969) *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*. Paris: de Boccard.

LSJ	Liddell, H. G., Scott, R. and Jones, H. S. *A Greek–English Lexicon* (9th edn). Oxford University Press.
PMG	Page, D. L. (ed.) (1962) *Poetae Melici Graeci*. Oxford University Press.
RE	Pauly, A., Wissowa, G. and Kroll, W. (eds.) (1893–) *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Stuttgart and Munich.
TGrF	Snell, B., Kannicht, R. and Radt, S. (eds.) (1971–2004) *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta.* Göttingen.

Introduction

A CHRONOTOPES AND COSMOLOGY

Drama is action in space and time that represents action in another space and another time. It transcends itself, both spatially and temporally. And beyond the space and time of a represented action (in Argos, say, in the time of Agamemnon), Aeschylean poetry imagines other spaces and times that may be more remote (Troy, the underworld, the time of Kronos). There is an Aeschylean *cosmos*.[1]

Where the spatial and temporal frameworks that are explicit or implicit in a text have the same form, this spatio-temporal form may be called a *chronotope*. I owe this concept to Mikhail Bakhtin.[2] But the use I make of the term is a radical extension of his method, and so differs from the existing applications of the term to ancient literature.[3]

Bakhtin insists on 'a sharp and categorical boundary between the actual world as the source of representation and the world represented in the work'. But he also refuses to 'take this categorical boundary line as something absolute and impermeable', and indeed 'out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serve as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and created chronotopes of the world represented in the work'.[4]

By contrast, I do not operate with a category of 'actual chronotopes' or 'real-life chronotopes'[5] antithetical to 'created chronotopes'. All my

[1] The only limitation is on the future: there is imagining of what will follow the represented action, but not (as in science fiction) of events following the representation.

[2] He defines it as 'the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature', and continues: 'This term is employed in mathematics, and was introduced as part of Einstein's Theory of Relativity. The special meaning it has in relativity theory is not important for our purpose; we are borrowing it for literary criticism almost as a metaphor (almost but not entirely). What counts for us is that it expresses the inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space)': Holquist (1981) 84.

[3] By Bracht Banham (2002) 161–272, Farenga (2006) and – on Aeschylus' *Eumenides* – Revermann (2008).

[4] Bakhtin in Holquist (1981) 253.

[5] One such 'real-life chronotope' is for Bakhtin constituted by the agora: Holquist (1981) 131.

chronotopes are – as socially constructed – 'created', and within this broad category of created chronotopes I do not isolate literature. Bakhtin's concern is almost entirely with numerous literary chronotopes. But my focus is on a small number of chronotopes that emerge in the context of certain socially integrative *practices* and are also embodied (with variations) in mythical, cosmological and dramatic *texts*.

The socially integrative practices (hardening into institutions) with which I am mainly concerned are reciprocity, payment in money, and polis ritual with its evocation or enactment of myth. My chronotopes, which I infer from practices and texts, are cognitive structures, socially constructed in the (conscious or unconscious) *mind*, but nevertheless closely associated with socially integrative *practices*, by which they are required, promoted and confirmed.

Bakhtin shares the Kantian evaluation of space and time (as indispensable to cognition), but differs from Kant 'in taking them not as "transcendental" but as forms of the most immediate reality'.[6] My chronotopes however are experienced as *transcendent* (as well as extending into the most immediate reality). By transcendence I mean comprehensive influence or power from the beyond. This differs of course from the Kantian sense of transcendental as a priori forms of thought. Rather, as in the subsequent tradition associated with Durkheim,[7] I regard basic forms of space and time as socially constructed, as experienced therefore as transcendent, and the chronotopes that unite these basic forms of space and time as partaking of their imagined transcendence. If I sometimes write as if chronotopes were impersonal agents, which of course they are not, this expresses the truth that they are experienced as transcendent, despite being constructed and imposed by human beings.

More specifically, basic forms of space and time are influenced by basic forms of social practice and organisation. For instance, sacrificial ritual may articulate conceptions of local space (e.g. by a procession to a temple) or of present time (e.g. by shaping a calendar), but may also play a role in the imagining of *cosmic* space and time – for instance in the smoke imagined as ascending to the gods above who demand the sacrifices, or in the myth of the ancient separation of immortals and mortals arising from the trick played in the sacrifice by Prometheus. Moreover (a) forms of state organisation (e.g. monarchy), (b) certain social codes and practices and (c) ritual – all these exemplify forms of social integration whose effectiveness may depend on being imagined as power that is external and comprehensive.

[6] Bakhtin in Holquist (1981) 85 n. 2.

[7] For his classic formulation see Durkheim (1976 [1915]) 10–11. A quite separate derivation of the Kantian categories from the social process of *exchange* is by Sohn-Rethel (1978).

Such external but comprehensive power (social transcendence) is naturally reified, in time and space, as *cosmic* transcendence. The comprehensiveness of the constructed cosmos is apt to embody the integrative (transcendent) power of social institutions.[8]

'Cosmisation' of social institutions is often explained by the need for their 'legitimation'.[9] But it may also be motivated by the need to explain the unknown (cosmic, comprehensive) in terms of the known (comprehensive social power). For Homer the world is ruled by a king, for Anaximander by the *apeiron* (unlimited) according to a social code of reciprocity (3A). Forms of social integration enter into the construction of space, time and the cosmos. Chronotope may extend to cosmology. Indeed ancient cosmology may be – because ultimately inaccessible to the senses – especially revealing of socially produced preconceptions of space and time.

To the extent that my chronotopes are ideas created in and by social practice (including ritual), they resemble the collective representations whose formation is located by Durkheim in ritual. Critics of the Durkheimian tradition have maintained that it is incapable of explaining social change, and indeed sometimes reject any suggestion of a static fit between ideas and practice, or between culture and social structure.[10] However, ritual is just one of my integrative social practices. And a social practice that is integrative in one respect can also create social tension and conflict: an obvious case is money, which on the one hand promotes, informs and simplifies a universal practice of peaceful exchange, but on the other hand may create tension – for instance as a result of unlimited individual accumulation. Moreover, socially integrative practices may conflict with each other, for instance when someone feels pulled in different directions by monetary advantage on the one hand and by ritualised solidarity on the other. My argument is based on the idea that the historical development of a monetised economy was a precondition for the *tension* between chronotopes that we find in Aeschylus. My emphasis on the tension or conflict between chronotopes[11] contrasts, once again, with Bakhtin.[12]

[8] Seaford (2004a) 11–12.

[9] E.g. by Berger (1969) 42–7, to whom I owe the term 'cosmisation'.

[10] E.g. Geertz (1973) 142–3.

[11] In Bakhtin's 'Concluding remarks' (written thirty-five years after the main text of his work on the novel) he states that within a single author or work 'we may notice a number of chronotopes and complex interactions among them', an interaction that he describes as 'dialogical' (in the special sense that he elaborates elsewhere): as such it 'cannot enter into the world represented in the work' ((Holquist 1981) 86, 252), whereas the interaction of my chronotopes within a single text or performance may be influenced by social practice.

[12] In each type of ancient novel Bakhtin identifies a *single* chronotope. In the later novel he identifies multiple chronotopes, such as the the rogue, clown and fool ((Holquist 1981) 159), the road (243), the castle (245–6), idylls (224–36), and the salon (246). These may seem more like stock themes:

Finally, Bakhtin calls *time* 'the dominant principle in the chronotope', and maintains that 'literature's primary mode of representation is temporal'.[13] This is generally true of Bakhtin's main concern, the novel.[14] But in drama the primary mode of representation is *spatial*. In its spatiality, especially as a *performance* in which a community is present as spectators (or even as choral participants), drama resembles ritual, and may embody the same chronotope. Greek drama was performed in a sanctuary. The primary dimension of individual biography is time, whereas of social interaction the primary dimension is space.[15]

B CHRONOTOPES AND HISTORY

The forms of social integration with which I will be mainly concerned are the social code of reciprocity, money, and communal ritual with its aetiological myths (*aitia*). In each is created its own chronotope, with cosmological reach.

Reciprocity I define as the (ostensibly voluntary) requital of benefit for benefit or of harm for harm. In the *reciprocal* chronotope time and space are imagined in terms of relations between two irreducibly distinct units. This will become clearer in Chapter 1.

In the *monetised* chronotope, by contrast, time and space are imagined as characterised by unlimitedness and by the reduction of distinctness (including opposites) to unity – a dissolution of internal limits that makes for (abstract) homogeneity. The unlimitedness of time may be imagined as cyclical, projected onto the temporal cyclicality of nature. The universal abstract power of money can early in its history be grasped only as occupying a place in time and space. I will describe this process of projection in Chapter 3.

The chronotope emerging from communal ritual is more complex. Reciprocity and money perform their integrative function by means of a series of (rule-bound) interactions between distinct parties (generally

similarly, Farenga (1998) 189 identifies 'the battlefield, the war council, the sea journey, the hunt, the funeral, the chieftain's hall' as 'typical chronotopes in heroic narratives'.

[13] Bakhtin in Holquist (1981) 86, 146.

[14] Bakhtin does mention, but without investigating, the chronotopes of epic and drama, which he associates with 'folk-mythological time': Holquist (1981) 104.

[15] Rehm (2002) 2 quotes the Japanese philosopher Watsuji (1889–1960): 'Temporality cannot be a true temporality unless it is in conjunction with spatiality. The reason that Heidegger stopped there [i.e. with temporality as the subject's structure of being] is that his Dasein is limited to . . . existence as the Being of the individual person. This is only an abstracted aspect when we consider persons under the double structure of being both individual and social.' For Rehm live performance involves a move 'away from private time into public space'.

individuals), interactions that have no essential connection to any particular time or place. But communal ritual defines a particular space and a particular time so as to transform a series of individuals into a cohesive group. Such definition is often implied and justified by the aetiological myth (*aition*) that may be evoked or enacted in – as well as accounting for – the performance of the ritual. The transformation effected by the ritual is linear, from the undefined (unlimited) to the defined, and so too is the aetiological narrative – concluding in the establishment of the ritual to be performed in this particular space at this particular time. It should be added that the resulting chronotope is, besides being linear, also in a sense cyclical and unifying, for in re-enacting or re-evoking the myth it annually imagines the presence of a remote time and a remote place, and this seems to merge what is remote with what is present. This is what I call the *aetiological* chronotope, which will be described further in 2E.

The aetiological chronotope embodies the transition from one kind of space and time to another, seen from the perspective of the conclusion. And so it contains another chronotope, or sub-chronotope, which expresses the space and time from which the transition is made, and which is accordingly the opposite or reversal of the definition or limitation embodied in the aetiological chronotope: this I call the *antideterminate* chronotope. Moreover, aetiological myth may also dissolve boundaries between fundamental opposites – for instance between human and animal in aetiological stories of human victims being sacrificed until the cult was founded. Another instance is the myth of the daughters of the Argive Proitos, who reject marriage, are forced in a frenzy from their father's house, moo like cows, wander for thirteen whole months around the woods of Arcadia, and finally – restored to their senses – found a shrine and cult for Artemis at distant Lousoi.[16] The linear movement ends with the foundation of the cult at Lousoi, after a preliminary phase in which spatial boundaries as well as boundaries between fundamental opposed categories (human–animal) are dissolved. This preliminary and contrasting phase exemplifies the antideterminate chronotope, which is frequent in *aitia* and in rites of passage. In its dissolution of boundaries, including those between opposites, it resembles – and may overlap with – the monetised chronotope. Such overlap forms, in Aeschylus, the basis of a partial synthesis of the monetised and aetiological chronotopes.

My contextualisation of chronotopes in practices permits an explanation of that *sharedness* of the form of space and time, the 'intrinsic connectedness'

[16] See esp. Bacchylides 11; Seaford (1988). Cf. Calame (2009) 7, 21.

of their structures, that defines the chronotope. Let us see how this works for our three main chronotopes.

The (spatial and temporal) distinctness of units characteristic of the reciprocal chronotope corresponds to the distinctness or autonomy of the two parties in the practice of reciprocity. This distinctness or autonomy underlies the ostensible voluntariness of reciprocity, and includes both a spatial and a temporal aspect – spatial because the moral pressure to requite is the same wherever the two parties are located, temporal because requital is not attached to any particular time period.

The monetised chronotope is different in form, but nevertheless – as a chronotope – also emerges from a practice in which space and time are similarly structured. The instantaneous cohesion of the parties to monetised exchange has an impersonal dynamic that aspires to unlimited (universal) homogenisation – unlimited not only in scope (this coin has the power to purchase all things) but also in both space (this coin has the same power elsewhere) and in time (this coin has the same power in the future).

As for the aetiological chronotope, in many communal rituals there is evoked transition from the remote undifferentiated to the specific here and now, i.e. in both space (the undefined area from or through which the god arrives) and in time (the crisis before the ritual was founded).

Such are my chronotopes. The integrative social practices with which I associate them are all to be found in the society to which Aeschylus belonged. Money was of more recent origin than the others and is absent from Homer. Also largely absent from Homer, though surely not from the society in which it was produced, is communal ritual. My main focus is on how the interplay between the aetiological chronotope and the (relatively recent) monetised chronotope in Aeschylean tragedy promotes the imagined unity of the polis.[17] But this will involve exploration of the social practices influencing the chronotopes (and cosmology) implicit in other texts and performances of the archaic and classical periods: Homer, the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (referred to here as the *Demeter Hymn*), mystery-cult, polis rituals and presocratic cosmology. Despite the influence of individual poetic creativity, the same socially transcendent chronotope, for instance the monetised chronotope, is detectable as implicit in both text and social practice.

Finally, there are two respects in which I must qualify my focus on a limited number of chronotopes. Firstly, it is – I emphasise – simplistic and reductive, but a necessary first step in the investigation of complexity. I

[17] It is of course possible that – while making for the solidarity of the polis as a whole – different chronotopes tended to promote the interests of different sections of the polis, but with this issue I will not be concerned except briefly in 16D.

do not mean to deny that texts and social processes can be analysed as yielding many different chronotopes, which may or may not overlap. The social construction of the chronotopes is no longer directly observable, and was shaped no doubt through the complex interaction of factors far more numerous than those I have selected.

Secondly, although a chronotope is a form shared by space and time, I will also have occasion to investigate forms of space and forms of time separately, whether or not the aim is to establish that they (by *sharing* a form) constitute a chronotope. In particular, I may discuss space, which is my main concern, with at most only a brief reference to the sharing of its form by time.

c PREVIOUS TREATMENTS

Although my debt to previous *scholarship* is enormous and obvious, it has not been my aim to produce a synthesis of previous *interpretations*. I have started not from those interpretations, despite the great value of many of them, but from the texts themselves in the light of my understanding of their religious, social and economic context. Similarly, although there have been several studies of space and of time in early Greek texts,[18] my concern is distinctively with the *social* determination of *chronotopes*.

I have nevertheless of course been influenced by earlier interpretation, for instance by the enquiry into the the *spatial* significance of Athenian drama pioneered by Oliver Taplin.[19] There is a mode of this enquiry, however, that I reject. Intra-theatrical space (i.e. space viewed or imagined by a theatre audience) tends to be divided into such categories as 'theatrical', 'scenic', 'dramatic', 'mimetic' and 'diegetic'. Such distinctions are satisfyingly systematic, and have their uses. But they sometimes encourage jargonisation of the obvious, or may even obscure the nature of theatrical viewing: the viewing of mimetic space may enter into the imagining of diegetic (narrated) space, for instance, and vice versa.[20]

More damagingly, such terms tend to reify intra-theatrical space, to imply that there are kinds of space that belong exclusively to the theatre.[21]

[18] For time see the survey by Csapo and Miller (1998) and the collection by de Jong and Nünlist (2007). For space in Homer see 1A n. 1, and in philosophy from Plato onwards Algra (1994). Most recently see Calame (2009), who – like me – insists on the practical function of the spatio-temporal manifestations of Greek texts (Bacchylides, Hesiod, the foundation myth of Cyrene, the gold leaves), albeit with a quite different analytical framework.

[19] Taplin (1977). [20] Wiles (1997) 17–18.

[21] And so to defend the autonomy of theatre studies. Nor do I project 'text' onto space, despite recognising that interpretation of space resembles perception of texts in certain ways. A welcome critique of metaphors of text and reading is by Rehm (2002) 8–12.

Extra-theatrical perceptions and conceptions of space cannot but enter into the viewing or imagining of all the categories of intra-theatrical space. We will see that even conceptions of *cosmic* space may be an important component of theatrical imagining. Intra-theatrical space is perceived through pre-existing schemata. It is not *sui generis*. And indeed it was for the ancient audience if anything probably even less separated from extra-theatrical space than it is for a modern one.[22]

I approach intra-theatrical space and time through the perceptions and conceptions of extra-theatrical space and time that entered into the synthesis created by Aeschylus, through the space and time embodied in *socially constructed chronotopes*. And just as I eschew terms for intra-theatrical space, so too I eschew the intra-textual terms[23] used in the discussion of *time* in the formalist analyses produced by narratology.

This is not the first treatment of pre-existing ideas of space, time and cosmology in the interpretation of Athenian tragedy. In particular, the visual details of tragic performances have been interpreted by David Wiles (1997) in the light of Greek cosmological ideas (for instance the privileging of east), and by Rush Rehm (2002) with experience of performance, scientific understanding of our perception of space, and an Appendix on Greek theories of space. The central purpose of my study, by contrast, is to broaden our understanding of performance through a *historical* account of the social construction of space, time and cosmology, as part of my attempt to show how Aeschylean tragedy is best understood as embodying a cosmology that can be related to the development of the polis. I use 'cosmology' in the broad sense of a set of views about the space, time and the fundamental nature of the universe. This should not, in my view, be separated from the performances. My aim is to integrate poetry, performance, cosmology and history. Such integration greatly enhances, I believe, our appreciation of the unique aesthetic power of Aeschylean drama.

D SUMMARY

In Part 1 I focus on three fundamental instruments of social integration: reciprocity, polis ritual (with its *aition*) and money. Historically, the reciprocal chronotope (Chapter 1) survives, but is nevertheless to some extent marginalised by – or transformed into – the aetiological chronotope (Chapter 2) and the monetised chronotope (Chapter 3). The Homeric code of

[22] See Chapter 6; Wiles (1997) 18.
[23] Such as 'prolepsis', as e.g. in narratological analysis of tragedy in de Jong and Nünlist (2007).

reciprocity is on elaborate display in the arrival of an outsider at a household (Chapter 1). An outsider arrives at a household also in the *Demeter Hymn*, but here reciprocity is marginalised or adapted to express the communality of the polis (Chapter 2). Meanwhile, inter-personal reciprocity is transformed by monetisation (Chapter 3). Each of these modes of social integration is unconsciously associated with transcendent power and so creates a specific cosmology.

The influence of the development and monetisation of the polis on the Dionysiac festival, and on the emergence therein of tragedy, is the theme of Part II. Chapter 4 describes the political significance of the arrival of the outsider (Dionysos) at the royal household in a festival, Chapter 5 the way in which this arrival is transformed into drama, and Chapter 6 the influence of monetisation on the form and content of the emergent drama.

From the historical processes described in Part I emerged a specific kind of *cosmology*, from those described in Part II a specific kind of *performance*. Their *combination* in the extant tragedies of Aeschylus is described in Part III. In passing from the genesis of tragedy to extant tragedy I am interested not in 'survivals' but in the *persistence and development* of the *basic pattern of action* described in Chapters 2, 4 and 5: a political confrontation between polis and household is expressed in the control of space (immediate, geographic and cosmic) by ritual. This basic pattern of action corresponds roughly to the aetiological chronotope, and indeed it is the kind of action which gives rise to – and is reinforced by – the aetiological chronotope. But its development was influenced by the historical process of monetisation described in Chapters 3 and 6. And so I begin Part III with an account of the similarities and differences between ritual and money as instruments of social integration, based on the opposition between *limit* and the *unlimited* (Chapter 7). Ritual exercises social control by limiting the potentially unlimited. Money exercises social control by limiting individual inter-personal exchanges, but promotes an unlimited cycle of exchanges in which it can tolerate no limit to its own accumulation, power, and extension in time and space. Our detailed discussion of the plays in Part III shows the aetiological chronotope interacting with the monetised chronotope: in particular, the aetiological crisis tends to be characterised by the unlimitedness and cyclicality (deferral of completion) of the monetised chronotope.

Part IV moves to a more general level. The aetiological chronotope is limited, linear, and associated with the polis, whereas the monetised chronotope is unlimited, cyclical, and associated with the individual and

the autonomous household. The former typically ends with the differentiation of opposites, whereas the latter is characterised by persistent homogeneity and the unity of opposites. Chapter 13 introduces a verbal form of ritual origin ('form-parallelism') that functions in Aeschylus as a compelling vehicle of the synthesis of the monetised unity of opposites with the differentiation of opposites in the the rite of passage. Chapter 14 describes the cosmic reach of the monetised chronotope in Aeschylus, and Chapter 15 its absorption into the final differentiation characteristic of the aetiological chronotope.

The monetised and aetiological chronotopes are not of course confined to Aeschylus. Part v concerns the similarity of the Aeschylean extended chronotopes (cosmology) to those found in Herakleitos and in early Pythagoreanism. The point is not to demonstrate influence, but to explore the relation – in tragic and 'philosophical' texts alike – of cosmology to the same transcendent modes of social integration. A final chapter tests our basic pattern of action by seeing how it differs according to the dramatic setting, and by locating it historically in the development of Attic literature through comparing its earlier form in the *Demeter Hymn* with its later form in Sophoklean tragedy.

I have almost entirely excluded the *Prometheus Bound* from consideration, because I concur with much current scholarly opinion[24] in believing that it is not by Aeschylus. And indeed, although my method of analysis finds much common ground between the six other plays attributed to Aeschylus, it does not work for the *Prometheus Bound*.

[24] E.g. West (1990) 51–72.

PART I

The social construction of space, time and cosmology

CHAPTER 1

Homer
The reciprocal chronotope

1A HOMERIC SPACE

Spatial ideas are socially constructed in an unconscious process of ordering. For us events and things may seem only contingently related to space. But to understand the early Greeks' spatial ideas, we must think beyond the abstract framework or homogeneous vacuum that has emerged from our own social ordering of space. The Greeks do not need an abstract conception of space to contain or embody social order. Rather, their spatial conceptions (concrete or abstract) are always already socially constructed.

In contrast to earlier treatments of space in literature,[1] I divide space into three simple categories: (a) cosmic space, which embraces the entire cosmos, (b) geographic space, i.e. the space of land and sea that extends to the ends of the earth, and (c) immediate space, i.e. space visible from a single point. (a) contains (b), and (b) contains (c). This tripartite scheme is not based on the Greeks' own conceptualisation of space, but is rather a disposable tool for analysing their verbal representations of space.

(1) *Cosmic* space. The threefold division of sky, sea and underworld is the division by the three sons of Kronos (Zeus, Poseidon and Hades) of their inheritance, with earth and Olympos common to all three (*Il.* 15.187–93). The rigid division of the cosmos is imagined in terms of the most important rule preventing conflict within a household (between brothers over *inheritance*). In the Hesiodic cosmogony, by contrast, the principle is partly *biological* (Earth gives birth to Sky, with whom she produces further

[1] Treatments of space in Homer are Hellwig (1964) and the first two chapters of Purves (2010). Hellwig's concern is with the question whether there is a unitary poetic intention in the various spatial and temporal aspects of the action. Purves claims for the *Iliad* 'the notion of a eusunoptic or cartographic view of space', while the *Odyssey* moves towards 'the sequential model of following a path or route through space', which anticipates the 'countercartographic way of seeing' in Herodotus (65–6). But I maintain that the abstract systematicity needed for the map is absent from Homer: 1A(4) and 3B.

offspring including Okeanos) and partly *conflict*: the victory of Zeus and his allies over the Titans and monstrous Typhoeus establishes the cosmic division between upper and lower – for the defeated are now confined in Tartarus.[2]

The articulation of cosmic space is in Homer mentioned only occasionally and incidentally, and is vague and inconsistent. Besides the division by inheritance into four spheres, a different fourfold division is implied by Tartaros being 'as far beneath Hades as sky is from earth'.[3] Different again is the cosmology implied by Achilles' shield, on which is depicted earth, sky, sea, heavenly bodies, various activities on the earth, and – around the rim – Okeanos (*Il.* 18.478–608). As for Hades, Odysseus arrives at a specific spot on the shores of Okeanos,[4] where the blood of his sacrifice attracts the dead (*Od.* 11.36–7). There are brief mentions of a house (69, 150, 571, 627), a meadow (539, 573) and a plain (577), but nothing like the systematic space of the next world in, say, Plato's *Republic*. There is in Homer no consistent or elaborate cosmic architecture, just as there is almost no cosmogony.

Further, the divisions of the Homeric cosmos play no large part in the narrative. The passage of deities between heaven and earth is – at most – briefly described,[5] as is the passage of mortals to or from the underworld.[6] True, there are suggestions that the separate spheres might be confused. Zeus should – complains Poseidon – 'remain in his one-third *moira* (share)'. The Lord of the Dead fears that Poseidon will break open the earth and expose the houses of the dead. Giants intend to climb to the sky by piling Ossa on Olympos and Pelion on Ossa. The Sun threatens to go down to Hades and shine there. Zeus boasts that he could drag all the deities up to Olympos along with earth and sea.[7] But these threats to confuse the cosmic boundaries are not realised. The Homeric cosmos neither changes nor emerges from the background.

(2) As for *geographic* space, borders in Homer are rare.[8] *Eschatia* is sometimes translated as border, but actually means a (furthest) *area*.[9] We

[2] Hes. *Theog.* 729, 868; cf. *Il.* 14.203–4 (IB).

[3] *Il.* 8.16 (this is about as systematic as the cosmos ever gets in Homer); cf. Hes. *Theog.* 720. The role of Zeus's victory over the Titans in confirming the boundary of the underworld (as in Hesiod) is occasionally hinted at: *Il.* 14.204, 279, 15.224–5; cf. 8.478–81.

[4] *Od.* 10.508–16, 11.19, 158; cf. 10.86, 20.65–6, 24.11.

[5] E.g. *Il.* 1.194–5, 592; *Od.* 1.102–3.

[6] *Il.* 23.71 (Patroklos); *Od.* 11.625 (Herakles), 24.10–13 (suitors).

[7] *Il.* 15.195, 20.61–5; *Od.* 11.315–16, 12.383; *Il.* 8.19–27.

[8] They are implied in the catalogues of places at *Il.* 2.16–17 and 845; also *Il.* 24.543–5. Ὅρος, the later word for boundary, occurs in Homer only twice (in the form οὖρος), both times of *stones* marking boundaries between fields (*Il.* 21.405, and the simile at *Il.* 12.421).

[9] Similarly the word θίς (of the shore) basically means a heap (of sand), not something that divides.

do not find in Homer anything like the description in Aeschylus by Pelasgos of the borders of the vast area of land that he rules (*Su.* 254–9), or the passage in which Herodotus lists the tribes of Scythia and then describes it as square in shape.[10]

For the articulation of geographic space we must look rather to lists of places. There are occasional brief lists, some of which describe journeys. Some are in geographic order, and some of these may be called itineraries.[11] The existence of (lost) itineraries is perhaps indicated by the formula 'the way and the stages of the journey'.[12] As for actual journeys, by far the most prominent is that of Odysseus to numerous fabulous places, between which however the spatial relationships are almost entirely unsystematic.[13] The speed with which Hera travels from Ida to Olympos is compared to the speed with which a traveller on a long journey imagines himself to be in a desired place (*Il.* 15.79–83). Similarly, the epic bard may speedily imagine the destination of a human journey, and frequently fails to mention any place – even over long distances – between departure and arrival.[14]

The other kind of topographical list comprises those that are not itineraries. There are two instances that seem to be systematically comprehensive.

One is the list of the places – cities, ploughland, vineyard, etc. – represented as surrounded (like the whole earth) by Okeanos on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.478–608). This is moreover unique as an image of the whole earth, *and* in the range of activities described that do not re-appear elsewhere in the epic and that include the *public procedures* of wedding procession, judicial process, and Linos song at the vintage. Conceptions of space are constructed through social processes. But there is no indication of any spatial relation between the (imaginary) places.

The other comprehensive list is the catalogue of Greek contingents ('catalogue of ships')[15] at Troy (*Il.* 2.494–877). This exhibits considerable

[10] Hdt. 4.100–2; Hartog (2001) 92.

[11] Others are not in geographic order, and sometimes it is hard to tell: e.g. *Il.* 9.150–52, 12.20–22; *Od.* 9.21–6.

[12] *Od.* 4.389, 10.539; cf. Hes. *Op.* 648 with West (1978) ad loc.

[13] The indications of their location, and of their spatial interrelation, are rare and vague: *Od.* 5.277–80, 9.82–3, 10.81, 507, 12.4, 447. Cf. Sack (1986) 64: 'in primitive societies, distances are experienced as sequences of encounters with events as one moves from place to place rather than as lengths of separation between points'.

[14] Notably at *Il.* 1.423–4, 431, 484, 494, 3.5–6, 6.171–2, 11.682–3, 16.676–83; *Od.* 5.50–57. Intermediate places are mentioned at (notably) *Il.* 13.20–38, 14.225–30; *Od.* 15.295–9. In Homer the idiom 'there is a (place) . . . ' is often used to shift the focus from one place to another (i.e. to express spatial discontinuity): e.g. *Il.* 2.811, 11.711, 722, 13.32; *Od.* 3.293, 4.354, 844, 9.116, 13.96, 22.126.

[15] The Trojan catalogue is shorter, vaguer, displays little knowledge of places beyond the coast, and seems modelled on the Greek catalogue. After describing the contingents from around the Troad,

geographic sequentiality in covering much of the Greek mainland, and so hints at an ordered conception of geographic space. But some of its features run counter to such a conception. One is that the list consists in fact of three geographically distinct lists. It begins by moving through Boeotia and its neighbours, Athens and Salamis, the Argolid, Corinth, Sikyon, and then Sparta, Pylos, and northwards to Elis and the realm of Odysseus and across to the Aetolians. We then move suddenly to Crete and northwards to some islands in the south-east Aegean. Another abrupt break then takes us northwards around (the later) Thessaly and across the Pindos and back.

Another feature that is inconsistent with a unified conception of space is that – although the contingents within each sub-list are in geographic order – the towns and other localities (over 200 overall) within each contingent are *not* listed in geographic order; and moreover there is only one statement of any spatial relation between them, and only one instance of them defining the boundaries of an area.[16]

It was demonstrated by Giovannini (1969) that the catalogue of ships does not reproduce a list of the Mycenean Age but reflects the political geography of the seventh century.[17] He also showed that the order of the contingents in the three sub-lists corresponds to the routes of three itineraries preserved in a Delphic inscription of *c.* 200. These itineraries are of a kind haphazardly preserved on inscriptions from as early as the fifth century: a centre organising a festival with panhellenic ambition might compile a useful list of *theōrodokoi* – those in the various political communities who would receive the *theōroi* sent out from the centre to announce the date of the next festival and the accompanying religious truce. Giovannini argues in detail that seventh-century Delphic lists of this kind lie behind the catalogue of ships. Now festivals are barely mentioned in Homeric epic, and the panhellenic aspirations of a festival are alien to it. But it is entirely conceivable that catalogues produced in such a context could be deployed by the epic poet for the unusual purpose of listing the Greeks who came to Troy. Indeed it is from our perspective predictable

it 'appears to follow four radii (Thracians, Kikones, Paeonians; Paphlagones, Halizones; Mysians, Phrygians; Maeonians, Karians, Lycians), the last place along each radius being described as "far off"' (Kirk 1985) 250.

[16] *Il.* 2.625–6, islands across the water from Elis (I exclude location near a natural feature such as a river), 615–17.

[17] A year later (in ignorance of Giovannini) Hope Simpson and Lazenby (1970) published what is still the most detailed case for the catalogue as essentially from the Mycenean Age. They fail to realise the significant difference between the presence in Homer of Bronze Age *objects*, which may themselves have been lovingly preserved over centuries, and of the *social organisation* that is so different from that recorded in the Linear B texts. The oral preservation over centuries of a long and detailed topographical list is (like details of social organisation) unlikely.

that the least unsystematic geographic space in Homeric epic should derive from something so alien to it as the panhellenic aspirations of a festival.[18]

If the epic poet did deploy the Delphic lists, he had little interest in preserving any geographic order of places within each contingent, but was concerned rather with putting at the head of the list (or at least in the first verse) the place associated with the leading hero of the contingent,[19] as well as with other matters no doubt such as appropriate epithets. The result was further from the verbal equivalent of a map than the Delphic lists would have been.

(3) Thirdly, there is Homeric *immediate* space.[20]

In Euripides' *Bacchae* the second messenger speech begins thus: 'When we had left this Theban land and gone beyond the streams of Asopos, we were striking into the uplands of Kithairon, Pentheus and I . . . Well, first we take up positions in a grassy valley . . . there was a glen, surrounded by heights, with water running through, overshadowed by pines, where the maenads . . . ' (1043–52). It is here that Pentheus is put by Dionysos on top of a tree and then killed by the maenads. This combines the integration of immediate into geographic space with the integration of action (journey, killing) into this defined area.

Such a combination is rare in Homer.[21] True, there are in the vast Homeric narratives a few detailed descriptions of places, which tend however to be elaborated for their own sake (as *loci amoeni*) rather than as contexts for the action.[22] Action is, rather, normally located – if at all – by means of a single briefly mentioned marker, such as the sea, a spring, a fountain.[23] Man-made locators include tombs, towns, houses, gates and thresholds, but only rarely temples.[24]

Indeed, barely mentioned in Homer are temples, dedications in temples, and communal precincts in general, despite their conspicuousness during at least the later phases of the formation of Homeric epic.[25] They belong to a whole category of items that were available for inclusion but excluded

[18] On a much smaller scale, although temples are almost entirely excluded from Homer, the three places in the prayer at *Il.* 1.37–8 are no doubt locations of Apollo's temples.

[19] Giovannini (1969) 60.

[20] Within immediate space there is yet another category of space, immediate space as experienced in relations with others, studied by 'proxemics' (applied to the *Odyssey* by Lateiner (1992)).

[21] It occurs in the urban space of Phaeacia: *Od.* 6.255–309. Note also the immediate space at *Il.* 22.143–61.

[22] See esp. *Od.* 5.63–73, 7.83–132, 13.96–112; *Il.* 6.242–50.

[23] Though note *Il.* 6.4 (space between two rivers), 8.561 (between river and ships).

[24] Temples briefly mentioned at *Il.* 5.446–7, 6.297; *Od.* 6.10 (and 266).

[25] The main exception is the temple of Athena (Troy's enemy) at Troy, which has been seen by some as a late (Athenian) addition: Seaford (2004a) 53–4.

because alien to the ideology of Homeric epic.[26] Another such exclusion is of the *procession*.[27] Just as the temple contains the wealth of the *community*, so the procession also embodies the purposive, organised identity of the group (sometimes the whole community), with the result that it may express the appropriation of the space by the group.[28] Temples too were important for the organisation of space, partly because they were frequently the destination of processions. Just as public sacrifices are described in Homer with no mention of a temple, so rituals that would normally involve a procession (notably funerals and public sacrifices) are occasionally described, but with barely any description of the procession.[29] The only description of a procession[30] is of the wedding procession represented in the comprehensive picture of human activity on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.492–6), though even here its destination is not mentioned.

(4) What do cosmic, geographic and immediate space in Homer have in common? On Achilles' shield, which – as armour, divine artefact and gift – is a supremely heroic object, all three kinds of space combine in a single representation. This may seem to resemble a map,[31] but combines vastly different scales and is described by a list of places with no indication of spatial interrelations (except that Okeanos is represented on the outer rim).

In Homeric narrative all three kinds of space are *unsystematic*. To this generalisation I have in the footnotes listed various exceptions. But on the whole there is very little part in the narrative for cosmic or territorial boundaries, defined areas, and spatial system in general. Cosmic space is vaguely and inconsistently indicated. It is on one occasion stated to have internal boundaries, but they play no part in the action. Geographic space is largely without internal boundaries and defined areas, and tends to be imagined in terms of lists of places. Immediate space only rarely contains defined areas. It tends rather to have a single focus (e.g. a tomb), and is never defined or appropriated by processions and temples.

None of this is meant to deny that the world of Homer contains defined spaces. A city or a house, for instance, is defined by its outer wall. What

[26] Seaford (2004a) 54.
[27] For the number and importance of processions in classical Athens see Parker (2005) 178.
[28] Accordingly processions are important in various cultures, from the earliest times: e.g. Oppenheim (1977) 115, 139, 187, 193.
[29] E.g. *Il.* 6.293–6, 24.707–9, 786; *Od.* 3.421–46. By a procession I mean a collective movement from one place to another, and so exclude the movement three times around the corpse of Patroklos described at *Il.* 23.13.
[30] Apart from the brief indication of a sacrificial procession through the town at *Od.* 20.276.
[31] Purves (2010) 2, 48, 104–6.

I mean by a 'defined area' is a space defined conceptually (rather than architecturally) as an area (whether or not based on natural divisions) – like the underworld and its parts in Plato, or Pelasgos' kingdom, or the glen with the maenads in it in *Bacchae*, or the territory of Attica. Such conceptual definition, even of a real place, involves a degree of *abstraction*. Such abstraction is not entirely absent from Homeric epic. But on the whole it envisages space in concrete terms.[32] Even measurement of distance is by action, such as the throwing of a stone or a day's sailing,[33] and even direction is expressed by dawn and dusk or by the winds.[34] Homeric space is unsystematic and concrete.

(5) What has determined this conception of space? The basic unit of Homeric society is the household, which is projected onto the cosmos. Relations between households take the form of reciprocity, though a single household may achieve a position of power that seems monarchical. The wealth of Homeric society is pre-monetary, and is in the narrative obtained largely by positive reciprocity or by plunder. Positive reciprocity may take the symmetrical form of gift-giving or the asymmetrical form exemplified by the personal relationship between Odysseus and Eumaios.[35] Symmetrical positive relationships are exemplified by the hospitality received by Telemachos on his journey outside Ithaka – from Nestor at Pylos, Diokles at Pherai and Menelaos at Sparta. In the narrative of this journey there is no interest in any intervening place.

As for plunder, in Ithaka the relationship between Odysseus and Eumaios has been temporarily replaced by the suitors' plunder-like extraction[36] of Odysseus' animals from Eumaios. But according to Thucydides (1.5) plunder was once honourable. Nestor narrates a 'quarrel between us and the Eleians over cattle-driving', when 'from the plain (*pedion*) we drove off' cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and horses to the town of Pylos. His detailed description contains no mention of boundaries.[37] The economic activity of Homeric heroes, because it operates through reciprocity and plunder, has no interest in inter-community boundaries, which – as we have seen – are barely mentioned in Homer. They do not appropriate *agricultural* (as opposed to animal) wealth,[38] nor do they engage in its

[32] Noted by Lloyd (1966) 185–7. [33] *Il.* 3.12; *Od.* 4.356, 6.294, etc.
[34] E.g. *Od.* 9.26, 12.81, 13.110–11; Hartog (2001) 27. [35] *Od.* 14.62–4, 15.363–70.
[36] *Od.* 14.17–19, 105–9; Seaford (2004a) 43–4. [37] *Il.* 11.670–83; cf. also 1.154, 20.91; *Od.* 21.18–19.
[38] *Od.* 14.264 may – it being in *Egypt* – seem to allude briefly to plundering planted fields, even though there is no mention of agriculture and *agroi* means 'countryside' (e.g. *Od.* 17.18), whereas ploughed land is *aroura*. Cf. *Od.* 9.39–61. *Il.* 1.154–6 refers both to the driving away of animals and the *destruction* (not plunder) of agricultural produce.

production.[39] True, the *temenos* – an agricultural piece of land set aside for a hero or king – is briefly mentioned nine times, but it never plays any part in the narrative (four times it is mentioned merely as a reward for valour).[40] The objects that embody wealth and prestige, acquired by violence or by inter-personal networking, are stored in houses, not in barns or temples.[41] Consider for example Odysseus' great bow, stored along with bronze, gold and iron in the inner chamber (*thalamos*) of his house: it was a gift from Iphitos, whom he had encountered in the house of Ortolichos when he, Odysseus, was searching for plundered sheep and Iphitos was searching for lost mares (*Od.* 21.11–41). I suggest that the Homeric conception of space cannot be understood in isolation from the heroic ideology and heroic economy implicit in Homer.

Another factor may be the conditions of performance of Homeric epic in its formative phase. In Homer heroic song is performed by an individual, generally at a feast, and by Achilles almost alone in his tent (*Il.* 9.189–90). These conditions of performance lack the ritualised definition of space that inheres in choral performances such as wedding songs, harvest songs, victory songs, or dithyrambs. Such definition by action may easily define this space here as the elsewhere, whereas the bard is like the traveller in the Homeric simile who merely *imagines* himself to be in a desired place (*Il.* 15.79–83).

1b homeric time

The time that falls within the experience of Homeric individuals, corresponding roughly to immediate space, I cannot deal with here.[42] I will confine myself to indicating that conceptions of the remote past are shaped by the same socially derived preconceptions that shape conceptions of remote space. In the 'remote past' I include both cosmic time, corresponding to cosmic space, and intermediate time, which falls between the beginnings of the world and the experience of individuals.[43] Intermediate time

[39] Although on the shield of Achilles (once more) a king stands silently amid the harvest (*Il.* 18.556–7), and Laertes (*Od.* 24.207, 226–33) has been brought to digging by isolation.

[40] *Il.* 6.194, 9.578, 12.313, 20.184. The other mentions are 18.550 (on shield), *Il.* 20.391 (Iphition's), *Od.* 6.293 (Alkinoos'), 11.185 and 17.299 (Odysseus').

[41] The main exception, the bringing of a textile to the Trojan temple of Athena, accompanies a prayer that is *rejected* by the goddess (*Il.* 6.311). On the lack (or ineffectiveness) of dedications in Homer see Seaford (2004a) 54–6.

[42] See Fränkel (1955) 1–7. Accame (1961) charts developments in the idea of time (its detachment, systematisation, etc.) from Homer to Aeschylus and Pindar.

[43] There are of course many other ways of categorising time, e.g. as viewed respectively by men and gods: Vidal-Naquet (1960).

is the time of earlier generations, and corresponds roughly to geographic space.

Cosmic time, like cosmic space, is of little interest to Homer. Okeanos, which seems to encircle the earth, is also 'the *genesis* of all' (*Il.*14.246). The threefold division of the cosmos (1B), and Zeus sending Kronos beneath the earth and sea (14.203–4), are both briefly mentioned, but without any reference (such as 'long ago') to the remoteness of the time in which they occurred.

The temporal distance of some sub-narratives from the main narrative is often unspecified. Examples are the adultery of Ares and Aphrodite, the paradigmatic stories of Meleager and of Niobe, and some of the narratives attaching to the people seen by Odysseus in the underworld (a special case).[44] Events that occurred in an earlier generation are almost always narrated by someone within the poem rather than directly by the poet. Because they were not actually experienced by the narrator (the longevity of Nestor makes him the exception), they tend to reveal channels of social memory.

What are these channels through which memory reaches back into earlier generations? The relevant passages are few in number, but especially conspicuous in them are reciprocity and monarchy, both instruments of social cohesion.

As for reciprocity, past favours create present obligation, and so remain in the memory to be recalled by mortals and immortals.[45] Even negative reciprocity can structure distant memory, as in Nestor's narrative of reciprocal raiding (*Il.* 11.670–761). In Glaukos' list of his ancestors over five generations he narrates the biography of his grandfather Bellerophon (*Il.* 6.150–211), to which Diomedes responds that Oineus (his grandfather) and Bellerophon once exchanged gifts (218–220). And so Glaukos and Diomedes, rather than fighting, exchange armour. A gift of armour may itself, through reciprocity, take us back to an earlier generation. Nestor's narrative of Lykourgos killing Areithoos derives from the armour worn by Ereuthalion, whom Nestor in his youth had killed, for Ereuthalion had received the armour as a gift from the aged Lykourgos, who had in turn taken it from the corpse of Areithoos. The famous bow given to Odysseus in the house of Ortolichos by Iphitos (1A), before he was killed by Herakles, was once wielded by Iphitos' father Eurytos (*Od.* 21.11–41). Agamemnon's sceptre, given through a sequence of gods and mortals (Hephaistos, Zeus, Hermes, Pelops, Atreus, Thyestes, Agamemnon), embodies the power of

[44] *Il.* 9.529–99, 24.602–17; *Od.* 8.266–36, 11.235–332. [45] *Il.* 1.40, 503–4, 8.362–5; 18.398.

monarchy (*Il.* 2.101–8). The genealogy of the Trojan (*Il.* 20.215–41) and Phaeacian (*Od.* 7.54–63) kings each begins with a god.[46]

The Homeric conceptions of the distant past and of distant space are somewhat vague and relatively unsystematic, without the comprehensive framework provided by abstract units of measurement such as years or stades, and often take the form rather of a concrete list (of places, of people). Because Homeric time and Homeric space are the same in these respects, we can speak of a Homer *chronotope*. And given the influence on it of reciprocity, we may call it a *reciprocal chronotope*.

1c social integration

The unit of reciprocity in Homer is the person or the household. Diomedes and Glaukos have had no previous contact, but renew by gift-exchange the reciprocal relationship of their grandfathers. The Homeric household is marked by internal solidarity, and its external relations are mediated neither by territory nor by polis[47] nor by money but by inter-personal reciprocity with other aristocratic households. Social space is therefore unsystematic (1a), and social integration is largely confined to interactions between particular individuals or households. And so, to the extent that the epics concern a whole society, such interactions have weight in the narrative.

Consider again for instance the journey of Telemachos. Although there is no interest in any other place (apart from a brief mention of his stay with Diokles), the process of his reception at Pylos is set out in much detail, as also at Sparta. Telemachos (with Mentes), arriving to find the Pylians performing a sacrifice on the beach, is taken by the hand by Nestor's son Peisistratos, is given a share of the feast, prays and pours a libation to Poseidon, and participates in another animal sacrifice performed shortly afterwards at the house of Nestor. At Sparta he arrives (with Peisistratos) at the House of Menelaos while a wedding feast is being celebrated, and is escorted in, bathed, and given a share of the feast before being questioned. In Homer outsiders arrive during the performance of ritual.[48] Nestor and Odysseus arrive at the house of Peleus to find him performing a sacrifice (*Il.* 11.768–80). Odysseus enters the house of Alkinoos to find the leaders of the Phaeacians pouring libations. But he continues through the house

[46] Other mentions or brief narratives of events located in earlier generations are at *Il.* 1.266–72, 2.594–600, 743–4, 4.372–99, 5.383–402, 14.115–24, 250–61, 317–28; *Od.* 15.225–55.
[47] The political assemblies in Homer are futile or worse: Seaford (1994a) 3–5.
[48] Seaford (1994a) 50–1.

and – as an isolated and complete stranger – clasps the knees of the queen, utters words of supplication, and sits in the ashes by the hearth, the *eschara*.[49] Wine is drunk and libations are poured, and the king announces that the guest will be entertained and animal sacrifices performed on the following day. On his departure he is given gifts, as is Telemachos by Diokles and by Menelaos.[50]

The loving description – in scenes of hospitality – of gifts and of ritual (or protocol) expresses their social significance in the code of reciprocity, as ways of creating relationship with outsiders, as the generally accepted mechanisms by which the (seemingly self-contained) households do in fact maintain – or establish for the future[51] – relationships with what lies beyond them spatially. Protocol and reciprocity are neglected by the suitors at Ithaka, and perverted by the Cyclops, whose household is accordingly both entirely self-contained and without any spatial relation to the rest of the epic.[52]

[49] Emphasised by repetition: *Od.* 7.153, 160, 169.
[50] *Od.* 7.135–91, 3.490, 4.589–619, 13.10–20. [51] Especially through the gift (e.g. *Od.* 21.35).
[52] Suitors: *Od.* 1.119–20, etc. Cyclops: *Od.* 9.80–3, 105–6, 112–15, 265–71, 370.

CHAPTER 2

Demeter Hymn
The aetiological chronotope

The specificity of the Homeric chronotope can be further brought out by contrast with a narrative that, although written in Homeric language and metre, takes us towards Aeschylus. Its theme was his birthplace (Eleusis), it may well have been recited at a public festival, and estimates of its date fall between *c.* 650 and *c.* 550 (he was born in 525). This is the *Demeter Hymn* – the only surviving pre-Aeschylean Attic[1] literature apart from the poems attributed to Solon and some short verse inscriptions.

It tells the story of Hades taking Persephone down to the underworld, her mother Demeter's search for her and entry disguised as an old woman into the house of Keleos at Eleusis, the founding of mystic initiation for humankind, and Persephone's eventual return to earth (forced on Zeus and Hades by Demeter) for two thirds of every year. Central to the narrative is the arrival of the stranger in the house of Keleos. In Homer the elaborate rituals and protocols accompanying the arrival of a stranger express their social significance (1c) as embodying the reciprocal relationship of the household with what lies beyond it. The actions by which the stranger is incorporated into the house in the *Demeter Hymn*, by contrast, prefigure *mystic* ritual. The *Demeter Hymn* narrates the *aition* of the Eleusinian mystery-cult. The reciprocal chronotope is replaced by the aetiological. The myth was experienced in the ritual: they form a single complex, which is the theme of what follows.

2a THE SPACE OF RITUAL

The divisions of Homeric cosmic space are not guarded by barriers, and are sometimes threatened, but remain intact (1a). Hesiod, unlike Homer, narrates the *genesis* of the cosmic order, in the form – characteristic of

[1] I agree with the argument of Parker (1991: 15 n. 22) against Clinton's (1986) view that 'the author was not from Attica and he was not writing for an Attic audience'.

aetiological myth – of the resolution of extreme disorder, in this case the violent challenges to Zeus mounted by the Titans and Typhoeus. The result is a cosmic order based on rigid separation. Tartarus, containing Zeus's defeated enemies, is surrounded by a bronze barrier (*Theog.* 726, 732–3), and a terrifying dog prevents anybody leaving the house of Hades (772–3). As for the upper boundary, gods and mortal men once ate together at Mekone (535–6), but were permanently separated[2] as a result of Prometheus tricking Zeus in the distribution of portions.[3]

The *Demeter Hymn* also moves from crisis to resolution, but the resolution – the cosmos as it is now – differs significantly from the Homeric cosmos and Hesiodic cosmos as they are now. The *Hymn* ends not with *separation* of the cosmos into its component sectors but with their *interconnection*. Persephone will commute between the underworld and the immortals above, Demeter restores ('sent up') the crops, and mortals are to receive happiness in the underworld below through the establishment here above of the Eleusinian mysteries. Accordingly, the preceding crisis is one of separation. Although the marriage of Hades with the Olympian Persephone unites upper and lower worlds in a sense, it results in cosmological separation: the absence of Demeter from Olympos (92–3, 355), and of Persephone in Hades, causes a serious crisis by preventing the crops from emerging from the earth (307) and potentially depriving the gods on Olympos of sacrifices (312, 332). Whereas in Hesiod the present order results from separation, in the *Demeter Hymn* it results from the overcoming of separation.

Cosmology is often imagined in terms of patriarchal family relations, whether between brothers (Homer) or between successive generations (Hesiod). Central to the *Demeter Hymn* however is the relation between mother and daughter, a relation that – unlike that between brothers or between males of successive generations – has no objective basis for antagonism (over inheritance). It is only the desire of an alien male, the bridegroom, that sunders the intimate bond between mother and daughter. It is the power of this intimate bond that in the end creates the partial interconnection of the cosmos.

In the *Demeter Hymn* Persephone eventually returns annually to join her mother and the other immortals,[4] and Demeter founds mystery-cult and orders a temple to be built. Here, in the mystic ritual, the joyful return of

[2] West (1966) on 507–616.

[3] Prometheus' gift of fire to men (after Zeus withheld it) does constitute crossing of the boundary between gods above and men below, but Zeus retaliated by giving woman (and her evils) to men.

[4] 400, 447, 465.

Persephone (called Kore at Eleusis) will be enacted, or at least celebrated,[5] and – in another concession obtained in the face of the necessity of death – blessings in Hades will be bestowed on the mystic initiands. The cosmic crisis was centred on Demeter's new temple at Eleusis (355), in which she sat separated from the gods.

Accordingly, the temple will now be for all time the site of (vertical) cosmic interconnection. Like Demeter's emotional reunion with her daughter, the mystic ritual merges immediate (ritual) space with cosmic space. The symbolic appropriation of space by ritual extends to the cosmos. In general mystic initiation might impart information about the geography of the underworld.[6] Plato refers to evidence for the roads to Hades provided here on earth by 'holy and customary things':[7] this surely refers to mystic rituals, which, as a preparation for the underworld, may well have created a sense of being in it. Hence perhaps the idea that initiates continue to perform mystic ritual in the underworld, most strikingly (but not only)[8] in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, in which the torchlight in the Eleusinian nocturnal festival is imagined as the sunlight[9] which shines on mystic initiates in the next world.[10] Pindar, in a passage full of mystic allusions, claims that after death the 'good' have sun by night as much as by day.[11] Aeschylus' lost *Bassarai* was, I have argued, based on the idea of the sun seen in Hades in mystic initiation.[12] For Cleanthes (331–232 BC) the cosmos is a *mustērion*, with the sun a torchbearer.[13]

The subjective experience of being initiated is kept from us by ancient secrecy. But of the two most explicit surviving accounts, one describes it as a journey through all the elements, entry into the underworld and seeing the sun at midnight.[14] The other, preserved by Plutarch, compares the experience of the soul on the point of death to initiation into 'the great mysteries':[15] it includes journeys through the darkness, fear and trembling, followed by a wonderful light. It would not require much suggestibility for such darkness to be imagined as the underworld.[16] In Lucian's *Cataplus*

[5] Lada-Richards (1999) 81–4; Burkert (1983) 275–6; Mylonas (1961) 261–5.
[6] As in the famous gold leaves: GIJ.
[7] *Phaedo* 108a ὅσια καὶ νόμιμα.
[8] Cf. also esp. the μύσται and βάκχοι proceeding on the sacred road in the underworld on the Hipponion gold leaf (*c.* 400: no. 1 GIJ); [Pl.], *Axiochus* 371de; Plut. *Mor.* 1105b.
[9] Mentioned along with myrtle groves (155–6), which I suggest are also derived from the mystic ritual, for the initiates carry myrtle branches (Parker (2005) 349). In *IG* II² 4058 an Eleusinian initiate states that she will never forget the 'nights shining with the beauty of the sun'.
[10] 454–6; cf. 155, 446–7, 312–14, 340, 351, with Seaford (2005) 603.
[11] *Ol.* 2.61–3; similar is *fr.*129 Snell.
[12] Seaford (2005).
[13] *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 1 538 von Arnim.
[14] In the cult of Isis: Apul. *Met.* 11.6, 21, 23.
[15] *Fr.* 178; this almost certainly means (or at least includes) the Eleusinian: Sourvinou-Inwood (2003b) 33.
[16] Burkert (1983) 280.

(22) a dead man, just after disembarkation from Charon's boat, describes the effect of the darkness, then says to another dead man 'you were initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. Are not things here similar to them?', and receives a positive answer.[17] The sun was not the only heavenly light with which the mystic light in the darkness was identified. The evidence for the experience of thunderbolt and earthquake in mystery-cult goes back to the fifth century (5A); Iakchos (the Eleusinian Dionysos) was imagined in the mystic rite as a star (2E).

Several of the experiences of Demeter in the *Demeter Hymn* were *aitia* for elements of the mystic ritual.[18] Do they include the return of Persephone from the underworld, to be reunited with her mother in front of the temple (377–85)? Not, presumably, in the form described in the *Hymn* (in a chariot driven over sea and land by Hermes). But we hear (a) from fourth-century Athens of benefits (known only to the initiates) for the wandering Demeter from the Eleusinians (presumably help in finding Persephone),[19] (b) from second-century Athens of the sounding of a gong 'when Kore is being summoned', and (c) from a Christian text of the finding of Persephone (Kore) celebrated with the tossing of torches.[20] A fragment of an anonymous rhetorical exercise (second century AD)[21] has Herakles, barred from Eleusinian initiation, claim to 'have been initiated into truer mysteries' (i.e. his *katabasis* to the underworld).[22] The fragmentary papyrus then allows us to discern '. . . I . . . through the night . . . the fire whence . . . I saw Kore': here again, experience of the underworld and mystic initiation are envisaged in terms of each other, this time with a vision of Kore associated with light in the darkness. The epiphany of Kore (however represented) was surely a high point in the rite of passage.[23] Personal salvation and cosmic interconnection may have been established simultaneously.

It may be further suggested that, along with (vertical) *cosmic* space, the Eleusinian ritual encapsulated also *geographic* space.

Demeter searches for her daughter over land and sea (43–4), wanders for nine days over the earth fasting, unwashed and with torches (47–50), separates herself from Olympos and goes to 'the cities and rich works of humankind' (92–3). Once arrived at Eleusis, Demeter tells Keleos'

[17] Brown (1991), who also discusses Idomeneus of Lampsacus *FGrH* 338 F2.

[18] Notably the purification, fasting, abstention from wine, αἰσχρολογία and drinking of the κυκεών (192–211): Richardson (1974) 211–17.

[19] Cf. the passages cited by Richardson (1974) 81, 174.

[20] (a) Isocr. *Panegyr*. 28; (b) Apollod. *FGrH* 244 F110; (c) Lact. *Epit*. 18.7. Other Christian texts report the enactment of wanderings and grief: see most recently Parker (2005) 355. See also Aristides, *Eleusinios* (19 p. 422 Dindorf) with Sourvinou-Inwood (2003b) 30.

[21] *Pap. Univ. Milan* 1 20.18–32 (D63 Scarpi), on which see Colomo (2004).

[22] Cf. E. *HF* 613 (with Bond (1981) ad loc.); Colomo (2004) 92.

[23] Clinton (1992) 85–90.

daughters a quintessentially Homeric[24] fiction – that she was brought by pirates from Crete to Thorikos (123–5), where she escaped, 'wandering' to this unknown place (Eleusis) where she is now (133–4). Four journeys (real or imagined) of unknown destination – her search over land and sea, her journey over the earth, her kidnap by pirates, and her wandering from Thorikos – take her eventually to Eleusis.

Despite the supposed ignorance inherent in the wandering, and the apparent arbitrariness of the destination, the destination is in fact anything but arbitrary, for it is in this very place that Demeter's temple will be built and Persephone will return from the underworld. In this way the Homeric itinerary, which expresses an unsystematic conception of space (IA), is contrastively incorporated into the new conception of space centred on the cult site. The seemingly random journeys are used to justify the necessity of this particular centre. In aetiological myth it is the *unmotivated* that is effective, that has authority: if Demeter had come to Eleusis for a particular reason, that reason could be questioned. The same pattern, of geographic wandering by a deity to a place that becomes a major cult site, occurs in both the *Homeric Hymns to Apollo*.[25]

Demeter's wandering over the earth with torches while fasting and unwashed (in the *Demeter Hymn*) may well reflect rituals performed by the initiands at Eleusis.[26] The contrast between the arbitrariness of her ignorant wandering and the triumphant certainty of the destination reappears in our passage of Plutarch: 'wanderings (*planai*) at first, and exhausting runnings around and certain anxious and incomplete (*atelestoi*) journeys through darkness', and in the end (*telos*) 'wonderful light . . . pure places and meadows'. This account may derive from the Eleusinian initiands' enactment of Demeter's search for Persephone.[27] The enactment combines ritual space with (imagined) geographic space. In ritual space the arbitrariness of any particular point in geographic space may be eliminated by its intersection with (vertical) cosmic space.[28] Demeter's fictitious journey is Homeric, but its conclusion marks the site of her temple, and in Homer

[24] Richardson (1974) 188.

[25] Delian 30–46 and Pythian 214–93. Cf. e.g. Kadmos founding Thebes where a wandering cow happened to lie down through exhaustion (Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.4.1).

[26] As do various other features of her behaviour in the *Hymn*: Richardson (1974) 22–30, 165–8, 171.

[27] Clinton (1992) 85; Sourvinou-Inwood (2003b) 33–4; Parker (2005) 355–6. At Pl., *Phaedo* 81a it is implied that the sufferings of the initiands include 'wandering' (πλάνη). Demeter's wanderings were in some versions more closely related than they are in the *Hymn* to the founding of the Mysteries: Richardson (1974) 81, 174.

[28] As in e.g. Sophokles' *Oedipus at Colonus* (18E).

we saw that such importance for a temple in the organisation of space is inconceivable.

There is another way in which her journeys seem to merge with ritual space. The precise place at Eleusis where Demeter is met by the daughters of Keleos is the Maiden Well (*Parthenion Phrear*), which was in historical times almost certainly a location for cultic dance.[29] After conversing with Demeter, the girls go home, whence they return to invite her there. Their return to the Maiden Well is marked by a simile of hinds or heifers in springtime bounding in a meadow (174–7). Richardson in his commentary notes the occurrence of similar similes in ritual contexts. The passage may well reflect ritualised movement at Eleusis between temple and Maiden Well. If so, then here too the geographic space of Demeter's journey is encapsulated in ritual space, rather as – in the *Homeric Hymn to (Pythian) Apollo* – the Cretans sailing from Knossos are first diverted by Apollo to Krisa, on the coast below Delphi, and then, in the final stage of their journey, sing a paian as they follow Apollo up to the site of the panhellenic sanctuary (514–17).

There is in the *Demeter Hymn* another (cosmic) journey that merges into – here by taking the form of – ritual movement. Hades abducting Persephone in a chariot is represented in vase-painting as a wedding procession. Abduction and bridal resistance were (even if only staged) features of the normal wedding.[30] The movement of Hades' chariot is both vertical (to the underworld) and horizontal (as if a wedding procession). Persephone eventually puts this movement into reverse by returning in a chariot from the underworld, to the Eleusinian temple, where Demeter's movement to greet her is compared to that of a maenad on the mountainside (386). Maenads leave their marital homes and thereby symbolically reverse marriage ritual and subvert the autonomy of the household by performing communal cult on behalf of the polis.[31] Similarly, Persephone leaves her marital home (379) to return to whence she was brought. But it is not only the household of Hades that is thereby limited. It is Persephone's self-exiling mother who is compared to a maenad, at the point of their reunion. It is the power of Demeter, and her attachment to her daughter, that are able to limit the paternal authority of Zeus and thereby ensure cosmic reintegration.

Maenadism is Dionysiac, and Dionysos was also present at the Eleusinian festival, as Iakchos, who was invoked, apparently with cosmic associations

[29] Richardson (1974) 180–1, 327–9. [30] Seaford (1987) 106–7; Jenkins (1983).
[31] Seaford (1988) 124–8; (1990b) 84–90.

(2E), in the great procession from Athens to Eleusis. But he is not mentioned in the *Demeter Hymn*, and so we will defer discussion of Dionysiac processional space to Chapter 6.

2B THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLIS

We described in the previous section two distinct influences on ideas of the cosmos. It may be imagined as ruled by a family, and it may be imagined in ritual. The former tends to reinforce its division, as in Homer, and the latter its interconnection, as in the Eleusinian mysteries. The *Demeter Hymn* ends with an interconnected cosmos (after a crisis of separation), albeit with the divine family still in control, after a concession is forced from Zeus.

I now suggest that this interaction between *family* and *cosmos* tends to form the *polis* – a triad that will be central to our analysis of Aeschylus. Crucial for this process is that, in the crisis of separation, Demeter enters a mortal household. For the result of her exile from Olympos is that power to shape the cosmos is granted to mortals in ritual, in a way that involves transcendence of both mortal and immortal households.

First, the *mortal* household. The place at which Demeter ends her wanderings is the Maiden Well, a place of cultic dancing (2A). Its communal significance in the Eleusinian sanctuary is reflected in its description here as 'from which the citizens (*politai*) drew water' (99). Having then entered the house of king Keleos (96–7, 475), Demeter attempts to make his baby son immortal by putting him in fire. But his mother Metaneira reacts by screaming with fear, and thereby – Demeter declares – deprives her son of immortality. Demeter then reveals herself as a goddess, and leaves the house, but not before announcing 'let the whole people (*dēmos*) build for me a great temple and an altar below it, beneath the polis . . . ' (270–1). Keleos calls the people (296 *lāon*) to assembly and tells them to build the temple.

The distinction between these two words for 'people', *dēmos* and *lāos*, is significant. *Lāos* means in particular a mass assembled by a leader, as here. But *dēmos* can mean the land, and tends to mean 'the community tied to the earth'.[32] Similarly the very rare word *polupeirōn* ('of many boundaries'), of the assembled *lāos* at 296, indicates the many boundaries between *farms*.[33] The temple is built by 'the whole *dēmos* beneath the polis'. What will be

[32] Casevitz (1992); Haubold (2000) 114 n. 316, 184 n. 140.
[33] Cf. ἀ-πείρων of the people gathered en masse for death ritual at *Il.* 24.776; Hes., *Scutum* 472.

important for our argument is the transition from failed ritual in the ruling household to permanent mystic ritual for all humankind in a communal temple.[34]

Secondly, the *immortal* household. Demeter enters the mortal sphere, somewhat arbitrarily, as a result of a conflict within the immortal family. But this conflict itself arose from an earlier assimilation of the gods to the sufferings of mortals (or projection of mortals' sufferings onto the gods). In Homer the cosmic order, based on separation by inheritance, is stable and permanent (1A). But in the *Demeter Hymn* a family crisis is created, by marriage. Persephone suffers like a mortal bride, who had to leave her mother for the house of an unknown master, a separation often imagined as death. It is apt therefore that she is taken in marriage to the underworld, to the grief of her mother. The cosmic family is drawn into the sufferings of mortals: the separation between daughter and mother at marriage, even the separation of death.

At all three levels – death, family, cosmos – the separation is eventually modified by the action of Demeter. In the Eleusinian mysteries, through which mortals achieve partial victory over death, there is celebrated the return of Persephone for part of the year. This return restored daughter to mother, and ended the crisis of cosmic separation.

In this multiple resolution of the crisis, the mortal ruling family is transcended by the polis, in the founding of Eleusinian temple and mystery-cult. Similarly, the return of Persephone requires a limit on the autonomy of the immortal ruling family. As a father Zeus gave his daughter to his brother Hades (3). But as ruler of the cosmos Zeus must – by yielding to the power of Demeter – limit both his own paternal authority and the marital authority of Hades. This contradiction, between the paternal authority of Zeus and his royal authority over the cosmos, may arise from a recent development in the myth.[35] But whether it did or not, in the figure of Zeus patriarchal authority over the household is forced – by the crisis – to transform itself into something like political authority: in its concern for the cosmos it transcends the household. The polis can emerge only by virtue of limiting the autonomy of the household, in various respects that in Attica include the institution by which households are constituted, marriage (18B).

[34] 271–4: the leading individuals named in 474–5 are perhaps intermediate between monarchy and polis (2D), with πᾶσι (476) seeming to introduce the reference to all humankind in 480: cf. *IG* II^2 3661 ὄργια [of Demeter] πᾶσιν ἔφαινε βροτοῖς.

[35] Lenz (1975) 58–69.

The specific polis and *dēmos* mentioned are those of Eleusis. The Eleusinian sanctuary and mysteries were (from an unknown date) organised by the Athenian polis,[36] which – although absent from the *Demeter Hymn* (its presence would have ruled out an Eleusinian polis) – nevertheless surely helped to preserve (if not to shape) a narrative in which the crucial role of the *dēmos* would be recognisable to all Athenians.

2c shared space

Having identified homologous movements from household to polis on both earth and Olympos, we will now suggest that there is a convergent political tendency at the third level also, in the resolution of the cosmic crisis.

After the temple is built, Demeter sits in it (303, 319, 355), apart from the gods, and creates a terrible year 'for humankind' (*anthrōpoisi*) by keeping the crops hidden in the earth. The famine belongs to the crisis of cosmic separation – of Demeter from the Olympians, and of what is above the earth from what is beneath it. It is when Persephone returns from the underworld to join the other immortals that Demeter restores fertility to the whole earth and establishes mysteries at Eleusis. This ritual, we have seen, incorporates geographic (horizontal) space in the imitation of the wanderings of Demeter and cosmic (vertical) space in the celebration of the return of Persephone.

It also – we now emphasise – celebrates the other gift of Demeter to humankind, corn. It is when she has 'sent up'[37] corn again from the earth that Demeter imparts her mystery-cult (471–7). Her child Ploutos, mentioned a little later (489), was the embodiment of agricultural wealth and prominent at Eleusis.[38] He was one identity of the child whose birth was announced (along with the display of an ear of corn) at a high point in the mystic ritual.[39] The Athenians prided themselves on corn having been spread throughout the world from Eleusis.[40] Also universal was happiness in the underworld, for those 'of humankind (*anthrōpōn*) on the earth' who have been initiated (480). Cosmic interconnection celebrated in the mystic ritual brought well-being to humankind in this world (cereal wealth) and

[36] Largely irrelevant to my argument is the problem of when Eleusis became part of Attica (early, it is now widely believed): bibliography in Parker (1996) 13 (add Osborne (1994) 152–4).
[37] ἀνῆκεν; cf. e.g. Pl. *Crat.* 403a 'from the earth below is sent up (ἀνίεται) wealth (ὁ πλοῦτος)'.
[38] Parker (2005) 337.
[39] Richardson (1974) 26–30, 317–20; Parker (2005) 358–9.
[40] Richardson (1974) 194–6.

the next. Full participation in the mysteries was open to all adults who knew Greek and were not polluted by bloodguilt.

Demeter obtains the return of Persephone by 'hiding' seed in the earth, which threatens to starve humankind and so to deprive the gods of sacrifices (312). But she does so only after she has taken up position in the temple built by the *dēmos* at Eleusis (her initial exile is among the 'rich works' of humankind). This delay is not required by the narrative. Its point rather is to locate the subsequent vertical interconnection of the cosmos, with the return of Persephone and of the corn, firmly in the Eleusinian temple, where it will be celebrated in the future.

Cereal agriculture is in this complex of myth and ritual central to the structure of the cosmos. More specifically it embodies – along with the return of Persephone – the vital *interconnection* of the cosmos. This is an unusual cosmology. By contrast the Homeric cosmos is structured by the social institution of inheritance within the household. What has, for the Eleusinian cosmology, replaced the structure provided by inheritance? The polis emerges by limiting the autonomy of individual households through the development of a single political authority over a unified territory. Fundamental here is cereal agriculture, which requires more communal defence of (communally defined) land than does livestock.[41] The importance of cereal agriculture to the Eleusinian cosmology reflects the growing importance of communally defined agricultural territory as the basis for a new kind of community. In Homer agriculture was relatively unimportant (1a), but will be prominent in our discussion of Aeschylus.

At Eleusis the importance of agriculture is expressed in geographic space as covering the whole earth,[42] and in (vertical) cosmic space as interconnecting the cosmos. And perhaps this cosmic interconnection also has a specific role in expressing the unity not only of the land but of the people united by the land. For it was at a polis festival that the massed initiands activated the blessings of Demeter by encapsulating geographic and cosmic space within the immediate, defined, shared space of the *telestērion*, her temple[43] built by the community in its relation to the land (the *dēmos*). The boundary between this world and next is dissolved, and the underworld itself is imagined as a shared space, like the underworld meadow that contains the anonymous mass of processing Eleusinian initiates in

[41] E.g. de Polignac (1995) 5, 34, 38, 39, 42, 49, 58 (defence replaces raids).

[42] Demeter wanders over the earth, threatens to destroy humankind by depriving the earth of crops, and eventually restores them to the 'whole earth' (472).

[43] For the identification of the temple with *telestērion* see Richardson (1974) 328–30.

Aristophanes' *Frogs*.[44] We will in due course discuss further evidence for the Eleusinian procession expressing the identity of the polis (2F).

The space of the Homeric underworld, by contrast, is – like Homeric space generally – relatively undefined (1A). The interest is rather in the mythical individuals with whom Odysseus (though not his companions) converses, whereas people en masse appear as a wretched, bloodstained, and frightening mass gathered at the blood in Odysseus' sacrificial trench (*Od.* 11.36–43), as receiving the judgements of Minos (569–71) and as emitting a fearful clamour (539, 632–3). In Homer relations between men of different households depend largely on inter-personal reciprocity, not on shared public space, and accordingly there are virtually no processions, very few temples, very few defined areas (in this world or the next), and no political assemblies that are anything other than ineffective or disastrous.[45] Further, relations between men and gods in Homer depend largely on inter-personal reciprocity, and so even the arrival (epiphany) or presence of a deity is never a focus of collective emotion, never unites a group[46] as it does in later texts. It is as the focus of *collective* emotion, by contrast, that the epiphany of Kore (Persephone) at Eleusis dissolves the boundary between this world and the next,[47] and the arrival of Dionysos at Athens or at Thebes dissolves the boundary between public and private space.[48]

Just as geographic space is encapsulated in the defined and shared space of the temple, so Demeter restores fertility both to the whole earth but also, more specifically, to a defined area of land, the Rharian plain (450), presumably near her temple. Whether or not it had once been politically significant as the rich plain sustaining the unity of a community, the sacred ploughing attested much later as performed there by 'the Athenians'[49] affirmed a symbolic link between the community who organised it and the agricultural fertility of a defined area.

What we have traced is a convergence of tendencies – on earth, on Olympos, and in the cosmos – towards the formation of the polis. The polis is a human institution, but is too socially transcendent to be imagined as having been invented by humankind. The transcendence of autonomous

[44] 326, 374; cf. 155–8 'you will see a beautiful light, just like here, and myrtle groves, and happy bands of men and women, . . . the initiates'.

[45] Nevertheless Hammer (2002) makes a case for the political importance of public space in Homer.

[46] The closest to an exception is *Od.* 24.529–36, where Athena stops the fighting at Ithaka after the killing of the suitors. Significantly, this occurs in the relatively late ending of the epic, added in the spirit of the emerging polis (Seaford (1994a) 38–42): revenge yields, with divine help, to reconciliation.

[47] Clem Alex. *Protr.* 2.12; Lact. *Epit.* 16.7. Cf. the mystic epiphany in *Bacchae* (2E).

[48] 2E(5); 5A.

[49] One of three sacred ploughings performed by the Athenians (Plut. *Mor.* 144a), described by Parker (2005) 197 as a 'transfer to communal level of the concerns of individual farmers'.

households by a new kind of community is sufficiently fundamental to require the involvement of gods and the cosmos. True, the obvious problems resolved in the narrative – marriage, separation between mother and daughter, fertility, and death – do not include the polis, and may well be inherited from an ancient myth. But in its sixth-century version (our *Hymn*) their interaction has been influenced by a new kind of community.

How did the polis come into being? One model is the absorption of the autonomous household, along with other autonomous households, into an organisation (the polis) by which they are united. But how, given the autonomy of the household, is this possible? For the mythological imagination (though not necessarily for the historian) two factors are key: transcendence and internal conflict. Household autonomy is transcended by a greater (socio-political) power, and conflict within the household weakens its autonomy.

The former tends in pre-modern societies to be projected by the mythical imagination onto the cosmos (3a). What is unknown (the cosmos) can be imagined only as a version of what is known (society), and the sanctity of socio-political power is put beyond contention by being projected into a remote time (by the authority of myth) and a remote space (as the power that rules the cosmos).

As for conflict within the household, relations within the Homeric household are (as are the cosmic divisions based on inheritance) unproblematic and stable;[50] they become unstable, in the *Demeter Hymn*, when Zeus gives his daughter to his brother. Hades taking Persephone, and Demeter's reaction to it, project gender-based conflict within the household onto the cosmos. It is the consequent action of Demeter that creates not only the transcendence of household by polis at Eleusis but also, at the cosmic level, the emergence of an authority (Zeus) that limits the patriarchal autonomy both of himself (self-transcendingly) and of his brother Hades.

What is the connection between this political strand of the myth and its location at Eleusis? It was above all at Eleusis that the mortal and the cosmic spheres were *united* – in a mass celebration, organised by the polis, of a dramatic event (the return of Persephone from underworld confinement) that achieved its power by connoting simultaneously not only the curtailment of patriarchal autonomy but also the interconnection

[50] The damage done to Odysseus' household by the suitors is from the outside. Poseidon's anger against Odysseus produces no conflict with his Olympian relatives (note *Od.* 1.77–9, 13.141–2, 341). And see 1a(1).

of the cosmos, the fertility of the earth, and the softening of the irreversible harshness of death.

This fictional configuration of ritual, myth, cosmology, fertility, and transition to the polis, emerged from the process (with all its haphazardness) in which the inhabitants of Attica created their polis, and it may also have contributed, as an inspiring paradigm, to the process. The configuration will reappear, in various forms, in Aeschylus.

2D THE OUTSIDER CREATES THE COMMUNITY

In Homer detailed description of the arrival and incorporation of an outsider into a royal household has social significance (IC), for through it the household expresses its relationship with the outside world. It does so by affirming inter-personal reciprocity with gifts, or by incorporating the outsider into the ritual that expresses its internal solidarity, the sacrificial feast. It is the household – the basic unit of Homeric society – that is at the centre of, and seems reinforced by, both these processes. So far from threatening the autonomy of the household, the outsider may even seem by incorporation to increase it.

In the *Demeter Hymn* too there is detailed description of the arrival and incorporation of an outsider into a royal house. But here it is not the house but the outsider who is central. Eleusis is privileged by Demeter choosing it as her destination. She performs in the house actions that prefigure the Eleusinian mystery-cult.[51] When one of these actions is interrupted by the queen, Demeter orders her temple to be built, leaves the house, and will soon take up position in the newly built temple.

This narrative produces a sense of disjunction, in four ways. Firstly, it interrupts the main issue (the fate of Persephone). Secondly, the Eleusinian rituals are in the *aition* prefigured in the house[52] but in reality will be performed in the temple. Thirdly, the command to build the temple is (in narrative terms) unexpected and abrupt. Fourthly, 'the household of Keleos passes the famous "entertaining a god in disguise" test with flying colours',[53] and so we would expect it to be rewarded, as e.g. Ikarios was rewarded by Dionysos for his hospitality with the gift of the vine. In this

[51] Richardson (1974) 12–30.

[52] See above; and note that Demeter declares that it is because she nursed Demophoon that he will be eternally honoured (263–4).

[53] Parker (1991) 9; and for praise of Keleos' hospitality to Demeter see Richardson (1974) 178. Parker well describes my first and fourth ways, which he explains by the greater importance (in such a narrative) of results over motives, and by the contribution to the myth by this particular poet. But this, at best, takes us only part of the way.

respect it is as if we are still in the Homeric world of the affirmation of inter-personal reciprocity with gifts. However, in the *Demeter Hymn* the royal hosts drop out of the picture.[54]

Disjunction may reflect intrusion. The temple may (like the cosmo-political Zeus) represent a later element, introduced into a narrative centred on the household. The same transition, from powerful household to public temple, is suggested in the archaeological evidence at Eleusis (4F2). The effect of the disjunction is that ritual closure, which in Homer accommodates the outsider in the solidarity of the household, in the *Demeter Hymn* seems *deferred*, until the establishment of the mysteries in the new temple in which Demeter is finally accommodated. The site of the emergence of polis from household is ritual. To this deferral of ritual closure from royal household to polis cult we will return in Part III.

Here too then there is – much as we saw earlier at the cosmic level – a significant development, in the direction of the polis, from Homer. But in fact the development is prefigured already in the *Odyssey*. Telemachos and Peisistratos, arriving in Lakedaimon, are entertained in the house of King Menelaos, who happens to be feasting neighbours and kinsmen. But Scherie, where Odysseus is entertained in the house of Alkinoos, seems less monarchical (e.g. *Od.* 8.390–1). Accordingly, it sometimes seems to be a wider group that is entertaining Odysseus[55] – an ambiguity that produces contestation.[56]

In a third phase of this development, in democratic Athens, outsiders (human or divine) are entertained at the Prutaneion, which – though imagined as somehow a private (royal) dwelling – is a place of public cult and the administrative centre of the polis, and its hearth is common to the whole polis (4B). In the past, an aristocratic clan might boast, it was we who entertained a prestigious outsider (Pl., *Lysis* 205cd).

The *Demeter Hymn* embodies all three of these phases. Firstly, Keleos is *koiranos* (97), which seems to mean sole ruler (as e.g. at 87), and it is his household that entertains the outsider Demeter. But, secondly, Keleos

[54] Except that in the end Keleos is just one of the leading men to whom Demeter teaches her mysteries (473–77).

[55] See esp. *Od.* 7.28–31, 98–9, 136, 189–93; 8.40–43, 388–95; 13.10–15.

[56] At *Od.* 11.338 Queen Arete says, 'Phaeacians, . . . he is my ξεῖνος (guest, stranger), but [or 'and': δέ] each has a share in the honour', and urges her audience to give him gifts. Whether the 'honour' here is for host or ξεῖνος, the queen is claiming to be the host, with the wider group in a secondary role. Echeneos, the oldest of the Phaeacians, who earlier said that the others were awaiting king Alkinoos' orders in this matter (7.161), now urges the company to obey the queen, and affirms the supreme authority of Alkinoos. Alkinoos then assumes responsibility for the gift-giving as well as (because he has 'power') the leading role in conveying Odysseus home. Such assertions are needed only because there is doubt.

seems to be just one of several leading men (*basileis*: 473–5), and one of his daughters points out to Demeter that there are several other men who might entertain her in their homes, men she describes as having 'great power of honour here, the first among the people (*dēmos*), and they protect the walls of the polis . . . ' (150–1). Then, thirdly, the temple is built by the people and Demeter moves into it. In contrast to the ambivalent but static picture of Scherie, the move from house to temple in the *Hymn* embodies the transition from monarchy – via aristocracy – to the polis.

The place where a significant outsider is welcomed defines the nature of the community. This will reappear in our discussion of the Athenian festivals of Dionysos and of Aeschylus' *Suppliants*. Here we note a possible explanation of why in the Hymn the fire in Keleos' house is mentioned but not – as we might expect – the hearth. The omission may result from the marginalisation of King Keleos (as recipient of Demeter) in the *Demeter Hymn* in favour of the polis. He was elsewhere said to have founded the hearth in the Athenian Prutaneion.[57] This was the *hestia* ('hearth') referred to in the aristocratic 'child (initiated) from the hearth', who represented the Athenian initiands in general,[58] thereby – I suggest – replacing the Eleusinian royal infant whom Demeter nursed at the hearth.

2e the aetiological chronotope

In celebrating here and now the undying glory of heroes, the Homeric bard or rhapsode makes a connection of present with past. And the Homeric narrative very occasionally mentions the ancient origin of a feature of the present, for instance of the arrival of Zeus's daughter Delusion among men (*Il.* 19.95–131). But the Homeric chronotope is concrete, unsystematic, and shaped to some extent by the (dominant) code of inter-personal reciprocity (Chapter 1).

In the *Demeter Hymn* the foundation of mystic initiation at Eleusis by Demeter explains, justifies and requires the enactment – here and now – both of the initiation and of ancient events narrated in the hymn as surrounding its foundation. Demeter once arrived at Eleusis from her wanderings over land and sea, and Persephone once emerged at Eleusis from the underworld. Temporal transition (from the remote past) and spatial transition (from remote places) converge on the ritual at Eleusis. The ritual enactment of aetiological myth associates the remote with the

[57] Plut. *Mor.* 667d; 4c. [58] Sourvinou-Inwood (1997) 145, 162 nn. 40 and 41; Mylonas (1961) 236–7.

present (time and place),[59] and *because the form of time and of space is the same* we may speak of an aetiological *chronotope*. By intensifying the here-and-now it draws in the surrounding people annually to Eleusis – an in-gathering reflected in the narrative of the *Demeter Hymn* (2A). As so often, a community is constituted by the remote past and from the outside.

Aetiological time is both linear and non-linear. It is linear in the sense that the mythical narrative moves from crisis to resolution. It is non-linear in two ways. First, the distance between remote past and present is diminished in the re-enactment or celebration of myth. And secondly, this tendency is reinforced by the annual enactment of the myth returning every year, as if in a circle, to the same point, thereby seeming to challenge the irreversibility of linear time. Indeed, the regularity and exactness of annual repetition may, by a controlling abstraction, express the invariance that seems to condense time, to diminish or even eliminate the sense of the linear passage of time.[60]

Aetiological space has a similar effect. It is linear in that Persephone comes from the underworld, Demeter from beyond Attica, or Dionysos from over the sea, etc.[61] But the Eleusinian *telestērion* imagined as the underworld, or Dionysos moving in a procession in a cart shaped like a ship, or the performance of a dithyramb that describes at length the presence of numerous gods[62] – these are examples of rituals in which the *here* is imagined as *elsewhere*, or at least the sense of linear distance between here and there is diminished. It is above all – as in all three of these examples – *epiphany*, the presence of the gods, that tends to transcend the restrictive specificity of place.

Aetiological myth may ensure *that* the ritual is performed (by narrating divine instruction, or a crisis consequent on its non-performance), or *how* it is performed (e.g. what Demeter undergoes prefigures ritual). More specifically, the aetiological chronotope may contribute to the survival of the ritual by putting beyond doubt or dispute *where* and *when* it is to be performed. The Oschophoria is celebrated at Phaleron on the seventh day of the month Panepsion, because it was there and then that Theseus and his companions returned from Crete to Athens.[63] Such specification by

[59] The importance of aetiological myth has been neglected. But see now Parker (2005) 374–83; Kowalzig (2006), (2007a) 24–32.

[60] Rappaport (1999) 187–8, 222, 225, 230–3. Cf. the comparison of (*linear*) human generations to the *cycle* of death and birth of leaves at *Il.* 6.145–9, which however differs from the *transitionality* (from crisis to resolution) of aetiological time.

[61] All three are remote from Olympos even before they arrive in Attica.

[62] Pi. *fr.*70b. 8ff. [63] Plut. *Thes.* 22; cf. e.g. Philostr. *VA* 4.18.

a shared aetiological myth may be especially useful in mobilising a large community, such as the polis.

But the aetiological chronotope does even more than ensure that, how, where, and when the festival takes place. The return of Theseus may be *experienced in the ritual*. Demeter's wandering over the earth was probably imitated by the initiands, and Persephone's emergence from Hades was a high point of the initiation (2A).

Why is the aetiological chronotope experienced – or even re-enacted – in the mystic ritual itself? In part, perhaps, precisely to re-establish the necessity of this particular place (or even time) for the performance of the ritual. But the subjective effect of the re-enactment, perhaps also therefore its motivation, seems to have included a complex synthesis of feelings of (1) *control*, (2) *interconnection*, (3) *epiphany*, (4) *group cohesion* and (5) *transcendence*.

(1) Ritual *controls* by enacting perfection. Eleusinian initiation diminishes the fear of death[64] by pre-enacting it, moving from a crisis of anxiously ignorant disorder to eternal joy. Death seems to be permanent departure for an unknown place, and so its ritual pre-enactment requires symbolic embodiment of temporal and spatial remoteness. Darkness may be imagined as Hades, imitation of Demeter's search for Persephone may encapsulate geographic space, the epiphanic return of Persephone implies control over cosmic space, and re-enactment controls the linear passage of time by bringing the remote past into the present. The initiatory transition (from ignorant and anxious wandering) interpenetrates reassuringly with a transition (the re-appearance of Kore) from the authoritative era of myth, and acquires traditional form in its dramatic re-enactment. The symbolic control of unknown *space* (the underworld) also controls – as unforgettable re-enactment of the past – linear *time*, even the unknown future experience of death.

(2) Inherent in all this is the need for cosmic *interconnection*. The initiands' experience of darkness at Eleusis was followed by the appearance of a wonderful light, and it is this kind of transition that underlies the idea – for which the evidence goes back to the fifth century – that for mystic initiands the sun (or a star) shines in the underworld (2A). The experience of heavenly light in the underworld is of an *interconnected*

[64] Burkert (1987) 21. In this, as in many other respects, mystic initiation resembles the 'Near-Death Experience': Chapter 2 n. 74.

cosmos, even a unity of cosmic opposites. In *Bacchae* the experiences of Pentheus, based in numerous details on mystic initiation, include – just after his adoption of the dress that he will wear on his journey to Hades – a vision of 'the things he ought to see' that includes two *suns* (918–24). The second sun reflected in the mystic mirror[65] prefigures – I now suggest – the other sun, the one that awaits the initiate in the underworld (as dramatised in Aeschylus' *Bassarai*). Another cosmic unity of opposites is experienced at the climax of his Dionysiac initiation[66] by Polyphemos in Euripides' *Cyclops*: he sees the earth and the heaven mixed together (578–9). The formula ὕε κύε ('Rain! Conceive!'), called out to sky and earth repectively, was according to Hippolytos 'the great and secret Eleusinian mystery'.[67] I will discuss further instances of mystic cosmic interconnection in 5A.

Mystery-cult reaches into the underworld, as we have seen, but also indeed into the cosmos as a whole: the idea that the dead pass through the cosmological elements (fire, earth, air, water) seems to have been present in some form in mystery-cults in the classical period.[68] It is explicitly as mystic initiation, and with terminology derived from Eleusis,[69] that Plato describes the soul's celestial vision (*Phdr.* 250bc), for which the soul flies upwards,[70] an idea derived perhaps from 'flying upwards' in mystic initiation.[71]

Yet another form of cosmic interconnection is the instruction to the initiate, on some of the famous funerary gold leaves, to declare, in Hades, that 'I am the child of earth and the starry sky (*ouranos*), but my *genos* (race, stock) is of the sky (*ouranion*)'.[72] This is probably based on the myth of the Titans, children of earth and *ouranos* but exiled to the underworld.[73] At any rate we have the offspring of the cosmic opposites sky and earth in Hades. To the implied predominance of the sky in an interconnected cosmos I will return in Part V.

(3) The light appearing in the darkness was sometimes identified with a heavenly body, probably associated with the epiphany of Kore (2A), and itself sometimes associated or even identified with deity.[74] Clinton assembles evidence to suggest that the mystic vision at Eleusis might be of deities

[65] See Seaford (1996) 223 (on *Ba.* 918); Seaford (1997). [66] Seaford (1981); (1984a) 197, 209.
[67] *Haer.* 5.7.34; cf. Procl. *In Tim.* III 176.28 Diehl; Burkert (1983) 293.
[68] Seaford (1986). [69] Riedweg (1987) 30–69.
[70] Cf. also the mystic ascent of the soul at Pl. *Symp.* 211bc, and later references to mystic ascent and mystic flight assembled by Hardie (2004) 25.
[71] Seaford (2009a). [72] Nos. 2, 8, 29 GIJ; cf. also nos. 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 25.
[73] Seaford (1986).
[74] As in the cross-cultural 'Near-Death Experience': Seaford (2005) 605; n. 64 above.

illuminated *from within*.[75] We may add the light that shines from the body of Demeter as she makes her epiphany in the *Demeter Hymn*, when the house is filled with light 'as with lightning' (278–80), as well as several literary texts that imply the *identification* of the deity with light in mystic initiation. For instance,[76] in the epiphany of Dionysos in *Bacchae*, which is in numerous details based on mystic initiation,[77] he appears bringing salvation to his thiasos, who calls him 'greatest light'. Moreover the light he creates in the darkness is attacked by Pentheus, who identifies it with Dionysos;[78] the word that dropped out of the next line probably gave this light a cosmic dimension.[79] In Aristophanes' *Frogs* the initiates in the underworld call on Iakchos to join their dancing in the meadow (326), and in urging him to bring torches they call him 'light-bearing star of the nocturnal initiation (*teletē*)' (339–44). In Sophokles it is, the scholiast tells us, 'according to a certain mystic *logos*' that in an Eleusinian context Dionysos (Iakchos) is called 'chorus-leader of the fire-breathing stars' (*Ant*. 1146–7).

(4) Perfection through control (1) may take the form of ecstatic *cohesion*. In comparing progress in philosophy to mystic initiation Plutarch (*Mor*. 81de) reveals that at first the initiands 'push against each other around the doorway'. But he who gets inside and sees the 'great' light 'follows along with the *logos* as if it was a deity (*theos*)', with silence, wonder, humility and order. In the mystic transition – effected by the sight of a great light and of a deity – competitive isolation is followed by wonderful order.

The order often takes the form of participation in a *chorus*. In Plutarch[80] the anxious and unlimited journeys of the initiand in the darkness are ended by a wonderful light, whereupon he is received into meadows with sacred sounds and visions and *choreiai*, and is with pure men, and from here he looks down on the 'uninitiated crowd . . . being trampled by itself and driven together in much mud and mist'. Darkness isolates the individual, the light marks the reception into *choruses*.

[75] Clinton (1992) 89–90 and (2004) 97–100. Pl. *Phdr*. 250bc clearly implies that what was seen in the mysteries *contained* light, like certain sculptures in Mithraic cults. A votive plaque from the sanctuary at Eleusis (*IG* II^2 4639) shows Demeter with rays of light emanating from her neck, ears and hair.

[76] For other examples, including the lost *Bassarai* of Aeschylus, see Seaford (2005); also Pi. *Ol*. 2.53–60 (with Richardson (1974) 318).

[77] Seaford (1996) 195–203 on *Ba*. 576–641.

[78] *Ba*. 630–1; the manuscript *lectio difficilior* φῶς is in fact perfect (see my commentary).

[79] After φαεννὸν, 'shining': αἰθέρ' Canter (cf. 293); εἶδος Gigante (cf. Sappho *fr*. 34; E. *Cyc*. 353, *El*. 727). Dionysos also in this scene reactivates the thunderbolt that accompanied his birth.

[80] *Fr*. 178 (quoted in 2A).

This passage has numerous detailed similarities with our mystic epiphany in *Bacchae*, to which the choral thiasos reacts thus: 'O greatest light . . . how I rejoiced to see you, having isolated desolation (μονάδ' ἔχουσ' ἐρημίαν).'[81] The clear implication is that the epiphany introduces unity into a group of isolated individuals,[82] and indeed the initiated thiasos in *Bacchae* displays a wonderful cohesion[83] that contrasts with the isolated individualism of the failed initiand Pentheus. In the *Phaedrus* passage cited above the 'blessed apparitions' seen by our souls 'while being initiated, in pure light and themselves pure', include 'shining beauty, when with the happy *choros*, a blessed sight and vision, following with Zeus . . . '.[84] It is as a choral procession that the 'blessed *thiasoi*' of initiates in *Frogs* invoke Iakchos as 'star of the nocturnal mystic ritual', referring also to their 'most lovely activity as a *choros*, which the Fates bring together (*sunagousin*), for we alone have sun and holy light who have been initiated . . . ' (450–6). *Phaedrus*[85] and *Frogs*, probably also *Bacchae*, conflate Eleusinian with Dionysiac mystic elements.

The cohesion of the group may promote the idea that a deity is present as focus and as controlling power (epiphany). But the cosmic dimension may seem to belong not so much to a deity from beyond but to the chorus itself. In mystery-cult from the fifth century into late antiquity the chorus was identified with the cosmos (notably as a chorus of stars).[86] A cause of the identification may be that, as noted by anthropologists,[87] the sense of integration induced by the unison of utterance and movement may extend to the whole cosmos. And a cosmic chorus may have a divine leader. Iakchos as mystic 'chorus-leader of fire-breathing stars' was no doubt surrounded by initiates with torches. The chorus of Euripides' *Ion* associates Dionysos and torches at Eleusis with the dance of the starry *aithēr* and the moon (1074–9). Feelings of choral cohesion, of cosmic integration and of divine epiphany reinforce each other.

(5) *Transcendence*. In creating group cohesion the deity seems to operate both as a single focus and as the mysterious agent of the cohesion of sound, movement and feeling that inspires the group with well-being and power.[88] Such agency, being both external and comprehensive, is *transcendent*. It

[81] 608–9; cf. 584 (appeal to come to thiasos). [82] Seaford (forthcoming).
[83] 75, 693, 748. [84] Pl. *Phaedr.* 250b.
[85] Riedweg (1987) 30–69. [86] Csapo (2008); Hardie (2004) 23–4; Ferrari (2008).
[87] E.g. Rappaport (1999) 220, 380, 404.
[88] E.g. in *Frogs* (401–3) the choral procession of initiates project their (desired) effortlessness onto Iakchos ('show how you cover a long route without effort') as they invoke him as φιλοχορευτάς to send them forward.

shares a logic with the need for a lawgiver or mediator to come from outside the community, and with the festal entry of god or human potentate uniting a city: only he who does not belong to the group can unite it.[89] Dionysos, for instance, arriving as outsider (*xenikos*) at Patrai, is called 'Mediator' (*Aisumnētes*).[90] Even the Homeric household seems reinforced by the entry of a guest (2D).

2F THE IAKCHOS PROCESSION

We have described mere possibilities of how the aetiological chronotope may have been imagined within the here and now of mystic ritual. Most tangible is the choral procession of initiates in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, which represents the opening procession that escorted Iakchos from Athens to Eleusis.[91] It too involves imagining cosmic space (the underworld), but it also represents movement through a space that was familiar to Athenian citizens, linking the centre of the polis to its periphery. The aetiological chronotope emerges from ritual, but comes to answer a *political* need, to define the lasting space of the polis.

The *Demeter Hymn* adapted the Homeric itinerary to express a new, unhomeric, conception of space (2A). This conception was derived from the importance of agriculture, centred on the communal temple at Eleusis, shaped by the emergent polis, and expressed in the communal ritual of mystery-cult. The *Hymn* does not mention Athens. But already in the fifth century we find this conception in a form adapted to the Athenian polis as a whole. The Eleusinian ritual is embedded in Athenian public cult in various ways:[92] examples that involve space are the importance at Eleusis of certain Athenian and Attic rituals concerned with ploughing and associated with Demeter's gift of corn,[93] the placing of the Eleusinion (in Athens) under the same financial and administrative control as the sanctuary at Eleusis,[94] and the opening procession that escorted Iakchos from Athens to Eleusis.

This great procession, of which there is no trace in the *Demeter Hymn*, links the centre of the polis to periphery (Eleusis was near the western

[89] Seaford (1994a) 251–2. [90] Pausan. 7.19–21; Seaford (1994a) 138, 252, 261–2.
[91] Demonstrated by Graf (1974) 40–50. For other mystic processions see the Hipponion gold leaf (no. 1 GIJ) lines 15–16; Milesian inscription, no. 149 Jaccottet (2003); Kallixeinos ap. Athen. 198e, 200bc, 202d; Rice (1983) 60–1, 80–2, 187–90.
[92] Sourvinou-Inwood (1997) 141–50.
[93] The sacred ploughing and the Proerosia: Sourvinou-Inwood (1997) 146–9; Parker (2005) 330–1.
[94] On the singularity of this arrangement (the closest Attic parallel is Brauron and the city Brauronian) see Parker (1995) 332.

land border with Megara), and may be said to take further the *political* conception of space that was implicit in the *Hymn*. Processions often included the politicially excluded: women, young people, metics, and perhaps sometimes even slaves.[95] A procession is collective, purposeful action, and so processional movement from an urban centre to the periphery of its territory has political significance as the symbolic appropriation of space, overlaying territory with community.[96] Herodotos (8.65) reports that when the Persians were ravaging an Attica empty of its inhabitants (in 480 BC), Dikaios the Athenian saw 'a cloud of dust moving from Eleusis, as of about 30,000 men', and the 'mystic Iakchos [song]' was heard. This was interpreted as a divine voice that would ensure victory for the Athenians. The vast ghostly procession,[97] and the choral song personified as Iakchos, embody the survival of the polis, the claim of the Athenians as a whole to their land – as well as implicitly acknowledging their Greek allies, for (as Dikaios explained to his Spartan companion) 'this is the festival that the Athenians celebrate . . . and any Athenian or other Greek who chooses is initiated'. The most recent re-examination of the evidence for the festival demonstrates that, although 30,000 is hyperbole, 'we must certainly think of several thousand participants'[98] in the procession. The Eleusinian mystery-cult was a ritual of the polis,[99] and the Athenians had a 'passionate sense . . . that their welfare was tied up with' the mysteries.[100] In the finale of Aeschylus' *Eumenides* the processional escort embodies the 'whole land of Theseus' (Attica), calls for a response form 'the whole people', and seems to allude to the Eleusinian mysteries.[101]

The very same procession is represented by Aristophanes as of initiates in a blissful *underworld* (2E). What Aristophanes represents as eschatological, Herodotos represents as central to the unity and identity of the polis. In fact in Aristophanes too the procession has its civic dimension: the civic chorus of comedy with its traditional concern for the polis is here composed of mystic initiates. This idea of a perfectly cohesive polis in the underworld, a mystic community, a ritually achieved utopia that is both political and eschatological, takes to an extreme the political dimension of Eleusinian ritual space that we detected in the *Demeter Hymn. Bacchae* too indicates the wonderful cohesion of the initiated community (2E).

[95] Kavoulaki (1999) 300. [96] De Polignac (1995) 24, 37, 40–3, 52–3; Kavoulaki (1999) 297–8.
[97] In reverse, because *coming* from Eleusis. [98] Parker (2005) 348.
[99] Shown in detail by Sourvinou-Inwood (1997) 144–6.
[100] Parker (2005) 343, citing *inter alia* the involvement of all Athenians implied by Andocides saying to a jury 'when we got back from Eleusis' after the Mysteries: Andoc. *Myst.* III. Note also Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19–20 (with Wilson (2003) 183–4).
[101] 1025, 1039; 17A(5).

It is through ritual that numerous pre-modern societies think of belonging to a community.[102] In the case of Athenian citizenship, the ritual often mentioned as performing this function is public animal sacrifice, which might be on a very large scale. The Eleusinian cult also performed the function, but distinctively. It embodied the polis, but transcended it (as open to all who spoke Greek), as well as transcending all other groups including the household. For participation was voluntary, transformative of the participant, and on an individual basis;[103] and it offered access to the cosmos, as well as the promise of joyful cohesion in an eternal future. The power of mystic initiation to transcend the household, which is expressed in Dionysos extracting women from their separate households to form the thiasos, gave it a special place in the *political* aetiological imagination of the Athenians (15D).

2G CENTRE AND PERIPHERY

Aeschylus of Eleusis was a citizen of Athens, a polis based on the territory of Attica. In his lifetime the boundaries of Attica were – albeit no doubt less precise[104] – similar to what they are now. Two sides of its roughly triangular shape are bounded by the sea; and the third, northern, side consists of fairly continuous mountains, mainly Kithairon and Parnes, which formed a natural boundary with Boiotia. The mountain chain was especially permeable to the west (along the coast towards Megara), as well as between Kithairon and Parnes, and east of Parnes.

Sanctuaries were often built on or near the borders of city-states.[105] Most Attic extra-urban sanctuaries of importance (some of them connected by ritual to the urban centre) are on or near the coast.[106] We may come closer to the sense that the Athenians had of their territory if we stand on the Acropolis, from which much of it can be seen, or look from the theatre of Dionysos at the sea beyond the harbour of Phaleron, where the polis

[102] E.g. Kertzer (1988) 18–19: 'Indeed, as with so many peoples, the very notion of being a Tallensi, one of "us", was defined by participation in common ritual.'

[103] Parker (2005) 342–3.

[104] Despite the use, in some places and at some times, of inscribed stone markers, 'inland boundaries between one territory and another were more like a belt than a simple line': Cole (2004) 77; cf. 20, 178–9.

[105] De Polignac (1995), 37, etc.; border sanctuaries in the inscriptional record: Rousset (1994) 121; McInerney (2006). For de Polignac such sanctuaries (and processions to them from the urban centre) are crucial, from the eighth century onwards, for the creation of city-states. He regards Athens as exceptional, as monocentric in contrast to the large number of bipolar city-states.

[106] See e.g. Parker (2005) 58–62 (including the map).

celebrated the return of Theseus from Crete. The space of the polis does not extend greatly beyond immediate space (as defined in 1A).

What lay beyond this territory? We imagine remote space as *mapped*, as occupying a certain place in a familiar abstract model. But the geographic space imagined by Aeschylus' audience was shaped rather by oral reports, and – like cosmic space – by the celebration of myth in cult. Athens contained various forms of cultic orientation towards what lay beyond the city, including sacred journeys beyond the polis borders. Connection with Delphi is grounded in the cult of Apollo Pythios, and with Delos in the cult of Delian Apollo; and each of these cults had more than one sanctuary in Attica.[107] A fourth-century *horos* in the agora declares itself of 'the sacred road through which the Pythais (a delegation to Delphi) proceeds to Delphi'.[108] It was along this same road, reports Ephoros,[109] that Apollo first arrived in Delphi. Aeschylus both refers to the Athenians escorting Apollo to Delphi (*Eum.* 12–14) and evokes the ship (*theōris*) sent every year by the Athenians for Apollo on Delos (9D). The point from which distances from Athens were measured was an altar, of the Twelve Gods, which – if the site of a public hearth (4A) – would easily be imagined as the centre of the city and so generally of geographic space.

A rite of passage at or near the periphery of a polis, preceded by a processional movement from its centre, includes the enactment of its *aition* that tells of the cult being founded there by someone arrived from well beyond Attica. This description of the Eleusinian mysteries applies for the most part[110] also to the Oschophoria, with its procession to the harbour at Phaleron for the annual celebration of the victorious return of Theseus from Crete.[111] A difference is that the Eleusinian mysteries gain access also to cosmic space (the underworld). True, at the Oschophoria too the remote space is a place of death (the Cretan labyrinth), and the death of Aigeus, caused by imagined death of his son Theseus, is evoked in the ritual.[112] But the labyrinth is merely geographically (rather than cosmically) remote, a place of barbarian savagery that once – it was imagined – dominated Athens.

This makes the Oschophoria political, albeit in a way different from the Eleusinian festival.[113] It resembles rather another coastal cult. In Euripides'

[107] Parker (2005) 55–6, 69, 80–7. [108] Lalonde *et al.* H34. [109] *FGrH* 70 F31b.

[110] Elements of a rite of passage in the Oschophoria are collected by Parker (2005): 209–10, 216–17, but he prefers the term 'ephebes' rite'.

[111] Enactment of the myth at the festival: Plut. *Thes.* 22–3. [112] Plut. *Thes.* 22.

[113] Another kind of political significance is implied by the suggestion that the genos called Salaminioi owed their role as organisers of this marginal festival to their own territorial marginality as originally inhabitants of Salamis: Osborne (1994) 158.

Iphigeneia in Tauris, set on the north coast of the Black Sea, Iphigeneia is required to sacrifice any arriving Greeks, and nearly sacrifices Orestes. At the end of play Athena gives instructions for their return (1435–74). Orestes is to take the image of Artemis Tauropolos to Halai, 'at the furthest borders of Attica', and build there a temple for it. The image will be 'named after the Taurian land and your sufferings which you endured as you roamed throughout Greece, goaded by the Erinues (Furies)'. As for Iphigeneia, she is to serve the goddess as key-keeper at Brauron (less than four miles from Halai), where she will eventually be buried. The two sanctuaries appear to be linked by Euripides, and Artemis could be imagined as Tauropolos at Brauron too.[114] It was believed that (non-Greek) Pelasgians from Lemnos had once kidnapped from Brauron by sea Athenian women who were celebrating the Brauronia festival.[115]

These coastal sanctuaries with their rituals define Attic territory both externally and internally. They face outwards, towards the savagery of barbarians beyond the sea, but also inwards, in their connection with the urban centre. Just as the Eleusinian procession started at the Eleusinion (at the foot of the Acropolis),[116] and a procession moved from Athens to Phaleron, so too the Brauronion (on the Acropolis)[117] was probably the starting point of the procession to Brauron for the Brauronia festival.[118]

Also associated with the Brauronia[119] was the Brauronian *arkteia*, a rite of passage for young girls, who became for a time 'bears' (here or at the coastal sanctuary of Artemis at Mounychia) as a preliminary to marriage.[120] The chorus-members of Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (640–5) are proud to have been 'a bear at the Brauronia' as part of their education by the polis. Whether the bearish savagery was imagined as inhering in the girls, and so to be purified before marriage (as an ancient source puts it),[121] or as external to them (notably as future death in childbirth),[122] it was imitated by the girls so as to be accommodated, controlled, tamed.

[114] Tsouni (2002) 122, 127. [115] Hdt. 6.138; cf. Plut. *Sol.* 8 (Halimous).
[116] See also *IG* I³ 84.35–6, which refers to 'the gate by which the *mustai* [initiands] march to the sea'.
[117] Possibly already in the sixth century but certainly in the fifth: Osborne (1985) 154–7; Cole (2004) 195–6.
[118] Parker (2005) 52; Cole (2004) 195. For the procession (*theōria* rather than *pompē*) see Ar. *Peace* 871–6; Peppas-Delmousou (1988) argues for a ritualised connection between Brauron and Delos under the Athenian tyrants. Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F101 mentions *kanephoroi* (cf. Parker (2005) 248–9). On the bringing of Artemis to the urban centre in various city-states see Cole (2004) 195.
[119] Parker (2005) 230–1. [120] Parker (2005) 233–48.
[121] *Anecd. Gr.* 1 445 Bekker; cf. Schol. Theocr. 2.66.
[122] So Parker (2005) 247–8, who concludes: 'By becoming bears, by encasing the savage force in their own weak frames, they rendered it familiar and tame.'

Such imitative control of savagery is analogous to what Artemis says to Orestes about her festival at Halai: 'in recompense for your slaying, let someone hold a sword against a man's throat and make blood flow' (E. *IT* 1459–60). Aetiological savagery from afar is experienced in a controlled form.[123] Cult set in wild terrain both marks the periphery of the polis and enacts a liminal stage in its sexual reproduction. It integrates into the polis – in a controlled form – the savagery of the barbarians beyond the sea as well as the savagery affecting Athenian wives-to-be. It controls dangerous transitions in space and in time.[124]

Some border cults did in fact mediate relations with potentially dangerous outsiders.[125] Homeric epic has neither rural sanctuaries nor any conception of political borders between city-states (IA). To the subsequent establishment of such borders a sanctuary might contribute as a symbolic container of potential disruption and therefore, more specifically, as a place of mediation between neighbouring communities. The peripherally located rite of passage to adulthood, such as we have found at Brauron, at Mounychia, and (in an attenuated or largely symbolic form) at Phaleron, was traditionally a pivotal means for the community to maintain its identity through time. It seems that with the development of the polis it may contribute also to maintaining its definition in space.[126]

The coastal orientation of Phaleron and Mounychia is southwards, of Halai and Brauron eastwards. The Eleusinian sanctuary is also peripherally located, not far from the land border with Megara towards the west.[127] It too was in myth associated with a barbarian threat to Athens.[128] And it too was the destination of a procession from Athens for a rite of passage that enacted and accommodated the dangers of remote aetiological space. But there are important differences. The excursion is not to a wild uncultivated area such as Brauron but to an area rich in agriculture, the site (in the *Demeter Hymn*) of *dēmos* and polis. The rite of passage is not of a few (representative? elite?) young people into adulthood but rather of a mass of

[123] Whereas the *aitia* express the extreme, e.g. that on the Black Sea coast there were actual human sacrifices, just as in the *arkteia* myth a bear is killed.

[124] For Artemis with this dual role see Cole (2004) 178–97.

[125] De Polignac (1995) 36, 75–6.

[126] Seaford (1994a) 252.

[127] A sacred piece of land (ἱερὰ ὀργάς) between Athens and Megara was left uncultivated under the protection of the Eleusinian goddess: Schol. Thuc. 1.139.2.

[128] Eumolpos (the eponymous ancestor of the priests at Eleusis) was the Thracian leader of a Thracian army in alliance with the Eleusinians against Athens, in a war that ended with the foundation of cults central to the Athenian polis: Parker (1987).

adults (male or female, slave or free, Athenian or non-Athenian) into the next world.

There remains the land border to the north, with Boiotia. In the north-eastern passage was the Amphiaraon, founded in the mid to late fifth century (a period of Athenian control) near Oropus, in territory first settled by Eretria and subsequently disputed between Athens and Thebes.[129] Here we know almost nothing of public cult. But at a permeable point of the north-western border, just south of Mt Kithairon, was the village of Eleutherai. Here, says Pausanias (1.38.8), was once the boundary with Boiotia, but Eleutherai came over voluntarily to the Athenians, making the boundary Kithairon. He adds that the ancient image of Dionysos was brought from there to Athens. This Dionysos presided over the City Dionysia, to which we will return in Part II.

2H CONCLUSION

The *Demeter Hymn* narrates an *aition* that establishes by divine authority not only the universal significance of Eleusis, the birthplace of Aeschylus, but also various components of a polis: the memory of the marginalisation of the ruling household, a temple built by the people, agricultural space, the cohesion of a ritual for all that celebrates the arrival of a deity from afar.

Eleusinian initation was open to Greek-speaking humankind. The extraordinary cohesion of the group was created by the ritual alone, and depended on neither gender nor kinship nor locality of residence nor even citizenship. It did depend on understanding of the ritual utterances and on the enhancement of group definition by the secrecy of the ritual, which in its paradoxical combination with the universal intake may have created a sense of the possibility of universal cohesion. In transcending Athenian citizenship, it cohered with the panhellenic aspirations of the Athenian polis, its pride as the source of Demeter's benefits for humankind[130] and its pride – frequently manifested in tragedy – in having welcomed outsiders.[131] Herakles, for instance, was initiated at Eleusis.[132] Finally, the cohesion, power and universality of the ritual were inseparable from its access – again established by Demeter – to cosmic interconnection.

Eleusinian mystery-cult exemplifies how a ritual with its aetiological chronotope may express the needs of a developing polis. It was an important

[129] Parker (1996) 146–9. [130] Corn and mystery-cult: Isocr. *Panegyr.* 27–31.
[131] Isocr. *Panath.* 169 (referring to tragedy). [132] Alluded to at e.g. E. *HF* 614.

influence on Aeschylean tragedy,[133] but of course remained in the place where Demeter had fixed it. The cult in which tragedy came into being was of Dionysos Eleuthereus, whose image had been brought from the border of Attica to Athens. But before coming to the genesis of tragedy we must first devote a chapter to a transformation of social relations that accompanied – and was no less fundamental than – the creation of the polis.

[133] Chapter 10 n. 12.

CHAPTER 3

From reciprocity to money

In the previous chapter we described an instance of the transformation of the *reciprocal* chronotope into the *aetiological*. In this one we give various instances of its transformation into (or marginalisation by) the *monetised* chronotope.

3A POLIS, COSMOS AND MONEY

The *space* constituting the polis is a limited area that is united by a privileged centre and – in contrast to say feudal space – relatively homogeneous.[1] The Athenian polis maintains its homogeneous identity in *time* by an identical cycle of office-holding etc. (repeated circularity tends to homogenise linear sequence), while also imagining a temporal limit, a mythical time when the polis did not yet exist.[2] Although the analogy here between space and time is weak,[3] we may perhaps speak of a *polis chronotope*. However, we shall not make much use of the concept, because to express its identity in ritual the polis uses the transitionality of the *aetiological chronotope*. Aetiological space, unlike polis space, is external as well as internal to the polis, but lacks the practical *territoriality* of polis space. Polis space is created and maintained by a combination of aetiological space and territoriality.[4]

Territoriality has been defined as 'the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area'.

[1] Although Hippodamos of Miletos, active in the mid fifth century, produces a differentiated schema of polis space: Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet (1996) 81–5.

[2] On the myths of the foundation of Athens see Parker (1987).

[3] In part because the myths of Kekrops and Erechtheus/Erichthonios express the *autochthony* of the Athenians, which bestows on the community a kind of unlimited temporal continuity.

[4] The focus of this book is on Athens. But similar processes will have occurred elsewhere (in a special form in colonisation: Dougherty (1993)). For the territoriality of Athens as a special case see de Polignac (1995).

Territoriality 'in the modern world is often an essential feature of defining social relationships . . . This use of territoriality – to define belonging in a community – occurs to a somewhat lesser degree in pre-modern civilizations, but occurs hardly, if at all, in primitive societies where social relationships are so clearly and strongly upheld.' Territoriality does occur in hunter–gatherer societies, in which however it 'depends on the distribution of resources over space and time', whereas 'agricultural communities tend to be territorial as a whole and tend to subdivide land within the community, and these tendencies increase as population densities increase'.[5] The polis is territorial, but the reciprocal chronotope is not. Aetiological space, for instance in the *Demeter Hymn*, is not necessarily territorial, but may be used in a polis festival to express territoriality, as occurred in Attica (2FG).

The space of the polis is taken by Vernant to be the model for the earliest known 'philosophical' cosmology. In contrast to monarchy, in the polis citizens are ruled by impersonal law, before which they are equal. And this equality is expressed also in the symmetrical organisation of space around a centre – 'middle' (*meson*) or 'common hearth' – in which the citizens participate, a 'geometrical scheme of reversible relationships governed by equilibrium and reciprocity between equals'. It is this, for Vernant, that provides the model for the cosmology of Anaximander, in which the reciprocal relations between the elements are held in equilibrium by an egalitarian order, and space is symmetrically ordered around a centre occupied by the earth.

I have criticised this account in detail elsewhere.[6] Here I take the critique further, but only in so far as it concerns *space*.

Vernant's account contains some truth. The idea of space symmetrically ordered around a central earth no doubt does reflect egalitarian political organisation (*isonomia*) around a centre. But how is power exercised? Aristotle almost certainly maintained that for Anaximander everything is surrounded and steered by *to apeiron* ('the unlimited'). Simplicius, drawing on Theophrastos, states that Anaximander made *to apeiron* the principle and element of existing things, and goes on to describe it as an *apeiros* nature, from which all the heavens and the *cosmoi* in them come into being. He then gives us what are probably[7] the words of Anaximander (B1) himself (and so his only surviving sentence):

[5] Sack (1986) 19, 27, 59. [6] Seaford (2004a) 180 n. 30, 187–8, 191–8. Vernant (2006).
[7] Not least because his next words are 'describing it thus in rather poetical terms'.

And from which [things] existing things have their genesis, into these also occurs their perishing, according to necessity. For they give penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the *taxis* ('arrangement, disposition') of time.

Note first that – as elsewhere in presocratic philosophy[8] – there is no mention here of cosmic *law*. It is generally agreed that it is the opposites, such as hot and cold, that are here paying the penalty to each other. In their reciprocal encroachment the equal opposites perish into and emerge from the *apeiron*. On Vernant's hypothesis we would expect that universal power combined with involvement in the process of reciprocity between equals would belong to cosmic *law*. But in fact it belongs to the *apeiron*, which is not located at the centre of a bounded space, in a way that would reflect the space of the polis, but is unlimited, surrounding all things as well as being their source and destination. The *apeiron* is fundamental to the cosmos. And so – given that Vernant believes (rightly) that cosmology is a projection of society – the question must be: what is there in society that corresponds to the *apeiron*? Vernant does not even ask the question.[9]

The answer may seem counter-intuitive. It is *monetary value*. Besides surrounding and steering all things, the *apeiron* in a sense contains all things, which emerge from and pass back into it. It is unlike all other things and separate from them. It is in eternal motion. It precedes and outlasts (the genesis and perishing of) all other things, and is immortal and indestructible. Despite its universal power, it is impersonal. It is unlimited, but imposes limits. It is also internally unlimited (i.e. undifferentiated, homogeneous). Despite all this, it is imperceptible, and so abstract (or semi-abstract). And it unites opposites. This is all we know about the *apeiron*, and all of it applies also to monetary value.[10]

Moreover, this also allows us to make sense of the surviving sentence of Anaximander. The cosmic process it describes, ordered by the *taxis* of time, is the projection of a political process of social integration. To that extent Vernant is right. Inasmuch as no opposite maintains dominance, there is something like a cosmic *isonomia*. The reciprocal encroachment of the opposites is a synthesis of the cyclicality of nature with the cycle of reciprocal revenge, in which retribution seems just to the perpetrator but to the victim seems to demand just retribution. The fundamental importance of the *apeiron*, of which Vernant can give no account, embodies the

[8] Hklt. B114 is not an exception: Seaford (2004a) 202 n. 74. [9] Seaford (2004a) 190–3, 202.
[10] Seaford (2004a) 205–7. Were all this – as has been suggested to me – to apply equally to Homeric *phusis*, it would do so only by a complex process of inference (the word *phusis* occurs in Homer only at *Od.* 10.303, of a herb).

universal power of money, here as standard compensation (or penalty),[11] to neutralise vendetta by absorbing it into itself, into the universe of monetary value. By depersonalising injury, the universal power of money reconciles the opposing parties, and this is projected as the systematic reabsorption of the opposites (thereby no longer opposites) into the impersonal, universal, homogeneous and somewhat abstract *apeiron*.[12] The *cosmic power* of monarchy has been inherited not by *isonomia*, as Vernant maintains, but by money.

Anaximander's is not the only presocratic cosmos that has been unconsciously shaped by the ubiquitous power of money. The three elements of this argument set out at length in my *Money and the Early Greek Mind* (2004) can here be only briefly restated.[13]

Firstly, central instruments of social integration tend, at least in premodern societies, to be consciously or unconsciously projected onto the cosmos. The trans-individual comprehensiveness of power is reified as transcendent. This is obvious enough in myths of e.g. Moira, which means 'fate' because it means 'distribution',[14] and Zeus's *monarchy*. It would be surprising if it did not occur with the new instrument of social integration, impersonal but seemingly all-powerful, that pervaded the polis from the early sixth century.

Secondly, the revolution in thought marked by presocratic cosmology occurred at exactly the same time and exactly the same place as the first society in history that was pervasively monetised, by the invention and rapid spread of coinage: early sixth-century Ionia, more specifically the leading commercial power, Miletos.

Thirdly, Anaximander's *apeiron* is no more than one instance of the astonishing analogy between the structure of the presocratic cosmos and the structure of money. This does not of course mean that the cosmos can ever *be* money or be *reducible* to money. In its projection onto the cosmos numerous other factors may be involved.[15]

[11] Chapter 3 n. 27. [12] For detail see Seaford (2004a) 201–5.

[13] One objection advances the possibility that coinage was itself the product of the new mentality that produced presocratic philosophy. This leaves the new mentality unexplained, whereas the invention and spread of coinage is explicable by the practical needs and possibilities within the specific historical conjuncture in which it occurred. I do accept that the introduction of coined money was just one element of a general transformation of the archaic polis both internally and in its external relations. My emphasis was on the growth of trade, the availability of electrum, and distinctive religious practices (animal sacrifice and mystery-cult), all of which are – I concede – inseparable from the complex processes of a broader context. This does not however affect my insistence on the specific *influence* of monetisation on presocratic cosmology and tragedy.

[14] Seaford (2004a) 51 n. 27. [15] Seaford (2004a) 11–12 (esp. n. 40).

To illustrate this projection, we will select two features of money (and of Anaximander's *apeiron*) that are most relevant to our themes of space and time: *unlimitedness* and *homogeneity*.

One aspect of the unlimitedness of money is its unlimited *accumulation*. In the pre-monetary world of Homer unlimited accumulation (of prestige goods such as tripods) would have been absurd and pointless.[16] And the code of reciprocity limits the accumulation of wealth by the obligation to give.[17] But once precious metal money can be impersonally exchanged for many goods and services, now and in the future, here and elsewhere, as well as easily stored, concealed, and transported, then its unlimited accumulation will make sense. We first hear of this unlimitedness in the poetry attributed[18] to Solon,[19] and then in Aeschylus, Aristophanes and Aristotle.[20] Such unlimitedness – of abstract value – is familiar to us, but at its first-ever appearance was surely puzzling, imaginable only as concrete, as occupying space. In Aeschylus it is imagined in terms of the sea.[21] Solon says (*fr.* 13.71) that no *terma* ('end, limit, boundary') of wealth 'having appeared for men is set up (πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται)'. The visible boundary marker is only partly metaphorical, for Solon was alarmed at the seemingly unlimited expansion of abstract value embodied in land. He has to deal with the consequent enslavement through debt. Whereas in the code of reciprocity the poor cannot owe more than they can give, the new general power of money seems to inhere in itself, is *impersonal*, and so reifies obligation, creating the idea of a general objective necessity (quantified debt).

There is a sense, moreover, in which money is indeed spatially and temporally unlimited. Being valued for its exchange value (especially in the highly convenient form of coinage) rather than any use value, its acceptance as payment depends on confidence in its future acceptability elsewhere. For money to function, its value must be imagined as the same in different places and in the future. It aspires to acceptability unlimited in space (and time), and in practice the dynamic of its convenience tends to push the limits further outwards. Coinage, soon after its invention, spreads rapidly among the Greek city-states of western Asia Minor and the eastern

[16] The crucial difference here between *large* and *unlimited* is illustrated by the absurdity of accumulating ten billion tripods (as opposed to ten billion drachmas). Significantly, by far the largest (tending towards unlimited) aggregate of wealth in Homer is what Achilles imagines *rejecting* from Agamemnon, to express the breakdown of reciprocity and to valorise (uniquely in Homer) his *psuchē* (*Il.* 9.378–411): 14c; Seaford (2004a) 301–3.

[17] Seaford (1994a), (2004a) 292–8; Tandy (1997).

[18] For the problem of its authenticity see most recently Blok and Lardinois (2006); uncoined silver money is already apparent in the laws of Solon (Seaford (2004a) 90–3).

[19] *Fr.* 13.71–3. Cf. 3c. [20] Seaford (2004a) 165–9. [21] *Ag.* 958–62; Seaford (1998) 123–31.

Aegean, and coins are soon found well beyond the borders of their issuing polis. In the lifetime of Aeschylus Athenian coinage was hoarded as far afield as Egypt and Sicily, and Athens was receiving tribute in the form of precious metal money from numerous 'allies' in the Aegean, de facto subjects of the first ever monetised empire, within which Athenian coinage eventually became dominant.[22] The fundamental medium of domination is this tribute money, which at the City Dionysia will be displayed in the theatre.[23]

At the same time money seems unlimited not only in accumulatability and in space (and time) but also in its *exchangeability* for more and more goods. The homogeneity to which the metal of money aspires is perfected by the coin stamp, which superimposes ideal or abstract value onto metallic value and so renders metallic variations irrelevant. Further, this abstract homogeneity *homogenises*: by its universal exchangeability, by being assigned to all goods, abstract value seems to underlie them all, to assimilate them to itself. Even those remote from each other in space and time participate in, and so are united by, the same abstraction. The result is that abstract value seems to be concretely extended in space and time, as well as – being unlimited, all-powerful, and abstract – to transcend both space and time.

Monetisation also tends to replace traditional modes of exchange (reciprocal giving, redistribution, barter)[24] with a new kind of (impersonal) transaction, monetary 'purchase', embodying a relationship of mutual absolute egoism: the transactors are opposed to each other in that in principle each tries to obtain maximum advantage for himself. The unlimitedness and seeming self-sufficency[25] of money contrast with earlier instruments of social integration such as kinship, ritual, reciprocity, and sacred space. For instance, the temporal and spatial limitation implicit in ritual has an integrative function (7AB); and in the old code of reciprocity accumulation is limited by the obligation to give.

The antagonism implicit in purchase assimilates it to revenge. Purchase and revenge share a vocabulary,[26] and in both of them there is (in contrast to gift-exchange) *necessity*. For Anaximander the opposites perish into the

[22] Figueira (1998), e.g. 555.

[23] Isocrates (*On the Peace* 82) describes this as a long-established practice. Kennedy (2006) rightly argues that Aeschylean geography is not so much ornamental as an expression of Athenian *power*. I add that the power of *money* influences conceptions of geographic space.

[24] On the relative unimportance of barter and its fundamental difference from monetised exchange see Seaford (2004a) 155–6, 292.

[25] 7B, 9C, 11C.

[26] Τίνειν and ἐκτίνειν are used of paying (and πράττειν and ἐκπράττειν of exacting) revenge, penalty, compensation or price (not gifts). And so the rare instances of τίνειν being used for recompense for benefit imply necessity: e.g. *Ag.* 822. All four words are used in *Oresteia*.

apeiron 'according to necessity (*chreōn*)', which may imply debt (*chreos*). Moreover, the regulation of revenge by the universal power of money resembles purchase. In the laws of Solon, which are contemporary with Anaximander, agreement is obtained by an injury being exchanged not for an injury (a kind of barter) but for a sum of money.[27] In both purchase and regulated revenge a relationship of mere opposition between the parties is – in contrast to the continuing relationships of gift-exchange and vendetta – neutralised by money payment into no relationship at all. True, money has value only as participating in future exchanges, and in this sense purchase does in a sense belong – like the vendetta – to a continuing cycle, but with the crucial difference that in purchase the continuity is in the identity of the money not of the parties.

Money – all-underlying, impersonal, and depersonalising – absorbs and so neutralises opposition both in the old cycle of vengeance and in the new cycle of purchase. This historical transition is in Anaximander projected onto the cosmos. As in Homer (IAB), time and space are imagined in terms of the social practice of reciprocity, but reciprocity is now being transformed by monetisation and by the polis so as to produce a very different cosmos, systematic and largely impersonal, in which time – so far from being reciprocal – is abstracted to impose limit and order on reciprocity. For Anaximander there is a *taxis* ('order') of time, and for the reformer Solon time has a lawcourt (*fr.* 36.3).

The opposites, in this projection of human onto material process, are not only the opposed human agents but also their material injuries or commodities that are equivalent to, exchanged for – and so imagined as transformed into – money (the *apeiron*). So it is also in the cosmos of Herakleitos of Ephesos, except that now – in the generation after the death of Anaximander, with monetised purchase having pervaded society still further – what is projected is merely the cycle of purchases. Various features of Herakleitean cosmology can be shown to be projections of the monetised economy. Notably, the Herakleitean fire is explicitly compared to gold as exchangeable for all things (B90), and moreover – just like money – is concrete and yet somehow contains the abstract *logos*, which in the fifth century could mean monetary as well as verbal account.[28]

The idea of the unity of opposites, which is in Anaximander merely implicit (in their mutual absorption into the *apeiron*), has become central to the cosmology of Herakleitos. This expresses the socially integrative centrality of the antagonistic agreement (unity of opposites) inherent in

[27] Solon F26, 30, 32, 33, 65 Ruschenbusch (1966). [28] For detail see Seaford (2004a) Ch. 12.

monetised exchange: not only are all goods, however different, united in the same system of numerical value, but this homogenisation also unites in agreement those whose relationship – *qua* transactors in a monetised transaction – is merely antagonistic. Money, in Theognis and in tragedy, unites opposites,[29] and in Aristotle 'equalises' people.[30] For Herakleitos everything happens according to strife and necessity (*chreōn*), which – as in the Anaximandrean cosmic process – may imply the idea of debt (*chreos*). And strife, he maintains, is justice.[31]

Even from this brief sample of the influence of money on presocratic cosmology we can begin to see the contours of what I call the *monetised chronotope*. Because abstract value seems to extend in space and time, and yet to transcend all things, there emerges an unprecedented model of space and time. All things in the cosmos consist of a single (more or less abstract) substance that is homogeneous and eternal: the 'unlimited' of Anaximander, the air of Anaximenes, the fire of Herakleitos, and so on. Anaximander's 'unlimited' may mean without external limit (i.e. of infinite extent) or without internal limit (i.e. continuously homogeneous), or both. It also lacks temporal limits.[32] In our surviving sentence of Anaximander the conflict between opposites, deriving in part from the cyclicality of nature (day–night, the seasons), is absorbed into the 'unlimited': this embodies the historical transition from the reciprocal to the monetised chronotope.

Herakleitos' *kosmos* is a (homogeneous) fire, and has no temporal limits: 'the *kosmos*, the same for all things, was not made by god or man but always was and is and will be an ever-living fire' (B30). And the fire in some way underlies the constant transformation of opposites into each other. The soul, which is composed of cosmic fire, has no spatial limits (B45). But the universal homogeneity of abstract value is expressed most perfectly, completely divorced from its circulation, by Parmenides, for whom the continuously homogeneous One, eternal and abstract, is all that exists.[33] Herakleitos and Parmenides both represent a new conception of (monetised) time, without beginning or end, but for Parmenides there is not even cyclicality.

Besides homogeneous abstraction and unlimitedness, a third feature of monetised space is non-directionality ('absolute' space). 'The way up and down is one and the same' (Hklt. B60). This unity of spatial opposites

[29] Seaford (2004a) 170–1. [30] *EN* 1133a17–21; Seaford (2004a) 152.
[31] B80; cf. A22. Harmony, justice and unity consist in conflict between two forces: B8, B10, B51, B52, etc: Seaford (2004a) 239.
[32] 'Immortal and indestructible': B3 (cf. B2).
[33] Seaford (2004a) 244–65 (for the explanation of its limitation in space see 244–9).

represents extreme homogeneity: there is not even the abstract differentiation of opposite directions. The universal homogeneity of money mediates or absorbs opposition – opposition between parties to exchange and opposition between opposed spatial perspectives. It is the crucially *impersonal* universality of money that neutralises the particularity of perspective underlying directionality. The closest temporal analogy is the cycle, in which time in going forward is in fact returning to the same point.

Similarly, for Anaximander the earth is held in place not by resting on something, which would mean distinct upward and downward directions, but by virtue of its similar distance from all things. It has been said that this 'theory of equilibrium was a brilliant leap into the realms of the mathematical and the *a priori*'.[34] This is not just brilliance. We may concede to Vernant that it is influenced by the symmetrical space of the polis, but also insist that is influenced too by the projection of the monetised chronotope (universal, abstract, homogeneous) – in so far as it is possible to impose on what is bounded and partially visible (earth) what is more freely projected by the imagination onto the cosmos as the *apeiron*.

Coming to what is even more accessible to sight, monetisation influences the conception also of *geographic* space.

3B MONETISED GEOGRAPHY

Anaximander, who produced the first extant account of systematic and absolute cosmic space, was also said to have produced the first ever *map* of the inhabited earth.[35] And in fact evidence for earlier maps barely exists.[36] Perhaps the first kind of map was of the whole earth.

The possibility of a map requires the idea, found also in the Homeric shield of Achilles, that the earth is bounded. But the map differed from the Homeric list of places in three ways. Firstly, it was a complete representation of the *whole* earth. Secondly it was *systematic*, representing the spatial relation of each place to every other. Thirdly, it represented these spatial relations not verbally but spatially, and so was *abstract*.

This tendency towards comprehensive and systematic abstraction did not become universal (for instance Aristophanes' Strepsiades amusingly fails to grasp the abstractness of maps),[37] but was not confined to

[34] KRS (1983) 134 [35] KRS 104–5.

[36] There are at most crude diagrams, of which one on a Babylonian clay tablet has been called a map of the world, but it may well postdate Anaximander, and may not even be a map: Kahn (1960) 83; BM 92687; reproduced and described by Unger (1935) 312–14.

[37] Ar., *Clouds* 202–17. Strepsiades' misunderstandings are practical and political: e.g. he understands geometry as measuring land for distribution in lots to citizens. Cf. (for maps in fifth-century Greece)

Anaximander. Herodotos (4.36) mentions maps that show the earth as circular, with Okeanos running round it (as on the Homeric shield), and Asia as equal in size to Europe. The earliest cartographic conception of geographic space was characterised also by a degree of *symmetry*. The systematicity, abstraction and homogeneity that are manifest in Anaximander's *apeiron*, and that I relate to monetisation, have some influence also on the combination of experience and imagination with which men imagined the surface of the earth. Homogeneity is imposed on variation in space by symmetry, rather as it is imposed on *temporal* sequence by repeated circularity (3A).

How did the Greeks arrive at this new conception of geographic space? The obvious answer is through expanding knowledge of the world, which in turn resulted from trade and colonisation. The city of Anaximander, Miletos, was in his time especially well placed in this regard, with colonies and trading links from the Black Sea to Egypt and from southern Italy to the Levant.[38] Anaximander himself was said to have established a colony on the Black Sea.[39]

This answer is pertinent, but insufficient. Itineraries, consisting of lists of places, may embody detailed knowledge of remote places. It is not just greater knowledge that produces the new conception of space, but greater knowledge *for a new purpose*. If that purpose was trade, then we need to specify what exactly it is about the activity of trade that required the new conception.

In the time of Anaximander, in the wide area within which Miletos was commercially dominant, commerce was no doubt frequently conducted with the benefit of pre-existing reciprocal relations established by the exchange of gifts. In the only act of commerce[40] in the *Iliad*, between Euneos and the Greek army, Euneos first gives gifts to Greek leaders. By the time of Anaximander commerce was being facilitated also by the acceptability of precious metal (uncoined and coined), and by the rapid geographical expansion of coinage.

The general acceptability of precious metal promotes the possibility of exchange even where there are no (or weak) pre-existing relations of positive reciprocity. Space comes to be envisaged no longer as consisting of *itineraries*, of sequences (or networks) of places each of which provides

Hdt. 5.49; Aelian, *VH* 3.28. Plut. *Nik*. 12.1 and *Alkib*. 17.3–4 describe (perhaps unreliably: cf. Thuc. 6.1) Athenians, just before the Sicilian expedition, sketching Sicily and its relation to Libya; they do so in urban public places (by contrast, Strepsiades is a rustic).

[38] Seaford (2004a) 198–200. [39] Aelian, *VH* 3.17 (12 A4 DK).

[40] Other than selling slaves: Seaford (2004a) 25 (*Il*. 7.467–75).

hospitality and confirms positive reciprocity (as in e.g. the journey of Telemachos in the *Odyssey*), but as an *area* within which precious metal is becoming generally acceptable in payment or exchange (i.e. as money).[41] Barter is relatively ritualised and relatively reliant on pre-existing networks, whereas money tends to create areas, or a single large area, that contain ubiquitous possibilities for (relatively impersonal) exchange. Such an area would be envisaged as homogeneous not only as uniformly providing such possibilities but also as measuring and exchanging everything through a single homogeneous medium (money), with the result that in the end much of the known world may seem pervaded and unified by the acceptability of a single medium of payment and exchange.

Money emanating from a polis exercises power beyond its borders. This is not the kind of power exercised by a polis universally within its borders (territoriality), based ultimately on physical control. But it does inhere in physical objects, and does aspire to (and may even obtain) universality; and in this combination of respects it differs from other forms of power over the exterior, such as that obtained through a code of reciprocity (alliance) or through ideology. Does the power of money therefore involve a kind of territoriality?

Territoriality is not an area or framework that pre-exists action, it is rather 'the primary spatial form power takes', and 'provides a means of reifying power'. 'The many controls over things in space . . . become condensed to the view that things need space to exist.'[42] The form taken by the universal reified power of money is spatial, i.e. territorial. The area formed by territoriality is – because created to be a 'reliable background'[43] for the exercise of power – itself an abstraction, which may merge, in the imagination, with the powerful abstraction of monetary value. And it is the dynamic of unlimitedness at the heart of money, including spatial unlimitedness (3A), that tends to extend this powerful abstract substance to encompass (in the unconscious imagination of Anaximander and others) all geographic space and, beyond that, the whole cosmos. Though a map must have boundaries, money tends to create in the imagination the paradox of an unlimited abstract territoriality.

[41] A nice example, albeit from much later, is provided by Kreon urging his son to go as far from Thebes as possible, to Dodona (E. *Pho*. 977–85). There is no mention of any personal connection there, but Kreon will provide his son with precious metal.

[42] Sack (1986) 26, 23, 33.

[43] 'The prime function of territoriality is precisely the thing that makes its true and most useful nature so elusive: to provide sufficient organisation, structure, and predictability to be allowed to fade into a reliable background which the occupant does not have to concern himself with, but which is crucial for the subsequent development of more advanced behaviours and . . . efforts' (Edney (1976) 43).

While proposing that money is a factor in the sixth-century social construction of geographic and cosmic space, we nevertheless allowed (3a) that polis space may have influenced cosmology.[44] And we allow here that the polis could be imagined some way beyond its borders. Territoriality tends to 'engender more territoriality'.[45] Thales of Miletos not only believed that all things were made of a single thing (water) but also proposed (Hdt. 1.170) that the Ionians should set up a common government in a central position, in relation to which the other Ionian cities would be like the demes of a polis.

3c sixth-century attica

In the sixth century the formation of Athenian *polis* space deployed *aetiological* space, and occurred along with the development of monetised space. Polis space and monetised space are both *areas*, but whereas the former is limited the latter is unlimited. Ancient historical narratives of sixth-century Attica were written around a few individuals. These narratives will now be explored for traces of the interplay between political, aetiological and monetised space.

(1) Solon

Solon states that it is 'only' the hidden measure of intelligence that 'holds the limits (*peirata*) of all things' (*fr.* 16). The implication is that otherwise 'all things' would be unlimited. This is the only cosmological remark in the poetry of Solon, and it reminds us of the only surviving sentence of his contemporary across the Aegean, Anaximander (3a).

But whereas for Anaximander 'the unlimited' (*to apeiron*) is what everything passes from and into and is steered by,[46] for Solon there are ultimately limits, albeit provided only by the intelligence. Why the similarity, and why the difference?

In the course of the sixth century Athens' external trade greatly increased, and monetisation was intensified by the introduction of coinage (probably in about the middle of the century) and by precious metal brought from Thrace by Peisistratos.[47] From about the end of the century Athens continued to acquire much precious metal from its own land (at Laurium),

[44] And vice versa: e.g. Ar., *Birds* 1007–8.

[45] Sack (1986) 34. 'When events extend over greater areas than do the territories, new territorities are generated for these events.'

[46] B3, cf. B2; Kahn (1958); Seaford (2004a) 192.

[47] Hdt. 1.64; *Ath. pol.* 15.

the only substantial polis to do so. The Athenians had, as Aeschylus puts it, 'a spring of silver, a treasury in the earth' (*Pers.* 238).

Under the rule (527–510) of the tyrant Hippias there were Ionian poets at Athens and recitations of the Ionian Homeric epic, in what Solon had called the 'oldest land (*gaia*) of Ionia' (*fr.* 4a). Although we know of no Ionian cosmologist settling in Athens before Anaxagoras (*c.* 500–428), Ionian cosmology had in all likelihood reached Athens in Aeschylus' youth. Any receptivity of Athens to such ideas was probably enhanced by its development into the kind of monetised polis in which Ionian cosmology had first emerged. In a parallel development, the political and metaphysical doctrines of Pythagoreanism were said to have been brought to the colonies of southern Italy, at about the same time as the introduction of coinage there, by Pythagoras from Ionian Samos.

Miletos and Athens were within the same cultural milieu, and were both monetised. But however receptive (or otherwise) to the new cosmology, Athens remained distinct from the type of polis represented by Miletos. Miletos had 'next to no arable land'[48] but dominated the sea, and accordingly its internal conflict was between the *Ploutis* (wealthy, also called *Aeinautai*, 'perpetual sailors') and the *Cheiromacha* (manual strugglers) – no doubt over the wealth accumulated through the unlimitedness of money in the widespread Milesian commercial hegemony. The Athenian polis, by contrast, was formed to defend a large agricultural territory defined by rituals and sanctuaries (2c), and its internal conflict between rich and poor was – in the time of Solon at least – over the individual monetised accumulation of agricultural land within the confines of the polis.

This conflict became a political crisis that Solon was appointed (probably *c.* 593) to resolve.[49] The poetry attributed to him complains that wealth, and the desire for it, are unlimited.[50] Just as the task of Solon as wise reformer was to devise limits to the appropriation of space by money, so in his cosmology it is only intelligence that provides ultimate limits. The potential unlimitedness of his cosmos expresses – as does the 'the unlimited' of Anaximander – the unlimitedness of money (and so of the ownership of land), to which Solon – in contrast to Anaximander – had to devise a limit. The only recorded practical activity of Anaximander was to lead a colony into the remote distance, the shores of the Black Sea. For Athens too money transcended polis space, but in the export of indebted Athenian farmers

[48] Möller (2000) 87–8. [49] Recent scholarship on Solon: Blok and Lardinois (2006).
[50] *Fr.* 13.71–3; also 4.11–13, 4c2, 6.3.

as slaves.[51] Money is unlimited in accumulation, in exchangeability, and in extension beyond the borders of the polis (3a). The land, the indebtedness of farmers, and the slaves sold abroad, all had a monetary value.

The crisis faced by Solon is, like money itself, comprehensive. He favours limits not only on money and the cosmos but also both politically (allowing neither side an unjust victory, he compares himself to a boundary-marker between battling opponents) and in ethics (moderation – *internal* limit – becomes vital to the polis).[52] The interconnected aspects of limit figure also in the earliest surviving account of Solon, namely his conversation with Kroisos reported by Herodotos (1.30–1). Being fictitious, it is a true account of values projected onto Solon, in the fifth century if not also earlier.

The narrative centres around the contrast between the vast wealth of Kroisos[53] and the *telos* ('limit, completion, perfection') imposed on a life by ritual. Happiest – the wise Solon tells Kroisos – is the Athenian Tellos, who after a good life in a prosperous polis received with much honour a public funeral on the spot where he was killed in a victory at Eleusis. Next in happiness are Kleobis and Biton, who at the Argive Heraia pulled (in place of the oxen) the cart containing their mother the priestess to the temple, where after the sacrifice and feasting they 'were held fast in this *telos*', i.e. they died. *Telos* here evokes completion and perfection, but also the rite of passage that this ritual was (for the youth of Argos). The unlimited greed of Kroisos, by contrast, eventually led to his downfall when he attacked the Persian empire.

Why is such *telos* (cf. 'Tellos') preferable, according to Solon, to unlimited wealth? The answer is grounded in an abstract generalisation: 'we must look to the ending (*teleutē*) of every matter' (*fr.* 6.32). Happiness depends on the ending of a life, and the enclosure of death within ritual gives life a perfection that unlimited wealth cannot. There is also an implied contrast between the communality of the rituals and the individualism of Kroisos' wealth. And thirdly, the festival procession led by Kleobis and Biton moves from an urban centre across the plain to a peripheral sanctuary (the Heraion), and thereby expresses the appropriation by the polis of its land, as do processions to the periphery of Attica (2fg). Similarly, the public funeral for Tellos, also a rite of passage, is held where he died

[51] Solon *frr.* 4.23–25, 36.8–12; *Ath. pol.* 12.4.

[52] *Frr.* 5.6, 37.9–10, 4c; North (1966) 12–26.

[53] Kroisos was among the first to mint coins, and – as an immensely wealthy barbarian – serves to embody the undesirable unlimitedness of money (cf. e.g. S. *Ant.* 1037–9, where corrupting gold is said to come from Sardis and India). But historically he seems to have embodied a transition between the pre-monetary and money, for he regards his votive offerings at (e.g.) Delphi as creating reciprocal obligation. For other instances of the transition see Chapter 7 n. 14.

fighting in an Athenian victory at Eleusis – no doubt for control of the rich Eleusinian plain that was (or thereby became) the western periphery of Attica. The tomb of Tellos (and presumably others) marked the site of the victory.[54] In both cases the perfection of the ritual *telos* belongs to the communal appropriation of the land by which the polis is defined. The *telos* of the rite of passage is temporal, but is here associated also with the spatial limit that defines the unified polis.

The spatial aspect of this wisdom has been ignored,[55] and so has its relation to the crisis of unlimitedness that Solon was appointed to resolve. It is against the (individual) unlimitedness of money embodied in the figure of Kroisos that Solon is imagined to have privileged[56] the supreme happiness of the processional rite of passage – of a kind known from Attica (2FG) as well as Argos – with which the polis bestows completion on individual life and marks the periphery of its land. We may add that in the sixth-century state calendar of sacrifices attributed to Solon the inscribed definition of sums of money for public rituals[57] promoted and co-ordinated the communal control of their performance. And the political importance of the festival procession as embodying the whole polis is implied by the argument that the Solonian division of citizens into classes was derived from the scale of offerings made in the civic processions.[58]

(2) Tyranny

A generation after the reforms of Solon, the tyrant Peisistratos returned from his first exile, Herodotos reports (1.60.2–5), by means of a trick. A tall woman called Phue is dressed as Athena and placed with him in a chariot, and the proclamation that Athena is conducting Peisistratos back to her own citadel is believed by the gullible population. Scholars have adduced various considerations as background,[59] among them Athena escorting heroes in epic, the practice of impersonating deities in festival processions, and the return of an athletic victor. But what primarily concerns me is, again, what has been neglected: the spatial aspect of the episode, and what it exemplifies of the relationship between tyranny, ritual, and the genesis of drama.

[54] Cf. e.g. centuries-old memory of the tomb of one of the fallen Argive victors at Asine (Pausan. 2.36.5). On the political power of tombs see Seaford (1994a) 106–14 with bibliography.
[55] E.g. in my own earlier treatment of the episode: Seaford (1994a) 229–31.
[56] While also acknowledging kinship: Tellos' happiness consists partly in his offspring, and the mother of Kleobis and Biton is congratulated.
[57] Parker (1996) 43–55. [58] Connor (1987). [59] See most recently Blok (2000).

Peisistratos is first heard of in the context of conflict between the men of the coast and the men of the plain: he raises a 'third faction' from the *huperakrioi* and seizes the Acropolis (Hdt. 1.59). The *huperakrioi* are surely the 'men beyond the hills' east of Mt Hymettos[60] – as was Peisistratos' home at Brauron. It is after the other two factions 'drive him out' that he returns with Phue, whose home (Paiania) is on the way from Brauron to Hymettos and Athens. The detail that Phue was Thracian (*Ath. pol.* 14.4) may, I suggest, derive indirectly from the fact that between his second and third spells as tyrant Peisistratos established a power base (and a source of money) in the region of Mt Pangaios in Thrace.

His movement from periphery to urban centre[61] evokes, among other things, the festal procession in which the unity of the polis is expressed in the symbolic appropriation of its territory, perhaps also the idea of unity created by an outsider (2e5). Peisistratos is escorted to the city, but – in contrast to later potentates – by deity as well as by people: the presence of Athena, protectress of the polis, clarifies his status as a mere mortal as she escorts him to the centre where she belongs, the Acropolis, with its advantages as fortress and store of silver.[62]

The incident has been called 'theatrical'. This is obviously true in a sense, but requires qualification and exploration. Like a tragedy (6b), it is creatively eclectic as well as spectacular and unique; and it evokes myth (Athena escorting a favoured mortal) and ritual (notably the processional impersonation of deity). It was surely meant to evoke the popular unity surrounding the processional arrival of a deity from the periphery, as in the advent of Dionysos (4a). Such advents enact *aitia*, which move from crisis to permanent resolution, as did the advent of Peisistratos. The advent of Dionysos was the context for the emergence of tragedy, which also enacted *aitia*.

Peisistratos' trick is akin to tragedy, but only by virtue of belonging to another type of action – the creative detachment of ritual from its traditional context to be used, or rather abused, as an instrument of tyrannical power. The detachment of ritual from its context is a feature of the genesis of tragedy (6ab). And the abuse or perversion of ritual is one of the three typical activities of the tyrant (*turannos*) described in historical

[60] Cf. Andrewes in Boardman and Hammond (1982) 394–8.

[61] The Brauronion on the Acropolis, linking it with Brauron, may have been built in the sixth century (Chapter 2 n. 117), perhaps by Peisistratos, who undertook building at the sanctuary in Brauron: Photius, *Lex.* 1 (ed. Ch. Theodorides 1982) s.v. Brauronia.

[62] On Peisistratos and his sons keeping firm control of the Acropolis (if not actually living there) see Parker (1996) 84.

and philosophical texts from Herodotus onwards, the other two being the accumulation of money and the killing of kin.[63] The tyrannical accumulation of money was a factor making for the detachment of ritual from context in the genesis of Athenian tragedy. And all three activities are typical of the *turannos* depicted in *tragedy*. To this we will return. Here we observe merely that control of money both depends on and creates control of space. Within Attica, Peisistratos used taxes to embellish urban space (Thuc. 6.54.5) and extended his influence over polis space by lending farmers money so as to keep them contented in the countryside (*Ath. pol.* 16). In geographic space, he hired Argive mercenaries (Hdt. 1.61) and adorned Delos.[64]

(3) Kleisthenes

In his democratic reforms, in the last decade of the sixth century, Kleisthenes replaced the four old tribes with ten new ones, and assigned to each tribe three constituent units (*trittues*), one from each of the three regions of Attica: 'city', 'coast' and 'plain'. Each *trittus* contained between one and seven demes (villages). From now on the Athenians were to be named after their demes, not after their fathers (*Ath. pol.* 21.4). Clearly this marks an advance in the importance of space (at the expense of kinship) as a means of integrating the Athenian polis. Whereas in Peisistratos' first coup the men beyond the hills produced a tyranny over all Attica by forming a third party, in the Kleisthenic reform the unifying third group, if there was one, was the combination of *trittues* in the urban centre.

Each tribe sacrificed to its eponymous hero, and the ten eponymous heroes were represented in the agora as a statue-group that encapsulated all the citizens of Attica,[65] as did also the nearby presence of representatives from each tribe in the council house (bouleuterion). The encapsulation of space, which we have seen in ritual and sanctuary (2AC), may also be *political*. Just as the reforms of Kleisthenes developed the limiting definition of the citizen body,[66] so the agora itself became at about this time a defined space by the erection of boundary stones.[67] In Herodotos (1.153) the Persian king Cyrus despises the Greek agora as a space in which people gather to deceive each other on oath (i.e. for *commerce*) 'in the middle of the polis'.

[63] Seaford (2003b) gives source references. [64] Parker (1996) 87–8. [65] Parker (1996) 104, 119–20.
[66] Seaford (1994a) 215. [67] Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet (1996) 13.

Similarly integrative functions, albeit by different modes of symbolisation, inhered in other sacred places in the centre of Athens: the public hearth, for instance, and those shrines (such as the Brauronion) that were connected to sanctuaries on the periphery of Attica (2g). Spatially integrative also were the herms set up by Peisistratos' son Hipparchos as half-way markers between Athens and Attic towns,[68] and the measurement of distances from Athens from the altar of the twelve gods in the agora (4a).

Such measurement embodies *abstract* space. So too – in a sense – does the new tribe. The descent that unites it is artificial, merely imagined. The reality that unites it is space, or rather three spaces. But even the space is artificial: to envisage the tribe requires imagination, the abstraction of three actual spaces into one. In imagining the tribe the unifying role is played by an abstraction, the number three. And the replacement of the four old tribes by ten homogeneous new ones gave to another numerical abstraction (ten) a role in unifying the polis.

This gave rise, moreover, to an abstract polis *time*, for the civic year was divided not by the phases of the moon, as was the religious calendar, but rather into prytanies rotating between the ten tribes. Relative to the differentiation of time by festivals, this artificial polis time is abstract and homogeneous. For each tenth of the year fifty *prutaneis* from one of the ten tribes lodged in the bouleuterion, which thereby encapsulated not only the artificial (abstract) space of the polis but also its artificial (abstract) time.

The function of the reform was to 'mix up' the citizens.[69] At the heart of the Solonian reforms is the idea of *limit*, at the heart of the Kleisthenic the idea of *mixing*. These aims are not as different from each other as they may seem. Solon mediates conflict by the limitation of excess. What is the purpose of the Kleisthenic mixing? Also no doubt to reduce conflict, the conflict that arises from exclusive loyalty to a single group. Here too there is limitation of dangerous excess: region and 'tribe' mutually limit the loyalty that each commands. The effect is to increase the homogeneity of the population, as citizens of Athens. Another agent of the mixing of the citizens is the growing pervasiveness of money, which loosens local ties and obligations,[70] homogenises all citizens as transactors,[71] and so facilitates universal loyalty to a single urban centre. Through coined money any citizen can interrelate autonomously with any other. Similar in tendency

[68] Pl. *Hipparch.* 228b–229b; *IG* 1^3 1023; Parker (1996) 80–1.
[69] *Ath. pol.* 21.2, 3; Aristot. *Pol.* 1319b23–7. [70] Seaford (2004a) 293–7.
[71] 3a; Seaford (2004a) 151–2.

was the simultaneously developing polis cult of Dionysos, in which he was worshipped by the citizens 'all mixed up together'.[72]

The importance of *number* to both Kleisthenes and Pythagoreanism has prompted the suggestion that he was a Pythagorean.[73] But 'Pythagorean' has various meanings (16A). Kleisthenes was unlikely to have been an adherent of a Pythagorean sect or movement. If he was influenced by Pythagorean ideas, the basis for such influence was surely that he – like the political Pythagoreans – was confronting the problem of conflict within the polis. But this fact also makes the hypothesis of influence unnecessary, for the similarity of ideas across the Greek world in this period may derive from their independent emergence from poleis at the same stage of development.

To be more specific, I have argued elsewhere for the recent monetisation of the polis as a central factor making for the centrality in Pythagorean cosmology not only of limiting the unlimited but also of *number*.[74] The monetisation of Athens too, manifest already in the crisis confronted by Solon, had at the time of the Kleisthenic reform recently been accelerated by the introduction of coinage, and I suggest that this was a factor in the new political importance there of number, as of the (abstract) monetised chronotope.[75] The shared prominence of number in Pythagoreanism and in the reforms of Kleisthenes is significant; however, it derives not necessarily from influence but rather from the monetisation of the polis, which in turn however makes influence possible. It was after all during the early adulthood of Kleisthenes that Pythagoreanism moved – roughly contemporaneously with coinage – westwards from Samos across the Mediterranean to southern Italy.

The heart of political Pythagoreanism was Kroton, where in the fifth century Alkmaion used political language to state that health is a measured *mixture* (*summetros . . . krāsis*) of qualities that should limit each others' potential dominance.[76] Health is maintained by their political equality (*isonomia*), an idea that probably motivated Kleisthenes.[77] Socially integrative limit is projected onto the physical elements, as it was onto the

[72] According to an oracle cited by Demosthenes (*Meid.* 52). As a means of democratic mixing of the citizens Aristotle mentions combining private cults into a few public ones (*Pol.* 1319b23–7).

[73] The suggestion is largely rejected by Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet (1996) 63–72.

[74] Seaford (2004a) 266–83.

[75] I mean a general influence of monetisation on thought. But a more specific, indirect route has been suggested by Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet (1996) 65–6, and accepted by Vernant (2006) 241: the acrophonic system of writing numbers, based on five and ten, adopted in response to the increasing use of currency.

[76] 24 B4. For more instances of the positive evaluation of mixture see e.g. Hartog (2001) 94–5.

[77] Ostwald (1969) 96–157.

cosmos by Solon (3a). Moreover, the Pythagorean projection of socially integrative limit – along with the number three – into cosmology is crucial for understanding the tragedies of Aeschylus (Part v), who at the time of Kleisthenes' reforms was seventeen years old. The importance of the number three can be glimpsed already in the integration of Attica by Kleisthenes.

PART II

Dionysiac festivals

CHAPTER 4

Royal household and public festival

In 2c we described how the ritualised arrival of an outsider in a house, which in Homer expresses the code of inter-personal (or inter-household) *reciprocity*, in the *Demeter Hymn* by contrast expresses the *aetiological* chronotope associated with the ritual of the *polis*. In an Attic myth associated with the ancient[1] Anthesteria festival, Dionysos in reciprocal return for hospitality gives Ikarios the vine. But in the reorganised City Dionysia the arrival of Dionysos has lost any connection with such reciprocity. As in the *Demeter Hymn*, what is instead central is the aetiological chronotope of polis ritual. This is not to deny that Dionysos (and Demeter) bring blessings. The point is that the blessings involve ritual performed by the whole polis, and so have become largely detached from the code of inter-personal (or inter-household) reciprocity. In the genesis of drama at the City Dionysia the reciprocal chronotope has been replaced by the aetiological.

Drama is shaped, in part, by the matrix of Dionysiac ritual from which it emerged. It is not so much that the preoccupations of tragedy emerge from the ritual as that the ritual develops into drama because it already embodies, albeit in a crude form, some of the preoccupations of the polis. In the development of ritual into drama a basic pattern of action persists. One such preoccupation is the relation of the polis to the powerful household.

4a THE PROCESSION TO THE THEATRE

Whereas ritual songs (the wedding song, the lament, etc) are tied to a specific place (this house, this tomb, etc.), the epic singer locates the action in places of the imagination. Tragedy falls between these opposites, in that it is tied to a specific place (the familiar theatrical space) and may nevertheless

[1] Thuc. 2.15.4.

imagine this theatrical space as another space.[2] This imagining is influenced by the nature of the theatrical space, which is a form of ritualised space.

A group of anonymous individuals moves, singing, towards an area in front of a structure representing a dwelling (in a sacred Dionysiac precinct). This is what happens at or near the beginning of most extant Athenian tragedies, and in several of the others they arrive at a sacred place (images of the gods, altar, temple). We should not take this arrangement for granted, for there are many other ways of setting a scene. The Athenians did not see it as a given of 'theatrical space', into which every poet had to fit his new drama. Drama and the place of its performance were not invented out of nothing. Rather, they had recently developed out of choral performance in specific places. What we call the space of Greek theatre was a component of the meaning and emotional effect of choral performance,[3] perceived in terms of pre-existent visual schemata.[4] This singing group moving towards this house in this precinct evokes a schema. And the schema enters into the audience's perception of this particular instance of it. Embodying and confirming the same schema are previous tragic performances, and instances of the same configuration elsewhere in the city. The movement was called a parodos, not an 'entry into' (*eisodos*) the theatre[5] but a 'coming along to' or 'arriving at' a place.

Other choral genres do not have the parodos. The same configuration elsewhere in the city takes the form of *processional ritual* performed on behalf of the polis. In general processions are objects of viewing by bystanders, who may even be called (like the spectators of drama) *theatai*.[6] They may stop at specific locations 'usually for the performance of music, singing, and dance in connection with other ritual acts such as sacrifice',[7] and tend to conclude at altars in front of temples. At the City Dionysia there was a procession[8] to the sanctuary of Dionysos Eleuthereus (just south of the Acropolis), which contained the theatre. In this way the space of the theatre is performatively integrated into the ritual spaces of the city. The only indication of the route of the procession is a remark by Xenophon (*Hipparch.* 3.2):

[2] Occasionally as two different spaces in the course of a single drama, as in *Eumenides*. Old Comedy is more fluid.

[3] Tragedy was envisaged as a *choral* performance: Wilson (2000) 6.

[4] Wiles (1997) 4, 189.

[5] West (1990) 22 interprets πάροδος as 'coming *along*', and compares παριέναι εἰς τῆν ἐκκλησίαν or πρὸς το βῆμα, and παρελθεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον.

[6] E.g. *Il.* 18.496; Xen. *Hipparch*. 3.2; Xen. Eph. *Ephes.* 1.2.3; Kavoulaki (1999) 294, (2000) 146.

[7] Kavoulaki (1999) 295, 300, (2000) 152.

[8] Pickard-Cambridge (1968) 61–3.

I would think processions most pleasing to the gods and to the spectators if beginning from the herms they move in a circle round all the shrines and images in the agora honouring the gods, and at the Dionysia the choruses give extra pleasure to the gods, especially the twelve gods.

The only Greek theatre to have survived in substance from the fifth century is in the Attic deme of Thorikos. In the Attic demes dramatic festivals in the classical period were (so far as we can tell) organised in a manner similar to the Athenian. At Thorikos we find, in the words of David Wiles,[9] that

> the most striking features of the fifth-century theatre are the temple of Dionysos on the right hand side and the altar on the left [from the spectator's viewpoint]. The irregular shape of the auditorium seems to be determined by the fixed or pre-existent positions of the temple, altar and chamber.[10] Although the temple and altar are considered to be fifth-century like the auditorium, we must recognise that architecturally these sacred elements have primacy, and the auditorium is arranged in order to accommodate cult activity . . . In essence the acting space is a road that has been widened to create a plaza . . . Processional entries must have been made, as elsewhere, from the left, east side. Coming up from the road that leads from the harbour, perhaps commemorating the landing of Dionysos, the procession would have passed the rock-hewn chamber and been viewed from afar by the god in his temple and by honorands in the centre . . . The playing area is located between the temple and the altar.

At Ikarion too, from which we have fifth-century evidence for the performance of tragedy,[11] there is 'a close relationship between a temple, an altar, and a playing area'.[12] At Rhamnous the theatre seems to have coincided with the agora (or with part of it), and to have been the end-point of a processional route, again from the spectators' left (east).[13]

In Athens the temple of Dionysos was – as at Thorikos – on the spectators' right (albeit below the playing area), and – as at Thorikos and Rhamnous – the way for processions to enter was probably from the spectators' left (east), along the Street of Tripods that was lined with monuments celebrating choral victories.

The Street of the Tripods began at the Prutaneion (Pausanias 1.20.1). It is argued by Sourvinou-Inwood that the Prutaneion would be a natural place

[9] Wiles (1997) 31–3. For the archaeological evidence, from the late sixth-century retaining wall of the *orchēstra* onwards, see Mussche (1994).
[10] The chamber is on the left side of the theatre, enclosing a long row of seats cut in the rock.
[11] Csapo and Slater (1995) 125–6; Whitehead (1986) 215–18.
[12] Wiles (1997) 27. [13] Wiles (1997) 24–6.

for the procession to start from, for various reasons. It is the symbolic centre of the city, with important religious functions. It had been the seat of the chief magistrate, whose supervisory role at the City Dionysia included the great procession.[14] It was the place where foreign guests were entertained by the polis, as well as divine guests (the Dioskouroi). We hear of other processions from Prutaneion to sanctuary: an instance at Athens was for another foreign deity, Bendis.[15]

The City Dionysia is a festival of the kind that embodies the aetiological chronotope (2G), for its god was from Eleutherai on the borders of Attica. He was, the myth goes, at first rejected by the Athenians, who were consequently afflicted by a disease of the genitals from which they were cured only by manufacturing phalluses, and phalluses were carried in the great procession.[16] It was therefore important that annually he be properly welcomed into the city, and it is on separate grounds likely that his processional escort culminated in a *xenismos*, the entertainment of a foreign guest.[17] Accordingly, Sourvinou-Inwood infers that early in the history of the festival the original arrival of Dionysos in Athens was re-enacted by escorting him to the Prutaneion for a *xenismos* which, in her words, 'involved, among other things, the thing out of which tragedy developed, taking place in and probably outside the Prutaneion' ((2003a) 280). He was then escorted to his sanctuary on the southern slope of the Acropolis. The festival, and the procession at its core, resembled the Panathenaia as 'articulating, and being articulated by, the whole polis as one unit'.[18]

I will extend this insight of Sourvinou-Inwood with two suggestions. Firstly, why was developing tragedy transferred to Dionysos' sanctuary? So as to provide more space for the burgeoning performance and for its viewers? Because in general public processions concluded with sacrifice at public sanctuaries? There may be truth in both these explanations. I suggest that another motive was that the (eventual) arrival of Dionysos at his public sanctuary was a more unequivocal expression of the polis (rather than its

[14] *Ath. pol.* 3.5; 56.

[15] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 107–8; Chionides *fr.* 7; *IG* II^2 1256. It was (believed to be) the starting point also of Athenian migrations to Ionia (Hdt. 1.146.2).

[16] Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 243. Unusually the resistance comes from the people as a whole, not from a ruling family, whether because this is a post-classical version of the myth (with the old contradiction forgotten), or to emphasise the need for *popular* participation (to atone for an insult by the *whole people*).

[17] This is argued with persuasive detail by Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 73–172.

[18] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 72; moreover, 'the polis articulated in the City Dionysia and the Panathenaia is an open system, that included foreign residents and colonists' (ibid.).

ruler) welcoming the god than was his arrival at the Prutaneion. A community is defined by who welcomes significant outsiders (2D). At Eleusis Demeter was welcomed into the household of Keleos, but eventually takes up position in her public sanctuary. After Athens became dependent on foreign potentates it was proposed that one of them, Demetrios Poliorketes (336–283), whenever he came to Athens, should be welcomed with the rituals of welcoming an outsider that were given to Demeter and Dionysos (τοῖς Δήμητρος καὶ Διονύσου ξενισμοῖς[19] – Demeter here means the Eleusinian mystery-cult[20]).

My second suggestion is that the ritual outside the Prutaneion, having been transferred to the precinct of Dionysos, contributed both to the (visual and verbal) form and to the political content of the performance of tragedy. Moreover, it embodied a schema that entered into the audience's perception of the entry of the chorus in tragedy.

What follows will help to substantiate this claim. But first we must make a small deviation, to the agora.

4B AGORA AND HEARTH

The City Dionysia was established, or at least reorganised and expanded, in the second half of the sixth century (5A), and may have been susceptible to change thereafter as well. From about the same period there occurred a partial shift of the imagined public centre of Athens from the area of the Prutaneion to the agora.[21] The Prutaneion traditionally contained the 'common hearth' of the city, and had politically central functions; in uniting Attika Theseus established 'one Prutaneion and one bouleuterion' (Thuc. 2.15). But some of its functions were transferred to the agora, to the *prutanikon* in its south-western part[22] and to the altar of the twelve gods in its north-western part.[23] This altar was dedicated by the tyrant Hippias' son Peisistratos, who held high office (*archōn*) in 522/1, and became the central point of the city from which distances from the city were measured.[24] This was probably the 'fragrant navel of the town in sacred Athens' to which in a dithyramb Pindar summoned the gods,[25] in all likelihood at the City

[19] Plut. *Demetr*. 12, discussed by Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 73–4.
[20] Shown by Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 73–5. See e.g. Apollod. 3.14.7.
[21] E.g. Hölscher (1991). [22] Miller (1978) 54–66; Wycherley (1978) 48.
[23] Similarly the *stoa basileios*, built at about the same time in the north-western part of the agora not far from the altar of the twelve gods, may have taken over functions from the more ancient seat of the *basileus*, the *Boukoleion*.
[24] Thuc. 6.54.6; Hdt. 2.7.1; *IG* I³ 1092 bis. [25] *Fr.* 75.3: Lavecchia (2000) 257–60.

Dionysia.[26] It seems that one of these 'twelve gods' was Hestia (the goddess who embodies the hearth),[27] and moreover that towards the end of the sixth century there was built, in front of the altar of the twelve gods, a ground altar of the type called *eschara*,[28] a word that can be synonymous with *hestia*, 'hearth'. Traditionally supplication was at the hearth of the house, like that of Odysseus in the house of Alkinoos (1c), and we hear of supplication at the hearth of a Prutaneion (on Naxos).[29] But it was at the altar of the twelve gods, not long after its foundation, that the Plataians took up position, when the Athenians were sacrificing there, to ask them for protection.[30]

The ritual incorporation of an outsider marks the recipient as representing the community. In Homer it privileges the monarchical household (1c). Homeric Phaeacia and the *Demeter Hymn* express a transition towards the polis (2d), and roughly the same phase is marked by the Athenian king Amphiktyon, whose name refers to those who 'dwell around', giving hospitality at his hearth (*hestiōn*) to Dionysos (Pausan. 1.2.5). This transition is then completed by our shift from Prutaneion to agora.

A permanent feature of the transition is the *hearth*. On Phaeacia Odysseus supplicates at the royal hearth, *eschara* (*Od.* 7.169). It seems that a hearth marks the centre of the polis both in the Prutaneion and subsequently at the altar of the twelve gods in the agora. Inscriptions of the second century record Dionysos being taken in a torchlit procession to the theatre from a hearth (*eschara*), which Sourvinou-Inwood[31] identifies with the one in the agora. As for the theatre, the low altar in its choral area was called *thumelē*, the 'orginal and fundamental' meaning of which was 'hearth'.[32] In what is probably the earliest surviving dramatic text the *thumelē* is confrontationally claimed by the Dionysiac chorus (6a).

The late sixth-century historical movement of the hearth from royal dwelling (Prutaneion) to public space produced both the altar of the twelve gods in the agora (with hearth) *and* the final destination of Dionysos (with hearth) in his new or expanded sanctuary under the Acropolis in a reorganised festival. At some time in the history of the festival[33] each of

[26] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 97–8.
[27] Even though there is no evidence for her independent cult in archaic Athens: Shapiro (1989) 140–1.
[28] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 92. [29] Theophr. *fr.* 635 Fortenbaugh.
[30] Hdt. 6.108; Thuc. 3.68.5. [31] (2003a) 91–5.
[32] Gow (1912); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 142–3; Wiles (1997) explores its presence in the plays. Cf. Rehm (2002) 41.
[33] I am not concerned to chart this history. But we may note that the second-century inscriptions for a preliminary *eisagōgē* (introduction of the god) to the theatre suggest that the procession to the theatre may have been at some point duplicated: Seaford (1994a) 240–3. Possible scenarios for the development of the festival are summarised by Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 118–20.



Map 1 The Acropolis and the Agora in the classical period

three hearths – in the Prutaneion, by the altar in the agora, and in the sanctuary – were places for welcoming the god, and each had choral performances.[34] Other possible developments are that at first the procession went from Prutaneion to sanctuary, and subsequently did so via the altar in the agora, or that it went from altar to Prutaneion and from there to sanctuary.[35] Yet another is that the altar simply replaced the Prutaneion as the place for welcoming the god. Sourvinou-Inwood[36] ingeniously argues

[34] We do not know whether those in the agora preceded those at the Prutaneion.
[35] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 109, 119; Spineto (2005) 221. [36] (2003a) 160–1.

that ritual dining and performance[37] were transferred from the Prutaneion to a temporary structure called a *skēnē* (*skēnai*, 'tents', were used elsewhere for ritual dining) near the altar, and that this *skēnē* was subsequently transferred from there to the sanctuary along with the performances, where it became a rectangular wooden structure, the theatrical *skēnē*. But perhaps what developed into the theatrical *skēnē* was a *direct* substitute for the Prutaneion. In any case I will argue in an Appendix that, contrary to a popular view, there was a *skēnē* in the earlier plays of Aeschylus.

Our argument does not require us to choose between these hypotheses. What matters for us is that the two kinds of destination of the choral procession or processions – imagined royal house (Prutaneion) and public altar – embody the transition from monarchy to polis. And both schemata were enacted in the precinct of Dionysos, where tragic choruses take up position at what is imagined often as a royal house, sometimes as a temple, sometimes as a public altar or hearth that may or may not be separate from the *thumelē*.

Finally, the projection of the hearth from the private dwelling goes even beyond public space, onto the centre of the cosmos, in the Pythagorean cosmology (16B) that will prove important for understanding the politics of *Oresteia*.

4C ATHENIAN PRUTANEION

The Athenian Prutaneion has not been archaeologically identified. Pausanias (1.18.2) located it near the sanctuary of Aglauros, which was just east of the Acropolis.[38] This coheres with his other location of it, at the beginning of the Street of the Tripods (1.20.1), for this street roughly followed the route of the modern Street of the Tripods (just east and north-east of the Acropolis), along which has been found evidence for the dedication of the ancient tripods that were prizes for *chorēgoi*.[39] Such evidence has also

[37] Byzantine scholarship maintains that before the Athenians built their theatre they held dramatic contests in the agora: most detail in Kolb (1981) Ch. 3; Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 91. But Scullion (1994) 52–65 argues that this tradition is worthless. Schnurr (1995) puts these early contests in (the Lenaion, supposedly in) the 'old agora', which he and Dontas (1983) identify with the area of the Prutaneion. But cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 118–23.

[38] Dontas (1983); cf. esp. Hdt. 8.53 with Pausan. 1.18.2. For background see Miller (1978) 38–66.

[39] As well as an inscribed dedication by the custodian of the Prutaneion (*IG* II² 2877). The most western evidence of a choregic monument is on (modern) Prytaneiou St., just before it meets Mnesikleous St., and this has been proposed as the beginning of the ancient Street of the Tripods and so the site of the Prutaneion by Schnurr (1995), who also suggests that the famous 'Fasti' inscription (*IG* II² 2318) listing theatrical performances (most of its fragments found on the northern slopes of the Acropolis) may have been displayed at the Prutaneion.

been found at the other end of the ancient Street of the Tripods, in the east parodos of the theatre in the precinct of Dionysos Eleuthereus.[40]

We are told (*Ath. pol.* 3.5) that the Prutaneion was near the *Boukoleion*, the old seat of the 'king' (*basileus*).[41] It seems that this area just to the east and north-east of the Acropolis was the old administrative centre of Athens, perhaps to be identified with the 'old agora', before the development in the sixth century of the famous agora towards the Kerameikos.[42] To the *Boukoleion* we will soon return.

It seems then that at the City Dionysia a procession left the Prutaneion in the old centre of Athens at the east end of the north slope of the Acropolis, and passed around its east end, along the Street of the Tripods, to arrive at the sanctuary and theatre of Dionysos Eleuthereus at the east end of its south slope.

Imagine a procession arriving at the sanctuary of Dionysos Eleuthereus after the reorganisation of the festival but before the development of any substantial *theatrical* building: it arrived at the altar of the god outside the sixth-century temple in which his image was housed, and was probably a celebration or re-enactment of the original arrival of the god (in the form of his image).

What did the Prutaneion look like? We know that it provided dining, and the common hearth of the polis, and was a 'big house' (*megas oikos*).[43] The testimonia and remains of *prutaneia* elsewhere have produced a variety of opinions on the extent to which they resembled private dwellings.[44] Clearly they did not resemble temples. But they could be called 'sacred', and were the site of public cult:[45] e.g. inscriptions reveal that at Athens in the second century the ephebes performed official sacrifices at the common hearth in the Athenian Prutaneion.[46]

If Dionysos was welcomed at the Athenian Prutaneion, the processional group escorting him there could however presumably not be accommodated within the building, and anyway Greek choral dancing generally took place in the open air. If accordingly the group then sang and danced in front of the Prutaneion imagined as a royal house, this resembles the

[40] Pariente (1990) 705.

[41] Pollux VIII 111 says the *Boukoleion* was near the *Basileion* ('royal' house), which however *Ath. pol.* 3.5. seems to *identify* with the *Boukoleion*. In the classical period some of the functions of the *basileus archōn* were performed in the *stoa basileios* in the agora: Rhodes (1981) 103.

[42] So Dontas (1983); Schnurr (1995). For powerful arguments for the Prutaneion being in the same place over the centuries see Miller (1978) 38–45.

[43] Schol. Thuc. 2.15.2; οἶκος referring to a *temple* has (in all cases known to me) the deities or deity specified in the genitive.

[44] Miller (1978) 28. [45] Dionys. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.65; Miller (1978) 13–16.

[46] *SEG* XV 104, 5–7; *IG* II² 1006.

tragic chorus arriving at the *skēnē* imagined as royal house – temporarily erected to provide for the god perhaps the hospitality previously provided at the Prutaneion (4B).

We may go further and call both Prutaneion and *skēnē* imaginary *royal* dwellings. In the Delphic *Septerion* a ruler's dwelling is represented by a *skēnē* (4G). In his detailed study of the Prutaneion Miller notes that the Prutaneion and the royal palace of Homeric times 'share many functions'. These are

> the entertainment of foreign guests and local dignitaries, the provision of asylum at the hearth, and the designation of the seat of administration of the government. Then too the name *prutanis*, and therefore the Prutaneion, has a royal as well as a governmental connotation. It was, in some places, synonymous with king, as Aristotle says: '. . . the officials . . . [who] derive their honor from the common hearth: some call them Archons, others Kings, and others *Prutaneis*.'[47]

4D THE ADVENT OF DIONYSOS

A choral procession escorting from afar the newly arrived Dionysos, and taking up position outside a royal house, occurs in the opening of Euripides' *Bacchae*. Dionysos summons his companions the maenads to come to 'this royal house' and beat their drums 'so that the polis of Kadmos *sees*' (61).[48] They then sing (as parodos) a dithyramb,[49] in which they call Dionysos *exarchos* ('leader of the song') and refer to themselves as *katagousai* ('bringing in') Dionysos (85): this evokes the *Katagōgia*, the processional bringing in of Dionysos. At the beginning of the song they call on anyone who is inside the *melathra* ('palace') to come out (69).

Tragedy, according to Aristotle (*Poetics* §4), developed gradually 'from the leaders (*exarchontes*) of the dithyramb'.[50] It seems that an important stage in this development was for the processional dithyramb (escorting the god) to become a stationary song (*stasimon*).[51] *Bacchae* has various archaic

[47] Arist. *Pol.* 1322b28; cf. Pi. *Pyth.* 6.24, *et al.*; Miller (1978) 21–2; *Su.* 370.

[48] The word 'sees' is in emphatic position. [49] Seaford (1996) 155–6.

[50] Among the good independent reasons for believing this are: (a) it runs counter to the scheme of poetic development set up earlier in the *Poetics*; (b) it is counter-intuitive but paralleled cross-culturally; (c) it coheres remarkably well – sometimes in ways unlikely to have occurred to Aristotle – with the other indications that we have of the genesis of tragedy; (d) Aristotle's statement in his next chapter that the changes undergone by tragedy (1449a37–8 μεταβάσεις, i.e. those by which it came into being: cf. μεταβολαί at 1449a14) and the poets who introduced them are – unlike those of comedy – still known; (e) there is no inconsistency whatsoever in Aristotle's account (between dithyramb and the *saturikon* as origins): and see now Depew (2007). All this is ignored by those (most recently Scullion 2002) who continue to speculate that Aristotle is merely speculating.

[51] Seaford (1994a) 242. Cf. Them. *Or.* 26, 316d = *TGrF* 1 T6 (citing Aristotle as his authority): 'at first [before Thespis invented prologue and speech] the chorus entered and sang to the gods'. The

features.[52] Its opening, I suggest, encapsulates the genesis of Athenian tragedy out of the dithyrambic escort of the newly arrived Dionysos taking up position outside the imagined royal house (Prutaneion). That is when and where, now stationary, it attracts as spectators the whole polis (compare Dionysos saying 'so that the polis *sees*'), and so is relocated to under the southern slope of the Acropolis. The ritual expresses a social process; the myth expresses the meaning of the ritual; and the ritual enactment of the myth becomes drama. The nature of the social process will emerge as we proceed.

In a *xenismos* one would expect the god to be welcomed inside the royal house. The Athenian king Amphiktyon entertained (*hestiōn*) Dionysos at his hearth (Pausanias 1.2.5). Another Attic story is of Dionysos entertained in the house of Ikarios.[53] But such entertainment does not happen in *Bacchae*, in which Dionysos is taken by the Theban king into the house only as a prisoner: it is in the context of *confrontation* between the new arrivals and the ruler that we must see the demand, in the opening of *Bacchae*, that anybody inside the house should come out, and that the whole polis should see. The space just outside the royal house is *confrontational*, as it is generally in tragedy (Part III).

Similarly, well-known myths about Thrace, Orchomenos and Argos tell of the foolish rejection of Dionysos by the ruling family. To the extent that Dionysos on arrival enters the royal house in these myths, it is to transform it at its weakest point, by mysteriously imposing frenzy on the *women*, as in *Bacchae* (32). There may also, as Pentheus feared, be sex. The itinerant Dionysos was sexually united with the daughter of Ikarios, with the wife of the Aetolian king Oineus, and with the daughter of the Spartan king Dion. But the most spectacular instance occurred annually, at the oldest of the Athenian festivals of Dionysos, the Anthesteria.

4E POLITICAL SEX

Fourth-century scholarship tells us that

the *basileus* ('king') once occupied what is now called the *Boukoleion* ('cattle shed') near the Prutaneion. An indication of this is that even now the *summeixis*

authority of Themistios is strongly defended against scepticism (e.g. Taplin (1977) 62 n. 2) by Janko in his forthcoming Introduction to the fragments of Aristotle's *De poetis*. For the possibility that Arion produced a stationary dithyramb see 6A.

[52] Dodds (1960) xxvi–xxxiii, to which add the use of trochaic tetrameters describing the mystic epiphany at 604–41 (cf. Aristot. *Poet*. 1449a21, *Rhet*. 1404a30): the metre is common in the earliest surviving tragedy (*Pers*.), occurs in a fragment (60) of Aeschylus' (Dionysiac) *Edonians*, and is revived by late Euripides.

[53] For the connection of the Ikarios story with the City Dionysia see Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 74.

('ceremonial meeting') of the wife of the *basileus* (i.e. the annually elected magistrate entitled 'king') and Dionysos takes place there and the *gamos* ('marriage, sex').[54]

This ritual is in another fourth-century text, Apollodorus' *Against Neaira* (73), mentioned alongside various traditional secret rituals performed by the wife of the *basileus* 'on behalf of the polis', in a place which no other Athenian was allowed to enter, with the assistance of fourteen *gerairai* ('old women'), at the Anthesteria. It was also probably at the same festival that there occurred a procession (depicted in Athenian vase-paintings) escorting Dionysos in a ship on wheels accompanied by satyrs playing pipes.[55] Dionysos is here clearly imagined as arriving in Athens from overseas, and is being escorted in the kind of procession that was accompanied by the dithyramb. Although the sacred marriage occurred in the *Boukoleion*, the main focus of the festival was the temple of Dionysos 'in the Marshes'.[56]

The spatial arrangements of this festival are difficult to reconstruct. What we can say is that Dionysos enters the royal dwelling (probably having arrived[57] in the city in a procession), and is there united with the wife of the *basileus*. Whether or not organised into a procession, his arrival at the house must have been a public event, a significant element of the festival, involving numerous onlookers. He may have been represented by an image, or (like the satyrs) impersonated. We should also at this point note a feature to which we will return: the god comes from afar to enter the secret place of a royal dwelling. Unlike other *aitia* of arrival from afar (2G), the newcomer is a divine stranger whose arrival is celebrated at the most intimately enclosed centre of the polis.

The arrival embodies the same visual and narrative schema as the event of which Silenos was reminded by the entry of the chorus of satyrs in Euripides' *Cyclops*: this event, probably dramatised in an earlier satyr-play, was the escort provided by the revelling satyrs, with music and dance, for the arrival of Dionysos at the house of king Oineus for his sexual union with queen Althaia.

Some Athenian vase-paintings of the escorting of a bride (without bridegroom), sometimes by a satyr, have been connected with the union of Dionysos with the wife of the *basileus*, as has one of Dionysos being escorted by a satyr towards a threshold within which sits a bride.[58] The most detailed surviving depiction of a chorus of theatrical satyrs, on the

[54] *Ath. pol.* 3.5; Parker (2005) 303–4.
[55] E.g. Pickard-Cambridge (1968) Figs. 12 and 13.
[56] Perhaps a (wedding) procession went from *Limnaion* to *Boukoleion*.
[57] Dionysos having sex as *guest* in a household is a basic mythical pattern.
[58] Simon (1963). The arrival of a wedding procession at a house is frequently depicted in Athenian vase-painting: Oakley and Sinos (1993) Figs. 50, 70, 73, 78, 91, 99, 107, 108; Simon (1963) 16 n. 57.

'Pronomos vase', shows them with Dionysos in an erotic posture with his consort (presumably Ariadne). And indeed a myth that may have been associated with the marriage union in the *Boukoleion* is – as Erika Simon has argued – that of Ariadne: Theseus (as king of Athens and so prototype of the *basileus*) is required to *surrender* Ariadne to Dionysos.[59]

The *basileus* (like kings Oineus and Theseus) benefits the community by not resisting. If there was anything confrontational in Dionysos' arrival at the *Boukoleion*, it was no doubt light-hearted, especially if he was accompanied by satyrs (as he was in the ship-cart procession).

Just as the arrival of Dionysos with his thiasos at the *Boukoleion* was reflected in satyr-play, so – at the City Dionysia – his arrival at the Prutaneion was reflected in the confrontational arrival of Dionysos with his thiasos in front of the royal house in *Bacchae*. Dionysos' arrival at the Prutaneion was, we remember, 'the thing out of which tragedy developed'. Perhaps it was nevertheless infected by the satyric light-heartedness of Dionysos' arrival at the *Boukoleion*, for Aristotle also says in *Poetics* §4 that tragedy developed out of the *saturikon* (the 'satyr-play like'). The establishment or expansion of the City Dionysia in the second half of the sixth century (5A) may have been influenced by the more ancient Anthesteria. A restored fragment of Callimachus seems to state that before the institution of the City Dionysia dramatic and dithyrambic peformances took place at the Anthesteria.[60]

What might be the significance of this kind of confrontation? It is emphasised in the *Against Neaira* that the rituals performed by the wife of the *basileus* go back to before the democracy, to the monarchy. After the establishment of democracy, the people 'nevertheless' chose a 'king' for his virtue, with a wife who had had sex with no other man, 'so that she should make the secret sacrifices in the traditional manner on behalf of the polis'. Along with this preservation of the religious function of monarchy goes the enclosed integrity both of the royal family (she has had sex with her husband only) and of the secret rituals (she enters 'where not a single other Athenian enters'). And yet she is united with a highly mobile god, the god of the whole people, who comes from the beyond and 'wants to be honoured by everybody, in common, without making

[59] Simon (1963) 6–22 (esp.12–13, 15), (1983) 97–8. This version of the myth is attested already in fifth-century Athens: Pherekyd. *FGrH* 3 F148; *ARV*² 560.5. Parker (2005) 305 objects that Ariadne is not Athenian; but the imagination evident in e.g. the 'Pronomos vase' or Xen. *Symp*. 9 may have attached also to the ritual in the *Boukoleion*.

[60] *Fr.* 85, as interpreted by Hollis (2009) 273.

distinctions'.[61] As often elsewhere, the entry of Dionysos symbolises the fundamental irruption of the public sphere into the potentially introverted royal household.[62]

This confrontation expresses a basic pattern of action that cannot be understood ahistorically. In the fifth century none of the numerous communal cults of Athens was celebrated within – or focused on – the dwelling of a single individual. But had it always been thus? In general the archaeology of Greek settlements in the Mycenean period and the subsequent 'Dark Ages' provides much evidence for communal cult in – or in front of – the dwellings of rulers.[63] Moreover, much later cult buildings on the sites of Mycenean palaces were sometimes imagined as in a sense the dwellings of ancient rulers: the next section gives three examples.

4f royal house and public cult

(1) It is generally agreed that the thirteenth-century remains on the Athenian Acropolis are those of a palace complex.[64] In the *Odyssey* Athena comes to Athens and enters the 'well-built house' of Erechtheus (7.80–1). And in the *Iliad* the Athenians are called the people of Erechtheus, who was born from the earth and set down by Athena in Athens, in her temple, where he (or conceivably she) is propitiated by young men as the seasons come round (2.546–51). This epic tradition of the co-habitation of the goddess of Athens with its first king is often taken to embody a memory of the cult of the goddess in the royal dwelling, which subsequently became a temple of Athena housing the cult of Erechtheus. On the site of the Mycenean palace and the Old Temple of Athena was built (towards the end of the fifth century) the Erechtheion.

The Erechtheion complex embraced various cults on different ground levels.[65] Its eastern face is that of a normal temple, generally identified with the temple of Athena Polias. The south-west part of the building probably contained the tomb of Kekrops. In the projecting north porch a gap was

[61] *Bacchae* 206–9; Seaford (1996) 38, 44–52, 170. In the painting of Dionysos (with a satyr) approaching the *basilinna* (*ARV*² 1057.96) he is drunk – like any Athenian citizen at the festival.

[62] Seaford (1988), (1990b).

[63] Mazarakis Ainian (1997), e.g. 378: 'In the small Dark Age communities, it appears that rituals requiring the existence of some kind of shelter were carried out inside the leader's home, which as a rule stood at the same place for several generations, sometimes for several centuries. It is no coincidence that several among these rulers' dwellings gave onto the settlement's free space, which would have functioned as an assembly place and often as an hypaethral sanctuary.' Also de Polignac (1994) 7–8.

[64] E.g. Hurwit (1999) 72–4, 88.

[65] A recent account is by Hurwit (1999) 200–9.

left in the floor to show marks in the rock beneath, and a corresponding gap was left in the roof. The feature almost certainly reflects a belief that places struck by lightning should be left open to the sky,[66] and this was surely the place where Erechtheus, struck by the trident of Poseidon or the thunderbolt of Zeus, disappeared into the earth.[67] In Euripides' dramatisation the trident also caused the collapse of the royal house, but the polis was saved from destruction by Athena.[68] The destruction by earthquake of the house is described in terms of Dionysiac frenzy, as is the destruction of Herakles' house in Euripides' *Herakles*. They are thereby assimilated to Dionysos' destruction-by-earthquake of the house of his enemy both in Euripides' *Bacchae* (587–633) and – it seems – in Aeschylus' *Edonians* (*fr.* 58).

It has been demonstrated by Marianne Stern[69] that the north porch of the Erechtheion was designed to represent the entrance to a *palace*. Among the reasons for believing this are the form and rich decoration of the porch and its relation to the tall inner doorway (aligned between the two central pillars of the outer row of four). The only other appearance in classical architecture of a door within a projecting porch is in an Apulian vase-painting of the mid fourth century, called by Erika Simon 'the most important surviving imitation of a stage set in vase-painting'.[70] The palace of Erechtheus was the backdrop to Euripides' *Erechtheus*.[71] In early Athenian vase-paintings of Peleus receiving the procession of divine guests at his wedding,[72] the palace before which he stands is indicated by a tall door aligned between the two central pillars of a row of four (just as in our north porch). Pausanias calls the Erechtheion an *oikēma*, a word for a building that originates in the word 'dwell' (*oikein*), whereas for the (adjoining) temple of Athena he uses the word *naos* ('temple'). Stern also notes that the presence of altars *within* the Erechtheion (Pausan. 1.26.5) is a characteristic of a Mycenean palace, not of a classical temple.

(2) At Eleusis the *telestērion* ('hall of initiation') was built where once stood a Mycenean structure. This was almost certainly a dwelling, according to Travlos the dwelling of a ruler, in which 'the cult of Demeter came into being in a completely private form'.[73] Subsequently there was, according

[66] Nilsson (1967) 71–2; Cook (1925) 11–36. [67] Kron (1976) 44; Pausan. 1.26.5.
[68] *Fr.* 370.51, 55–60. [69] Stern (1986) 51–64.
[70] A crater from Tarentum: Würzburg, Martin von Wagner Musuem, H4696, H4701; Simon (1982) 22 and Fig. 3.
[71] *Fr.* 370.3, 51. [72] The Sophilos Dinos and the François Vase (*LIMC* Peleus 211 and 212).
[73] Travlos (1988) 91–2; Darcque (1981).

to Mazarakis Ainian, 'secular re-use of the complex [in the Early Iron Age] until circa the middle or the beginning of the last quarter of the eighth century, at which time . . . the area and presumably the building as well would have been officially devoted to the cult of Demeter'.[74] Memory of a cult passing from within the dwelling of a powerful man at Eleusis to a public sanctuary may be preserved in the *Demeter Hymn* (2B). Continuity – or revival – of focus is embodied in the small rectangular *anaktoron* from which, at the culmination of the mysteries, emerged the transforming firelight.[75] Its position within the *telestērion* was on the site of a Mycenean structure[76] that may well have been a royal dwelling, and through all the transformations of the *telestērion* remained in the same place.[77] The word *anaktoron* derives from an ancient idea of sovereignty.[78] The hierophant of the mysteries was from the Eumolpid clan, who regarded themselves as descended from Eumolpos, ruler of the Eleusinians.[79] The role of Eumolpos was re-enacted by the hierophant, and both carry a sceptre.[80]

(3) Our third instance is on the hill known as the Kadmeia at Thebes. Here the sanctuary of Dionysos Kadmeios was built on the site of the palace of the Mycenaean Age, according to Symeonoglou 'soon after the destruction of the first late Helladic palace'.[81] Over a millennium later the Thebans told Pausanias (9.12.3) that in the agora on the Kadmeia once stood the house of Kadmos, and pointed out the ruins of the *thalamos* ('bridal chamber') of Dionysos' mother Semele, which they still keep *abaton* (not to be entered – a feature of places struck by lightning). Pausanias adds that along with the thunderbolt hurled at the *thalamos* there fell a log that is now called Dionysos Kadmos.[82] There is a remarkable continuity here with *Bacchae* (6–11), in which Dionysos says 'I see the tomb of my

[74] Mazarakis Ainian (1997) 149, 347–8.
[75] Plut. *Mor.* 81e, *fr.* 178; Hippol. *Haer.* 5.8.39. A minority view refers the *anaktoron*/*anaktora* to the whole *telestērion* (cf. Parker (2005) 51), but even were this correct it would not much affect my argument.
[76] Travlos (1988) 93; Mylonas (1961) 85. [77] Travlos (1988) 93–4.
[78] In Linear B the word for king is *wanax*, from which derives the adjective *wanakateron*, as e.g. in *wanakateron temenos*, 'royal domain': Ventris and Chadwick (1973) 120, 265–6, 408–9, 589. Cf. *Od.* 15.397.
[79] In a fifth-century poem: *P.Oxy.* 2622 1 and *PSI* 1391; Richardson (1974) 197. In the *Demeter Hymn* (475) he is one of the 'kings' (*basileis*), along with Keleos, to whom Demeter taught her mysteries.
[80] Another Attic clan that administered its mystery-cult was the Lykomidai in Phlya: Plut. *Them.* 1.4; Pausan. 4.1.5, 7, 9.30.12; Hippol. *Haer.* 5.205.
[81] Symeonoglou (1985) 57.
[82] He also says that the precinct of Demeter was once the house of Kadmos and his descendants (9.16.5). Pindar (*Isthm.* 7.3–4) calls Dionysos at Thebes the Paredros of Demeter. Cf. E. *Ba.* 274–85.

thunderstruck mother (i.e. also her *thalamos*)[83] here near the house, and the ruins of the house still smouldering with the living fire of Zeus.' Kadmos, he adds, has made the area *abaton*, a precinct for Semele. The dual identity of a precinct that is also imagined as a ruler's dwelling appears even in what is seen (or imagined) by the audience of *Bacchae*.

4G THE DEMOLITION OF THE ROYAL HOUSE

Bacchae dramatises an *aition* of the Theban cult of Dionysos. The episode of Dionysos in the royal house prefigures – as does the episode of Demeter in the royal house in the *Demeter Hymn* – the detail of mystic initiation.

The *Bacchae* episode includes the demolition – by thunderbolt and earthquake – of the royal house, involving the reactivation of the smouldering fire left by the thunderbolt at an earlier demolition of the royal house (at the birth of Dionysos). The *aitia* of public sanctuary and of mystery-cult contain interrelated demolitions of the royal house.

The ruined royal *thalamos* pointed out by the Thebans in a precinct is unlikely to be something that no-one has got round to repairing or clearing away. It has *symbolic* value. What does it symbolise?

Whereas for Euripides the *thalamos* and tomb of Semele are the same, Pausanias (9.16.6) locates the tomb of Semele near the Proetidian gate, in the temple of Dionysos Liberator (*Lusios*)[84] along with the ruins of the house of Lykos. In his detailed study of the topography of Thebes Symeonoglou[85] states that the presence of a house here is 'puzzling'. What puzzles may be revealing. Lykos had sex with his niece Antiope, who was imprisoned in his house. That is to say, he exhibited the household introversion characteristic of Theban tyrants. But Antiope also had sex with Zeus (in the form of a satyr) at a cave sacred to Dionysos, at Eleutherai, on the border between Boiotia and Attica (2G), to which subsequently she makes a miraculous escape from her household imprisonment.[86] Very probably (although no such report has survived) Lykos' house was destroyed by Dionysos Liberator. At any rate in one version Antiope's father was Lykourgos, whose house was destroyed by Dionysos.[87]

The *autonomy* of a household is in the reproductive sphere *endogamy* (7B), of which the extreme form is *incest*. They all threaten the integration of households into a single community (the polis). And so Dionysos, who

[83] Those struck by lightning were generally buried on the spot: Artemid. *Oneir.* 2.9.
[84] Cf. Chapter 6 n. 57. [85] Symeonoglou (1985) 190.
[86] Seaford (1990b) 83–5. [87] Cf. also E. *HF* 566 (another Lykos) and 864 (Dionysiac).

embodies more than any other god the communality, the 'mixing up', of the citizens,[88] operates – in a series of myths – against the introversion of the household. The operation has a spatial polarity: endogamy is expressed in confinement in the house, from which Dionysos drives women to the wild periphery.[89]

Dionysos is not the only deity to disrupt familial introversion. In the Antiope myth he combines with Zeus. And when Oinomaos, in love with his daughter, resisted her daughter's suitors,[90] his house was struck by lightning from Zeus: the ruins were seen by Pausanias at Olympia, as were the ruins of his stables over his tomb.[91] In the *Prometheus Bound* Io narrates how, when she reached marriageable age, her father was required (by the Delphic oracle) to expel her from his home to wander at the margins of the land, with the threat that, if he did not, Zeus would annihilate his entire family with a thunderbolt (648–68). At Athens Hippomenes, a ruler (king or magistrate), displayed the dangerous tendency of the ruling family to introverted autonomy by imprisoning his daughter in his own house to punish her sexual union with a citizen (*astos*). The house was, on his downfall, physically destroyed.[92] Physical destruction of a house reverses familial introversion.

In *Bacchae* Dionysos is imprisoned inside the royal dwelling, in a place for cattle (618), and – as the house falls to the ground – the fire is reactivated that once embodied Zeus as lover of Semele. This entry of a god into the house for sex with a mortal queen is analogous to Dionysos' sexual union with the Athenian queen, also in a royal place for cattle (*Boukoleion*). Such entries represent a *politicisation* of the power of Greek ritual to negotiate contradiction.[93] Sexual union with a god from afar is the characteristic antidote to the reproductive introversion of the tyrannical family.[94] The entry of the god into the house – whether in cult or myth – is a symbolic limitation (or even reversal) imposed by the polis on the potential of the ruling household for autonomous introversion. The entry may have social implications (sexual union) or be merely physical (thunderbolt). At Thebes Zeus combines the two.

There is also an obvious difference between the Theban and the Athenian entry of Dionysos into the royal house. In the Athenian ritual he is

[88] Dem. *Meid*. 52 (cf. E. Ba. 35–8). Political 'mixing up': 3c.
[89] Seaford (1988), (1990b).
[90] Apollod. *Ep*. 2.4; Hygin. *Fab*. 253.
[91] Pausan. 5.14.7, 20.6–7; 6.21.3.
[92] Nik. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F51; Seaford (1994a) 345.
[93] At Pi. *Nem*. 11.1–4 Hestia, 'to whom Prutaneia are allotted', is asked to welcome Aristagoras into her *thalamos*.
[94] Seaford (1990b).

not resisted, and so there are no negative consequences and the royal building stays intact for the following year. But in the Theban myth familial introversion, whether in the form of endogamy or of outright resistance to the public cult, is met by driving women from their homes to the wild periphery or by demolition of the house. In between the Athenian and Theban extremes is the *Demeter Hymn*, in which as Demeter leaves the royal house she creates fear by a miraculous blaze of light, 'as of lightning' (280). But here the resistance of the royal family to the rite of passage derived not from hostility or endogamy but merely from ignorant anxiety, and so the house is not destroyed.

4H CONCLUSION: THE GENESIS OF TRAGEDY IN AMBIVALENT MAKE-BELIEVE

The public festivals of Dionysos enact the confrontational arrival of the god at a building imagined as the royal house (*Boukoleion*, Prutaneion). Similarly, the newly developed sanctuary of Dionysos Eleuthereus also contained an imagined royal house (embodied in the *skēnē*) to which the newly arrived god is escorted (from the Prutaneion). And so given that tragedy develops out of the Athenian cult of Dionysos (especially of Dionysos Eleuthereus), it is not co-incidental that it is frequently enacted in front of a royal house in a public sanctuary, and frequently represents the divinely assisted self-destruction of ruling families that often ends in the foundation of polis cult.[95] In the creation of tragic space and tragic plots, the free imagination of individual designers and poets no doubt played a part. But they also inherit visual schemata and narrative patterns arising from the historical development of the polis.

The polis preserves in some public buildings and rituals the memory of its ancient ruling household. The result is a fundamental ambivalence. A public building, sometimes within a public sanctuary, may be imagined as somehow a royal dwelling (and may even be built on the site of an ancient royal dwelling). The make-believe that a communal building of the democratic polis is a royal dwelling mediates the historical contradiction between religious conservatism and democracy. Not only is it a factor – along with the concomitant traditional impersonation of satyrs and (perhaps) of Dionysos – in the origin of the elaborate make-believe that is drama. It also combines the *opposites* of household and polis. The general unity or confusion of opposites, and the need to differentiate them

[95] Seaford (1994a); (2000a).

so that the polis prevails, will be central to our understanding of Aeschylus. Here we note its role in the historical generation of dramatic illusion.

From this household–polis ambivalence there results a subjective ambivalence in the attitude of the polis to the sufferings of the household. On the one hand the demolition of the house occurred not infrequently as a punishment in the archaic and classical periods, i.e. precisely the period of the flourishing of the autonomous polis. It was inflicted in particular on powerful individuals such as kings and tyrants, and the technical term (*kataskaptein*, *kataskaphē*) occurs of the destruction of the house of the ruler in tragedy (metaphorical at *Cho*. 50, actual at E., *Herakles* 566). The phenomenon has been studied by Connor, who concludes that 'the physical removal of the house demonstrated the ultimate authority of the polis, and prevented the return of the offending family and hence the danger of vengeance or renewed strife'.[96] From Athens we have the examples of the Alkmaionids,[97] of the violent opponents to Kleisthenes in 506,[98] and of leaders of the oligarchic coup of 411.[99] As for cult, a *skēnē* representing a 'tyrannical or royal dwelling' was burnt down by the Delphians in the course of the festival called Septeria.[100]

But on the other hand the ruins of the royal bridal chamber, inaccessible (*abaton*) in the Theban precinct of Dionysos, manifested the respect of the polis for (as well as its power over) the royal household. The sexual union of Dionysos with the Athenian queen may symbolically reverse the potential introversion of the royal family, but it is in the *Against Neaira* mentioned along with the interesting observation that a king and queen, who used in ancient times to perform the sacrifices, were still needed even after the introduction of democracy: in particular, a pure queen is needed to perform traditional rituals on behalf of the polis that include being given to Dionysos. This ambivalence belongs to a cultic pattern of action that persists, in a richly developed form, into tragedy, in which frequently the self-destruction of a great household brings benefit for the polis but nevertheless inspires awed sympathy.

The 'danger of vengeance or renewed strife' is regarded by Connor as neutralised, in the world of practical reality, by house demolition. But the sensibility manifest in tragedy goes further, avoiding any sense of responsibility of the people (especially the Athenian people) for the violence from which the polis benefits. This it achieves in three ways. One is to project the conflict outside Athens (Chapter 18). Another is to have the

[96] Connor (1985) 94.
[97] Isocr., *Concerning the Team of Horses* 16.26.
[98] Schol. Ar. *Lys*. 273.
[99] Craterus *FGrH* 342 F5 and F17.
[100] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 166; Plut. *Mor*. 418a; Strabo 9.3.12.

family destroy itself. A third is to have the family destroyed by the gods. *Bacchae* combines all three ways, and moreover the royal victim is punished for resisting the divine imperative of a cult that unites the Theban polis. In Euripides' *Erechtheus* Erechtheus is killed and his house demolished (in Dionysiac fashion) by the gods, but this happened at Athens, and the Athenian people duly reconstruct his house – at about the same time as the production of the drama.

Finally, we should also note that the thunderbolt and earthquake were not merely destructive. Even what physically destroys the house is ambivalent. It destroys the house, but unites the group in dramatic illusion, in a way that will be described in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Aetiological chronotope and dramatic mimesis

5A DIONYSIA AND DITHYRAMB

In 2G we described three Attic rituals located at peripheral sanctuaries, Eleusis in the west, Phaleron in the south, and Halai (linked to Brauron) in the east. Each of them seems to express the unity of the polis, by virtue of being not only connected with the urban centre but also established long ago by the advent of a deity or hero from well beyond the periphery. And each combines four aspects: (1) the political: in the cohesion of the procession that traverses its territory, in the single focus provided by the imagined advent from outside, and in the communal projection of crisis onto the remote beyond; (2) the aetiological: in the *aition* of a transition from a crisis in the remote past in a remote place; (3) the mimetic: in the imitation of the mythical events; (4) the overcoming of death: the annual return from the remote beyond is an escape from a place of death, connected perhaps with a rite of passage.

In the festival oriented to the north, the City Dionysia, we find (1), (2) and (3), but there seems to be no (4).

As for (2), the myth of the Athenian *rejection* of Dionysos Eleuthereus (4A) is, in contrast to rejections of Dionysos elsewhere, found only once in a late source,[1] perhaps because it had no place in the festival.[2] This relative unimportance of traditional aetiology may arise from the reorganisation (even perhaps creation) of the festival relatively late, in the second half of the sixth century.[3] And it permits the remarkable development of

[1] Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 243; Pausan. 1.2.5 mentions the introduction by Pegasos.

[2] Unless we include a very indirect allusion in the phalluses carried the procession, said in the late source to be a way of ending the disease caused by the rejection.

[3] Discussion and bibliography in Chapter 6 of Parker (1996), from whom I differ only in regarding the transfer of the image of Dionysos Eleuthereus to Athens as historical (albeit creating a myth). On Eleutherai joining Athens in roughly the same period: Parker (1996) 95 n. 118; Connor (1989) 10–11; Seaford (1994a) 245; Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 101–2. On the first victory in the inscribed official record, probably in the last decade of the sixth century (or slightly before), see West (1989) 251

(3) – the annual celebration of *different* myths, in drama. And yet the new (or reorganised) festival was surely associated with Dionysiac[4] myth. What myth?

The annual arrival of Dionysos Eleuthereus was almost certainly escorted by the dithyramb, from whose stationary form there developed tragedy (4D). And so the earliest myth or myths were probably those celebrated in the dithyramb. Investigation of the content of the early dithyramb will not only provide us with (4), death in the rite of passage that seemed missing from the City Dionysia. It will also demonstrate the striking *coherence* of our four aspects – political, aetiological, mimetic and ritual-eschatological – in the genesis of tragedy.

We learn from Plato that a typical theme of the early dithyramb, perhaps *the* typical theme, was the (Theban) birth of Dionysos accompanied by a thunderbolt.[5] In the seventh century Archilochos leads off the dithyramb 'thunderstruck in my mind with wine'.[6]

The next dithyrambic fragments to survive are by Pindar,[7] who was competing in the dithyrambic contest at Athens at least as early as 497–496.[8] Fragment 70a seems to be from a narrative of the conflict between Dionysos and Perseus that led to the foundation of the cult of Dionysos at Argos perhaps referred to by 33 *teletais*, which can mean mystery-cult. In fragment 70c there is mention of a *teleta* (probably) and choruses, and Dionysos is asked to come to the city (Corinth). Fragment 75 invokes the Olympian gods to the dance and (probably) to the altar of the twelve gods in the Athenian agora (4B), and praises Dionysos as celebrated with his mother Semele in springtime.[9] Among his shorter (probably) dithyrambic fragments we find the second birth of Dionysos (85) and the founding of the Eleusinian mysteries (346). In other remains of dithyrambic song the epiphany and birth of Dionysos are associated with each other.[10]

Fragment 70b begins with the statement that previously the song proceeded in a straight line, and contrasts this with a performance by those who 'know what kind of *teleta* the gods set up also by the sceptre of Zeus in their halls'. It then describes the presence of various gods, as well as of a fire-breathing thunderbolt, and the '*rhomboi* of drums'. The papyrus then

n. 1. For the festival beginning in this decade see Connor (1989); but cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 103–4.

4 Seaford (1994a) 272, 276.

5 *Laws* 700b; Pickard-Cambridge (1962) Chapter 1.

6 *Fr.* 120; Mendelsohn (1992).

7 For the Pindaric dithyramb see Lavecchia (2000).

8 *P.Oxy.* 2438.9–10; Van der Weiden (1991) 186.

9 The fragment ends there, perhaps just before references to Dionysos' birth. See further Seaford (2004a) 81.

10 E.g. in the dithyrambic 'paian' of Philodemos.

breaks off as it begins to narrate the birth of Dionysos in a passage that seems to have included an invocation of the god.[11] The *rhombos* was an instrument used in mystery-cult that made a roaring sound by whirling, and *rhomboi* is here generally translated 'whirlings'. The conflation of *rhomboi* with drums implies a confusion of roaring sounds.

In this fragment of Pindar there is a close interconnection between the (a) spatial, (b) mystic, (c) mimetic and (d) cosmic aspects of the dithyramb.

(a) There is a transition from processional[12] to stationary dithyramb, and the latter is associated with a royal house (of the gods). This is, we remember, the kind of performance from which tragedy emerged (4D).

(b) The *teleta* in the house is mystic ritual.[13] The close association of dithyramb with mystic ritual is well attested.[14]

(c) As for the mimetic aspect, the '*rhomboi* of drums' are surely imagined as making the sound of the thunderbolt. It seems that in Dionysiac mystery-cult the sounds of drum and *rhombos* were experienced as thunderbolt or earthquake.[15]

(d) The cosmic aspect is constituted by the presence of gods and thunderbolt. In a mystic context we hear of the 'whirling circular aitherial shaking (*enosis*) of the *rhombos*' (E. *Hel.* 1362–3). *Enosis* connotes earthquake,[16] and so to call it aetherial implies a confusion of the roar of thunder with the subterranean roar of earthquake, a confusion that occurs in mystery-cult.[17] In the lost drama *Peirithous*, set in the underworld, the chorus – almost certainly of mystic initiates – refer to an aitherial *rhombos* around which dance night and the stars.[18] Unison may in the suggestible context of ritual promote a shared sense of cosmic transcendence; mystic initiation created cosmic interconnection (2A, 2E).

[11] Line 31 (see Van der Weiden (1991), and Lavecchia (2000) ad loc.).
[12] D'Angour (1997), esp. 340–3.
[13] *Teletē* (Doric *teleta*) does not always refer specifically to mystic ritual, but that it does so here is clear from the context, not least from its being the object of the chorus' 'knowing' (εἰδότες): cf. E. *Ba.* 73–4 with Seaford (2006) 157–8; Lavecchia (2000) 135–6.
[14] Seaford (1994a) 268, (2004b) 80–1; Lavecchia (2000) 11–12, 136.
[15] Esp. A. *fr.* 57 (cf. *fr.* 23b); E. *Hel.* 1362–3; S. *Ant.* 152–4; see further Seaford (1996) 195–7; add that *barubromos* ('heavy-roaring') occurs of drums (E. *Ba.* 156) as well as of thunder (E. *Pho.* 182, cf. E. *Hipp.* 1201–2).
[16] It means earthquake in the mystic passage of *Bacchae* (587), and in its only other fifth-century occurrence (E. *Tro.* 1326) also refers to shaking the *earth*, as it does also in the common compound adjectives for Poseidon.
[17] Seaford (1996) 195–7; cf. the conflation of thunder with earthquake in *PV* and S. *OC*: 18E(2).
[18] Critias *fr.* 4, discussed by Csapo (2008) 273.

In *Bacchae* we see the same interconnection of aspects in more detail.

(a) The dithyrambic entry song in *Bacchae*, which has the thunderbolt birth of Dionysos as a central theme, is sung by the chorus as they take up position outside the royal house, and beat their drums 'so that the polis sees'.[19] Their second dithyrambic song (519–603), which also narrates the thunderbolt birth, is sung in front of the house, invokes Dionysos (553), and imagines various remote places from which he might be coming.

(b) The first dithyrambic song praises the blessings of mystic initiation (72–6). The second is embedded in a passage modelled on the death-like experience of mystic initiation.[20]

(c) In the second dithyramb in *Bacchae* the chorus narrate how Zeus seized Dionysos from the 'immortal fire' and said to him: 'Dithyrambos, enter my male womb. I reveal you, Bakchos, to Thebes to call by this name.' The reporting of direct speech is unusual in tragic song. It seems to represent here a dithyrambic *topos*: in Pindar (*fr.* 85) Zeus urges on Dionysos' second birth by uttering the words λῦθι ῥάμμα ('be released, stitching!') that are imagined to be the origin of the name 'dithyramb', just as the birth story is aetiological also of the cult of Semele (*Ba.* 6–12). In the *topos*, from the heart of the mystic ritual, the chorus (or a member of it) briefly adopts the persona of Zeus. This exemplifies the change of identity practiced in Dionysiac cult generally (masks, dressing as satyrs) as well as the theatricality of mystic ritual (10B).

The thunderbolt, in the Pindaric dithyramb merely imagined as present, in *Bacchae* now destroys the house, which in a bacchic frenzy collapses to the ground at the same time as the chorus do.[21] Very similar (as well as being in dithyrambic *style*)[22] was the Aeschylean Dionysos' punishment of king Lykourgos.[23] The chorus of a proto-dramatic dithyramb may well have imagined the collapse of the frenzied house as their own frenzied fall to the ground as they created thunder and earthquake with their drums. For even the mountain and its animals join in the chorus' bacchic movement (*Ba.* 726–7).

(d) The cosmic aspect of the mystic episode is represented by the epiphany of Dionysos simultaneously with thunderbolt, earthquake, and

[19] Seaford (1996) 155–7, (2004b) 80–1. [20] Seaford (1996) 195–203.
[21] 587–605 with Seaford (1996) 195–9. Cf. A. *fr.* 58; E. *HF* 825–1142, *Erechtheus fr.* 65.47–54.
[22] Seaford (1977–8). [23] *Frr.* 57, 58: Seaford (1996) 196.

the flaring up on Semele's tomb of the smouldering fire that 'once Zeus's thunder left', killing Semele.

Our investigation of the dithyramb has allowed us to see that the City Dionysia resembled in all four respects the model we derived in 5A from the other Attic festivals. Even closer to the model is the aetiological myth of Theban cult dramatised in *Bacchae*, whose dithyrambic entry-song encapsulated the genesis of Attic tragedy.

In both *Demeter Hymn* and *Bacchae* a deity arrives from afar and establishes a mystery-cult for the whole polis,[24] but only after entering disguised into a royal household that resists the ritual. The sojourn in the house reflects the process of mystic initiation – for instance in the fire that surrounds the infant son within the household (to bestow immortality on Demophoon, birth on Dionysos). The epiphany of Dionysos (a prisoner in the death-like darkness of the house) was preceded by his thiasos speculating on which remote place the god might be in, and it was accompanied by earthquake and by the fire of the thunderbolt that once accompanied his birth and continued to be experienced (in drumming) in Dionysiac mystic ritual. Similarly at Eleusis the epiphany of Kore (a prisoner in the darkness of Hades) was preceded by the initiands searching for her, as Demeter once did over land and sea (2A). And at some point in the mystic transition to joy there occurred the announcement of the birth of a child accompanied by a great fire that – given that the child was identified with Iakchos-Dionysos[25] – may have been identified with lightning.[26] Kore was summoned to the sound of an *ēcheion* ('gong').[27] There was an *ēcheion* in the theatre too, where it was called *bronteion* ('thunderer').[28]

In both *Demeter Hymn* and *Bacchae* the mystic epiphany embodies the aetiological chronotope: from distant wandering a deity arrives at a place where (s)he establishes control of the cosmic (vertical) axis, control that will in the future be mimetically exercised by the polis in mystic ritual. Moreover, there were connections between the Eleusinian mystery-cult and the cult of Dionysos in both Athens and (probably) Thebes.[29]

[24] This certainly occurred in *Bacchae*, unless Dionysos announced at the end of the play (in the manuscript lacuna) that – despite his stating in the prologue that he has come to Thebes to establish his *teletai* there (39–40, 46–9) – he has for some reason changed his mind! For this and various other equally powerful considerations see Seaford (1996) 252–3, (2000b).

[25] From the fourth century, and probably much earlier according to Richardson (1974) 27, 319; cf. Burkert (1983) 289.

[26] Mendelsohn (1992) 119. [27] Apollod. *FGrH* 244 F110. [28] Schol. Ar., *Clouds* 292; Pollux 4.130.

[29] Seaford (1994a) 262–3. On Pindar's probably dithyrambic *fr.* 346 (transfer of Eleusinian mystery-cult, probably to Thebes) see Lavecchia (2000) 31, 109–21, 190–5; Wilson (2003) 175–8.

However, there is much about the Dionysiac cult that is distinctive. Firstly, the Dionysiac is distinguished from the Eleusinian *aition* by the *antagonism* between household and deity. The ignorant Eleusinian queen merely fears the saving fire, but the ignorant Theban king attempts to extinguish it (623–5). Whereas Demeter fills the house with light 'as of lightning' (280), the Theban house is *destroyed* by thunderbolt and earthquake. The crucible of dramatic mimesis is the cosmic culmination of Dionysiac mystic initiation, the epiphanic power of thunderbolt and earthquake to release the initiands from the here and now in the moment of terror that immediately precedes salvation.[30] But it is also, in *Bacchae*, the moment of epiphanic *victory* over king Pentheus. This dithyrambic mimesis embodies the greatest intensity of both mystic transition and (political) conflict.

Now this victory is also an *opening out* of the mystic ritual. At the (traditional) Anthesteria the queen performed secret rites 'on behalf of the polis'. In the *Demeter Hymn* the goddess leaves the royal house, where she first performed the mystic ritual, and orders a temple to be built by the people for mystic initiation that is secret but for the whole polis (and others). A third model of the relationship between mystic ritual in the royal house and polis cult is provided by *Bacchae*. First the god's dithyrambic escort drums in front of the palace so that 'the whole polis may see' and urges those inside the palace to emerge, and then their god destroys the house, emerges from his imprisonment there, recounts to his ecstatic thiasos what has happened within, and proceeds to found his cult for the whole polis. The celebration of mystic – or at least secret[31] – ritual in polis festivals of Dionysos was a regular pattern.[32] The dithyrambic poet Aristagoras was prosecuted for 'dancing out the mysteries'.[33] The dithyrambic genesis of tragedy encapsulated in *Bacchae* opens out the charismatic mystic ritual, detaches it from its ritual function (6AB), transforms it into a *spectacle* for the whole polis and beyond.[34] This was enabled also by the fact that, in contrast to the other Attic festivals from which we derived our model in 5A, the focus of the 'City' Dionysia (ἐν ἄστει) was on arrival of the deity at the urban centre not the periphery.

Despite this transformation into spectacle, Dionysos remained the god who creates egalitarian cohesion in initiated thiasos as in polis, and the former may have served as a model for the latter. In *Bacchae* he came to

[30] 5A; *Ba*. 576–41 with Seaford (1996) 195–202.
[31] The initiated thiasos performs rituals other than mystic initiation, from which some of them may derive: Seaford (1994a) 262–327.
[32] Seaford (2006) 70–2. Traces of it survive from the Anthesteria and Lenaia, but not from the City Dionysia, probably because it was transformed there into drama.
[33] S^{EV} Ar. *Clouds* 830; Csapo (2008) 286.
[34] Cf. Dio Chrys. *Or*. 36.35 on tragedy as mystic revelation for the masses.

initiate the whole polis.[35] During internal conflict in sixth-century Athens Epimenides was said to have come from afar (Crete) to initiate (*katorgiazein*) the polis.[36] The *visible* aspect of large numbers of initiates at Eleusis might be politically significant (2F). The potential of mystic initiation as a model of political community has been recently noted by Kowalzig apropos of Pindaric dithyramb.[37]

In a story from the island of Naxos[38] some drunken youths made a *kōmos* to the house of a rich man called Telestagoras, and insulted his two marriageable daughters. 'The Naxians' intervene, which produces fighting that ends in Lygdamis becoming tyrant. Martin West suggests that this derives from a traditional entertainment with a ritual basis, and compares an *aition* of Attic comedy, in which farmers enter the city, proclaim their grievances in the streets with the words 'here lives so-and-so who has done as follows to so-and-so the farmer', and are consequently made to do the same thing in the theatre.[39] The Naxian story has the configuration that interested us about the Anthesteria (4E): a *kōmos* to a household, tension over possession of the females of the household, and the involvement of the polis. And the Attic *aition* makes explicit the transformation of confrontation with the household into drama. Further, our perspective allows us to make sense of the name Telestagoras, which combines initiation (*telestēs* means 'initiator') with the openness of the agora.

5B THEBES AS AETIOLOGICAL ELSEWHERE

This opening out, and detachment from ritual function, no doubt helped the mimetic element of the dithyramb to develop into fully fledged drama, in which both action and physical environment are comprehensively imagined as in another place, and with different myths every year. Another factor in this process was the distinctive *mobility* of Dionysiac cult.

The god of the festival was from Eleutherai,[40] which had recently belonged to Thebes. Whence did he come to Eleutherai?[41] In *Bacchae* the first Greek city he has come to (20, 23), after much wandering around Asia, is his birthplace Thebes, where he will establish mystery-cult before

[35] 39–40; note also 23, 35–6, 694; cohesion: 75, 609, 693, 748; 2E(4).
[36] Plut. *Sol.* 12.4–6; κατοργάζειν of mystic initiation also at *Mor.* 766b.
[37] Kowalzig (2007a) 169, on those composed for Argos; we may add that a likely context for their performance was the mystic summoning of Dionysos from the underworld at Lerna; cf. Wilson (2003)174–80.
[38] Reported by Aristotle (*fr.* 558). [39] Schol. Dion. Thr. p. 18.15 Hilgard; West (1974) 27.
[40] Itself said to have been the birthplace of the god (D.S. 3.66.1).
[41] Where he was rejected by the daughters of Eleuther: Seaford (1994a) 245 n. 43.

going to another land (49–50). Continuing his southward journey will lead him to Argos,[42] where once again he will madden resisting women. But the Kaza pass, a main line of communication from Thebes to Argos (and Athens), leads across the Kithairon range through Eleutherai.[43] Eleutherai was in Theban tradition a place of Theban cult,[44] and in Euripides' *Antiope* was the setting for the arrival of one chorus of Theban maenads and another (probably) of Athenian citizens.[45] There is epigraphic evidence for an association of Semele, Dionysos' Theban mother, with the City Dionysia.[46] The panhellenic Dionysos, like the panhellenic Demeter of Eleusis, had arrived in Attica after much wandering.

Early in the Athenian official contests, dithyrambic poets came from elsewhere, for instance Pindar from Thebes. And Dionysos himself is especially *mobile*, the god who may *arrive* anywhere, in a dithyrambic procession. But although a dithyramb may summon Dionysos to the centre of Athens (e.g. Pindar *fr.* 75), his birth epiphany[47] cannot be enacted as having occurred anywhere other than in the royal house at *Thebes*. Into the City Dionysia the dithyramb brought Thebes, which – as disastrously rejecting Dionysos – could be imagined as the place of aetiological crisis beyond the border (2G).

So too, for instance, in the annual celebration of Theseus' return Crete is imagined at the Oschophoria in the Phaleron sanctuary: here is there and now is then, the annual re-enactment implies (spatial and temporal) circularity, but what is enacted is a (spatial and temporal) *transition* (from danger to victorious safety). This, the aetiological chronotope, persists into tragedy, but without the circularity of annually re-enacting the same myth. And whereas Crete and the Phaleron sanctuary are in the end distinct, in tragedy the aetiological elsewhere may be the place of cult. Urban Thebes, brought into Athens by the dithyramb, in *Bacchae* functions as aetiological elsewhere, but it is also where the cult is finally founded. In this respect space and time diverge. The final foundation effects a temporal transition, but the places remain merged (this *skēnē* remains the palace at Thebes). Moreover, the catastrophe transcends and effaces the distinction *within the drama* between the urban palace and the savagery of the place (Mt Kithairon) that may have been an aetiological elsewhere for Theban cult.

[42] Explicit at Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.5.
[43] Ober (1985) 119–20, 223. An ancient roadway went through the fortress called Gyphtocastro (of *c.* the 370s), now identified with Eleutherai.
[44] Timagoras *FGrH* 381 F1; see also D.S. 4.2.6.
[45] Suggesting a mediating function for the cult? Detail in Collard, Cropp, and Gibert (2004) 259–329.
[46] *LSCG* 18A 44–50 (cf. D 35–8); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 97, 133 n. 151.
[47] For birth as epiphany see Rutherford (2001) 367–8.

This effacement, in which aetiological violence is brought from the beyond to the very centre, is not untypical of tragedy (15A).

How were actual relations between Athens and Thebes? According to Herodotos the city that had donated most money (*chrēmata*) to the tyrant Peisistratos in exile (i.e. before 545) was Thebes. The only other helpers he names are Argive mercenaries and Lygdamis, whom Peisistratos subsequently made tyrant of Naxos.[48] At about the same time the *kantharos*, whose home had been Boiotia, quite suddenly becomes an attribute of Dionysos in Athenian vase-painting as well as the type on Naxian coinage produced by Lygdamis. That there is a connection between these events is convincingly argued by Carpenter.[49] At the Boiotian sanctuary of Apollo Ptoios a dedication has survived by Hipparchos the son of Peisistratos.[50] On the other hand, Athens came into conflict with Thebes in 519,[51] and again – shortly after the ejection of the tyranny – in 506.[52] Thebes and Athens remained enemies throughout much of the fifth century. One reason for the hostility of the new Athenian democracy to Thebes, and for the subsequent association of Thebes with the excesses of tyranny in tragedy, may have been its alliance with the Athenian tyranny.

5C CONCLUSION

We have seen that an exceptional degree of mimesis inhered already in the dithyramb,[53] more specifically in its mystic elements. The importance of mystic ritual in the genesis of satyr-play and tragedy I have argued for elsewhere.[54] The mystic epiphany in *Bacchae* suddenly abolishes, in both space and time, the gap between present and distant. *Spatially*, mastery of the vertical (cosmic) and of the horizontal (geographic) axis combine in the moment of the full return of Dionysos from Asia to his place of birth (the flaming tomb of Semele). *Temporally*, it is the theatrical re-enactment of a mythical re-enactment of an originating event. In the tragic performance four temporal stages merge into one: the birth of Dionysos by a thunderbolt, the reigniting of the same thunderbolt on his return to Thebes, the (annual) invocation and celebration of his return in the Theban cult, and the enactment of the myth in Athens as drama. Like the return of Persephone at Eleusis, the birth story functions for the Dionysiac

[48] Hdt. 1.61; sim. *Ath. pol.* 15. [49] Carpenter (1986) 118–23.
[50] *IG* I^3 1470 (Peisistratos is an almost certain supplement); Schachter (1994).
[51] Hdt. 6.108; Thuc. 3.68.5. [52] Hdt. 5.77; the Athenian victory was commemorated in *IG* I^3 501(A).
[53] Cf. Schol. Ar. *Frogs* 320 (p. 284 Dübner) διθυραμβικά, τουτέστι Διονυσιακὰ δράματα.
[54] Seaford (1994a) 235–327.

thiasos as the *aition* of the mystic initiation by which it was created. In both ritual and drama the narration or re-enactment of the *aition* brings the spatial and temporal remote into the here and now.

To conclude, the four aspects of our model set out in 5a – the political, aetiological, mimetic and ritual-eschatological – all cohere in the dithyrambic epiphany at the heart of *Bacchae*. The dithyramb also brought to the City Dionysia a cult *aition* that – because the cult established was elsewhere – was not perpetuated in the festival but replaced by other myths, in a performance that continued to be regarded as *choral*[55] and often to end in aetiology.[56]

[55] Wilson (2000) 6; on early vase-paining see West (1990) 8. On the continuing Dionysiac self-referentiality of the chorus in tragedy see Chapter 6 n. 19.

[56] Seaford (2000a) 37–9. Scullion (1999–2000) argues that the *aitia* in Euripidean tragedy, and even some of the cults they refer to, were invented by Euripides. But see my response (Seaford 2009b).

CHAPTER 6

Monetisation and tragedy

6A THE FORMALISATION OF THE DIONYSIAC PERFORMANCE

In Part 1 we pursued the transformation of the reciprocal into the aetiological and monetised chronotopes, and in Chapters 4 and 5 the *political* context of the emergence of tragedy from the dithyrambic aetiological chronotope. Now we extend the picture by reverting to the sixth-century monetisation of the polis. Monetisation both promoted a new chronotope (Chapter 3), and was a factor – we will now argue – in the genesis of the new genre of tragedy and in two of its basic extant features – the confrontation of individual with chorus, and the frequency and variety of rituals and ritual genres evoked or enacted in a single tragic performance.

Arion of Methymna spent 'most of his time' with Periander, tyrant of Corinth (*c.* 627–587), but on a visit to Italy and Sicily earned 'much money' (χρήματα μεγάλα), which he brought back with him on a ship to Corinth (Hdt. 1.23–4). The story illustrates both the convenience of precious metal money and its dangers (the sailors attempt to steal it). The monetary motive also surely explains why Arion should have chosen exile from his own polis to live in Corinth.[1] A professional, such as a doctor, could be lured from one place to another by successively higher fees.[2] Herodotos also reports that Arion was the first person known to have composed, named, and taught, a dithyramb in Corinth. At Corinth there was no doubt, as elsewhere,[3] a local tradition of (unnamed, untaught, spontaneous) dithyramb, which Arion formalised. This was probably facilitated by the spread of alphabetic writing. Less obvious but no less important was the role of monetisation.

The implication of monetisation for performance goes beyond its power to attract virtuosi. The condensed power of precious metal money (and

[1] Corinth would have been no less monetised in this period than Athens (3A), if only as yet in the form of uncoined silver.
[2] Demokedes of Kroton: Hdt. 3.131.
[3] The invention of the dithyramb was attributed to various places: e.g. Pindar, *Ol.* 13.19; *fr.* 71, 115.

especially coinage) is easily transported, concealed, stored and paid, and has the immense advantage (over barter) of being exchangeable at all times, and in most places, for numerous goods and services. The *financing* of performance may include payment for trainers, performers, musical instruments, costumes, and all that is required for its ritual (or theatrical) context, including e.g. sacrificial victims. A store of money has a centralising power of impersonal co-ordination that is increased if the money belongs to a single person, such as the *turannos*.

What form did the dithyramb take before Arion formalised it? Archilochos says that he knows how to lead it (*exarchein*) when his mind is thunderstruck with wine (*fr.* 120). This implies not only improvisation but also – in a hymn of which the typical theme is the birth of Dionysos by a thunderbolt (5A) – assimilation of the performer to the god. Indeed elsewhere the *exarchos* of the dithyramb is Dionysos (*Bacchae* 141), and that the dithyramb was improvisatory is confirmed by other texts.[4] It was a traditional, riotous hymn sung by satyrs or others in a processional escort of Dionysos.[5] Arion probably imposed a script and rehearsal, perhaps also transformed it from processional to stationary,[6] and no doubt controlled the performance with his virtuosity. The traditional chorus may well have focused on an individual, but if the individual was an improvising chorus-member (whether or not imagined as Dionysos) or an image or impersonator of Dionysos, the focus arises from the cohesive enthusiasm of the chorus. Pictures of the Dionysiac thiasos with its god predate drama.[7] But the tyrant uses his money to create a new kind of Dionysiac performance for public display, and this includes buying in Arion to formalise and lead it as composer, poet, choreographer and performer.[8] Aristotle (*Poetics* §4) states that from an improvisatory beginning and developing from the *saturikon* (satyr-play-like) tragedy 'became solemn (*apesemnunthē*) late'. I suggest that this solemnisation was the final stage in a process that began with the monetised formalisation of the Dionysiac performance.

Inherent in this formalisation is the potential for tension between those who follow communal tradition and those who promote a new kind of

[4] Aristot. *Poet.* 1449a9–11; A. *fr.* 355.

[5] There is evidence for this *kind* of performance in sixth-century vase-painting: Seaford (2007a).

[6] Cf. 4C. Aristotle (*fr.* 677 Rose, *De Poet.* F36a Janko, ap. Proclus, *Chrest.* 43) attributes innovation in dithyramb to Arion, who 'first led the circular chorus' (also Hellanikos *FGrH* 4 F86 and Dikaiarchos F75 Wehrli). d'Angour (1997) attributes the stationary dithyramb to Lasos (much later). Such a development may occur more than once.

[7] In fact the association of the satyrs with Dionysos in Athenian vase-paintings becomes common in the second half of the sixth century, and may be a form of (urban) *legitimation* of the unruly thiasos.

[8] For general historical connection between tyranny and the individual authority of the choral composer see Nagy (2000) 174, 411–12.

individual control. This can only be a hypothesis, because direct evidence of such tension is unlikely to survive. But we do by chance preserve a piece of evidence that has survived for a different reason (its interest to theorists of music). It is a song – or part of a song – attributed to Pratinas (said to be the first writer of satyr-plays) and almost certainly sung by a chorus of satyrs.[9] It employs a hyberbolic form of the dithyrambic linguistic style to incite violence against the pipe (*aulos*), and includes the words 'Mine, mine is *Bromios* (Dionysos) . . . Let the *aulos* be second in the dance, for it is a subordinate.' Athenaios (617bc), who quotes the song, preserves information about its context: when the dancing-places were being occupied by pay-receiving (*misthophoroi*) pipe-players and chorus-members, the choruses began to accompany the pipe-players (rather than the reverse, as had obtained before).[10] This new domination by the pipe-players caused indignation, expressed in a strong form of the choral self-referentiality used in hymns to attract deity:[11] 'Hey look! Here is the tossing of hand and foot for you, ivy-haired lord of the triumphant dithyramb; hear my Dorian dance-song.'

Here then is evidence of tension introduced into the performance itself by its monetisation – tension between on the one hand the amateur participants in a traditionally riotous celebration associated with the periphery ('it is *my* task to rush over the mountains with Naiads', sing the satyrs) and on the other hand the use of money to control the performance by hiring urban professional soloists and even new (more subordinate) chorus-members. Peripherality (real or imagined) at the urban centre is politically significant,[12] but creates tension. In fact the distinction between professional individuals (actors and pipe-players) and a citizen chorus persists throughout the fifth century.

In the situation at Corinth as described by Herodotos there is not just one powerful individual but two, not only Arion but also he who controls the money, the tyrant Periander. Is it possible that the tension might be between the chorus and the man of money himself, the tyrant? This is more likely than it may seem. The earliest occurrences of the word *chorēgos* (chorus-leader) are in Alkman, once of a 'pre-eminent' female exercising authority over the chorus, and once of Agesidamos, 'leader of the people'.[13]

[9] Seaford (1977–8) 81–94; Wilson (2000) 336 n. 85.

[10] True, the oppressive individual here is not composer but paid pipe-player; but this is the only song that happens to have survived from this milieu.

[11] Furley and Bremer (2001) 1.59–60.

[12] Cf. 3A(3); Nagy (1990) 389–90; Theogn. 53–8; Aristot. *Pol.* 1319b.

[13] *PMG* 1.43–5, 10(b).11. For the connection between choral leadership and kingship in Sparta see Nagy (2000) 347–9.

Koruphaios could refer both to chorus-leader and to political leader (e.g. Hdt. 3.82.3). The word *chorēgos* came to refer to a wealthy individual who did not belong to the chorus, namely the man who provided the money to equip and train it. Moreover, tension between Dionysiac thiasos and autocrat is already there in those myths in which the thiasos is initially suppressed or rejected by a king.[14]

Then there is the evidence of the drama. In Euripides' satyr-play *Cyclops*, the chorus of satyrs bewail their loss of Dionysos and of roaming with Nymphs on the mountainside, now that they are slaves of Polyphemos (63–75), who bans their Dionysiac music and dance (203–5). This Polyphemos has, in contrast to the Homeric model, sophisticatedly selfish modern attitudes to his own wealth. The captivity of the satyrs to a man of money seems to have been a recurrent theme of satyric drama.[15] And in the only other extant drama on a Dionysiac theme, a man of money,[16] the *turannos* Pentheus, attempts to imprison the marginal (Lydian) thiasos as well as to stop its Dionysiac song and dance.[17] It is therefore significant that in the earliest surviving song sung by a chorus of satyrs (Pratinas'), probably from an early satyr-play, they assert their Dionysiac identity against someone hired to control their revels. This theme of (satyric or tragic) drama on Dionysiac myths derives, I suggest, from the conditions of performance in which the genres were created. Satyric drama, because it was instituted in the festival programme to preserve what had been lost from tragedy, was inherently conservative. *Bacchae* was both archaic in style and similar in detail to Aeschylus' dramatisation of the persection of Dionysos in *Edonians*.[18]

The same originating contradiction is still felt, albeit remotely, in those passages of extant tragedy in which the chorus expresses its identity as a *chorus*, rather than e.g. as old men of Thebes. Such choral 'self-referentiality' tends to be associated with Dionysos,[19] and sometimes forms a contrast or contradiction with the actions of the *turannoi*. In Sophokles' *Antigone* the choral invocation of Dionysos to come to purify the polis (polluted by the *turannos*) with dancing (18E) must be taken together with their earlier mention of the king Lykourgos putting a stop to Dionysiac choruses (963–5). The Euripidean Elektra declines the chorus' invitation to join their dance at a polis festival (*El.* 167–80). When Jokasta rejects the oracle of Apollo, the chorus in their next song associate the excessive wealth of the

[14] E.g. by King Lykourgos at *Il.* 6.133–40. [15] Seaford (1991), (2003c). [16] E. *Ba.* 257, 812.
[17] *Ba.* 226–7, 257, 812; as did Lykourgos probably in Aeschylus' lost *Edonians*.
[18] Dodds (1960) xxxi–xxxiii. [19] Henrichs (1995); Kowalzig (2007b) 232–42.

turannos with *hubris*, unjust gain (*kerdos*) and impiety, and ask, 'If such actions are honoured, why should I dance?' (S. *OT* 895–6).

I suggest that the monetised formalisation of the dithyramb was an important step in the pre-history of tragedy, and that the tension inherent in it, between thiasos and tyrant, contributed to the representation of this tension in the only two dramas by tragedians that survive on a Dionysiac theme. How did this happen?

Myth emerges from the repetition of ritual, as legitimation and to amplify and clarify its emotions. In this process a chorus-leader is – we can see from sixth-century vase-painting[20] – easily imagined as a mythical figure. Even the biography of Arion becomes mythical.[21] The Dionysiac thiasos has an *exarchos* ('leader, soloist'), who may be imagined as Dionysos. And in *aetiological* myth we find the rejection of cult, both as cautionary tale and so as to endow the celebration with a sense of eventual triumph over adversity. The loss or imprisonment of Dionysos gives force to his subsequent epiphany. His processional entry might be imagined as re-enacting a mythical triumph over initial opposition, such as the return with Hephaistos to Olympos.[22] It is possible therefore that the *exarchos* sometimes impersonated the mythical *enemy* of the thiasos.

A subsequent development, the monetised formalisation of the performance, creates a new kind of opposition or tension between thiasos and powerful individual. This new individual is the paid composer and performer, who both belongs to the thiasos (as *exarchos*) and is nevertheless easily identified with the mythical king who opposes it. Such an identification might well include features of the autocrat who by providing the money controlled the performance, the tyrant. Just as the unprecedented individual power of the tyrant is easily imagined in mythical terms,[23] so conversely the mythical ruler may be coloured by the historical phenomenon of tyranny. At the same time the Dionysiac chorus, with its traditional associations with the margins (the mountains, or even Asia), may have assimilated its new subordination to its old marginality. The opposition between tyrant and marginal chorus persists into extant tragedy. Although public choruses seem to represent the community of the polis,[24] and in tragedy the choral performers are male citizens, they nevertheless almost

[20] E.g. Green (2007) 101.

[21] His return to Tainaron on the back of a dolphin emerged from Dionysiac choral (probably dithyrambic) performance – here too (cf. 2E) encapsulating (*maritime*) distance in the performance of an aetiological myth of cult, whether of Melikertes–Palaimon (Ieranò (1992)) or of Poseidon at Tainaron (Csapo (2003) 91–2).

[22] Hedreen (2004). [23] Ogden (1997); Vernant (1990) 207–36. [24] Nagy (1990) 142, 367–8.

always represent a group that is in some sense marginal: women, slaves, old men (10B).

Monetisation contributes in this way to the content of mature tragedy, but also to its form. Although the details of the process are lost, the establishment of the second actor, an important step in the development of drama, may have arisen out of *tension* – between Dionysos and autocrat at Athens. Given that this step was attributed by Aristotle to Aeschylus,[25] it is tempting to locate it *after* the fall of the Athenian tyrants (when Aeschylus was fifteen years old), and to hypothesise that it was influenced by imagining tension between Dionysos and the *turannos*. The early chronology of tragedy is unknown. It seems likely that tragedy was already emerging from the dithyramb under the tyranny, and it is possible that tragic contests were officially instituted (shortly) before its fall. But in any event the advent of democracy may well have transformed the character of the performances.

In fifth-century Athens tragic choruses were each financed and controlled by a *chorēgos*, who also made 'paradramatic' public appearances.[26] How were festival performances resourced under the tyrants? Hipparchos, son of the tyrant Peisistratos and brother of the tyrant Hippias, was credited with the institution at the Panathenaia of rhapsodic contests in the recitation of Homer. Rhapsodes moved between city-states, and competed for cash prizes.[27] The other great urban festival – of Dionysos Eleuthereus – may have been either created or expanded (along with his sanctuary) under the tyranny (5A). Hipparchos 'invited Anacreon, Simonides, and the other poets to Athens'. We are also told that he induced Simonides (from Keos) to come to Athens by large fees and gifts.[28] Simonides was said to be the first poet to compose for a wage, and to be too fond of money; and several remarks attributed to him emphasise in various ways that the most important thing is money.[29] Participants in the early dithyrambic competitions, said to have been founded by Lasos of Hermione, included Simonides, Hypodikos from Chalkis, Pindar from Thebes, and Melanippides from Melos.[30] Isocrates (*Ant.* 166) states, no doubt with exaggeration, that the Athenians gave Pindar a reward of 10,000 drachmas.

[25] Aristot. *Poet.* 1449a16.

[26] Wilson (2000) 136, who proposes (109–10, 150–1, 194–7) an analogy between the *chorēgos* and the tragic individual in their relation to the community.

[27] At least in the time of Ion of Ephesos: Pl. *Ion* 530a1–2, 535e4–6.

[28] *Ath. pol.* 18; [Pl.] *Hipparch.* 228c.

[29] Xenophanes *fr.* 21; Ar., *Peace* 698–9; and numerous source refs. in Campbell (1991) 346–9, 364–7; Kurke (1991) 59.

[30] All said to be before 490: Hypodikos (508–9): Marmor Parium A46. Pindar (496–7): *P.Oxy.* 2438.9–10; Van der Weiden (1991) 186. Melanippides (493–4): Marmor Parium A49 (and *Suda* s.v. Melanippides, 3.350 Adler).

Hippias had a hands-on role in the organisation of the procession at the Panathenaia,[31] and so may have been involved also in the details of the City Dionysia.[32] A late fourth-century text, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* (1347a), states that the tyrant Hippias allowed people to commute liturgies (including the *chorēgia*) for a moderate sum (and nevertheless to be enrolled as liturgists). Although much in this text is clearly fabricated, it is argued by Wilson that 'it is not inconceivable that a memory of ancient practice should be preserved here in a form heavily coloured by contemporary arrangements'.[33] If 'contemporary arrangements' include the liturgies, then the kernel of truth preserved by the passage may be that Hippias appropriated to himself the resourcing and control of the choruses by introducing money into the process. Such a measure would be in keeping with the statement of Thucydides (6.54.5) that the tyrants 'while taxing the Athenians at only five per cent, adorned their city beautifully and carried out the wars and sacrificed in the temples (ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ ἔθυον)'. The prices to be paid for public sacrificial victims, which had been set out in the persistently respected calendar of Solon, were now taken on by the tyrants, no doubt along with the other expenses of the publicly funded festivals.[34]

For they controlled considerable new supplies of precious metal, which Peisistratos used both to obtain and to 'root his tyranny' (Hdt. 1.64), and coinage may well have been introduced into Athens during his rule.[35] The universal power of money under unified control must have surpassed all traditional methods in co-ordinating the preparations for increasingly elaborate and spectacular choral performances.[36] If we ask why it was in *Athens* that tragedy came into being, the answer must include Athens' access to silver, especially from Thrace and Laurium. With Laurium Athens was the only major polis to possess abundant supplies of silver within its territory.

[31] Thuc. 6.57: 'he was arranging how each part (ἕκαστα) of the procession was to proceed'; also 1.20; *Ath. pol.* 18.3; Seaford (2004b) 75–6.

[32] The report (preserved in Athenaios 12.44) that Peisistratos was visually identified with Dionysos may derive from his public role in the Dionysiac festival. Compare E. *Ba.* 319–20, and subsequent autocrats identified with Dionysos. Compare also the theatrical ruse of Peisistratos to ensure his return (3c).

[33] Wilson (2000) 15. On the importance of money to the City Dionysia generally see Wilson (2010).

[34] Though not e.g. of the (ancient) Anthesteria, which continued to be funded in a traditional way: Seaford (2008).

[35] *Ath. pol.* 15.2; Hdt. 1.61, 64; Seaford (2004a) 131; Kroll and Waggoner (1984).

[36] Seaford (2008). A glimpse allowed us into the workings of the fifth-century *chorēgia* reveals the advantage of using large sums of money (e.g. Lys. 21.1–2): one of the overseers appointed by the *chorēgos* is assigned the task of 'buying and spending whatever the poet or any of these other men [the other overseers] told him' (Antiphon 6.13).

By re-enacting annually the original advent of Dionysos the community controls the flow of time,[37] and the myth of resistance to that original arrival both implies the necessity of the ritual and endows it with a sense of eventual triumph. But the monetisation of the polis promotes and facilitates the control of Dionysiac performance by an individual, the *turannos*. This development produces a dual contradiction, firstly between the isolated individual and the cohesion of the thiasos,[38] and secondly between aetiological time (the annual re-enactment of an ancient linear event) and the *unprecedented* lavishness of display made possible by the concentration of money.[39] This dual contradiction was, I suggest, productive, resulting in the striking and socially fundamental polarity, at the heart of tragedy, between the ancient cohesion of the *choros* and the unprecedented power bestowed by monetisation on the individual. Tragedy frequently ends with the demise of the powerful individual(s), the survival of the *choros*, and the foundation of polis cult in which performances of *choroi* will continue for ever. In this way the crisis characteristic of aetiological myth – what I call the aetiological crisis – is expanded to include the *turannos*, and resolved, as the aetiological crisis always was, in the foundation of cult for the whole community. The ancient form absorbs the new historical phenomenon, and is much richer for doing so. We will in due course see how in tragedy the aetiological crisis also absorbs the dangerous new unlimitedness of money.[40]

6B THE COMBINING OF RITUAL GENRES[41]

The traditional advent of the Dionysiac thiasos at royal house or public altar was transformed, with the monetisation of festival and performance, into the tragic confrontation between *turannos* and newly arrived, marginal chorus. I will now relate this same monetisation to another unprecedented but central feature of tragedy – its tendency to evoke or enact, within the same performance, a *variety* of rituals and ritual utterances.

Before the Persian wars, claims Plato, *mousikē* was divided into hymns, laments, paians, dithyrambs (about the birth of Dionysos) and nomes, but subsequently these genres were mixed up with each other, with the result that *aristokratia* gave way to *theatrokratia* (*Laws* 700a–701a). Plato here is not thinking only of music (he makes separate mention of musical mixing).

[37] Rappaport (1999) 187–8, 222, 225, 230–3. [38] 2E, 5A.
[39] Manifest also in the adornment of Athens under the Athenian tyrants: cf. Thuc. 6.54. Tyranny in general and unprecedented wealth: Thuc. 1.13.
[40] 7B, 15A. [41] For more deatail see Seaford (2004b), (2007a), (2008).

And although *theatrokratia* may not be confined to the theatre, it does seem that Plato here has the theatre in mind, in part because he associates the degeneration with democracy (701a4), which elsewhere he associates with theatre (*Rep*. 605b). He is thinking not of a degeneration of drama but of its growing social power (concomitant with social degeneration) at the expense of the traditional genres of song.

In Homer we hear of four kinds of choral song: the paian, the Linos song, the wedding song and the lament.[42] They exemplify a phenomenon that is widespread in preliterate cultures, the traditional song with a specific function in a specific context. Much of the choral poetry known to us from the seventh and sixth centuries is, though not anonymous, also written for – or *as if* for – specific functions, from which, roughly speaking, derive context of performance, form and content. But of course a song may be performed without its originating function and context (e.g. a wedding song may be sung in contexts other than a wedding), and so belongs to its genre merely by virtue of form and content. Such detachment from function and context is on the whole a precondition for the combination or mixing of genres.

Was this detachment, which culminated in the literariness characteristic of the Hellenistic period, already occurring in the archaic period? The evidence is insufficient, and if such a change did occur, it must have been both limited and uneven.[43] The context most favourable to the development of drama is the festival, in which a hymn was performed in the kind of sanctuary that had undergone elaboration from the eighth century onwards. The function of such a performance is broad: like that of the material objects dedicated in the same place, it is divine favour but also public display.[44] In the (probably seventh-century) *Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo* Delian girls are described as first praising Apollo and Artemis and then singing of men and women of ancient times, and imitating the voices of all men. The choral[45] songs of Stesichoros, which narrated myths, were probably performed in the same kind of context.

It is with tyranny that we see something unprecedented. Peisistratos engineered his return as tyrant by enacting a quasi-festal procession (3c). His son Hipparchos used his control of public ritual – the Panathenaia – to

[42] *Il.* 1.472–4, 18.569–73, 493–5 (cf. *Od.* 23.144–9), 22.391, 24.720–22. Note also the hint of a *partheneion* at *Od.* 6.101–2. Group *dancing* is described at esp. *Il.* 18.590–606 (on 604–6 see Edwards (1991) ad loc.); *Od.* 8.262–4.

[43] Fowler (1987) 101 discusses the Greek lyric genres under the three stages: (1) purely 'occasional' poetry; (2) poetry with developed literary characteristics, but still connected in some way with an occasion; (3) purely 'bookish' or literary genres.

[44] Depew (2000).

[45] That they were choral is very likely.

insult an enemy by rejecting his sister from a procession: this conflict, which occurred shortly before or after the institution of the official contests in tragedy, made the tyranny more oppressive (Thuc. 6.59) and thereby no doubt led to its downfall (as rulers' abuses of ritual do in tragedy). In general tyrants had the reputation of using and abusing public ritual for their own ends. To select one example from many, Herodotos (5.92) reports that when the women of Corinth came to the temple of Hera 'as if for a festival' Periander stripped them of their clothes. When the Sikyonian tyrant Kleisthenes, being hostile to the Argives, transferred 'tragic choruses' from the Argive hero Adrastos to Dionysos, and the rest of Adrastos' cult to the hero Melanippos, we should note that this famous step in the prehistory of tragedy is also the manipulative detachment of traditional rituals from their traditional context and function by a tyrant. Although ritual may always be political in the broad sense, there is nothing in (for instance) Homeric epic that resembles Kleisthenes' innovation, which was surely greatly facilitated by his enormous monetary wealth.

Monetisation enabled a new kind of individual control and co-ordination of performance and – in consequence – more elaborate and more politically charged forms of display. The use of money to attract poets from elsewhere may create panhellenic glory for city or for tyrannical family. But it also tends to detach performance from its originating context. The result is that different kinds of song, no longer separated from each other so absolutely by specificity of function and of locality, tend to share rather the function of universal display in panhellenic contexts. Money is undiscriminating in what it can buy, and its accumulation and expenditure is unlimited.[46] 'The Muse', according to Pindar (*Isthm.* 2.6–8), 'was then not avaricious nor a working girl (*ergatis*). Nor were sweet songs with silvered faces sold . . . ' This metaphor of prostitution implies not only the recent *commodification* of song but also its concomitant *promiscuity*.[47] As Pindar maintains elsewhere (*Pyth.* 11.41–4), 'Muse, it is your task, if you have contracted to provide your voice silvered for a wage, to set it in motion at different times in different ways.' A poet composing for money will provide songs for as many contexts as he can. It is significant that Simonides, said to be much concerned with money and to be the first poet to have composed for fees, was also remarkable for the number and variety of his clients and of the genres in which he composed.

The aspiration of the monied tyrant to universal display detaches the dithyramb from any originating context, i.e. from specificity of function

[46] Seaford (2004a) 165–9. [47] On money as promiscuous see Seaford (2004a) 155–7.

and of place. Indeed the dithyramb, as a choral song escorting Dionysos into town, was especially apt for such elaboration, firstly because – while losing its specific practical function (of escorting Dionysos) – it could retain its identity as praising the god and relating his myths, before subsequently even extending to non-Dionysiac content; secondly because it is at the heart of a pandemic festival; and thirdly because it has a panhellenic dimension: the advent of Dionysos was celebrated by numerous Greek cities. The dithyramb is visually, verbally, and musically elaborated, and transformed from an improvisatory processional hymn into a scripted and rehearsed display before numerous onlookers at the destination of the procession.[48]

This is a crucial step in the genesis of tragedy, and it returns us to the development encapsulated in *Bacchae*: the mimetic dithyramb is sung by the choral escort of Dionysos before numerous onlookers outside a building imagined as the house of the local king.[49] How might such a performance develop into tragedy?

A remarkable and unprecedented feature of tragedy as a performance was that it consisted not of a single song but of several distinct songs (separated by episodes). The dithyramb, having concluded its function of accompanying Dionysos to the Prutaneion (4A), was left without a function while Dionysos was – perhaps after some delay – taken into the house to be entertained.[50] Like much else in the genesis of tragedy, this prolongation of functionless performance is also encapsulated in *Bacchae*: the chorus remain before the royal house, engaging in prolonged confrontation with Pentheus, and sing further songs, including another (stationary) dithyramb (519–603). *Bacchae* consists merely and entirely of the commonest Dionysiac theme – the overcoming of resistance to his arrival.

Performance on arrival at a house was a context to encourage the promiscuity of genres, for it was a broad category that included e.g. the wedding and *kōmoi* celebrating victory.[51] The *Kōmos* – meaning revel, band of revellers, or their song – seems to have been an important early feature of the City Dionysia.[52] At the Anthesteria a wedding song could easily have been sung, along with the dithyramb, by Dionysos' escort outside the imagined royal dwelling (the *Boukoleion*) as he was united with the *basilinna* within.

[48] Seaford (1994a) 241–3, 267–8; d'Angour (1997). [49] 4D; Chapter 5.

[50] West (1990) 21 conjectures, on purely formal grounds, that in 'Thespis' tragedy' there was 'but a single episode-stasimon sequence'. Similarly Schadewaldt (1974) 119: 'die Urform vermehrt und durch neue Formen erweitert wird'.

[51] Victory song arriving at house: Pi. *Nem.* 1.19–22 ἐπ' αὐλείοις θύραις, *Isthm.* 8.2 παρὰ πρόθυρον, and perhaps Bacchyl. 6.14–15 προδόμοις ἀοιδαῖς. Wedding songs: E. *Alc.* 915–21; Oakley and Sinos (1993) 26–30, 37, 138 n. 107; *diegertikon*: 17C.

[52] This seems implied by the inscription called Fasti (*IG* II² 2318).

In Euripides' *Cyclops* (37–40) Silenos compares the choral entry-song of the satyrs with escorting Dionysos in a *kōmos* to the house of Althaia for sex. Compare for instance, in Sophokles' *Trachiniai*, the song by 'those inside the house and those outside the courtyard' (202–3) at the news of the impending return of Herakles: it contains elements of *ololugmos*, wedding song, paian and dithyramb.

But it was similarity not only of *context* that facilitated the addition of new genres to the dithyrambic nucleus but also of *form* and *content*. The relationship between chorus and individual leader (*exarchōn*), wherein (in the dithyramb) Aristotle locates the genesis of tragedy, obtained also in other genres, for instance the lament.[53] Archilochos leads off (*exarchein*) the paian as well as the dithyramb.[54] As for content, the choral focus on an individual is common to various rituals (wedding, lament, hero-cult). At Sikyon the 'tragic choruses' honouring the sufferings of Adrastos are transferred to Dionysos. The transfer may have been suggested, or at least facilitated, by lamentation already occurring in the cult of Dionysos.[55] This illustrates the possibility – facilitated no doubt by Kleisthenes' money – of making new kinds of performance by *splitting and combining* traditional performances, as a phase in the prehistory of tragedy.

The new recipients of the Sikyonian cult, Dionysos and Melanippos, both come from outside to the centre of the city, Melanippos from Thebes to the royal dwelling, Dionysos (to judge from his festivals elsewhere) in a procession from the margins to the centre. Just as extant Athenian tragedy celebrates, in the polis cult of an imported Dionysos, the foundation of Attic cults for heroes from elsewhere,[56] so at Sikyon cult is founded – in an act of political reform – for Melanippos from elsewhere as well as with 'tragic choruses' for Dionysos. If the abolished cult of Adrastos had been in any way *restricted*, then this contrasted with the new cult, which belonged to the whole polis. Indeed, Melanippos is established in the Prutaneion, i.e. in the imagined royal dwelling at the symbolic centre of the city (4C), which I take as further confirmation of the importance of the Athenian Prutaneion in the genesis of tragedy. According to Herodotos (5.67–9) the Sikyonian Kleisthenes' reforms influenced the reforms of his democratising nephew Kleisthenes at Athens. Perhaps they also influenced the concomitant development of tragedy.[57] The City Dionysia expressed

[53] E.g. *Il.* 18.51, 24.721. [54] *Frr.* 121, 120.
[55] Lamentation in Dionysiac cult in the classical period: Seaford (1994a) 322–3.
[56] Notably Orestes, Ajax, Oedipus, Herakles, Iphigeneia and Eurystheus.
[57] If Dionysos 'Eleuthereus' (easily taken to mean 'Liberator') was introduced into Athens by Kleisthenes (as an expression of political liberation?: Connor (1989)), it was perhaps under influence

both the unity of the polis and – in part through the presence of non-Athenian poets – a panhellenic aspiration that also favoured the tragic celebration of non-Athenian myths.

Tragedy was an entirely new genre, unique in being known to have come into being in a particular area and time. The emergence of other poetic genres was in every case in fact merely the elaboration (notably by the use of writing) of existing traditions of performance. But tragedy emerged from the dithyramb into something quite different.

Tragedy, unlike other performances, consists of several songs, and evokes or performs various genres of ritual song – sometimes in quick succession within the same song. True, there are, besides tragedy, some songs from the classical period that seem to combine the characteristics of two genres, and so to defy the unificatory classification imposed on songs by Alexandrian scholarship.[58] But unique to tragedy is the frequency and variety of the kinds of ritual and of ritualised utterance evoked or performed, both in the spoken and the sung parts. Moreover, the combination of two genres in tragedy sometimes involves *antithesis* between them, or even the poetic identification of antithetical genres such as paian and lament (15B).

These features owe much, I contend, to the monetisation of Dionysiac cultic performance. They all occur in all of Aeschylus' plays (and generally in Athenian tragedy). For instance, the opening of *Septem* evokes various forms of ritualised utterance (hymn, oath, prayer, supplication, lament, paian and wedding song), and is dominated by a confrontation – between individual and newly arrived chorus – that is expressed in the opposition between two of these ritualised utterances, paian and lament (9A).

6C CONCLUSION: COMPETING CHRONOTOPES

The *reciprocal chronotope* of Homeric epic, in which distinct units interact, is replaced, in the *Demeter Hymn*, by the *aetiological chronotope*, in which there is transition from one unit to another by which it is controlled or absorbed. The aetiological chronotope may be used to express the

from Sikyon, where the cult of Dionysos *Lusios* ('Liberator') (a) included both mystic ritual *and* a public procession (cf. 5A), presumably to his temple near the theatre, and (b) came from Thebes (arguably in the sixth century: Casadio (1987)), where his sanctuary contained the destroyed house of Semele. (4FG): Pausan. 2.7.5–6; Seaford (1994a) 261–2. Cf. Them. *Or.* 27: tragedy invented by Sikyonians (information from Aristotle: Chapter 4 n. 51); cf. Aristot. *Poet.* 1448a30–5.

[58] Rutherford (2001) 90–108.

territoriality of the polis. And in mystic ritual it may – while not ignoring geographical distance – focus on control of the vertical (cosmic) axis, in particular through absorbing the underworld into this world by prevailing over the experience of death. In Dionysiac cult the aetiological chronotope is influenced by both polis territoriality and mystic aspiration. This is the context of the emergence of tragedy.

Territoriality is not the only aspect of the political unity expressed in the aetiological chronotope. The enemy of the community, in the traditional aetiological elsewhere, is exemplified by the savagery of the Minotaur. But the enemies of sixth-century citizens are not monsters. They may be external or internal, and the two categories may combine: for instance, Thebes provides Peisistratos with money and mercenaries to enter Athens as tyrant. The savage aetiological elsewhere is in tragedy adapted to express political as well as territorial unity, to be a way of imagining the *urban* enemies of the polis.[59] The City Dionysia is – despite its connection with Eleutherai, and in contrast to our other festivals (2G) – entirely urban. The aetiological enemy remains elsewhere, projected out from one urban centre (Athens) onto another (notably Thebes), which is – with aetiological logic – absorbed into the central cult place, in two ways: it is represented in an (Athenian) cult place, and it is, within the drama, where the cult is finally founded (5B). This is true of *Bacchae*, and of *Septem* (9A). But in *Oresteia* the trilogy form is used to move from the aetiological elsewhere (Argos) to – in the third play – the very place (central Athens) from which it was imagined.

This politicisation of the aetiological chronotope accompanies the comprehensive power of a single individual (tyranny), the centralisation of the festival, and the transformation of ritual into spectacle. All three developments are facilated or even promoted by monetisation, and they underlie respectively the content, genesis and extant form of tragedy.

Monetisation enables the spectacular centralisation of the polis festival, and promotes a homogeneous *monetised chronotope* that extends beyond polis borders. The Acropolis, with its store of money, is the centre of power that extends homogeneously throughout the monetised world. Money, with the unlimited homogeneity of the monetised chronotope, has the universal power sufficient to transcend and efface not just the polis chronotope (3A) but the aetiological chronotope as a whole. The politicisation

[59] The rural monsters such as Polyphemos are generally left to satyric drama, but even he is in Euripides' *Cyclops* transformed into a wealthy urban enemy of the polis: Seaford (1984a) 51–9.

we have described of the aetiological chronotope occurs alongside and within the monetised chronotope. The aetiological elsewhere is projected from one urban centre onto another within homogenised space. And the differentiation between the two centres is *politicised*, not only because Thebes is hostile but also because onto Thebes is projected the monetised individual power that could threaten also Athens. The chronotopically expressed aetiological opposition has become that between community and monetised individual. The politicisation of the aetiological elsewhere cannot avoid being in its turn monetised.

This synthesis between the aetiological and monetised chronotope is a synthesis of opposites. The latter is cyclical, abstractly homogeneous, and unlimited, in the accumulation of individual power. And monetised individual power is – in the figure of the *turannos* – itself unlimited, and will not deny itself the killing of kin and the abuse and perversion of ritual.[60] The *turannos*, although he performs ritual and so belongs within the polis, perverts it and so falls outside the polis. It is partly through its invariance that ritual creates order,[61] and so once performance is detached – under the influence of monetisation – from the functional invariance of ritual, then it may readily (and safely) move towards the perversion of ritual, especially when – as with tragedy – there is a good thematic reason to do so. The aetiological chronotope, by contrast, is produced to justify and co-ordinate communal ritual, and consists of limitation, differentiation, transition, and the absorption of distant into present.

In our synthesis of opposites it is the aetiological chronotope that prevails. Tragedy derives from polis ritual, and continues to be performed alongside it. *Oresteia*, like the *Demeter Hymn* and *Bacchae*, concludes with the foundation of polis cult. True, *Demeter Hymn* and *Bacchae* each have as their theme the *aition* of the cult founded, whereas the relationship between myth and final cult in *Oresteia* – for the Erinues (Furies) – is much looser. In general tragedy is free to attach to cult foundations myths that were only loosely (if at all) connected to them. Nevertheless the overall form of tragedy is frequently *aetiological*, inherited from its cultic origin.

It is an overall aetiological form that – in Aeschylean tragedy – contains its opposite, the monetised chronotope. In particular, in *Oresteia* the aetiological crisis at Argos is pervaded by the monetised chronotope, as well as by the individual perversion of ritual. What is more, the monetised

[60] 3c(2). [61] Rappaport (1999) 41–2.

chronotope reaches out into the cosmos. And so too does the aetiological chronotope that derives from mystic ritual, which was a factor in the genesis of tragedy. Our exploration of the interaction of chronotopes in Aeschylus will be much concerned with cosmology. Finally, we should not forget that central to what I have called competing chronotopes are human beings attempting, in imagination and practice, to maintain control of their society.

PART III

Confrontational and aetiological space in Aeschylus

CHAPTER 7

Telos *and the unlimitedness of money*

The aetiological chronotope is transitional and *limiting*: for instance, the arrival of Dionysos at the house re-enacts, in the here and now, the controlled *ending* of an ancient journey from afar. In the Dionysiac festival, and in tragedy, aetiological space is *politicised* as confrontational space (Chapters 4 and 5). The spatial transition culminates in individual or chorus arriving (often from afar) at a place of confrontation with the royal household. The *temporal* transition, to the founding of cult for the whole polis, is ended by the *spatial* transition.

In the City Dionysia this political confrontation developed under the influence of monetisation, in a way that influenced the form and content of emerging tragedy (Chapter 6). In what follows I explore the interaction between the inherited aetiological chronotope, characterised by limitation, and the new monetised chronotope, characterised by unlimitedness. The interaction contains both conflict and synthesis.

7A *TELOS*

We begin with what makes such an interaction possible. First, there is the similarity between ritual and payment.

A commercial exchange between A and B can be analysed as consisting of three phases XYZ, where in X and Z there is no obligation between A and B, and Y is a (frequently brief) intermediate state in which obligation (debt) has been incurred but not yet fulfilled (paid). Ritual may have the same structure, where two phases of static normality (X and Z) frame the creation of a dynamic phase of tension (Y). This is most obvious in the rite of passage, where in the 'liminal' phase (Y) the bride or mystic initiand may be detached from the previous identity but still resistant to acquiring the new identity. But it may also apply to other kinds of ritual. In particular, celebration of aetiological myth may have created a temporary sense of tension, in the Oschophoria over the fate of Theseus,

for instance, or in the polis festivals of Dionysos over his original rejection by household or community. Even if the tension is artificial, the festival may nevertheless move through a phase of crisis or obligation to restored normality (or stasis). For bride or mystic initiand the restored normality (Z) will be very different from the original normality (X), whereas for the community (whether in rite of passage or festival) the difference may be minimal.

The restoration of normality requires the *limitation* of Y. In the case of ritual this is achieved by general acceptance of the power of the (generally traditional) forms of ritual action. But in a monetised transaction it can be achieved only by general acceptance of the power of money. Because it is the money itself that (seems to) contain the power, it makes no difference what actions effect or accompany its transferral. But the important point here is that ritual and money are parallel, inasmuch as they both have the power to limit Y. Such limitation is, seen positively, *completion*: normality is restored, social integration obtained. Indeed money and ritual each provide a universally agreed paradigm to co-ordinate numerous social interactions. In addition, rites of passage and money both *mediate contradiction* – the former between the old and new identity, the latter between the parties to the transaction (3A).

The socially integrative power of money is in its power to limit, to complete transactions. So too it is by virtue of completing transition that rites of passage integrate individuals into groups. Such integration exemplifies the *co-ordination and definition* effected through ritual. Sacrificial ritual, for instance, co-ordinates and defines the individual participants as a group, separating (limiting) it from whoever or whatever is outside. It is thereby effective also in integrating a new arrival into the group. In Homer an arriving stranger participates in the sacrifice, and newcomers are accepted into the royal household through ritual (supplication, as well as the rituals of sacrifice and feasting: 1C). Another means of social integration is political *authority*.

The importance of limitation for these various forms of social integration is manifest in the range of the root *tel-* (especially in the noun *telos*, the verb *telein*, and the adjective *teleios*). It means (a) limit or completion, but also – more specifically – (b) payment to humans or offerings to the gods, (c) ritual, (d) authority. And so for instance its four ocurrences in the *Demeter Hymn* are of the completion of the temple (301), what is to be carried out or completed by Zeus (323), offerings for Kore (369), and mystery-cult (481). This range is not a coincidence, but the meaning of the word. How are the senses related to each other?

(a) The positive sense of *completion* combines the negative sense of *limitation* (ending) with *integration*: illness is merely ended, works of art are completed.
(b) *Payment* integrates by completing obligation, which may be of revenge (as in a striking passage of *Choephoroi*: 11C). Already in the fifth century *telein* could mean to pay money, and *telos* could mean tax as well as financial expenditure. Tax completes social obligation. Offerings to the gods may complete obligation, though they also fall under (c) ritual.
(c) For '*ritual*' there is in fact no exact equivalent in Greek. The closest is *telos*, which can refer to wedding ritual, mystic initiation and sacrifice, and in general offerings to the gods.[1] A rite of passage (wedding, mystic initiation) is a *telos* because a completion of transition. An offering to the gods (including sacrifice) is a *telos* because payment (completions of obligation).[2] In generally ritual is socially integrative.
(d) *Authority* is a power to complete that integrates the group.

In what follows we will take words with the root *tel-* as a basis for exploring the way in which the relationship between these *three forms of social integration* (authority, payment, ritual) is represented in Aeschylus.[3] But first we must pursue the similarities between ritual and money as instruments of social integration (and disintegration).

7B RITUAL AND THE UNLIMITEDNESS OF MONEY

The use of uncoined silver as money preceded the introduction of coins, at least in some poleis, and persisted alongside it. Uncoined silver was – even in amounts of high value – concealable, portable, durable and storable, and so convenient as money. The rapid spread of coinage from the early sixth century increased this convenience by promoting greater ease of exchange, even for goods and services of low value. This pervasiveness of coins was especially socially integrative, in that – in complete contrast to the circulation of prestige gifts in the pre-monetary society of Homer – it tied most goods and services, and most people (rich or poor), to the same substance as measure of value and means of exchange.

[1] E.g. *Pers.* 204, *Ag.* 934.
[2] Some of the early occurrences of *telos* suggest an association with the binary opposition of balance: Holwerda (1963).
[3] *Telos* in Aeschylus is described from a different perspective, and without concern for its relation to the shape of the action, by Fischer (1965). Goldhill (1984) discusses the interaction (and ambiguity) of many instances of *telos* and related words in *Oresteia*, with remarks on their structuring role. See also Waanders (1983).

And yet the development of money, coined and uncoined, had other consequences that were – paradoxically – the opposite of socially integrative. Money is unprecedented not only in its ease of possession but also in its embodiment of general impersonal power that is extensive in time and space. The power of money to command all goods and services not only creates the possibility of, and desire for, its *unlimited accumulation* (3A); it also increases the possibility of *self-sufficiency*, and so tends to reduce – or at least seems to threaten – the traditional importance of ties of reciprocity and kinship.[4]

The possessor of wealth may be the individual or the household. To the extent that wealth belongs to the household, then its self-sufficiency will be enhanced by monetisation, and this enhanced self-sufficiency may be disintegrative of the polis. And to the extent that wealth belongs to the individual, then the self-sufficiency promoted by monetisation may increase conflict between individuals within the household, especially over the possession of monetised wealth. Monetisation may be both integrative and disintegrative of the polis, and disintegrative of the household. It may be disintegrative of the polis by endowing households with unprecedented self-sufficiency, and disintegrative of the household by endowing individuals with unprecedented self-sufficiency together with the motive for intrafamilial conflict.

A similar ambivalence is displayed by ritual. It may be integrative of the polis (e.g. festival procession, large-scale animal sacrifice), as well as of smaller groups such as the household (e.g. funeral, animal sacrifice). But the ritual of the household may be indirectly disintegrative of the polis, by expressing the power and solidarity of the household in a way that sustains conflict with other households: for instance, the polis (in Athens and elsewhere) legislated against excess in the performance of funerary ritual, in part at least to pre-empt the divisiveness created by public display of the solidarity of the powerful household, especially at the funeral of someone slain by a rival group.[5] May ritual also be – to complete the analogy with money – disintegrative of the household? No, on the whole, for ritual, in contrast to money, generally belongs not to an individual but to the group.[6]

The exception is tragedy, in which rituals that generally express family solidarity are used in intrafamilial conflict. For instance, Klutaimestra uses death ritual not with its normal integrative functions (solidarity with the

[4] Seaford (2004a) 292–315. [5] Seaford (1994a) 74–105.
[6] Magic, performed by an isolated individual, might be an instrument of intrafamilial conflict.

dead, incorporation of the dead into the next world) but to kill her husband (10A), whose anger persists from Hades. The limiting, integrative function of ritual is transformed into its opposite.

Monetisation and ritual integrate the polis, and yet they may also – by increasing the autonomy of its components – promote its disintegration. This paradox of monetisation was, I suggest, an important factor in the genesis of Athenian democracy. Monetisation favours both an economically united polis (with a single medium of exchange, treasury, standardised taxation, etc.) and the loosening of the personal ties of reciprocity, including the unequal reciprocity (dependency) of patronage. It thereby tends to create a mass of individual *citizens*. It simultaneously homogenises and individualises, bestowing on each of its possessors the same kind (albeit not the same degree) of self-sufficiency – embodied in the same homogeneous substance – that it bestows on every other possessor. Each citizen, like each individual coin, has its status through legitimation by the polis.[7]

Further, inter-personal dependency tends to be replaced by the temporary assumption by citizens of powerful roles, as magistrates, jurors, etc. In Homer it is as King Agamemnon that King Agamemnon performs sacrifice. But in democratic Athens the impersonal power of office (including religious duties) passes – like the new impersonal power of money – from one relatively self-sufficient individual citizen to another. Monetisation also makes possible (6AB) the public imitation of the old order in tragedy, in which the royal performance (now perverted) of ritual is also a role temporarily assumed each year by various individuals.[8]

Despite its contribution to the emergence of democracy, the individualising power of money was a source of new anxiety, giving new importance to the socially integrative role of ritual. Monetised individualism is in several texts, not least *Bacchae*, contrasted with the integrative power of Dionysiac cult.[9] In order to end a crisis of civic conflict Solon had both organised polis cult and limited the unlimited power over other citizens that money in principle gives to individuals. The extreme object of anxiety is the self-sufficiency of the tyrant, who in various historical and philosophical texts accumulates money, dispenses with both reciprocal benefit and his own kin, whom he kills, and abuses ritual (3C). I call this figure the 'historical tyrant', albeit without making a judgement on the proportions he contains

[7] For analogy between currency and citizenship see Kay and Mott (1982) 6; for Greece Kurke (1999) 309–16 (*dokimasia*); individuals imagined as coins: Seaford (2004a) 298.

[8] Farenga (2006) 276–8 argues that the written laws of the democratic polis provide the citizens with 'scripts' for performance by any citizen.

[9] Seaford (2003c).

of fact and imagination. My concern is with how the historical tyrant was *perceived*.

Polykrates, for instance, having acquired power in Samos through manipulating a religious festival,[10] killed one brother and banished the other, and eventually fell as a result of being lured to 'acquire enough money to rule the whole of Greece'.[11] Money is unlimited in various ways. There is no limit to its accumulation, to the desire to accumulate it, or to what people will do to acquire it, and it seems to have unlimited power.[12] In the acquisition of historical tyranny money provides both motive and means. Individual desire for money may create conflict with kin and override respect for the sacred, and money allows its autonomous possessor to dispense with ties based on kinship or reciprocity (friends, perhaps even the gods),[13] and to control ritual for his own ends.[14]

The ambivalence of money, integrating the polis but motivating and enabling individual transgression, contributed no doubt to the ambivalence of both historical and tragic tyranny. Kreon in Sophokles' *Antigone*, for instance, is obsessed with money, claims to represent the public interest of the polis, and perverts ritual in executing his niece and creating violent conflict with his son (18E). The Athenian tyranny was remembered with detestation but also with admiration.[15] It was obtained and maintained by means of silver money, which inter alia helped it to control polis ritual (3C), but also by manipulation of kinship. Peisistratos sealed his second acquisition of tyranny by marriage with the daughter of his rival Megakles. But when Megakles discovered that the marriage was not being consummated, Peisistratos lost his tyranny (Hdt. 1.61). The point here is that any male offspring of the marriage would transmit a claim to dynastic power to the family of Megakles, and this would threaten the continuity of wealth and power, within the same household, embodied in the existing sons of Peisistratos.[16] In marrying the girl but not making her pregnant, Peisistratos was hoping to have the best of both worlds, alliance with another powerful household but also autonomous continuity for his own household. A less deceptive way of ensuring the autonomous continuity of wealth and power

[10] Polyaenus, *Strat.* 1.23. [11] Hdt. 3.39, 122–3.
[12] Seaford (2004a) 157–72. [13] Seaford (2004a) 157–65, 292–5.
[14] This is not to say that money *requires* its possessor to dispense with reciprocity, for it may be given as a gift. Early (transitional?) examples are 'gifts' of money to mercenaries (Seaford (1994a) 225 n. 141), and Kleisthenes of Sikyon sending home his daughter's unsuccessful suitors with a talent of silver each (Hdt. 6.130).
[15] Andrewes in Boardman and Hammond (1982) 416.
[16] Herodotos gives as a motive for the non-consummation 'because he had adult sons of his own'.

within the household was *endogamy* (including incest),[17] to which I will return.[18]

The Athenian tyranny was important for creating the conditions for emergent tragedy (6A), in which the traditional 'king' of mythology is (probably in the early years of the democracy) fused with the historical *turannos*. The word 'hero' barely occurs in extant Greek tragedy. Much more common are words from the root *basil-* (king, royal), or words from the root *turann-*, which are even more frequent with over 170 instances. Modern use of the term 'tragic hero' is symptomatic of an ahistorical perspective.

The tragic *turannos* exhibits all four of the characteristics exhibited by the historical *turannos*:[19] preoccupation with money, abuse of ritual, kin-killing and endogamy.[20] The tragic *turannoi* of Thebes exhibit all of them together. In historical as well as tragic tyranny the new phenomenon of money together with the ancient practice of endogamy promotes unprecedented self-sufficiency, of which the negative aspect, individual isolation from men and gods, is expressed in kin-killing and abuse of ritual.

The key to this configuration is, we have seen, the *unlimitedness* of money. Tragedy dramatised pre-monetary myths in a manner influenced by monetisation.[21] The mythical themes of endogamy and kin-killing predate money, and may have their origin in the unprecedented material wealth controlled by royal families in the Bronze Age. But from Homeric epic they are absent.[22] Tragedy, by contrast, chooses to focus on them, and to represent them in a mode influenced by the new power of money to sustain the introverted self-sufficiency of household and of individual. This mode includes the abuse of ritual as well as explicit mentions of money.

Tragedy merges a traditional form (the aetiological transition embodied in polis ritual) with a new content (historical tyranny). The form consists of a crisis followed by the restoration of communal well-being. Traditional aetiological crises include plague, as well the confusion of civilised

[17] Cf. 4G. By 'endogamy' I will mean marriage within the tri-generational household, i.e. of first cousin or closer. It was practised by e.g. the Sicilian tyrants: Gernet (1981) 289–302; Seaford (1994a) 212–14.

[18] 8C, 18B. [19] 3C(2).

[20] They do not of course occur in all tragedies: e.g. understandably not in the surviving evidence for the three tragedies we know to have been performed in autocratic states (Syracuse and Macedonia): Aeschylus' *Persians* and *Aitnaians*, and Euripides' *Archelaos*. On this issue generally see Seaford (2010b).

[21] The illuminating view that tragedy represents a synthesis of pre-polis myth with the institutions of the polis is associated with J.-P. Vernant, but he (and others) ignore a central institution of the polis, namely coined money.

[22] There were a very few instances of kin-killing in the epic cycle, but never (as in tragedy) as the main focus: Seaford (1994a) 360–2.

distinctions. In Athens, before Kekrops founded marriage, people mated at random. At Patrai sex in the precinct of Artemis produced the demand for annual human sacrifice, ended only by the founding of cult for a newly arrived Dionysos. In the Spartan sanctuary of Artemis *Ortheia* fighting and death at the altar produced disease cured by the establishment of cult.[23] These aetiologies contain actions that prefigure (and may be experienced in) the cult, but confuse the civilised distinctions established by its foundation. As yet another example of this confusion (marking our *antideterminate chronotope*) we gave in the Introduction the myth of the Proitids, in which the absence of *internal* limits (distinctions) is complemented by the (temporary) absence of an *external* limit – to the Proitids' wandering. Comparably, in the negative (liminal) phase of Eleusinian mystic initation, before the blissful *telos*, there were anxious and unlimited (*a-telestoi*) journeys (2A).

The spatial relations of tragedy remain influenced by its emergence from the escort of Dionysos at the City Dionysia to the royal house. Such ritual contains the potential for confrontation between polis (embodied in the Dionysiac procession) and royal household, and affirms the predominance of the former. Its (politicised) aetiological transition is from the autonomy of the ruling household (the aetiological crisis) to the festal integration of the polis. In the monetisation of the transition, from which emerged tragedy, the confusions of the aetiological crisis were extended to absorb the confusions of (tyrannical) monetised individualism – endogamy, the abuse of ritual, and kin-killing.

But how was such absorption of history by myth possible? Only by virtue of the existence of elements common to them both. The monetised chronotope, like the aetiological (in its temporary antideterminate phase), abolishes basic distinctions, internal as well as external limits. The temporary crisis is ended by the traditional completion of the ritual. But the unlimited power and desirability of money may subvert this completion, subordinating ritual to itself as a mere means. Communal ritual, faced with this threat to ritual by the unlimitedness of tyrannical money, may symbolically neutralise it by absorbing it into its aetiological crisis. The victory of ritual completion over the unlimitedness of money is given a Greek–barbarian dimension by the preferability of ritual completion (*telos*) over the unlimitedness of money in Solon's stories of Tellos, and of Kleobis and Biton, narrated to the Lydian monarch Kroisos in Herodotos (3C1).

[23] For these and other instances see Seaford (1994a) 252–3, 258, 293–5, 354, 364, 365.

More specifically, the *aitia* of Dionysiac cult outside Athens, and especially in Boeotia, contained the theme of *kin-killing* (especially maternal infanticide) inspired by Dionysos so as to punish the resistance of the ruling family to the cult. Kin-killing is perpetrated by the historical tyrant on the route to individual wealth and power, but in Dionysiac aetiology destroys the resistant royal household.

Other practices of historical tyranny (endogamy and the abuse of ritual) also belong naturally to the aetiological crisis. *Endogamy* expresses autonomy, and as such features variously in Dionysiac myth, as antithetical to the centrifugal power of Dionysos and his thiasos.[24] The *abuse of ritual* resembles the temporary subversion of ritual (human sacrifice, sex or conflict in the sanctuary, etc.) that in the aetiological myth precedes its foundation. Indeed the representation of 'historical tyranny' may itself be influenced by such myths. It remains to say more about these two themes in tragedy.

(1) *Tragic endogamy*. By reproductive self-sufficiency a family may preserve its wealth or solidarity, but at the cost of dangerous introversion, of isolating itself from the community. This dilemma is a general and probably ancient theme of Greek myth.[25] With monetisation it takes a new form, which increases the self-sufficiency of the (wealthy) household, along with the potential for internal conflict that arises from its members' aspirations to individual self-sufficiency. How can this new monetised phenomenon be expressed in the pre-monetary medium of myth? By assimilation to the phenomenon through which myth already expresses the self-sufficiency of the powerful household, namely *reproductive* self-sufficiency. *Tokos* ('offspring') comes to mean financial interest. The interpenetration of reproductive and monetary introversion in a tyrannical family occurs in Sophokles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (18E).

Tragic endogamy has a spatial dimension. The politicisation of the Dionysiac myth–ritual complex produces a polarisation that is both spatial and (as concerning reproduction) political. In the Anthesteria, for instance, Dionysos is imagined as coming from afar (in a ship), and enters the king's house, indeed penetrates to its heart, symbolically subverting its potential autonomy by sexual union with the queen. Similarly, in myths Dionysos comes from afar and enters the female quarters of the house, from which he drives the resistant women. An extreme form of household autonomy is endogamy, which in tragic myth often goes with spatial confinement of the female, which may be opposed by the extractive, centrifugal, politically

[24] Seaford (1990b). [25] Seaford (1990a).

universalising power of Dionysos: e.g. it is no coincidence that the need to extract Antigone from her endogamic confinement is accompanied by an invocation of Dionysos to come from afar to purify the whole polis (18E).

In *Bacchae* the politico-spatial opposition also has a psychological dimension. The women extracted by Dionysos from their houses, including the rejectionist (royal) women, exhibit the collective ecstasy of the initiated group[26] that contrasts with the imperviously rejectionist isolation of Pentheus as he vainly tries to enclose Dionysos in the house. In transforming Pentheus and taking him up to the mountainside Dionysos subverts the self-sufficiency not only of the household but also of the individual. The initiated well-being of his thiasos is made to contrast, in *Bacchae* as in various other texts, with the isolating self-sufficiency of money.[27]

(2) *Tragic abuse of ritual*. In the Greek polis ritual might be a matter for households, or for larger bodies such as the whole polis, or for both. The wedding ritual, though involving a procession through the streets, focuses on transferring the bride from one household to constitute another. Death ritual, though generally a matter for the household, might take public form in hero-cult and in the public funeral of the war dead. Animal sacrifice might be performed by a household or at the heart of a polis festival. The epinikian celebration often included singing outside the victor's house, but was also a public event.[28] Supplication for protection, and mystery-cult, are *diachronically* ambivalent: they both had once been a matter for the royal household (or at least so tradition implied), but were in the classical period a matter for the polis.

This diachronic ambivalence facilitates the politicisation of aetiology manifest already in the *Demeter Hymn*, which combines the traditional mythical theme of the wanderer arriving at a household with that of the opposition between household and community, in such a way as to embody the aspirations of the emerging polis (2B). The immortalising of the royal infant is rejected (involuntarily) by the queen at the royal hearth, but reflects the mystic ritual then founded for humankind in a new public temple. As for supplication, we will see its political ambivalence in *Suppliants* (8A).

In the politically confrontational form of aetiological myth, as dramatised in *Bacchae*, the tyrannical king *deliberately* rejects public ritual and *imprisons* the arriving god in his house. The transition from household to

[26] *Ba.* 75, 693, 748.
[27] *Ba.* 257, 812, 902–12; other texts: Seaford (2003c).
[28] Currie (2005) 17–18, 269.

public sphere is violent: the royal women are forced from their houses, the royal house is physically destroyed. And the king is made to undergo a lethal, isolated form of mystic initiation in which he is killed by his maenadic mother as the victim of animal sacrifice. The sufferings of the household take the form of the negative (preliminary) stage of mystic initiation before the ritual is itself finally established[29] in the polis.

Tragedy originates in a ritual that is ambivalent between household and polis, the public arrival of Dionysos at a royal household, and represents or evokes various others (6B). And it often embodies the transition from the perversion of household ritual to the final establishment of polis ritual. In *Oresteia*, for instance, the violent conflict within the household is dense with evocations of mystic ritual and of evocations or performances of household rituals such as wedding ritual, death ritual and animal sacrifice. But finally the Erinues (Furies) are to receive public cult for all time, including sacrifices, of which some are associated with marriage and reproduction,[30] and are finally escorted off to their place of cult, in a procession that evokes the Panathenaia,[31] to a destination that may evoke the Eleusinian mysteries (17A).

Further examples of the transition could be given from all three tragedians. Generally true of tragedy is that – with the rule-proving exception of *Persians* – rituals evoked or performed in or by the household are perverted into instruments of its disintegration; whereas rituals of the polis are represented positively, and sometimes explicitly as confirming its integration (e.g. at *Eum.* 978–95). The same ritual may be disintegrative of the household and then finally integrative of the polis (e.g. mystic ritual in *Bacchae* and animal sacrifice in *Oresteia*).

We are now in a better position to make sense of the interaction of limit and the unlimited, ritual and money, in the dramas of Aeschylus. The similarity of structure between ritual and money as instruments of social integration co-exists with a basic opposition between them. They both have a limiting function in interactions between people, but money is in various ways *unlimited*. In emergent tragedy this unlimitedness is absorbed into the aetiological crisis of the Dionysiac mythico-ritual complex. The result is a performance in which the aetiological transition accommodates and limits the disruptive unlimitedness that originates in monetisation. It was monetisation of ritual that made possible the prolongation of performance, the *sequence* of enactments or evocations of ritual characteristic of extant tragedy (6B). In such a sequence it is only the final ritual enacted or

[29] Chapter 5 n. 24. [30] *Eum.* 835, 853–7, 890–1, 895, 1037. [31] Chapter 15 n. 44.

evoked that can create the limit (closure) generally created by ritual. In this way politicised aetiological form concludes the unlimitedness of perverted household rituals with the limit (closure) provided by communal ritual. As we shall see, the repeated deferral of *telos* in Aeschylean narrative (again with the illuminating exception of *Persians*) is driven by intrafamilial conflict over wealth and power. In general Aeschylean tragedy is a site of opposition between – and synthesis of – aetiological and monetised conceptions of space, time and cosmology.

CHAPTER 8

Suppliants

I now turn to the surviving plays of Aeschylus. I have nothing to contribute to many areas of speculation, for instance on whether specific features of the plays are innovative or on the relation of the plays to specific historical events.[1] For instance on the Danaid trilogy, with which I begin, I do not address such vexed questions as its precise date and the order of the lost plays,[2] for my argument for the most part does not depend on them. My initial focus will be on the *shape of the space* that is either visible in the action and its theatrical context or imagined as beyond it. This shape was not invented *ex nihilo*, and must not be taken for granted as the only possible shape for drama.

8A CONFRONTATIONAL SPACE

Suppliants is located between sea and town.[3] The chorus of Danaids have been pursued by their suitors and cousins, the sons of Aigyptos, from Egypt to Argos. The Danaids enter and supplicate images of the gods at 'this hill of the assembled gods [or gods of the meeting place]' (189) and an 'altar common to all these gods' (222). Here they confront the local king Pelasgos, notably with their threat of polluting suicide (465). It is generally believed that Aeschylus has in mind here the widespread cult of the twelve gods, and in particular the altar of the twelve gods in Athens.[4] We may add that if – as seems likely – there was both there and in the *orchēstra* an altar imagined as a hearth (4B), this would be a visual extension of the parallel.[5]

[1] Recent examples of these concerns are (on innovation) Föllinger (2003) and (on *Su.* and historical events) Rohweder (1998).

[2] For recent bibliography on the Danaid trilogy see Sommerstein (1996), (2008).

[3] 15, 31, 713, 955–6, 1018.

[4] The twelve chorus-members propose to hang themselves from the images (465). Against the view of Raubitschek (1969) that the Athenian twelve gods were old Attic deities and not the Olympians see e.g. Shapiro (1989) 134.

[5] Cf. Orestes supplicating at image *and* hearth (on the Acropolis) at *Eum.* 439–40.

The processional arrival of Dionysos in Athens, to the imagined house of the king, also stopped for choral dance at the altar of the twelve gods in the agora (4A). The agora had from the late sixth century been growing in importance, at the expense of the area containing the royal buildings (Prutaneion, *Boukoleion*, *Basileion*). The altar of the twelve gods was already in the sixth century a place of supplication by outsiders, and the Dionysiac procession may well have been already performing there during the lifetime of Aeschylus (4AB). Such a performance would have provided a model – alternative to the performance outside the imagined royal house – for tragedy. A public altar with suppliants is inherently theatrical, for it temporally creates a visible space for dialogue in a conflict of which the outcome is nevertheless uncertain: supplication is the least likely of rituals to end peacefully.

But if the Athenian altar of the twelve gods was a factor in Aeschylus' choice of location, why did he not locate it inside the city? Two factors converge, (1) politics and (2) ritual.

(1) In Homer supplication takes place inside the house, at the royal hearth. Tragedy too is about monarchy; but tragic space – with the chorus remaining under the sky – expresses the importance of the polis. The two destinations of the procession at the City Dionysia – Prutaneion and public altar – correspond to opposing conceptions of the state (monarchy and polis), for the form of the state may be defined by who it is that receives the outsider. The ambivalence that we found in this respect in the *Odyssey* and the *Demeter Hymn* (2A) reappears with greater urgency in *Suppliants*. If the Danaids had supplicated at or in the royal house, this would mean that Argos was a monarchy. But if they had supplicated at an altar of the assembled gods in the agora, this would thereby have established their claim on Argos as a polis. The ambivalence is preserved by having them supplicate at an altar of the assembled gods but – as supplication generally is in tragedy – *outside* the city, where they are confronted by the king.

The ambivalence resides also in the democratic disposition of the king. He wants the suppliant branches to be placed 'on other altars of the local gods, so that all the citizens see the evidence of this arrival, so that talk not be directed against me',[6] and makes explicit the relationship between the place of supplication and the form of the state:

[6] 482–4, with West's text.

You are not sitting at the hearth of my house. If the polis is polluted communally, let the people be concerned to work out cures collectively. I would not make any promise until I have consulted with all the citizens about these things. (365–9)

The Egyptian princesses, who are no more democratically minded than the Persian royal family in *Persians*, immediately adopt the opposite view:

You are the polis, you are the people. A ruler (*prutanis*), unjudged, you control the altar, the hearth (*hestia*) of the land, by your single-voting commands . . . (370–3)

But Pelasgos then acts on the more democratic view.[7]

Towards the end of the play the Danaids must go into the city, and so the political implication of space becomes again an issue. This is the point – I suggest – of Pelasgos describing (957–63) the kinds of lodging available to the Danaids.[8] There are many public houses (δώματα . . . δήμια), and he himself has no mean dwelling. The Danaids can, in company with many others, live there in well-prepared dwellings. Or they can, if they prefer, live in single dwellings. The issue is then taken up, albeit without a decision, by the Danaids (970–4) and by their father Danaos (1009–11). The commentators are almost certainly right to suppose that the 'surprising detail' of all this derives from its importance later in the trilogy.[9] But why was it important at all? Because it bears on the issue of what kind of state Argos is. A community is characterised by entrances from the outside, by who it is that entertains or protects suppliants and other outsiders. Argos has voted to accept the suppliants, and so is democratic. But it is the king who persuaded the assembly (615–24), and the next play of the trilogy was probably set, as tragedy often is, at the royal house within which occurs the endophony (intrafamilial killing).

At least part of the point of the 'surprising detail' is to mediate this contradiction between monarchy and polis. That is why – immediately after describing the lodgings available – Pelasgos ends his speech by stating that the Danaids' protectors are himself *and* the citizens, whose vote is being fulfilled. The contradiction is obviated also by Danaos' expressions of concern about the chastity of his daughters that frame his statement of the choice of lodgings (1009–11), implying that it is this concern (rather

[7] 398–401, 517–19, 601–24. It appears that in the time of Aeschylus Argos had a 'king' who gave his name to the year and was an official in the democratic constitution: Tomlinson (1972) 192–3.

[8] This crucial spatial aspect is absent even from the detailed study of giving asylum to suppliants as an expression of polis identity in *Suppliants* by Grethlein (2003) 45–107.

[9] FJW 1 43, and on 957–61.

than the view that Argos is not a polis) that will motivate the choice of the royal house.

(2) The other factor making for the extra-urban location is ritual. *Suppliants* is pervaded by three kinds of ritual: supplication, lamentation and marriage ritual. They are interrelated, and interpenetrate. Supplication and marriage ritual have in common the weakness and transitional isolation of the individual (suppliant, bride) at the centre of the ritual. The intactness of the Danaids as suppliants is also the intactness of virgins.[10] In the Greek wedding song the resistance and lamentation of the bride might be echoed by a chorus of girls.

Marriage was sometimes associated with physical pursuit, which was an extreme expression of the tension between bride and bridegroom.[11] Much of the imagery of the play is *hymenaial*: it belongs to the stock of imagery that in wedding songs – and in poetry that draws on them – expresses the bride's fearful rejection of marriage.[12] Some of this hymenaial imagery involves the imagining of remote *space*: the Danaids are like young cows pursued by wolves on the high rocks (351), or nightingales or doves pursued by hawks (62, 223–4).[13] The bride is taken from her mother, from the only home she has ever known, and delivered to the power of an unknown male. Moreover, a communal preparation for this departure is the kind of ritual exemplified by the Attic *arkteia*, in which young girls depart to the spatial periphery for their wildness to be expressed and tamed (2G).

This absolute transition to the unfamiliar periphery may become, in the extremist imagination of myth, departure to a more distant periphery than is feasible in ritual. Both the female resistance and the distance travelled may seem unlimited, as in the myth of the Proitids.[14] (Extreme too is the Proitids' belief that they are cows.) The extreme may even be on the vertical axis: the Athenian wedding might take as a model the journey of Persephone to the underworld.

It is in this context that the Danaids' repeated association of themselves with their Argive ancestress Io[15] acquires a special meaning. Io was desired by Zeus, and so was transformed into a cow by Hera and placed in a meadow, from which she departed for Egypt (291–311). It is at this

[10] E.g. 223–4 expresses the sancity of the suppliant but is also a hymenaial image. Wife as suppliant (*hiketis*): 17C. For the interconnection of virginity, sacredness and supplication in *Suppliants* see Zeitlin (1992) 208–13.
[11] Gödde (2000a) 161. [12] Seaford (1987) 110–15.
[13] Cf. *PV* 857; hymenaial (?): Seaford (1987) 111. [14] Introduction B.
[15] 17, 43, 275, 291–321, 535–6, 1064.

meadow, outside Argos, that the Danaids have arrived from Egypt (50–1, 538–40). The genealogical and topographical associations with the priestess Io mediate between the city and the newcomers – appropriately, because as priestess of the famous temple of Hera (291–2) she belonged to the kind of spatially peripheral cult that mediates relations with potentially dangerous outsiders (2G).

The associations go further. The basic cause of the remote wandering of both Io and the Danaids (in opposite directions) is male desire. In the oracular response narrated by Io in *Prometheus* she was to be 'expelled from her house and fatherland so as to wander at large (*aphetos*) at the furthest boundaries of earth' (665–6). The primary reference of *aphetos* – to sacred animals roaming in a temple precinct – is inevitably connoted here, for Io is about to be transformed into a cow. But the freedom implied by *aphetos* (from *aphienai*, release) is extended to the furthest imaginable boundaries.

In *Suppliants* the journey of the bovine 'maenad of Hera' (564) Io to Egypt, which ends in her impregnation, represents – in the extremist imagination of myth – the enforced departure of the girl to the wild and unfamiliar periphery as preparation for marriage.[16] Because the journey of the Danaids from Egypt to Argos results from male desire, and is to the precise starting point of Io's earlier journey to Egypt, it seems to represent – again by the extremist imagination of myth – the return of the marriageable female from the periphery. This is the ritual factor that converges with the political to locate the play outside the city.

The Danaids are to be married in Argos, and the play ends with them processing off to the town (955, 1018) and – as they do so – singing what is surely a wedding song,[17] sung alternately by the chorus of Danaids and (almost certainly) another chorus composed of their Argive bodyguards so as to express traditional tensions between the sexes over marriage.[18] The tensions remain unresolved (as at the end of *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*), and will of course reappear in the trilogy, for the Danaids are still untamed.

The male chorus refers to the arrival of the pursuing sons of Aigyptos as *euploia*, 'fair sailing', a word that occurs in only two other places in the fifth century, and in one of these it refers to the (equally disastrous) wedding of Oedipus (S. *OT* 423). Here in *Suppliants*, as the procession moves off singing a wedding song, it cannot but evoke the idea, found

[16] In an earlier version, in which her wanderings ended in Euboia (West (1985b) 145–6), the imagining was less extreme.
[17] Detailed argument: Seaford (1987) 114–5; Swift (2006) 136–7.
[18] FJW ad loc; Seaford (1987) 114–15.

frequently elsewhere in tragedy,[19] of the wedding procession as a sea-voyage.[20] Accordingly, when the male chorus then desire that the *teleuta* ('ending, completion') of *marriage* should befall the Danaids, this seems to merge with the *teleuta* ('ending' or 'completion') of the sea-voyage, just as earlier (138–9) the Danaids had prayed that Zeus eventually make the *teleutai* of their sea-voyage favourable (corresponding to '*fair* sailing' here).

The journeys to and from Egypt are extremist expressions of the ritualised transition required for the reproductive process. As in our Attic rituals (2G), geographic space is imagined out of – and encapsulated in – ritual space. We will see that the only other long distances described in extant Aeschylus, between Salamis and Sousa in *Persians* and between Troy and Argos in *Agamemnon*, are also each encapsulated in ritual space. Similarly, the Danaids' proposal to go down to the underworld (by hanging themselves) is expressed as the ritual of supplication. 'If we cannot reach the Olympian gods we will approach (*hixomestha*) with branches the Zeus of the dead' (156–61). *Hixomestha* can mean supplicate as well as approach. Here it means both,[21] because they propose to carry supplicatory branches on their journey to the next world.[22] When they again threaten to hang themselves rather than marry, they express it as the familiar idea of marriage to Hades (789–91). Here again, supplication and marriage go together. Cosmic descent is again imagined as ritual. Like Demeter and Dionysos (5AC), a long journey brings them to this place where through ritual they aspire to access over the vertical cosmic axis – and not only to the underworld: three times the suppliants express the desire to escape into the sky.[23]

In one of these they say (393–4) 'I determine on [or define, ὁρίζομαι] flight up to the stars.'[24] The verb ὁρίζειν in this context cannot be entirely without the *spatial* sense ('define by a border') that is basic to it and that is uppermost in its only[25] other occurrences in Aeschylus, both of them in this play. Pelasgos says 'I make as the border [of my realm], *horizomai*, the land of the Perrhaibians etc.' (256). And on her flight Io swims across what will be called the Bosporos, and thereby marks out a boundary for (*horizei*)

[19] Seaford (1987) 124, 129–30. The Danaids' sea-voyage is associated especially closely with (their rejection of) marriage at 134–43.

[20] This idea is implicit also in the Athenian vase-paintings of Dionysos in a cart shaped like a ship.

[21] This dual meaning is central to the opening scene of the play: see FJW on 1 ἀφίκτωρ and 20 ἀφικοίμεθα.

[22] Cf. supplication in the underworld in fourth-century gold leaves from Thurii, GIJ nos. 6.6 and 7.6.

[23] 393–4, 779–82, 792–3.

[24] That this is the best meaning here for ὑπάστρωι (a *hapax*), rather than 'flight under the stars', is shown by FJW ad loc. Cf. *Su.* 781–3; and E. *Hek.* 1100–5, *Ion* 796–8, *Pho.* 504–6.

[25] Unless we include the awkward conjecture σοὐρίζει at *Cho.* 927 (see Garvie (1986) ad loc.).

Asia.[26] This occurs in the Danaids' narrative of her journey from Argos to Egypt. We have described this journey as an extension of ritual space into geographic space. As such, it is quite unlike any journey narrated in Homer. But there is another influence on this conception of space, more akin to the monetised geography described in 3B. The places named (548–55) are 'Asia', 'Phrygia', 'the city of Mysian Teuthras', 'Lydian dells', 'mountains of the Cilicians', 'land of the Pamphylians', and 'the rich cornland of Aphrodite' (Phoenicia)'. These are all large defined areas, like e.g. the places listed as traversed by Dionysos in the prologue of *Bacchae*, but again to be found only rarely in Homer (1A). There is even a (named) boundary, between Europe and Asia, created by Io's swim.

This is the conception that produced, a century or so earlier, the first ever maps of the world, and might in turn have been influenced by them. It is not just that such maps consist of large defined areas, but also that at least some of the earliest maps showed the earth as circular, with Europe and Asia the same size.[27] That is, they showed the world as a comprehensive, symmetrical unity, like the presocratic cosmos (3B). Io's swim, like the maps, unites the world and divides it into two. In the same spirit, the realm of Pelasgos has its frontier in the far north of the Greek mainland and includes 'the whole region through which the [Thracian river] Strymon passes':[28] the otherwise surprising extent and detail is there to complement the area traversed by Io and the Danaids between Argos and Egypt.[29] A similar unity of opposites reappears in *Persians*, in the queen's dream of Greece and Persia (or Europe and Asia) as women yoked together in disastrous conflict (15B).

In the Danaid trilogy we may speak of Egypt as the original place of aetiological violence, aetiological because the violent pursuit of the Danaids and their murderous bridal hostility to endogamy belonged to a sequence that probably led to a final founding of institutions by which the contradictions were accommodated and so their violent form precluded.[30] This aetiological crisis comes from the barbarian beyond (Egypt), but is installed as ritualised kin-killing in the royal house of a Greek city. The same[31] happens in *Bacchae* (Asia).

[26] 546: see FJW ad loc. Here in the active voice because the definition is not willed by Io.
[27] Hdt. 4.36; KRS 104–5; Kahn (1960) 81–4. Aeschylus may also have been influenced by the writings of his contemporary the Milesian Hekataios.
[28] 254–9. The next words 'the part of the setting sun' (i.e. westwards) have seemed to contradict 'the whole region . . . ' The best solution is to take Aeschylus to mean the whole region (and) westwards.
[29] This description may also have a political motive, in the friendship of Athens with Argos (18C3).
[30] 17C, 18B.
[31] Agaue's killing of Pentheus is inspired by Dionysos and described in terms of sacrificial ritual.

But there is also a difference. In *Bacchae* the polis – in this spatially expressed confrontation with the ruling household – is represented by the chorus with Dionysos: they arrive from afar and summon everybody from the royal house (68–9), within which, conversely, the king encloses their god. With the arrival from afar of the chorus first of Danaids with Danaos, and then of the sons of Aigyptos, the confrontation is in a sense reversed. It is *endogamy*, expressed spatially as *enclosure* in the household (8c), that is brought from afar, along with the kin-killing that it incites and the autocratic attitude that contrasts – we have seen – with the democratic disposition of the Argive king.

To conclude, at the heart of the trilogy there is confrontation between (Egyptian) monarchical household with (Argive) polis, and ambivalence within the Argive community between monarchy and polis. Both confrontation and ambivalence are expressed most vividly in ritual, not least through its power to encapsulate geographic and cosmic space. Moreover, the two remaining fragments of the lost trilogy both concern ritualised control of the cosmic (vertical) axis, first in intrafamilial conflict and finally in its political resolution (17c).

It has already emerged that the trilogy has all the elements of the proto-dramatic performance described in Part II, albeit differently configured: encapsulation of geographic and cosmic space in ritual, conflict between chorus and ruler, politically charged arrival from afar at the agora and then at the royal house, confrontation over ritualised access to the cosmic axis, combination and perversion of ritual genres (detached from their functional context), and aetiological violence brought from afar to the royal house. These elements will reappear, in various adaptations, throughout Aeschylus' extant plays.

8b the deferral of *telos*

The flight of the Danaids represents, in the extremist logic of myth, an unlimited form of the normal female resistance to marriage. And the same is true (in a different form) of the experiences of Io, with whom the Danaids identify. Io, on being sexually united with Zeus, was transformed into a cow in a meadow (299, 540). This is the mythical paradigm for the movement of a girl at puberty from her home to a peripheral place where she is imagined as a cow. But Io is then, with the same extremist logic, driven to a much more remote periphery, the Nile, to which the conclusion of the normal process (sexual union) is spatially and temporally deferred: she is thereby released from her suffering by Zeus, and gives birth.

With this anomalously remote conclusion the deferral of *telos* is not over. Firstly, the normal return from the periphery (to Argos) is only achieved by Io's descendants the Danaids. Secondly, this 'return' of the Danaids is initially not in fact to the internal pole of the rite of passage (the marital home), but rather to the very same meadow (on the *periphery* of Argos) to which Io was sent out from her home.[32] Thirdly, the journey of the Danaids is motivated by resistance to marriage. Fourthly, once arrived and confined as suppliants to the altar, they desire to go down to the underworld, with Hades as their lord (158–9, 791) and up into the sky (8B). And finally, on being forced into marriage they will kill their bridegrooms on the wedding night.

The structuring role of the deferral of ritual completion is confined neither to wedding ritual nor to Aeschylus.[33] This rejection of spatial as well as of temporal limits implies a chronotope of the unlimited. Aeschylus' is not the only text in which the Danaids' rejection of marriage is expressed as the unlimited. In the *Axiochus* attributed to Plato (371e) the Danaids perform 'water-carryings' in the underworld that are (eternally) 'uncompleted' (*a-teleis*) because with leaky pitchers.[34] In Aeschylus the only spatial limit they desire is the stars (8A). True, at the end of *Suppliants* the Danaids are escorted into the *centre* of Argos in a procession accompanied by a wedding song. But the subsequent murder of their bridegrooms brings the crisis of intrafamilial violence from the external pole of *Suppliants* (Egypt) to the internal one, further deferring the aetiological differentiation of external disorder from internal order.

And yet this does not mean that the Danaids despair of all completion on this earth.

Early in the play they appeal to the gods as 'not giving to have youth *teleon* against what is right' (79–80). Whether the youth here belongs to the Danaids (FJW) or to the Aigyptiads (West), *teleon* refers to the completion of marriage. A little later the Danaids appeal for help from the Zeus whose decrees are fulfilled (*teleion*).[35] Then, having described their voyage from Egypt, they pray (138–9) that 'the all-seeing father' may 'in time' create

[32] They have the same relation to Io as fifth-century marriageable girls to their mythical prototype.

[33] Cf. e.g. the deferral of both mystic and hymenaial *telos* in Sophokles' *Elektra*: Seaford (1985), (1994b).

[34] This has been associated with marriage ritual, the bottomless wedding *loutrophoroi* on graves (*loutrophoroi* carried water for the bridal bath): Rohde (1925) 587. And cf. the *Demeter Hymn* 481 on the *ateleis* (uninitiated) of the Eleusinian mysteries, with whom Pausanias (10.31.11) identifies a group containing a woman pouiring water into a broken jar in a painting of the underworld by Polygnotos. Compare the physical unlimitedness of Agamemnon's shroud (11C).

[35] 92. Cf. 123–4 θεοῖς δ' ἐναγέα τέλεα . . . ἐπίδρομα, which seems to mean something like 'polluted *telea* are vulnerable to invasion by the gods': West (1990) 134–5. Cf. 810.

for them favourable endings (*teleutas*). This implies that the sufferings of their flight belong in fact to the plan of Zeus and so will be justified by the eventual outcome. For that to be so, the intention of Zeus must be obscure, and indeed the desire of Zeus is 'not easy to track', the paths of his mind are impossible to see, but his power is ubiquitous and effortless (87–103; 14C). A good ending depends on the will of Zeus (211), whom they invoke as 'the power that most brings to completion (*teleiotaton*)' (525–6). 'What is brought to completion (*teleion*) for mortals without you?'.[36] Similarly, over the corpse of Agamemnon, it is immediately after describing the murdering *daimōn* of the house as insatiable (*akorestos*) that the chorus invoke the Zeus who is the 'cause of all things . . . for what is brought to completion (*teleitai*) without Zeus?' (17D).

The Danaids are confident that a *telos* will eventually be imposed by Zeus, and yet ignorant of what it will be, and it is this combination that generates the idea of the unlimitedness and invisibility of the mind of Zeus. Resisting the *telos* of marriage, they nevertheless cannot envisage the sufferings of their extended liminality as being without purpose or eventual completion (*telos*). Their sufferings are not complete, but that is only because the intentions of Zeus are beyond vision and his mind infinite. They make sense of their predicament by appealing to a god whose mind is temporally and spatially unlimited and yet contains a *telos*. It is by embodying this contradiction, by *personalising* it, and by endowing it with ultimate authority, that Zeus can mediate between the Danaids' rejection of *telos* and their desire for *telos*. Insoluble contradiction resorts – for mediation – to transcendent authority.

For this hopeful idea evidence is provided by their paradigm Io. After her wanderings, he who eventually soothed her (Zeus) was, sing the chorus,

> the ruler through unceasing lifetime (αἰῶνος . . . ἀπαύστου) . . .[37] she is made to cease (*pauetai*) by violence of painless power and by divine breathings. (574–8)

The chorus emphasise that this act makes Zeus the god to invoke in their circumstances, and praise his omnipotence. FJW comment that the repetition (unceasing . . . cease, ἀπαύστου . . . παύεται) 'appears to be pointless and, to a modern taste, even disturbing', but think to defend it by pointing to 'equally pointless' repetitions elsewhere in the play.

But might the repetition not have a point? The same paradoxical combination – of Zeus's powerful unlimitedness with sexual union as an

[36] 823–4; also 629, 689. [37] The next verse is missing from the manuscript.

ending – occurs in the response of the Argive males to the Danaids' rejection of the *telos* of marriage (1032):

> Not *parbatos* is the great *aperatos* mind of Zeus. May this ending (*teleuta*) befall you with many marriages of previous women. (1048–51)[38]

Aperatos means 'limitless', *parbatos* 'to be gone beyond'. But *aperatos* can also mean 'impassable', and *parbatos* 'to be transgressed'. This unity of opposite meanings prepares us for the next words: the *ending* (*teleuta*) that consists of marriage is wished on the Danaids. The mind of Zeus is endless, but he will impose the end that is marriage. Whereas the Danaids cannot see the conclusion of the travails that Zeus is putting them through, and pray to him to protect them from marriage with their cousins, the males by contrast identify the conclusion with marriage. And when the males say that the Danaids do not know the future, the Danaids respond by reaffirming that they cannot see into the mind of Zeus, an *abussos* sight (1057–8). *Abussos* means bottomless, and at *Sept.* 948 is applied to 'wealth' (9C). But by accepting the authority of Zeus to bring all to *completion* (*telos*) they have unwittingly prepared themselves to accept his eventual role as bringing their sufferings to completion in *marriage*. Zeus *Teleios* is a god of marriage.[39]

Similarly crucial is in *Eumenides* the preliminary acceptance by the Erinues of the authority of Athena to complete (434 *telos*) as arbitrator. Probably the Danaids were at the end of the trilogy persuaded by Aphrodite to agree to marriage (in a form more acceptable than that imposed by their cousins), a resolution willed also by her father Zeus (17C). In all this we can glimpse the kinship of the various meanings of *telos*: completion, ritual and authority (7A).

Faced with the absence of spatial or temporal limits to their flight, the Danaids must long for its conclusion, and so appeal to Zeus. They choose him not just for his completing power but also because it was he who resolved the hymenaial crisis of Io. Here however there is a paradox. The god to whom the Danaids appeal to save them from sexual union is the very god whose sexual desire for Io caused her wanderings. His 'release' of Io was not from sexual union: it *was* sexual union. The paradox is implied even by their own choice of words. *Himeros* – the word they apply to his obscure yet trusted desire (87) – refers in its only other occurrence in the

[38] The possible slight corruption of 1050–1 does not affect my point.

[39] Plut. *Mor.* 264b; Schol. Ar. *Thesm.* 973; D.S. 5.73. The marital Zeus *Teleios* is evoked also at *Eum.* 214, and *Ag.* 973 (Seaford (1987) 127), where the meaning of *teleios* (of Zeus) as 'bringing to completion' is made clear.

play to *sexual* desire (1005), and at *PV* 649 refers to his desire for Io. Their appeals to him as having power that is *teleios* (*Su.* 92, 526, 824) must in this context evoke the Zeus who as *teleios* brings to completion the *telos* of marriage. And the benign *teleutai* of the sea-voyage they request of Zeus (138–9) are in the wedding song assimilated to the wedding procession by the Argive males after evoking Zeus as guardian of marriage.[40]

The eventual resolution of this paradox, and the more acceptable form of marriage, are prefigured – again in the wedding song. The Danaids appeal to Zeus as – in his sexual release of Io from suffering[41] – 'having rendered violence (*bia*) benign'.[42] This violence may be the violence of his (sexual) touch,[43] but is inevitably associated with the constantly emphasised[44] sexual violence (*bia*) of the sons of Aigyptos. The benign outcome is his liberation of Io from suffering by this touch.[45] Just as according to the Danaids he 'soothed' the wandering Io (571 θέλξας), so the soldiers, in urging the desirability of marriage, mention 'soothing Persuasion' (θέλκτορι[46] Πειθοῖ), who presided over marriages.[47] All this prefigures the persuasiveness of Aphrodite in the final play of the trilogy, as well as the *mutual* desire that she will describe of sky and earth (17c).

Finally, arising from this fundamental conflict – between Danaids and Aigyptiads – are two others. One is the internal conflict faced by the Argive king: should Argos protect the Danaids at the price of war? Whichever he chooses, he will have to 'pay in full'[48] the consequences (i.e. the hostility of Aigyptiads or of Zeus). The dilemma is resolved by the vote of the Argive assembly. This vote, which famously gives us the first extant mention of something like democracy (604), is three times endowed with the authority conveyed by *telos*.[49] And yet even here the ultimate *telos* belongs to Zeus: the people decided, but Zeus 'completed the *telos*' (624).

The other conflict, between Argives and Aigyptiads ('insatiable in battle', 742), takes the form of the *telos* of battle, with *telos* envisaged as *payment*. 'If I do not exact this debt (ἐκπράξω χρέος)[50] for you', says the Argive king, there will be immense pollution. 'But if I come through the *telos* of battle,

[40] 1035; 8a. [41] *Su.* 571–81; *PV* 848–51.
[42] Εὐμενῆ βίαν κτίσας (1067). This translation (as opposed to 'having brought about benign violence') is supported by Aeschylus' normal use of κτίζειν (notably in 138–40 cited above) and the many passages cited by FJW ad loc.
[43] Cf. 576 and FJW ad loc. [44] 429, 798, 812, 821, 831, 849?, 863, 943.
[45] 1065–7; similar is the ending of Io's suffering by the 'painless strength' of Zeus at 576–9.
[46] 1040; θελγ- of male erotic soothing of the female also at 571, 1004, 1055.
[47] Plut. *Mor.* 264b; etc.: Seaford (1987) 114. Plutarch also specifies Zeus, Hera, Aphrodite and Artemis, all of whom are mentioned in this wedding song.
[48] 435, reading ἐκτίνειν or – reading τίνειν – 'pay'. [49] 601, 603, 739.
[50] 472; on ἐκπράττειν see Chapter 3 n. 26.

there will be bitter *analōma* (expense – of blood).' The debt owed by the Argives to the suppliant Danaids will be paid, as an expense, in battle. *Telos* here connotes the completion of warfare (e.g. *Il.* 16.630 τέλος πολέμου), but also – given the mention here of debt and expense – connotes the completion of payment. The uncontrollability of battle is assimilated to the ordered necessity of payment.

To conclude, the Danaids' resistance to marriage with their cousins results in seemingly unlimited deferral of ritual completion (*telos*), and this in turn produces a threefold crisis (cosmological, political and military) and so also the need for completion (*telos*) in all these spheres – *telos* in senses that we differentiate (ritual completion, authority, payment), although for the Greeks their separateness may sometimes have been submerged in the need to endow fearful events with completion. The deferral was only ended, after the Danaids' murder of their bridegroom-cousins, in the conclusion of the trilogy. But what was its origin?

8c endogamy

The flight of the bride is in normal marriage ritual at most merely evoked or implicit. But the flight of the Danaids' is real, and extreme. They say that it was not imposed by the polis for bloodshed but αὐτογενῆ φυξανορίαν,[51] adding that they are 'blaming marriage with the sons of Aigyptos as impious' (5–10).

Autogenēs (αὐτογενής) here means 'within the kinship-group' and *phuxanoria* (φυξανορία) 'flight from males'. The phrase anticipates their statement of the unlawfulness of cousin marriage at 37–9.[52] But it is taken in both the most recent commentaries[53] to mean 'by our own act' or 'self-chosen'.[54] This misinterpretation clouds understanding of the play as a whole, and so requires correction.

We do not in fact have to look very far to find *auto-* meaning (in effect) 'within the kinship-group': *autophonōs* (65) of Prokne killing her children means in effect killing within the kinship-group,[55] in a mythical paradigm that – we will soon see – has a remarkable set of correspondences with the situation of the Danaids. Kin-killing is 'self-killing'.[56]

[51] A generally accepted emendation of M's αὐτογένητον φυλαξάνοραν.
[52] See also 224–9, 335–9, 387–96, 933.
[53] FJW, and Sandin, who basically follows FJW.
[54] Elsewhere it occurs only in late texts, where it generally means 'self-generating'.
[55] As elsewhere in Aeschylus: see *Sept.* 850, *Ag.* 1091 (and Fraenkel (1950) ad loc.); and cf. *Sept.* 681, 734, 805; E. *Med.* 1254, 1269.
[56] Cf. Pl. *Laws* 872c–873b; Parker (1983) 123 n. 73.

Autanepsios ('own cousin') is used in a context of the Aigyptiads' claim to their cousins (933, 984). And there are other such words in which *auto-* emphasises the closeness (amounting to a kind of identity) of the kinship bond: *authaimōn*, *autadelphos*, *autokasignētos*. We should also note that *autogennēta* of Iokasta's copulation with Oedipus (S. *Ant.* 864–5) means in effect (however we analyse it) 'incestuous'. As for *-genēs* (-γενής), ἀπαλέξαι γάμον Αἰγυπτογενῆ (*Su.* 1053) means rejection of marriage within the kinship-group of Aigyptos, as indeed does *PV* 855–6 φεύγουσα συγγενῆ γάμον ἀνεψιῶν.[57]

FJW claim – for their mistranslation 'by our own act' – that it provides a contrast with the 'bloodshed' ('the flight is a consequence not of crime but of deliberate choice'), and with the 'polis', which 'prepares the hearer for an antithetical allusion in *autogenē* to the individual "self" as the agent'. Now the contrast with what precedes *autogenē* is indeed important, but FJW have misunderstood it. It is between a crime punished by the polis and conflict *within the kinship-group* (*autogenē*).[58] This distinction, programmatically stated here, will be of great importance to the play, and probably even more so to the trilogy (as also in *Oresteia*). It also emphasises that what is impious is not marriage in itself (an absurd idea) but marriage within the kinship-group.[59]

Moreover, 'by our own act' is contradicted by what immediately follows (it was Danaos who decided on the flight); and it would anyway be an over-elaborate expression for such a simple and prosaic idea as 'voluntarily'. The beauty of the phrase αὐτογενῆ φυξανορίαν, correctly understood, is that – as so often occurs in Aeschylus – it *unites opposites*. There is a poignant tension between the extreme flight of the Danaids (all the way here to Argos) and the *enclosed self-identity* of the kinship-group implied by *autogenē*. The sons of Aigyptos, suggests Pelasgos, have power over the Danaids as 'the closest in kin' (388 ἐγγύτατα γένους). But the Danaids will go to the most remote place to escape them. The unity of opposite relations (close kinship and murderous hostility) is expressed *spatially*.

[57] These passages counteract FJW's argument that 'the epithet is required to qualify only the second element in the subst., instead of the whole compound; this cannot be deemed impossible, in view of E. *HF* 1381 παιδοκτόνους σούς "killers of your children", but it would be abnormal, and the intelligibility of the expression is additionally reduced by its departure from the ordinary use of *auto-* as self and *-genēs* with verbal force'.

[58] *Cho.* 472–3 οὐκ ἀπ' ἄλλων ἔκτοθεν, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν, cited by FJW as embodying the contrast between polis and individual self as agent, refers in fact to the kinship group.

[59] This view is perfectly consistent with those passages of the play in which it seems that 'men in general' are being rejected: Seaford (1987) 110–19.

The importance of endogamy in Greek mythological thought[60] is manifest in its association with introversion in the fundamental categories of space, violence and eating. It is associated with the spatial enclosure of the female,[61] with kin-killing, and occasionally with endo-cannibalism (cannibalism within the family).[62]

These associations are simultaneously evoked in Danaos' instructions to his daughters to sit at the altar, like birds prevented from flight:

> in purity sit like a flock of doves in fear of hawks of the same feather as themselves, hostile blood-kin (ἐχθρῶν ὁμαίμων) and polluting the clan (*genos*); how could a bird that eats of a bird be pure? (223–6)

In what may have been a hymenaial image,[63] a bird of prey (the hawk) pursues another species (the dove), expressing the violence of enforced sexual union. But in cousin marriage it is even worse: bird eating bird is a kind of endo-cannibalism. The marriage rejected by the Danaids unites the opposites of absolute distance (hunt) and excessive closeness (endo-cannibalism).[64]

The introversion of violence, of sex and of eating occurs, together with avian pursuit, also in the story of Tereus raping and enclosing his sister-in-law: his wife then feeds him their son, and all three adults are transformed into birds. The Danaids have fled from introverted sex, and compare themselves to the wife of Tereus pursued by her husband:

> a hawk-pursued nightingale, who, kept away from fields (*chōrōn*) and rivers, laments with a new piteous song for her familiar haunts. (62–4)

As in a version of the myth,[65] Tereus pursues his wife after he has been transformed into a hawk and she into a nightingale. The 'familiar haunts' from which the nightingale here laments being kept away from (surely *by the hawk*) are the fields and rivers that (in Greek literature) she frequents.[66] Like the bride, the Danaids are lamenting, threatened by violent pursuit, and imagined as in the wild. Just as the hawk pursuing the nightingale may have been a hymenaial image, so the fields (*chōroi*) from which the

[60] 4G, 7B, 18B.
[61] Especially in tragedy: Seaford (1990b). Hypermestra, who may well have figured in *Danaids*, was *imprisoned* by her father when she refused to kill her husband: Apollod. 2.1.5; Ov. *Her*. 14.3ff.; Hor., *Odes* 3.11.45.
[62] Incest and endocannibalism: Thyestes, Tereus, Harpalyke, Kronos.
[63] Seaford (1987) 111.
[64] Cf. in this respect the omen with eagle and hare in *Ag*. (11A).
[65] Ach. Tat. 5.5.9; Konon, *Narr*. 31 (cf. Hygin. *Fab*. 45; *RE* I 473).
[66] 'Kept away from rivers' is given point, as FJW had remarked, by the frequent mention of the river Nile (e.g. eight lines later), from which they have been pursued.

nightingale is excluded are comparable to the protected *chōroi* in which in Sophokles a maiden 'is fed' (*bosketai*, i.e. as if an animal) until she is married.[67]

The text continues:

> She composes the death of her child, that he was by kin-killing (*autophonōs*) destroyed by her own hand . . . (65–6)

Autophonōs refers to the act of Tereus' wife that – as murder of kin in reaction to male sexual constraint of a relative – resembles the Danaids' killing of their husbands, which will be the central act of the trilogy. The introversion of sex and of violence are both expressed with the prefix *auto-* (*autogenē, autophonōs*). Further, *autophon-* means literally 'self-killing' (and refers in later texts to suicide),[68] and so may seem to prefigure the Danaids' threats of suicide.

8d why is the marriage resisted?

Why do the Aigyptiads insist on the marriage? In classical Athens the motivation for endogamy was generally the retention or accumulation of wealth and power within the family.[69] The claim of the Aigyptiads over the Danaids is represented – by both the Danaids (38) and the Aigyptiads' herald (918) – as a claim to *property*.[70] The chorus-leader, interrogated by Pelasgos about the Danaids' motivation for rejecting the marriage (335–9), says she does not want to be subjected (as *dmōis*) to the 'kin (*genos*) of Aigyptos', for 'who would buy[71] *philous* (kinsmen)[72] as her masters (τοὺς κεκτημένους)?'

The idea resembles Medea's complaint that women have to 'buy' a husband to be their master, i.e. with a dowry (E. *Med.* 232–4). Medea, like the Danaids, objects to both the commercial transaction and the

[67] *Trach.* 145; cf. also χώροι at e.g. S. *OT* 1126; Hdt. 9.15. This is ignored by West (1990) 129–30, who proposes that because the nightingale is *not* kept away from rivers, 'kept away' must be taken not with the rivers but with ἠθέων only ('from her familiar haunts, that is, from where she lived with Tereus'), and so emends the transmitted ἀπὸ χώρων ποταμῶν τ' ('from fields and rivers') to ἐπὶ χλωρῶν ποταμῶν ('by green rivers').

[68] E.g. Triphiod. *Capt. Tro.* 19. Suicide as kin-killing: n. 56 above.

[69] Seaford (1994a) 210 (with biblio); Cox (1998) 32–6, 210; endogamy widely practised in Athens: Thompson (1967).

[70] Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1252b5–7 'among barbarians the female and the slave have the same rank'.

[71] Reading ὠνοῖτο (transmitted is ὤνοιτο, i.e. accentuated like ὄνοιτο).

[72] *Philous* also has the secondary meaning 'dear' – to agree with Pelasgos' 'hostility' in the previous line: the secondary point is that the relatives, by becoming masters, are not dear. Commentators are led radically astray by supposing that it *only* means 'dear'.

domination. But whereas in *Medea* women (plural) buy a master (singular), in *Suppliants* a woman (singular) buys kinsmen as masters (plural). Why the difference? Because it is to the 'kin' of Aigyptos that each Danaid fears subjection. Normally a wife in conflict with her husband could rely on her natal kinsmen. But if she married a kinsman, then her kinsmen might well side with her husband because he too is their kinsman, and she would be isolated.[73] This issue may well have been more prominent in the lost *Aiguptioi*, especially if it was the first play in the trilogy:[74] Pelasgos raises the possibility that by Egyptian law the Aigyptiads are entitled to claim their closest kin in marriage (387–91).

This interpretation of the passage accounts for various features of it that other interpretations cannot account for. Firstly, we have seen that the plurals φίλους . . . τοὺς κεκτημένους acquire a point.[75] Secondly, our explanation also accounts for Pelasgos' reply, 'in that way (*houtōs*) strength (*sthenos*) is increased for mortals'. The reference of *houtōs* is simple. It is to the endogamy described by the Danaids as bought with their dowry. *Houtōs* ('in that way', including the retention of the dowry within the group of kin), replies Pelasgos, endogamy strengthens and enriches the family.[76] Wealth has *sthenos*.[77] And thirdly, what the Danaids say in response to Pelasgos,

> καὶ δυστυχούντῶν γ' εὐμαρὴς ἀπαλλαγή
>
> Yes,[78] and when they fare badly[79] easy is divorce. (339)

is – far from being incomprehensible, as on other interpretations of the passage[80] – precisely what is required. The Danaids concede Pelasgos' point about *sthenos*, and then state another consequence, the ease of divorce.[81] At Athens a wife was protected from easy divorce by her dowry, because

[73] This is, according to Plutarch (*Mor.* 289e), in effect the very reason why the Romans prohibited such marriages.

[74] An argument summarised by Sommerstein (1996) 143–7, and with important modifications in Sommerstein (2008) 284–6.

[75] Significantly, FJW translate their text (337 τίς δ' ἂν φιλοῦσ' ὄνοιτο τοὺς κεκτημένους;) as if the object were in the singular: 'What woman would object to her lord if she loved him?'

[76] Whereas FJW are driven to print a lacuna, and West (printing the same text of 337 as FJW) takes οὕτως to refer to possessing a woman even if she is unloving. Both solutions are unconvincing and unnecessary.

[77] Pi. *Isthm.* 3.2; E. *El.* 427.

[78] That is the point of καὶ . . . γε, as e.g. earlier at 296 and 313; Denniston (1954) 157–8.

[79] For δυστυχεῖν of the state of a marriage see E. *Pho.* 424.

[80] Seaford (1987) 117–18.

[81] It is no good to object that they dislike their cousins enough to want divorce. Their point is ad hoc. And the divorced state (impoverished, disreputable, lonely, permanent) might well be even worse than marriage to their cousins. See further Seaford (1987) 117–18.

it reverted, on divorce, to her former *kurios*.[82] But when the former *kurios* is a close kinsman of the husband, or even the husband himself, then loss of dowry is less of a threat to the husband. And her kinsmen, being also kinsmen of her husband, may not protect her against divorce, or indeed against other abuses by her husband. True, the Danaids' father Danaos is still alive. But he has no wife, and the Danaids have no prospect of brothers. Moreover, Pelasgos asks if the Aigyptiads have power over the Danaids 'by the law of the polis, saying they are nearest of kin (387 ἐγγύτατα γένους)', adding that if so then they should not be resisted: ἐγγύτατα γένους is an Athenian legal phrase, used for instance in the law requiring the *epiklēros* to be married to her nearest kin.[83]

And so on the death of Danaos the position of the Danaids would be that of the Athenian *epiklēros*, an unmarried woman with neither father nor brothers. Legally *required* to be married by her next of kin (i.e. her *kurios*), she was also protected by the Athenian polis from abuse by her male relatives (18B). The two go together, for without the intervention of polis law, an *epiklēros* and her inheritance might be claimed in marriage by her *kurios* and then, especially if she resisted abuse, be abandoned to disreputable[84] and impoverished solitude through divorce. In sum, without polis law the *epiklēros* is exposed to abuse and isolation.

At first sight this seems puzzling, inasmuch as the violent barbarian Aigyptiads are insisting on the kind of marriage that was at Athens legally required. But the puzzle is solved by the fact that the law by which the polis protects the *epiklēros* is significantly lacking in *Suppliants*, and the conclusion of the trilogy may well have contained the establishment of this protection (18B). In this way the advantage of such endogamy – the *sthenos* urged by the democratic Argive king Pelasgos and acknowledged even by the Danaids – can be combined with wifely contentment rather than violent resistance. This *sthenos* consisted of the wealth thereby kept within the family (8D), as well as of certain other advantages (18B). Once again, the aetiological crisis resolved by the founding of (one or more: 17C) polis institutions is projected not only onto the remote past but also onto a remote place, barbarian Egypt.

[82] A receipt for a dowry might be demanded of a husband to prevent him 'divorcing his wife easily' (Isaios 3.28).

[83] Isaios 3.64, 74, 10.5. Further discussion of the law: 18B. Sommerstein (1996) 145–6 regards Pelasgos' question (and 916–20, 932–3) as evidence of an *Egyptian* law. But the question receives no answer, and is rather meant to prefigure the contrast between the Greek law of the heiress (18B) and barbarian *lawlessness*. 916–20 and 932–3 are simply statements of possession, and do not imply a law.

[84] E.g. E. *Med.* 236–7.

This does not mean that the resistance of the Danaids is *merely* to endogamic isolation. Even a normal marriage is imagined to create bridal resistance, and the expression of this resistance as real and extreme (more possible in myth than in ritual) is a feature of tragedy.[85] The resistance and journey of the Danaids falls into this category, for it is imagined in hymenaial terms. The isolation and imagined violence[86] normally resisted by the bride converges with the isolation and possible abuse threatened specifically by endogamy. But why did Aeschylus put endogamy at the heart of his trilogy?

In the background is the importance of problematic endogamy (especially incest) in Greek mythology generally. This importance acquires a new inflection with the advent of the polis, which is constructed out of limiting the autonomy of the household, in particular the powerful household. And the tyrannical endogamy dramatised by tragedy is the extreme symbolic expression of such autonomy.

Marriage ritual establishes or perpetuates a household. And so Dionysos, in embodying the power of the polis to limit the autonomy of the household, propels women from the spatial enclosure of the household for communal cult into the wild in a manner that (a) renews bridal resistance or puts marriage ritual into reverse,[87] and (b) is at the opposite pole to their spatially enclosed *endogamy*.[88] And in the Dionysiac genre of tragedy female resistance to marriage frequently prevails.[89] In *ritual*, by contrast, all must end well. Bridal resistance is eventually overcome. And even in the marriage of Dionysos with the Athenian 'queen' within the royal house the symbolic undoing of the autonomy of the household is achieved in a peaceful and less extreme form.

The marriage with the Aigyptiads is resisted not only by the Danaids but also by their father Danaos, to whom they emphasise their obedience.[90] He reveals nothing about why he rejects the marriage (apart from the pollution we saw mentioned in 223–6). He was ruler of Egypt, and it is very likely that he will in the course of the trilogy become ruler of Argos.[91] This would be a seizure of tyrannical power, which is prefigured in *Suppliants* by his acquiring a bodyguard by vote of the assembly, for this was

[85] Seaford (1987).
[86] E.g. compare the Danaids like a calf up on the rocks 'pursued by a wolf' (*Su.* 351) with Deianeira compared as 'bride' to a 'deserted calf' (S. *Trach.* 529–30): Seaford (1987) 111.
[87] Seaford (1988) 127.
[88] As with Antigone, Antiope, Danae, Philomela: Seaford (1990b); there is a hint of the same polarity in *Bacchae*: Seaford (1997).
[89] Seaford (1987). [90] 11–13, 204–6, 969–71. [91] FJW 1 43, 48.

a well-known step towards tyranny taken at Athens (by Peisistratos) and elsewhere.[92]

The aetiological crisis of the trilogy may therefore have three elements of aetiological distance from the polis – time (the remote past), remote space (Egypt) and perhaps *tyranny* (of barbarian origin). And because it is an aetiological crisis, the significance of the theme of endogamy, and in general the vexed issue of the motivation of the Danaids (and of Danaos), can be understood only from the perspective of what can be reconstructed of the aetiological conclusion from the two surviving substantial fragments of the final play of the trilogy. The aetiological transition of the play was from the crisis of the Danaids' rejection of marriage with their cousins to the permanent ordering of gender relations in the polis – probably through (as in *Eumenides*) both law and cult.

This is the context in which we begin to make sense of Aeschylus' choice of theme. Like *Oresteia*, it expresses the extreme possibility of *introverted* tension arising from the *autonomy* of the tyrannical household. Such extremity will involve gender-conflict and kin-killing, which – as in *Oresteia* – required the creation of the polis. We will return to the overall significance of the trilogy in 17c and 18a.

A tension inherent in Greek marriage is that on the one hand the male desires to appropriate a female for the perpetuation of his household, but on the other hand the bride is lost to her natal household. This structural tension coincides with the ritualised tension of the ceremony, in which it is the bride who resists leaving her home. The structural tension is magnified in the case of brotherless daughters, whose father may be faced with the extinction of his household, more specifically with the transmission of its wealth to the alien household of his sons-in-law. Further, in this anomalous situation of wealth attached to the female, the wider kinship group may well lay claim to the wealth. The problem was in Homer met (if at all) by marriage to a stranger who – isolated from his natal household – becomes part of his father-in-law's household.[93] In the polis it was met by adoption of the son-in-law and by legislation (18b).

It is now finally intelligible why Danaos and his daughters should resist the marriage, and why the theme mattered to the Athenian polis. He is not the only father in myth to resist the marriage of a brotherless daughter. In some cases the threat represented by the son-in-law (extinction of the household) is expressed by an oracle predicting that he will kill his father-in-law. Indeed such an oracle was said to have been given to Danaos, and

[92] FJW I 43, 48, III 277 (on 985–8). [93] Seaford (1994a) 17.

may have figured in the lost part of the trilogy.[94] The tension inherent in household autonomy produces – in the extremity characteristic of the aetiological imagination – paternal resistance to all marriage and bridal resistance to endogamy, resulting in violence. For the Danaids three things coincide: obedience to father, fear of endogamic isolation, and the imagery of the normal bride resistance.

[94] See Sommerstein (1996) 144–5, and the important modifications in Sommerstein (2008) 284–6.

CHAPTER 9

Seven against Thebes

9A CONFRONTATIONAL SPACE

The spatio-ritual configuration of *Septem* is similar to that of *Suppliants*. A king is threatened not only by war from beyond the polis but also by immediate confrontation with the chorus of maidens who have left their homes in flight to supplicate an 'assembly' of gods who share a public altar.[1] In both plays the maidens' fear of abduction by external males is expressed in supplication, in the imagery of wedding ritual and in lamentation.[2] And in both plays the end of their conflict with the king is marked by his instruction to them to leave the images of the gods.[3]

Septem is not located outside the city (as is *Suppliants*) but on the Acropolis (240), probably in front of the royal house,[4] and its chorus of maidens come from within the city. But the difference is not as great as it may seem, for the Danaids will in the trilogy be incorporated into Argos, and repeatedly associate themselves with their Argive ancestress Io, who mediates between them and Argos (8A). And conversely, in *Septem* the suppliant chorus is assimilated to the invaders: their behaviour means that – according to Eteokles – 'we are being destroyed from within by ourselves' (194).

Moreover, in *Septem* the invaders, though Greek, are slightly assimilated to barbarians: that Thebes 'speaks Greek' (72–3) implies that the invaders do not, and this may colour the description of them as 'of alien speech' (170) and the terror they are to feel at the 'Greek' paian (269–70). One of them has horses whose bridles make a 'barbarian' sound (463). The oddity manifests the stereotype.[5] More tangibly, the pattern of endophony following an arrival from the remote (barbarian) distance – in Aeschylus in

[1] *Sept.* 95–8, 185, 220, 251; Hutchinson (1985) 55; *Su.* 189, 242, 355. Flight: *Sept.* 191.
[2] *Sept.* 364–8, 333–5 (cf. Seaford (1987) 112, 130; *Su.* 112–16); cf. e.g. 328 with *Su.* 884, 909.
[3] *Sept.* 265; *Su.* 508–9 (cf. 324), on which see Sinn (1993) 97. [4] See Appendix.
[5] This is not appreciated by Hutchinson, Page and West, who delete the irreproachable 73 (cf. MSS of *Ag.* 851).

his lost Dionysiac *Lykourgeia* as well as in his *Oresteia* and Danaid trilogy – is in *Septem* expressed in the emphasis on Scythian iron (728) as resolving the dispute between the brothers over their inheritance, apportioning them each a piece of land to be buried in. The iron is a 'stranger' (727), a 'settler' (728), 'savage minded' (730), a 'stranger from beyond the sea' (941).[6] Arbitrators had to be external to the dispute, and so sometimes came from afar.[7] As in *Bacchae*, it is a 'stranger' from afar who imposes the endophonic unity of opposites. Of the two external agents of the fratricide in *Septem* one (the curse) is from the distant past and the other (the Scythian iron) from a distant place, together embodying an element of the aetiological chronotope.

In the opening of *Septem* the chorus of maidens process into the *orchēstra*, constantly invoke the gods, and supplicate their images.[8] King Eteokles insists repeatedly that they should not lament.[9] He also tells them to remain 'inside', for what is 'outside' is the affair of men (200–1), and to leave the images and respond to his prayers with a paian, which he calls an *ololugmos* ('ululation') and a means of encouraging friends and dissolving fear (265–270). The confrontation over space, over the claim of the chorus to occupy public space, is also confrontation over ritual.

Presumably the chorus do leave the images before performing the next *stasimon* (287–368). But in the matter of ritual utterance they do the opposite of what Eteokles commands. Their next words are a song that begins with an expression of fear and goes on to describe in detail the horrors of the invasion of a city, the kind of description that elsewhere Aeschylus calls a 'paian of the Erinues' (15B). This song may have evoked a special kind of lament, for the fall of a city,[10] but also – because much of the detail is about the fate (including rape) of the *women* – approximates to a hymenaial lament by the chorus for themselves.[11]

And so in both *Septem* and *Suppliants* the chorus of maidens display a combination of supplication, self-lamentation, and hymenaial flight to public space that presents a danger to the local king. In both plays the visual expression of this transgression was probably impressive. And in both it contrasts with the spatial *enclosure* associated with endogamy. But whereas in *Suppliants* the endogamic enclosure is brought from afar (8C), in *Septem* it is lodged in the household of the local king.

[6] Cf. also *Cho*. 163. [7] Engelmann (1967). On public arbitrators in Athens see Gernet (1939).
[8] 98, 109, 171 185, 258, 265.
[9] 186, 191–2, 243, 279–80. On the opposition between Eteokles and the chorus see Giordano-Zecharya (2006).
[10] Alexiou (1974) 83–5. [11] On self-lamentation see Farenga (2006) 388–9.

Dominating the opening of *Septem* is the vehemence with which King Eteokles tries to restrict the chorus' lamentation. Why? As in *Suppliants*, the hymenaial tension between male and female seems to have converged with the tension between individual and chorus that marked the development of Dionysiac choral song into the tragic amalgam of genres (6A). Gender tension might be created also by female lamentation, which was in Athens and elsewhere restricted by law.[12] Eteokles fears that he himself will be lamented (6–8), and claims that the chorus are spreading fear.[13] The same combination – of the warrior ordering the female indoors and pre-emptive (and so ominous) lamentation – occurs in the *Iliad* (6.490–3). And the chorus' supplication of assembled gods may once again, as in *Suppliants*, raise the issue of the political identity of the community, and thereby implicitly call into question monarchical power.[14]

There is moreover a significant relationship between ritual and the politics of space. This will emerge after a brief detour, which starts with Eteokles' determination to suppress lamentation within *himself*.[15] At the climax of the great central scene, at the moment at which it becomes clear that he is doomed to fight his brother, he says:

> O entirely to be wept for [is] my family of Oedipus. Alas, my father's curses are now being fulfilled. But there should be no weeping or lamentation, lest there be begotten also a lament harder to bear. (654–7)

Presumably for him to lament would, like the girls' shrieks, dangerously weaken the resolve of himself and others. Eteokles' rejection of lamentation, even though his family is 'entirely to be wept for', implies determination. Similarly the besiegers, even while they weep for their own imminent deaths, refuse to lament.[16] But Eteokles' determination seems to follow from mention of the curse, and 'lest there be begotten (*teknōthēi*) . . . ' evokes the *disastrous procreation* of the royal family that includes – besides the incest (753–7) – Laios ignoring his duty to have no offspring (745–52) and Oedipus cursing his sons (723–33, etc). A little later Eteokles says, astonishingly, that this (personified) Curse

> is sitting with [or on] dry unweeping eyes, saying gain (*kerdos*) first, [fated] death afterwards. (696–7)

[12] For the relevance of this to tragedy see Seaford (1994a).
[13] 186, 191–2, 237, 243, 262, 280. He also objects to their words of ill-omen (238).
[14] In S. *OT* both the *king* (2–3, 16, 32 ἑφέστιοι, 41) and the gods (19–21) are supplicated.
[15] For male fear of being infected by female frenzy see notably E. *Ba.* and Bacchyl. 11: Seaford (1988) 131.
[16] 49–51. On this passage see Seaford (2012).

Whether these 'dry unweeping eyes' belong to Eteokles or (more probably) to the Curse, they confirm the earlier association of tearlessness with curse, and moreover associate the tearlessness with the recommendation of *kerdos* as preferable to death. This *kerdos* is – or at least strongly connotes – the inheritance that the curse makes the brothers divide by the sword, i.e. that motivates the mutual fratricide.[17] It turns out that Eteokles' suppression of lamentation is more than just the concern of a leader to avoid a general panic. It belongs also to his grim determination to retain his inherited property, even if the result is mutual fratricide. To this power of *kerdos* we will return in 9C.

The rejection of lamentation belongs to the general failure of ritual in the royal household. For the fratricide there can be no purification (679–82, 734–9). And as for wedding ritual, it was madness that brought together the incestuous bridal pair Oedipus and Jokasta.[18] All this – together with the implied rejection of procreation – expresses the introversion of the royal family, cut off from the gods as from the polis. But the most striking rejection of ritual occurs at the climax of the first part of the play, just before Eteokles goes off to fight his own brother. The chorus respond to the lines of Eteokles just quoted (696–7) by urging him to sacrifice to the gods so as to make the 'Fury (Erinus) of the black goatskin (*melanaigis*)' depart from the house' (699–700). But Eteokles replies that 'we are already of no concern to the gods'. Sacrificial ritual is of no avail: the Erinus that inspires kin-murder will remain in the house, rather as the *kōmos* of such Erinues is in *Agamemnon* 'hard to send out' of the house (1190). There will be neither lamentation nor sacrifice.

The word *melanaigis* here is significant.[19] Elsewhere it occurs only of Dionysos. Here it is surely designed to evoke the important Attic cult of Dionysos *Melanaigis*, who in the *aition* drove the daughters of Eleuther in a frenzy from their house. This expulsion was no doubt, as generally in myths of maenadism, so as to reverse the introversion of the household for the sake of public cult – at Eleutherai, whence had come the Dionysos of the dramatic festival (2G). This is one of the many passages that connect tragic patterns of action with those of Dionysiac cult. For instance, in its spatial implication it resembles the evocation of the Eleusinian Dionysos in *Antigone* (18E): in both cases an Attic Dionysos associated with the liberation of the contained female (the *eleutherai* from their parental house, Kore from the house of Hades) is vainly – just before the self-destruction

[17] See 9C. There are several variations on this theme: 727–33, 780–90, 816–17, 883–4, 908–10, 941–6.
[18] 756–7. Some identify this pair with Jokasta and Laios, but this does not affect my argument.
[19] Hutchinson's reference of it to a black storm wind (leaving the house!) gives nonsense.

of the household – evoked in a Theban context of such containment (of the Erinus in the endogamic house, of the endogamic Antigone in her cave imagined as Hades).

The ritual that obtains the Dionysiac departure from the house is rejected by Eteokles. Rejection of Dionysiac departure from the household occurs in a number of myths, in which it expresses the *introversion* of the household,[20] as it does also I suggest here. The introversion and political isolation of the Theban royal family is expressed ritually and at the same time spatially. Further, this introversion is here – as generally – self-destructive. It is an Erinus who is called *melanaigis*. This evokes the resemblance of Erinues to maenads, both visually and in their association with frenzied endophony.[21] Eteokles affirms not only the introversion of the household but also what regularly accompanies the introversion, the endophony that he is about to perpetrate. We recall not only Pentheus vainly seeking to enclose Dionysos within the house but also the kin-killing maenadism of Klutaimestra (*Ag.* 1235):[22] maenadism should leave the house, but her anomalous *bakcheia kakē* ('evil bacchanalia') is 'in the house' (*Cho.* 698).

After the news of the mutual fratricide and of the salvation of the polis, the chorus are again faced with a choice of negative or positive ritual utterance, of whether to rejoice with an *ololugē* or to lament for the dead brothers. Again, they lament, and describe their lament as maenadism (836). Its sound 'goes also through the polis' (900), and 'sends them [the dead brothers] forth from the house' (915). As in their earlier lament, the whole city groans.[23] What survives of Aeschylus' play ends with the resolve to bury the brothers 'where is most honourable', along with Oedipus (1003–4), and this – together with Pausanias telling us of Theban sacrifices at their tombs outside the city[24] – suggests that the play ended (a little later) with a procession off to the place where they will have cult at their tombs.[25] Is it possible to imagine this awesome family in the earth together as *not* receiving cult?

Lines 699–70 and 915 are the only two mentions in *Septem* that are unequivocally of the physical house (as opposed to the household) of the ruling family.[26] The ancient palace was said by the Thebans, in the time of Pausanias (9.12.3), to be where the agora is now on the Acropolis, i.e. where the play is set (240). I believe that the house formed part of

[20] Seaford (1988), (1990b); 46. [21] See Seaford (1993) 140.
[22] μαινάδα (Weil) is an almost certain conjecture: Seaford (1989b). [23] 247, 900–2; also 843.
[24] Pausan. 9.18.3; Symeonoglou (1985) 193. [25] So Foley (1993) 138.
[26] But note also the image of the fratricides as 'laying low the walls of the house' (880–1 δωμάτων ἐρειψίτοιχοι).

the backdrop of *Septem* (see Appendix). Certainly both these passages are about the movement from the house of the king, who rejects ritual (sacrifice, lamentation), into the space of public ritual – of 'maenadism' and of public lamentation (perhaps as prefiguring hero-cult). Dionysos is ambivalent: if rejected he inspires royal kin-killing, but sends women from their homes for polis cult. The royal fratricide belongs to the introversion of the household, and rejects the outward movement to public cultic space, a movement that is subsequently embodied in the maenadic lamentation that fills the polis and in the final procession to the place of burial (and of future polis cult).

Let us look more closely at the passage in which the lament is said to send forth the brothers from the house:

> ἀχάεις δόμων μάλ' αὐτούς[27]
> προπέμπει δαϊκτήρ
> γόος αὐτόστονος αὐτοπήμων.
>
> The sounding, rending, itself-lamenting, itself-suffering
> lament sends them forth from the house. (915–17)

Propempei ('send forth') refers to the funeral procession.[28] The bodies are imagined as sent forth from house to tomb by the lament itself (*goös*).[29] I have translated αὐτόστονος αὐτοπήμων as 'itself-lamenting, itself-suffering'. But precisely what does that mean?

Neither word occurs anywhere else. Hutchinson translates 'lamenting, and feeling pain, of its own accord'. Certainly (as with *propempei*) the lament is imagined as a person. But it is also *daïktēr* 'rending', which assimilates it not just to a person but to the violence of the dead brothers. Similarly, three lines earlier *sidēroplēktoi* ('struck by iron') assimilates the violence of the brothers to (the digging of) their graves (13A).

This suggests the possibility that αὐτόστονος αὐτοπήμων also alludes to the lamented fratricides. That would moreover give the repeated αὐτο- (*auto-*) point, as reflexive rather than affirmative, as evoking their *introversion*:[30] 'self-lamenting, self-suffering'. Suicide was equated in classical texts with kin-killing,[31] and the self-reflexivity expressed in *auto-* may

[27] As restored by West (1990) 122–3.
[28] As at e.g. *Sept.* 1059; Pl., *Laws* 800e, *Menex.* 236d. In Aeschylus προπέμπειν is always either funerary (*Pers.* 622, *Cho.* 23) or with a funerary association (*Ag.* 820 – cf. S. *El.* 1158–9; even perhaps *Pers.* 530 (12C)).
[29] Similarly *Cho.* 330.
[30] Cf. *Il.* 19.302, the women lamenting 'openly for Patroklos, but each for her own sorrows', σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε' ἑκάστη; Farenga (2006) 62–6.
[31] Chapter 8 n. 56.

be of individual or of family. Words beginning *auto-* refer frequently to the fratricide, for instance the repeated *auto-* at 734–5 αὐτοκτόνως αὐτοδάϊκτοι ('self-killingly, self-rending'). So too here *daïktēr* is to be taken with the repeated *auto-* that follows it. The intensifying repetition of *aut-* is evoked also in the description of the *incest* (along with the fratricide) a little later: παῖδα τὸν αὑτᾶς πόσιν αὑτᾶι θεμένα ('making the son of herself the husband for herself', 929–31). The royal introversion is both violent and reproductive. The same combination of opposites in the same family is implied by the use of the prefix *auto-* in *Suppliants* (8c) and in Sophokles' *Antigone*.[32]

Mourners in general, in defiling themselves and self-harming, assimilated themselves to the dead.[33] The assimilation is here extended to the personified lament.[34] In beating their own heads (855), the chorus give visible meaning to their calling their lament (and by implication the fratricides) αὐτόστονος αὐτοπήμων. The introverted violence expressed in αὐτοκτόνως αὐτοδάϊκτοι was associated with the mixture of earth with blood and of past with present sufferings, precluding purification (9d). Now, once again felt across spheres that seem to us separate, it seems to infiltrate the lament, which is thereby imagined as simultaneously sending forth the mourners in a public procession and taking on the *introversion* (violent, and even reproductive) of the household. The introverted space of the endogamic royal family contrasts not only with the Dionysiac outward movement (699–70) but also, in the repeated *auto-* of the lament, with the outward movement of the funeral procession from the house through the polis, into public space. It also, thirdly, contrasts with the remote distance from which Scythian iron has come to arbitrate the fratricidal conflict (727–36, 937–44), rather as in *Suppliants* too the introverted space of the endogamic royal family, also expressed in repeated *auto-*, is in tension with the geographic space traversed by the hymenaial Danaids (8c).

The funeral procession sets off from the royal house. But where does it end? There are two answers. The choral lamentation, as it fills urban space, encapsulates not only introverted space but also geographic and cosmic space:

[32] 51–2 αὐτόφωρος, incest and patricide of Oedipus punished by violence against self, αὐτὸς αὐτουργῶι χερί. Αὐτόχειρ is applied to the fratricide (172, cf. 56 αὐτοκτονοῦντε), to the suicides (1175, 1315), and to the death ritual performed by Antigone (900), who herself is αὐτόνομος (821) and destroyed by her αὐτόγνωτος ὀργά (875): as in *Septem*, the familial introversion unites spheres that we separate.

[33] Seaford (1994a) 86–8 (esp. Aristot. *fr.* 101 Rose).

[34] Cf. *Cho.* 152–3: a tear 'perished for a perished lord' (ὀλόμενον ὀλομένωι δεσπόται): tears flow into the earth for Agamemnon just as his blood once flowed into the earth (66). But the text is almost certainly corrupt: West (1990) 236–7.

Down the wind of your sighs row with your hands about your head the repeated stroke that perpetually crosses the [river] Acheron, conveying the unreturning black-sailed *theōris* to the land untrodden by *Paiōn* [Apollo], sunless, all-receiving, invisible. (854–60)[35]

The striking of head with hands – a feature of lamentation – is imagined as the oar-strokes that propel a boat;[36] and the boat is both the *theōris* (the boat sent every year by the Athenians for Apollo on Delos)[37] and Charon's boat that crosses the river Acheron to Hades.[38]

But this cosmic destination is merely imagined. At the end of the play the lamenting procession departs for an actual place.

– Alas suffering – Alas evils
– For the house – And for the land

is followed shortly by the last surviving lines of Aeschylus' play:

– Alas, where in the land shall we put them?
– Alas, where is most honoured.
– Alas, pain lying alongside [for] their father (πῆμα πατρὶ πάρευνον).[39]

The word for land is the same (*chthōn*) in both passages. The fratricides have caused suffering to the land, wherein however they will occupy the most honoured place. This exemplifies the ambivalence characteristic of hero-cult. Hutchinson rightly notes that the absence of ἄν in 1004 implies a specific place, but does not mention what we may reasonably infer therefrom, that it is imagined as a place of future cult. This may have been made clearer in any following lines now lost but once forming the end of Aeschylus' play,[40] rather as *Oresteia* is concluded by a procession off to a place where chthonic cult will be founded.

Septem represents a common tragic type: the action moves through the self-destruction of the royal family to the establishment of a polis cult that commemorates the myth dramatised in the tragedy. There is a contradiction between the royal brothers and the community: King Laios was told that by dying without issue he would 'save the polis' (749), and the conflict between his grandsons threatens to destroy the polis. 'I fear', say the chorus, 'lest with the kings the polis be overthrown' (764–5). The suffering, anger and destructiveness of the hero, the danger he continues even from the earth to present to the community, require the propitiatory honour of communal lamentation.[41] But such propitiation makes the hero

[35] West's text. [36] As in *Persians*: 12c. [37] Pl., *Phaedo* 58a–c; Parker (2005) 81–2.
[38] Cf. 690 (Eteokles allowing himself to be carried by the wind along the river Kokytos to the underworld), 613 (the expedition to Thebes imagined as a procession to Hades).
[39] 994–5 and 1002–4. [40] Hutchinson (1985) 208–9. [41] Seaford (1994a) 106–43.

a focus of communal emotion and so a source of communal benefit as well as of danger. The cult performed for the dead Eteokles and Polyneikes at Thebes may well have contained such lamentation.[42]

The ambivalence of such lamentation is prefigured throughout the *Septem*. Eteokles fears being 'hymned by the townspeople . . . with wailings' (6–8): the hymn, normally a festive song of praise for god or hero, is here imagined as a communal expression of hostility in the event of failure.[43] He tells the chorus not to lament (186, 243) and to sing a paian (266–70), but they devote their next song to imagining communal disaster. When eventually the messengers announce (792–821) that the polis has been saved and that the royal brothers have killed each other ('such things may be rejoiced at and lamented'),[44] the chorus at first (825–8) do not know whether to rejoice and ululate or lament. They choose the latter, but include the words 'in the end Curses sang the shrill strain of the song of victory (*epēlalaxan*), with the utter rout of the clan' (953–5).

The king who rejected lamentation is finally lamented by the chorus. The heroic ambivalence remains. The pollution is immortal (682, 734–8). The frenzied (836) lament contains criticism of the lamented (880–3, 922–3, 995), and even seems infected by the introversion of its object. But the community has survived, and will benefit from the cult.

Monarchy is confirmed by royal funerals. But the polis, rejecting autocracy, focuses its communal lamentation (in hero-cult or theatre) on death from the safely distant past. The self-destruction of the royal family becomes a means for the communal self-definition of the polis.[45] The finale of *Septem* enacts this transition spatially, with a procession from the royal house to a place in which access to benefit from the vertical axis, from beneath the earth, is controlled by civic cult.

9b the deferral and completion of *telos*

The opening of *Septem* is much concerned with the *telos* of the impending battle, which is in the hands of the gods, especially Zeus.[46] There follows an extended dialogue between King Eteokles and the chorus, who then sing a song concluded by *elpis* ('expectation' or 'hope') of the coming of

[42] Seaford (1994a) 139–40.

[43] 'One' (εἷς) in this position (and followed by 'much': πολὺς) would in a hymn express the importance of the god (Peterson (1926)), but here expresses the universality of the hostility.

[44] 820–1 should (*pace* Hutchinson and West) perhaps stand, as an emphatically epigrammatic conclusion: Seaford (1994a) 347 n. 57 (but 804 should be deleted, leaving stichomythia).

[45] On this theme in *Septem* see Seaford (1994a) 346–8 and (2000a) 40–2.

[46] 35, 116, 157, 163–4, 167, 627.

the 'night-time *telos*' (367). *Telos* here means – or at least connotes – the completion inherent in wedding ritual,[47] and specifically – with 'night-time' – its sexual consummation. *Elpis* may accordingly connote ironically the positive meaning 'hope', but the sexual consummation expected is the wretchedness of rape.[48]

As part of her resistance to marriage the bride might be expected to lament, and this gives point to the words of the chorus as they lament the prospect of the sack of the city:

> it is to be lamented that young girls, plucked unripe, should accomplish a hateful journey from their homes before the customary rites [of marriage]. (333–5)

The siege is envisaged by the chorus with the imagery and transition of the wedding, but without the normal closure that ends the anxiety and resistance of the bride. The threat of military invasion is assimilated to the traditional, familiar and more manageable crisis of female resistance to male domination in wedding ritual. The assimilation is psychologically plausible, but cannot avert disaster. The chorus pray to Zeus for a good *telos* but fear a wedding *telos* that will create rather than conclude suffering, like the chorus of *Suppliants*.

In the second half of the play, after the realisation that Eteokles will fight Polyneikes, there is no mention of a *telos* for the war. Instead, the root *tel-* is repeatedly used for the completion of Oedipus' curse – identified with the Erinus[49] – against his sons.[50] And indeed, whereas at the endings of *Suppliants* (8B) and *Choephoroi* (11B) *telos* is deferred, *Septem* concludes its trilogy, and accordingly the mutual fratricide is a completion (850 *telea*).[51] The curse endangers the polis through warfare, but in the end saves it – with the mutual fratricide that by bringing the dynasty to an end reaches in effect the state predicted by the oracle to Laios that he would by having no offspring 'save the polis' (749 σώιζειν πόλιν). The fulfilment of this oracle, and the *telos* of Oedipus' curse, is the salvation of the polis.[52]

Now, after the salvation of the polis, the perverted household ritual (wedding) is – as at the end of *Oresteia* – replaced by public ritual in public

[47] Wedding as completion (*telos*, *teleuta*): *Od.* 1.249, 20.74, 16.126; *Su.*1051; Pi. *Pyth.* 9.66; S. *Ant.* 1241; Poll. 3.38; also LSJ s.v. τέλειος 2b.

[48] The preceding words are 'victorious enemy', and the following 'ἐπίρροθον of lamentable woes': ἐπίρροθον is obscure here and may be corrupt.

[49] 70, 723, 791, 886.

[50] 655, 724, 766, 791 (cf. 782), 832, 954, 886 (ἐπέκρανεν), along with Apollo fulfilling (κραίνων) the ancient follies of Laios (802).

[51] Cf. 693 (ἀνδροκτασίαν τελεῖν), 905 (θανάτου τέλος), 930, 936.

[52] 795, 815.

space. The chorus' lament at the prospect of departure for a wedding *telos* of unlimited suffering is replaced by their ritual lament for a departure – from the royal house – that appropriates public space and prefigures public cult (9A).

9C POSSESSION

The curse 'extracted (*exepraxen*) debt and did not renounce (*apeipen*) it'.[53] The idea of the fulfilment of a curse as the payment of debt occurs also in *Agamemnon*[54] and is implicit in *Septem* 766–7: '*teleiai* (brought to completion) are the heavy *katallagai* of ancient curses'. *Katallagē* occurs elsewhere six times in the fifth and fourth centuries, twice of agreement to end hostility[55] and four times of monetary exchange.[56] Fundamental to these senses is the notion of quittance or resolution. To say that the heavy *katallagai* of curses are *teleiai*[57] is to imagine that curses create an imbalance or obligation that is resolved by suffering. The mysterious power of Oedipus' curse is imagined in terms of the mysterious power of (long-term) economic debt. Its content is that the brothers should divide up their inherited 'possessions' by the sword (787–90). The heroic duel has become an economic transaction.

It is in the immediately preceding passage, in which Eteokles departs to fight his brother in single combat, that the power of the Curse is most striking.[58] He states that the avoidance of shame (i.e. the cowardice of not fighting) is the only *kerdos* among the dead (684). The word *kerdos* can be used in a neutral sense ('advantageous'), but also to mean gain that is selfish or dangerous.[59] In this fratricidal context the latter meaning is impossible to exclude entirely. And so Eteokles' remark is ambiguous: it seems to mean that honour is the only advantage for the dead, but may also seem, shockingly, to assimilate honour to selfish gain.

The subsequent utterances of Eteokles are even more shocking (9A). First (697) he claims that the paternal Curse tells him κέρδος πρότερον

[53] 840. Of the six occurrences of ἐκπράσσειν in Aeschylus it means extraction of debt at *Su.* 472 and *Ag.* 1275 (see Fraenkel ad loc), and at *Ag.* 582 at least connotes it. In Aeschylus ἀπειπεῖν refers only to the non-acceptance or renunciation of material goods (*fr.* 78c.54; *Ag.* 1333), as at e.g. Clem. Alex. *Quis div. salv.* 11.4; πράσσειν can mean the extraction of debt or revenge (e.g. *Pers.* 476, *Ag.* 812, *Cho.* 311).

[54] 458 ἀρᾶς τίνει χρέος. [55] Ar., *Birds* 1588; Dem. *Ol.* 1.4.

[56] Dem. 50.30; Aristot. *Oec.* 1346b24; *Rhet.* 1418b32; Diphilos *fr.* 66.14; also *epikatallagē* at Theophr. *Char.* 30.15 and Diggle (2004) ad loc.

[57] Similarly the curse of Oedipus is, after the fratricide, itself *teleia* (832; cf. 791).

[58] 695, 709, 725. [59] *Ag.* 342, *Eum.* 704.

ὑστέρου μόρου, 'gain (*kerdos*) first, then [fated] death'. This seems to mean both that *kerdos* will precede death and that it is preferable to life. It is not honour that the Curse is concerned with, but to make Eteokles kill his brother. The fratricide, over the paternal inheritance, is represented as selfish gain. Earlier Eteokles has already used the word *kerdos* in a way that evokes the association of incestuous reproduction with the profit that accumulates from interest (7b, 11c).[60] Especially horrifying is that the gain will bring no benefit, because it will be followed immediately by death. The implication is that the selfish desire for gain has replaced honour, with its eternal glory, as the one thing more powerful even than the desire for life. In Sophokles' *Antigone* the Theban tyrant Kreon accuses the guard of being prepared to give up his life for money (322). And Kreon himself is accused, by Teiresias, of tyrannical *aischrokerdeia* (shameful desire for *kerdos*) that has made him exchange one corpse (his son Haimon) for two (Antigone and Polyneikes), making a horrific kind of profit.[61]

In his next utterance (702–3) Eteokles rejects the chorus' suggestion that the Erinus will leave the house when he sacrifices to the gods: 'Already we are somehow of no concern to the gods. Will *charis* (reciprocal good will) be honoured by them now that we are perishing?'[62] Just as there is no reciprocity between the brothers, so reciprocity between man and deity, on which the practice of religion largely depends, is excluded. Individual isolation both values *kerdos* and – in its extreme form – declines to sacrifice to the gods. The isolation of Eteokles from closest kin and from deity is – as is the isolation of the tragic individual generally – historically unprecedented. I have argued elsewhere that tragic isolation derives in part from the self-sufficiency imposed on the individual by the new phenomenon of monetisation.[63] The closest theme in (pre-monetary) myth to this unprecedented form of self-sufficiency is the horrific introversion of the royal family, notably at Thebes. Such mythical introversion may itself reflect a dangerous reality – the introversion of the family for reasons of wealth and power. In this passage of *Septem* the association of the Theban king's isolation with material gain, *kerdos*, is unusually powerful. Similarly in both the plays of Sophokles set at Thebes incest is associated with *kerdos* (18e).

[60] 437 καὶ τῶιδε κέρδει κέρδος ἄλλο τίκτεται, 'by this gain further gain is given birth to', with τίκτεται suggesting interest (τόκος). This is so even with the (inferior) κόμπωι (Keck) for κέρδει.
[61] S. *Ant.* 1056, 1066–71; cf. e.g. 322; Seaford (1998).
[62] For this translation of 703 see Hutchinson. The alternative is 'The *charis* of our death is honoured by them.'
[63] Seaford (2004a) 305–15.

The curse on the royal brothers embodies the individual urge for material gain that overrides even the most sacred considerations, and is in that sense unlimited. Or rather, this terrible and mysterious imperative, which in the time of Aeschylus had assumed a new (monetised) form, is integrated into the traditional (pre-monetary) mythical configuration by being projected onto the *curse*. In this process the nature of the curse is modified, and so is the configuration as a whole. The disruptiveness of individual gain is accommodated by reconfiguration.

To return to the song that follows the departure of Eteokles, the sea threatens the prow of the polis (760 πρύμναν πολέως), sing the chorus, and continue thus:

> I fear lest the polis may be overcome with the kings. For *teleiai* (brought to completion) are the heavy *katallagai* of ancient curses. The destructive things pass by the poor.[64] But wealth (*olbos*) of *alphēstai*[65] men that has grown too gross is thrown out of the ship. (764–71)

Eteokles in the prologue claimed to steer the πρύμνα πολέως,[66] which here is in danger of being sunk by (the battle for) the 'heavy' royal wealth implied by the economic associations of *katallagai*.[67]

The chorus of *Agamemnon* also describe the need for excessive cargo to be thrown overboard to save the ship from sinking, and add:

> A large gift from Zeus, ample and from yearly furrows, destroys the disease of famine. But a man's dark blood fallen to the earth in death, who can by invocation call it up again? (1014–21)

A *topos* of archaic and classical poetry[68] compares wealth unjustly obtained, which will not last, with wealth given by the gods. This is adapted here to the contrast between maritime wealth and agricultural wealth. The lasting wealth that in the *topos* is 'from Zeus' or 'given by Zeus'[69] becomes – by the addition of 'furrows' – agricultural, with Zeus providing the rain. And it also becomes – by the addition of 'yearly' – regular, and so lasting.

[64] Reading πενομένους (Bücheler, for transmitted πελόμενα) παρέρχεται, which fits the context perfectly. A lightly burdened ship (cf. 767 'heavy') survives the storm. Παρέρχεσθαι refers memorably to the harmless passing of a wave at *Od.* 5.429. Γενόμεν' οὐ (Hutchinson) gives feeble sense.

[65] For the problematic sense of this word, see below.

[66] 2–3. The idea is repeated at 30–4, 62–4, 208–10, 795–8; Cameron (1971) 58–70; Thalmann (1978) 32–7.

[67] This may also, given what follows, evoke the common practice of taking out a loan for maritime imports.

[68] Hes. *Op.* 320–6; Theogn. 197–201; Solon *fr.* 13.9–13; Pi. *Nem.* 8.17–18, *Isthm.* 3.4–6; E. *Hel.* 902–7, *fr.* 354.

[69] Theogn. 197; Hes. *Op.* 320.

The cargo, by contrast, is χρήματα κτήσια (1008–9). *Chrēmata* (χρήματα) means things, wealth, or money, and *ktēsia* (κτήσια) refers to *obtaining* (*ktasthai*) possessions (*ktēmata*) for oneself (i.e. here presumably by maritime trade), and so contrasts with what is *given* by Zeus. And giving implies reciprocity. Similarly, in *Eumenides* a man 'conveying many things all mixed up, without justice, violently' (553–5) is eventually shipwrecked. The stability of agriculture requires a cosmic dimension. The rain falling every year to earth is a 'gift from Zeus', contrasting not only with the singularity of cargo that threatens a ship with (irrevocable) sinking, but also with the singularity of the irrevocable falling of blood to earth. Agriculture and trade imply different cosmologies.

This antithesis between maritime and agricultural wealth is implicit also in *Septem*. In 764–71 (quoted above) *alphēstai* is surely not the merely decorative epithet for humankind that it seems to be in Homer, for such redundancy is not Aeschylean. In Homer it is in fact used 'especially of traders and seafarers' (LSJ). But 'the etymology "eaters of grain" appears to be indicated at Hesiod *fr.* 211 12–13',[70] and in its only other occurrence[71] after the sixth century it indicates agriculture (S. *Phil.* 709). It was perhaps obscure even to Aeschylus, who chose it as referring to sea-faring traders while connoting agriculture. At any rate the antithesis occurs – again as in *Agamemnon* – in the context of a *topos* that implicitly contrasts agriculture with blood in the earth (*Sept.* 754–5). And the brothers' dispute over the kingship is represented, insistently, as a dispute over *chrēmata* or *ktēmata* ('possessions').[72]

True, the only possession specified is the *earth*.[73] But this only serves to point the contrast with agricultural wealth. As their *pampēsia* ('full property') the fratricides 'will have, of the land, what they take in burial' (817–18). The grave itself becomes a possession. Here again, the desire for possessions seems to transcend death. The inherited possessions are to be divided by the sword, which has 'allotted them land to dwell in', enough for their corpses to 'possess' (731–3), which will lie on the 'bottomless (*abussos*) wealth of the earth' (949–50). This is the 'agreement' imposed on the brothers by their father's curse. They have gained the inheritance of unlimited wealth they desired, but only to lie on in death. *Abussos* contrasts the vastness of agricultural wealth with the little space their greed for gain has in fact brought them, but also evokes the unlimitedness of their desire: in Aristophanes *abussos* refers to the unlimitedness of precious metal money (*Lys.* 137).

[70] Heubeck, West and Hainsworth (1988) on *Od.* 1.349.
[71] Except of a kind of fish (LSJ). [72] 711, 729, 790, 817, 907, 944. [73] 731, 818; cf. 914.

Compare the prologue, in which the Thebans, in exchange for being reared by 'mother earth, your dearest nurse', must now defend her.[74] Whereas Oedipus sowed a bloody root (*rhiza*) (754–5), a defending Theban warrior is a 'stem (*rhizōma*) . . . from the *spartoi* [men "sown" in the earth]', who will defend 'the mother who bore him' (412–6). The *spartoi*, sprung from the dragons' teeth sown by Kadmos, are not envisaged in Aeschylus as ancestors of all the Thebans.[75] They are at least the ancestors of the royal family[76] and themselves already embody – by killing each other – the contradiction between common origin (in the earth) and self-destructive conflict. Another Theban warrior, also descended from the *spartoi*, will, if he dies, 'pay in full (*plērōsei*) his rearing (*tropheia*) to the earth'.[77] This implies that death in battle, with burial in the earth, constitute reciprocation. One of the attackers is 'paying back in full (*ektinōn*) his fine upbringing to Argos' (548), and – having travelled from afar – will not be 'doing petty trading in the battle' (545).

This communal norm, the inter-generational reciprocity between the Thebans as a whole (as well as individual warriors) and the fertile earth, with human and agricultural reproduction combining for the benefit of all, reinforces the aforementioned positive associations of agricultural wealth (compared to the unstable selfishness of commerce). By contrast, the royal fratricides are forced by an inter-generational *debt*, the paternal curse, to fight for individual *possession* of the earth rather than returning benefit to it. The antithesis is reflected in two opposed states of mind. One is Eteokles'. The other is Amphiaraos', who will 'enrich' the earth with his dead body (587), and who has

> no sign on his circle (shield), for he wishes not to *seem* but to *be* the best, reaping through his mind a deep furrow, from which good counsels grow. (591–4)

A sign stamped on a circle of metal increases its (seeming) value by making it money (a coin). Against this (monetary) *seeming*[78] is set the preference for *being*, which is here associated with agriculture.

[74] *Sept*. 16–19. Homeric *inter-personal* reciprocity, and the importance of *individual* descent, have been replaced by what constitues the polis: reciprocity *between the citizens and their shared land*, and the importance of *collective* descent – from Kadmos ('Citizens of Kadmos' are the first words of the play) and from the land.

[75] Hutchinson (1985) 112 on 412.

[76] E.g. E. *Phoen*. 1008.

[77] 477; paying back τροφεῖα to the fatherland is an ideal at Lys. 2.70; Isocr. 6.108; cf. Pl. *Rep*. 520b.

[78] Cf. *Ag*. 780, 788–9. For association of (absolute) seeming with money see Seaford (2004a) 283–4; for the shaping of the mind by money see Seaford (2004a) 158–60 and index s.v. mind.

9D COSMOLOGY

This contrast between royal family and community in relation to the earth is central to *Septem*. Its significance is developed in four passages, in the final third of the play, each of which strikingly combines agriculture, blood, kin-killing, and incest, (implicitly or explicitly) *mixing incestuous blood with earth*. In contrast to the communal reciprocity with the crop-bearing earth, the reproduction associated with individual gain is, in its association with the earth, incestuous and self-destructive. The four passages are as follows.

(1) The last words of the chorus to Eteokles:

Do you want to reap blood from the same womb (*autadelphon*)? (718)

(2) In the immediately following choral song:

When they would self-killingly, self-rending (αὐτοκτόνως αὐτοδάϊκτοι) die, and the dust of the earth drink their dark-clotted gory blood, who would provide purifications, who would release[79] them? O sufferings of the house, new, mixed with ancient evils (συμμιγεῖς κακοῖς). (734–40)

(3) The ancient evils, they go on to explain, are the offence of Laios. The Delphic oracle told him that he would save the polis by dying without offspring. But he foolishly

begot death for himself, father-killing Oedipus, who in sowing the pure ploughed field of his mother, where he was grown, transgressed/endured (*etla*) a bloody root. (751–5)

(4) Subsequently, in the choral lament over the brothers' bodies,

making the son of herself the husband for herself (παῖδα τὸν αὑτᾶς πόσιν αὑτᾶι θεμένα), she [Jokasta] gave birth to these men, who ended thus by their mutually slaughtering together-seeded (*homosporoisin*) hands. *Homosporoi* indeed, and *panōlethroi* (utterly destroyed/destroying) . . . their hostility has ceased, but life has been mixed in the blood-flowing earth; and they are very much (*karta*) of the same blood. A bitter resolver of the conflict, the stranger from over the sea . . . (929–41)

This last passage requires explication. *Homosporos* both continues the description of the incestuous nature of their parentage[80] and, with *-sporos* (connoting agriculture), leads into the mixture of life in the earth. The

[79] Reading λύσειε (Dobree) at 738: see Hutchinson (1985) ad loc.

[80] Similarly, incest is implicit in ὁμόσπλαγχνος of the sides through which they have been 'struck' (890), and in ὁμαίμοιν (681, cf. *Su.* 225). The adjectives may also imply the brothers' twinship. The rare ὁμόσπλαγχνος is used also by Antigone of Polyneikes (S. *Ant.* 511).

combination of opposites that we observed in 9A, of excessive blood-kinship with fratricidal bloodshed, is now manifest in the 'blood-flowing earth', and the paradoxical unity is affirmed by *karta*.

Why the repeated insistence on these themes? Whereas earth's gift of food for all requires from all the reciprocal duty to defend the earth, the curse inflicts self-destruction arising from unlimited individual desire for possessions within the introverted family, which is antithetical to the god-given wealth of agriculture. The antithesis is strikingly expressed, as so often in Athenian tragedy, by the fusion (unity) of the opposites that is based on what they have in common: sharp metal (for reaping and fighting), liquid (rain, semen, blood) flowing into the earth.

The abnormal 'fertilisation' of the earth by endogamous, fratricidal blood evokes the normal fertilisation of the earth by rain. Indeed, the fertilisation of the earth by blood is a *topos*, exemplified by *Agamemnon* 1014–21 (9C), after which Klutaimestra imagines the blood of Agamemnon spattering her as like the fertilising rain (1389–92). In *Eumenides* normality is in a sense restored finally by the Erinues' desire that the earth should drink[81] rain, not the blood of the citizens (980), prefiguring the fertilising (835, 938–49) and political role for their cult that is being founded in Athens in a cave – i.e. between the upper and the lower world, a striking instance of cosmic interconnection.

Returning to tyrannical Thebes, in *Antigone*, in the 'marriage rites in the house of Hades' the suicidal flow of her cousin Haimon's blood resembles and replaces the flow of seed in Antigone's underground cave or 'bridal chamber'; and the same ambivalence of liquid is there, in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, in the self-blinding of Oedipus over the body of his wife and mother.[82] Violent and reproductive introversion merge, in liquid.

What is more, the *topos* of blood fertilising (like rain) the earth perverts *cosmic* interconnection; and in *Septem* this perversion takes the form of irreversible mixture or confusion of blood with earth. Consider *summigeis* (συμμιγεῖς) in (2). It refers to temporal homogeneity: old and new sufferings are mixed, and indeed (3) even implies the identity of patricidal with fratricidal blood. But in the context *summigeis* suggests also the permanent mixture of blood with earth.[83] And so in the homogeneity (undifferentiation) implied by *summigeis* time and space combine, thereby instantiating the antideterminate chronotope. Further, *summigeis* must also evoke the underlying *incest*, for (a) *summeignumi* and *summeixis* are regular words for sexual union; (b) the association of agriculture with incest pervades the

[81] 949 πίοι, a good conjecture by West (1990) 291–2.
[82] S. *Ant.* 1237–41, *OT* 1275–81; Seaford (1987) 120–1.
[83] Cf. 940 μέμεικται of the blood mixed with earth.

three other passages, and is implicit – we have seen – even in another single word (*homosporoisin*); (c) most strikingly, with συμμιγεῖς κακοῖς here, 'mixed with evils', compare the 'evils mixed (συμμιγῆ κακὰ) for man and woman' in the vividly sexual description of the self-inflicted violence of the incestuous Oedipus and Jokasta that also instantiates the *topos* of blood for rain.[84]

By combining these meanings *summigeis* seems to express an all-pervasive homogeneity, mixing homogeneous time with bloodsoaked earth and the undifferentiation of incest (mother is wife, father is brother), and including the unlimited shared desire for possessions[85] that – in bringing the royal family to a 'childless' *end*[86] – contrasts with the reciprocity between the Theban community and the earth with her annual crops. The fratricidal blood in the earth, in contrast to the cosmic process that it resembles (rain to the earth), produces no offspring.

The pouring of blood into the earth was also a ritual practice, at the tombs of heroes, especially those slain in war.[87] It has been argued that 'the use of blood rituals in these cults may have served as a reminiscence . . . of the shedding of blood taking place in war and the fact that the hero had fallen in battle or been killed as a consequence of war'.[88] In Sophokles the dead Oedipus will drink the blood of the enemies killed in future conflicts between Athens and Thebes. And the idea of *mixture* is applied by Pindar to Pelops, in his grave, partaking of blood sacrifices at Olympia: ἐν αἱμακουρίαις . . . μέμικται.[89]

As often elsewhere in tragedy,[90] so too in *Septem* the cult that will be established is prefigured in the action:

> The self-slaughtering death of men of the same blood – there is no old age (*gēras*) of this pollution. (680–1)

The pollution will be permanent. What does this have to do with hero-cult? The extreme pollution of Oedipus, acquired (like that of his sons) by incest and kin-killing, is in Sophokles' *Oedipus Colonus* transformed into benefits (from his hero-cult) that will be permanent, indeed 'without the pain of old age (*gērōs*)'.[91]

[84] S. *OT* 1281: Seaford (1987) 119–20; 18E.
[85] 9C. Money homogenises its possessors (3C3) as well as goods (3A).
[86] *Sept.* 689–91, 720, 801, 813, 828, 877, 880–2, 954–5; and cf. 748–9 with 820–1. There is no hint of a future for the royal family. The scene with Antigone and Ismene is – as is now generally agreed – spurious.
[87] Ekroth (2002) 171–7, 257–68. [88] Ekroth (2002) 259.
[89] S. *OC* 621–2; Pi. *Ol.* 1.90–3. [90] E.g. E. *Ba.*; S. *Aj.* (Seaford (1994b).
[91] 1519. The permanence of the tomb with its benefits for Athens is stated also at 1555, 1707, 1765.

In the only other extant ending of an Aeschylean trilogy, in *Eumenides*, the danger that remains is of polluting anger from the Erinues, which must be transformed into benefit by permanent[92] cult. In *Septem*, on the other hand, 'having overpowered two, the *daimōn* ceased' (959–60). And so the permanent danger that requires the performance of the hero-cult must be something other than the *daimōn*, and indeed it is the pollution of the mutual fratricide. This kind of motivation is not uncharacteristic of hero-cult. The evidence for the tombs of heroes as in themselves polluting is not plenteous.[93] But here the fratricide is represented by Aeschylus as 'self-slaughtering' (680), i.e. suicide, which had a special power to pollute, as did kin-murder.[94] The dead may remain polluted by their transgressions in life.[95] And in the aetiologies of hero-cult anger from the tomb (required to motivate the permanent performance of the cult) may arise from the piteous death of the hero, which may in turn result from his transgression.[96] This widespread phenomenon is important for understanding several Athenian tragedies.[97] The horror of the mutual fratricide motivates – and is felt in – the performance of the cult. The extreme isolation of the individual is met with the powerful solidarity of the lament.

Accordingly, it is surely not coincidental that the fratricide is represented in terms that evoke the ritual performed in hero-cult, the mixing of blood with earth. Fratridical, incestuous blood is mixed in earth: this irreversible pollution is (together with its cosmological significance) best remembered and *controlled* by the ritualised mixing of sacrificial blood with earth. The logic may resemble that of the practice of being purified from murder by contact with the sacrificial blood (e.g. *Eum*. 448–50). The horror of the event cannot and must not be ignored, and so is made tolerable by being evoked in a controlled ritual context with a mere animal as victim,[98] and perhaps the blood is imagined as drunk by the heroes.[99] The ritual cannot

[92] *Eum*. 836, 890–1, 993, 977 1030–1. Cf. the permanence of other new benefits for the polis: Areopagos (683–4) and Orestes' tomb (763, 773). In general aetiological myth of cult implies its *permanent* foundation (not least so as to avoid future disater of the kind that caused the foundation). This permanence is made explicit also at S. *OC* 1033, 1518–19, 1765; E. *Med*. 1383, *Hipp*. 1428, *Hcld.* 1033, *HF* 1330, *IT* 1457. On the importance of 'forever' in various tragedies see Easterling (2004).

[93] Parker (1983) 39; Ekroth (2002) 263–5.

[94] Parker (1983) 42, 52, 122–3. Cf. Iles Johnston (1999) 139–19.

[95] Pl. *Rep*. 364b5–365a3; Iles Johnston (1999) 50–4.

[96] Seaford (1994a) 125–6, 184–5.

[97] Seaford (1994a) 123–39.

[98] Cf. Parker (1983) 373 on the purificatory power of sacrificial blood: 'The original source of power is the contact with blood, a repugnant, polluting substance, in a controlled ritual context that renders the threat tolerable.'

[99] E.g. S. *OC* 611–22; E. *Hek*. 536–7; Ekroth (2002) 265–7.

simply abolish the pollution (*Septem* 738–9), and so must be regularly repeated.

And so the fratricidal introversion, which transmits itself to the lamentation for the brothers and to the digging of their grave (9A), was perhaps evoked by the mixing of blood with earth in their cult. We find it even in Aeschylus' allusion to the tomb (*Septem* 1004): 'pain lying alongside (for) their father' (πῆμα πατρὶ πάρευνον). The phrase evokes our combined opposites of incest[100] and endophony. Similarly, the Sophoklean Antigone, who looks forward to lying with (and being dear to) her brother (72), has a bridal 'tomb' in which her cousin-bridegroom Haimon tries to kill his own father and commits hymenaial suicide.[101]

How is the polis to deal with such threats of pollution? In the metaphor of the funeral procession as ship (9A), the two destinations are antithetical. Delos, imagined as meaning 'clear',[102] is Apollo's island, and had been purified by Athenians of all its dead.[103] But Hades is 'the sunless invisible land, which *Paiōn* ["Healer",[104] i.e. Apollo] may not tread, all-receiving'. Death is excluded from Delos, Apollo from the underworld. In contrast to the threat of pollution from the multiple confusion of opposites perpetrated by the family, the chorus in performing death ritual simultaneously evoke a purifying god, an Athenian polis festival, and the ritual encapsulation of both geographic and cosmic space, in such a way as to evoke the *separation of cosmic opposites* (16C) effected by the Athenian festival.

Similarly, in *Antigone*, again in the context of endogamic endophony at Thebes, the choral invocation of Dionysos to come from afar to purify the whole polis evokes his control of the cosmic axis both at Thebes and in the Athenian festival of the Eleusinian mysteries (18E). But just as the pollution of the mutual fratricide is ageless, so the death of his kin makes Kreon say that he is destroyed by the 'hard-to-purify harbour of Hades' (S. *Ant.* 1284).

[100] The tomb is one of the forms of spatial enclosure that may symbolise the endogamy: Seaford (1990b). Cf. 18E(1).

[101] *Ant.* 1220–41.

[102] Pi. *fr.* 33c.4–6 Snell and Athen. 455D play on this meaning. See Tucker (1908) ad loc.

[103] Hdt. 1.64.2; cf. Thuc. 3.104.1; Parker (1996) 150–1. While the *theōris* is away from Athens, 'the polis is to be pure and nobody is to be killed by the state' (Pl., *Phaedo* 58b).

[104] If, as very likely, the MSS Ἀπόλλωνι is an intrusive gloss on Παιῶνι (Ahrens).

CHAPTER 10

Confrontational space in Oresteia

10A *AGAMEMNON*

Agamemnon is played before the royal house, in a space of confrontation between those who arrive from elsewhere (the chorus from the city, Agamemnon and Kassandra from Troy) and the royal mistress of the house who emerges from within. Despite the scepticism, anxiety and eventual opposition of the chorus, despite the imperiousness of Agamemnon and the foreknowledge of Kassandra, the space is dominated throughout by the queen.

The first words addressed to her concern her use of ritual to control space:

> You, daughter of Tyndareus, queen Klutaimestra, what is the need? What is new? What have you learnt, persuaded by what message are you sending around sacrifices? Ablaze with offerings are the altars of all the city-guiding gods, those on high, those beneath the earth, those of the doors[1] and of the meeting-place. And on all sides the torch sends its light up to heaven, medicined by the soft guileless coaxings of pure unguent, the royal oil from the inmost recess [of the house]'. (83–96)

The torchlight throughout the town stretches up to heaven (*ouranomēkēs*), and yet derives from the inmost recess of the royal house.

How does the queen know that this is the moment to exercise preemptive ritual control of urban and cosmic space? From her control of *geographic* space. *Lampas* (93), 'torch', seems inappropriate for a sacrifice, but has already occurred twice of the final beacon (8, 28) in the relay arranged by the queen to give her early warning of the fall of Troy. She describes it thus:

> Such are my laws of torch-bearers (*lampadēphorōn*), one filled from another in succession, and the winner is the one who ran first and last (νικᾶι δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών). (312–14)

[1] Reading τῶν τε θυραίων (Enger) for MS τῶν τ' οὐρανίων.

The Athenian torch-races (*lampadēphoriai* or *lampadēdromiai*) were won by the team whose final runner first lit fire on an altar.[2] In 312 *moi* ('for me', 'my') implies that the imagined ritual, and so the space, is under the control of the queen. Just as the destination of the *lampadēphoria* is the sacrifical altar, so her control of geographic space through the beacons merges into her control of immediate, urban and cosmic space through sacrificial offerings. The personal use of polis ritual may evoke tyranny (6A).

In sending news of his defeat at Salamis to Sousa Xerxes used the Persian relay of mounted messengers, which Herodotos compares to the Greek *lampadēphoria* (8.98). The Persian relay, designed to control the systematic space of a vast political unit, is evoked by Klutaimestra (282) in her description of her own relay (of beacons).[3] Here, as we shall see again, it is as if she is the queen of Persia.

The much discussed[4] third line (314) of our passage means that the winner is – as indeed was the case in Athens – the winning *team*, which includes the runners of the first and last legs.[5] Indeed the phrase used here for 'the one running first' (ὁ πρῶτος . . . δραμών) is used by Herodotos to describe the first leg of the Persian relay system and (by implication) of the Greek *lampadēphoria*.[6] But this metaphor, taken by itself, seems inappropriate and pointless: there is only one team of beacons, and so no 'victory'. Some scholars have accordingly rejected this interpretation of 314. But we should instead look for secondary meaning to give it point.

In 313 'filled' (*plēroumenoi*) is an oddly strong expression. The torch-bearers are filled presumably with the all-important fire that brings victory to the whole team. The structure of thought is like that of Herakleitos, for whom change in the cosmos is a process of the transformation of opposites into each other, through which fire persists as the single underlying substance (3A). Similarly, it is fire that persists throughout the relay, and 'fills' each runner so that there is no difference between the opposites of first and last. I do not mean that Aeschylus was influenced by Herakleitos. Nor is it especially significant that the underlying substance is common to both (fire). But I insist on the structural similarity with the Herakleitean notion of a single substance persisting through a process of transformation

[2] Schol. Patm. Dem. 57.43; cf. Herm. *in Phdr.* 231e; Parker (2005) 257 with n. 22, 472.

[3] She uses the word ἄγγαρος (282), Herodotos ἀγγαρήιον.

[4] To the report of various views in Fraenkel's commentary add Kaimio (1985) and Judet de la Combe (2001) ad loc.

[5] For the syntax cf. 324.

[6] The fact that he writes ὁ πρῶτος δραμών of a team of *horsemen* suggests (even though δραμών might be metaphorical) that it was already in his mind as the term used of the *lampadēphoria*.

in which opposites are unified. We will see in Part IV that the danger of the (Herakleitean) unity of opposites pervades the play.

In 314 'first' and 'last' surely form an opposition. However, the runners of the first and last legs are not in opposition but two members of the same team. And indeed the words 'victory goes to the first . . . runner' suggest the first to *finish*, and that is what πρῶτος δραμών normally meant.[7] The first runner to finish (the victor) is the last of the team to run.[8] But the paradox acquires substance, and interest in the context, only if 'last' also connotes the opposite of first meaning 'victor', i.e. only if it connotes *finishing* last (i.e. losing). This is surely the riddling, secondary meaning implied here. The *formulation* of the innocent but irrelevant idea of the whole team winning implies (by virtue of 'first' and 'last' being taken as opposites) the sinister paradox that defeat is somehow the same as victory. The paradox resembles such Herakleitean paradoxes as 'the way up and down is one and the same', and 'immortals are mortal and mortals immortal'.[9] The victory transmitted by the fire is both Agamemnon's over Troy and Klutaimestra's over Agamemnon (1378),[10] who is therefore both winner and loser. The seemliness of the victor being defeated is even made explicit by a charming Klutaimestra (941). His desire 'let victory, since it attended me, remain fixed' (854) is precisely what cannot be fulfilled.

There can be no more effective brief account of the *continuity* of a long (geographic) distance than the beacon speech, for the kindling of one beacon quickly causes the kindling of the next. In this respect the conception of space is the opposite of the Homeric (IA). And the lampadephoric image, with its insistence on the persistence of the victory-bringing fire throughout the different (even opposite) stages of the relay, implies the *homogeneity* of the space. As in Herakleitos, the homogeneous continuity of space combines with the unity of opposites. Klutaimestra achieves the combination by imagining geographic space as the immediate space of ritual.

Her domination of ritualised space in *Agamemnon* encounters some contestation. The chorus' questioning description of her offerings (83–96) is preceded by their general statement of the ineffectiveness of offerings, and followed by scepticism about the news of victory.[11] And the watchman and chorus each produce their own ritualisation of space.

[7] Despite Hdt. 8.98; cf. e.g. Thuc. 4.111.2; Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.11; Eupolis *fr.* 129; Pi. *Ol.* 6.75; Schol. Patm. Dem. 57.43 ὁ πρῶτος ἅψας ἐνίκα καὶ ἡ τούτου φυλή (on the *lampadēphoria*).

[8] So Foucart (1899) 112ff.

[9] Hklt. B60, 62.

[10] Where victory should not be emended away: Thomson (1966) ad loc; cf. Judet de la Combe (2001) ad loc.

[11] 69–71, 272–6, 477–87.

The watchman rejoices at the beacon with words that evoke the light in the darkness in mystic initiation, an evocation that will reappear, along with its spatial implications, later in the trilogy.[12] The chorus describe the sacrifice of Iphgeneia in terms that suggest a wedding, including '*proteleia* (preliminary sacrifice)[13] of ships' (227). The ships here are those whose journey to Troy was enabled by the sacrifice, but the phrase also evokes the hymenaial image of the bridal journey to her new home as a *sea*-voyage – an image frequently evoked in tragedy, for instance later in *Agamemnon* to describe the departure of Helen for Troy[14] as well as in *Suppliants* (8A). The voyage to Troy is by implication ritualised, as a bridal journey, as is also the *return* from Troy of Agamemnon with Kassandra by sea.[15] Ritual space is imaginatively extended to encapsulate the geographic space between Troy and Greece, and the journey of a whole army is imagined as a ritual that interrelates *households*.

Indeed the perversion of sacrifice and of wedding that launches the outward journey of Agamemnon reappears to reincorporate him on his return. But the controlling person is, again, Klutaimestra, who has prepared the welcoming sacrifice within the house, in which Agamemnon and Kassandra will be victims.[16] And the wedding is evoked by a whole series of similarities between the position of Kassandra and that of the bride.[17] They include the comparison of Kassandra to a captured wild animal (1063), of her own words to 'a newly married bride' (1179), and the visual configuration: in vase-paintings of the wedding procession the bridegroom and bride are often shown in a chariot, being welcomed by another woman (in vase-paintings the groom's mother), in front of a house.[18] But in *Agamemnon* the woman who welcomes (and controls) is the wife. The word for the vehicle in which Agamemnon and Kassandra arrive (*apēnē*) is used elsewhere of the vehicle that carries the bride.[19] The completeness of the

[12] Esp. at *Ag.* 552, *Cho.* 808–11, 961–4; Thomson (1966) I 42, II 12–13, 32, 49, 86, 153–5, 169–71, 178–80, 182; Seaford (1994a) 373–4. Important new confirmation (inter alia from *Ion* 1074–86) is provided by Widzisz (2010). The light in the darkness is preceded by the watchman's individual fear and sleepless lamentation, and followed by *choroi* in Argos (*Ag.* 12–24). Aeschylus was said by Aristotle and others to have profaned the Eleusinian mysteries in his dramas: *TGrF* 3 T93 (p. 63). See also Ar., *Frogs* 886–7. According to Athenaios (21d), probably using Chamaileon, the solemn theatrical dress introduced by Aeschylus was adopted by the priests of the Eleusinian mysteries: if the influence was in fact the other way, it escapes the objections made by Pickard-Cambridge (1968) 200–1. And cf. Chapter 10 n. 34.

[13] *Proteleia* occurs of the sacrifice preliminary to the *wedding*.

[14] 690–1; cf. 1179–80.

[15] Seaford (1987) 124, 127–8.

[16] 1056–7, 1128, 1277, 1298, 1035–8, 1310, 1433.

[17] Seaford (1987) 127–8.

[18] Oakley and Sinos (1993), esp. 30.

[19] 906, 1039; cf. e.g. Hes. *Scutum* 273. The bride has a seat (Hsch. s.v. κλίνη; Pollux 10.33), as does Kassandra (*Ag.* 1056).

queen's control of ritual is manifest also in her use of death ritual (praise, bath and shroud) to kill her husband.[20]

To conclude, the return of Agamemnon is preceded by a kind of *lampadēphoria* and – like the festal returns of Dionysos to Athens – followed by wedding and sacrifice. These rituals seem to encapsulate geographic space in immediate space, but – being controlled by the queen from within the royal household – are perverted into instruments of its self-destruction. Moreover, in killing her husband the queen reasserts her ritualised control of the cosmic axis. She describes her third blow as the third libation at the banquet for Zeus beneath the earth (1385–7). The libation here must suggest the flow of blood, which she then compares – as giving her erotic pleasure – to the fertilising rain that comes from Zeus above (1390–2). We will return more than once to this remarkable passage.

10B *CHOEPHOROI*

In *Agamemnon* the chorus are – as in almost all extant tragedies[21] – in a sense marginal: they are weak old men, left behind by the Trojan expedition (72–5), who fail – despite raising the possibility (1350–1) – to enter the house to prevent the murder of Agamemnon. As for the female chorus of *Choephoroi*, Garvie ((1986) 53) writes that 'since the chorus will later appear as conventional representatives of Argos . . . it is odd that Aeschylus should here stress their status as prisoners-of-war (75–7)'.

The oddity manifests, as often, the stereotype. Like the escort of Dionysos from Asia, the chorus are both outsiders and insiders. They perform 'Arian and Kissian' lamentation (423–4), and perhaps wore Asian dress, but belong to the royal household and seem to embody the polis. Though outsiders, they lament at the tomb of Agamemnon (Asian women were hired by the Athenians to lament their dead).[22] Similarly their fellow lamenter Orestes has – like Dionysos in *Bacchae* – arrived from a remote distance to establish himself by force in the house of his birth.

The ambivalence between inside and outside also has a politico-spatial dimension. The tomb of Agamemnon was just outside the royal house, i.e. in a space that is ambivalent between private (royal) and public.[23] Similarly, in the opening of *Bacchae* Dionysos and his Asian escort take up position just outside the royal house, and Dionysos points out the tomb of

[20] Seaford (1984b).
[21] Cf 6A. The only choruses of males who are not old in extant tragedy are the military ones far from home in S. *Phil.* and *Aj.*, and [E.] *Rhes.*
[22] Pl., *Laws* 800e; cf. *Ag.* 979, *Cho.* 733.
[23] Here (and in 10C and 12A) I reject the idea that the scene 'refocuses' (Taplin 1977: 338–9).

his mother 'near the house', just as Orestes in the opening of *Choephoroi* points out the tomb of his father.[24]

From Agamemnon's funeral Klutaimestra excluded the chorus of Argives, reserving it for his murderers, 'not with weepings from out of the house (ἐξ οἴκων)' (*Ag.* 1548–54). The *ekphora* (carrying out of the corpse) was 'without citizens', 'without mourning', and with Elektra lamenting but confined to an inmost recess of the house.[25] These anomalies imply familial introversion.[26]

The funeral procession from house to cemetery (a key element in the socialisation of death) implies a distance between the two. The lack of such distance here reinforces the sense of familial introversion. There was a belief of the Athenians that they used to bury their dead in their houses.[27] But at some point they banned even intra-mural burial, perhaps – archaeology suggests – from about 500.[28] A motive for the ban may have been – like other measures restricting death ritual – to reduce the danger of death ritual as a focus for divisive clan loyalties, in particular for the emotions required for avenging murder.[29]

At the end of the great lament by which these emotions are created Elektra promises 'from the paternal house' wedding libations 'of my inheritance' for her father, adding that 'I honour this tomb first of all' (*Cho.* 488). This synthesis of marriage ritual with the privileging of kin in death ritual suggests reproductive introversion, just as it does in Sophokles' *Antigone*.[30] Compare also the Sophoklean Elektra:

> I am wasting away without children, with no husband standing over me, but like an unworthy alien (*epoikos*) I manage (*oikonomō*) the *thalamous* of my father. (*El.* 187–90)

Thalamos can mean 'store-room' or 'bridal chamber'. The former gives point to *oikonomō*, implying the duty of a wife, who has come from outside the household (*epoikos*). But if we add its bridal connotation, it suggests the economics of familial introversion, just as it does in *Antigone* and *OT* (18E). The contrasting *communality* of premarital offerings is eventually established in the sacrifices promised for the Erinues in Athens (*Eum.* 835).

[24] Cf. the tomb central to *Niobe* (and other plays of Aeschylus, to judge from his *bios*: *TGrF* 3 T1.14).
[25] *Cho.* 431–2, 446.
[26] Tragic enclosure of daughter in tragedy as symbol of familial introversion: Seaford (1990b).
[27] [Pl.], *Minos* 315d.
[28] Cic. *Ad fam.* 4.12.3. Intra-mural burials do occur after 500, but mostly of children: Kurtz and Boardman (1970) 70; see further Seaford (1994a) 117–8; more recent bibl. in Oakley (2004) 252 n. 17.
[29] Seaford (1994a) Chs. 3 and 4.
[30] Seaford (1990b).

But the spatial introversion is contested. Orestes intends to make good – to the extent possible – his absence from his father's death rituals, including the *ekphora* (*Cho*. 4–9). The parodos then begins with the lamenting chorus proclaiming themselves to be carrying libations for Agamemnon *in a procession from out of the house*: the reference to the procession uses almost the same word as is used for the funerary choral escort of Xerxes in *Persians* and of the dead fratricides in *Septem*.[31] When the chorus subsequently refer in the past tense to their lamentation and self-beating (423–8), Garvie (1986) correctly comments that they 'may be felt to be *re-enacting* their original mourning, both here and in the parodos'. The tomb had been established – in a space ambivalent between public and private – in the course of the exclusive funeral enacted by the queen, who subsequently, in *Choephoroi*, sent libations to gain access to the dead king. But the libations are appropriated by the outsiders who embody the polis (the chorus), together with Elektra and the outsider Orestes.

The significance of this appropriation must be emphasised and carefully articulated. The fixed place of the tomb embodies both the temporal continuity of the household[32] and access through ritual to the cosmic axis. Like Dionysos, Orestes returns from afar to establish himself at his place of birth by controlling cosmic space though ritual at his parental tomb. In *Bacchae* this involves the self-destruction of the royal family and the establishment of public cult. Comparably, the death ritual in *Choephoroi*, in the ambivalent space occupied by the tomb, is both preparation for the matricide and (in a sense) the public death ritual prevented by Klutaimestra.

True, this barely compares with the physical destruction in *Bacchae* of the house by Dionysos as the thunderbolt is reactivated at his tomb in the scene that evokes numerous features of mystic initiation. What does resemble this scene is the song that accompanies the matricide itself. The chorus proclaim that Justice has finally come to the royal house of Troy, that Orestes and Pylades have come to the house of Agamemnon, that Orestes has driven all the way, that punishment has come, that Justice is finally coming.[33] It is an arrival from the outside that will transform the house. This emphasis is combined with a configuration of

[31] *Cho*. 23 προπομπὸς M; Lobel suggested προπομποῦσ'; I propose προπέμπουσ', for προπομπέω is very rare, and the omission of the υ would have caused the non-existent προπεμπος to be changed to προπομπός. Cf. funerary προπέμπειν in Aeschylus at *Sept*. 916 (9A), *Pers*. 622 (12C), etc. (Chapter 9 n. 28).

[32] See the dossier in Lacey (1968) 148–9, 298–9.

[33] *Cho*. 935–57 ἔμολε . . . ἔμολε . . . ἔλασε [a very probable conjecture] δ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν . . . ἔμολε . . . ἐποίχεται.

themes that undoubtedly derives from, and evokes, mystic initiation at Eleusis:[34]

> Cry out in triumph at the escape of our masters' house from sufferings and from the wasting of its wealth by two polluters, from being on a hard path (942–5)
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The light is there to see, and the great curb (*psalion*, part of bridle) has been removed from the house. Rise up, house. For too much time you have been lying on the ground. Soon παντελὴς χρόνος [or πρόμος][35] will pass out of the threshold of the house, when all the pollution has been driven from the hearth . . . .' (961–7)

The underlinings mark the points of correspondence with mystic initiation.[36] The most detailed account of Eleusinian initiation[37] contains most of them:[38] the initiand undergoes sufferings that include anxious wandering and being trampled on the ground, but on the appearance of a great light in the darkness he enters a state of being *aphetos* ('released', used especially of the freeing of animals),[39] pure, and *pantelēs*, which – besides meaning 'all-completing' (active) – can refer to the Eleusinian initiate as 'fully initiated' (passive).[40]

This evocation of ritual has an important spatial dimension. At the end of the song, or with the announcement of the light (963), Orestes emerges from the house. The corpses of Klutaimestra and Aigisthos also become visible, along with the cloth by which Agamemnon had been trapped. Plutarch (*Mor*. 81e) speaks of the initiands seeing the great light 'when the *anaktora* are opened'. This refers to the opening of the small rectangular

[34] See n. 12 above. Garvie (1986) 304 comments that 'though the parallels are undeniable it seems unnecessary to interpret the ode in mystic terms. The language is fully explicable in the dramatic context of the play itself.' But because Eleusinian mystic initiation was a significant and emotional experience undergone by most Athenians (2f), we cannot ignore the 'undeniable parallels'. Explicability 'in the dramatic context' makes the evocation all the more powerful. Mystic imagery in Sophokles' version: Seaford (1994b).

[35] The transmitted χρόνος means 'time', πρόμος (Lafontaine, followed by West) means 'leader' (i.e. Orestes). If time can sleep with someone (*Ag*. 894) and grow old with what it purifies (*Eum*. 286), then it can perhaps be imagined as emerging from the door. Cf. Widzisz (2012). Παντελής would then mean the perfect completion effected by the initiatory transformation: the bad time (the house on the ground 'for too much time') is transformed into time that is all-completing and (accordingly) complete because – like the initiated state – irreversible. But the personification of time may seem too concrete (a problem slightly diminished by reading passive ἐλαθῆι (Page) in 967). With πρόμος the sense of initiatory completion in παντελής would merge with that of authority over the house.

[36] See Thomson (1966) on *Cho*. 935–71; Seaford (1994a) 373–4.

[37] Plut. *fr*. 178, cited in 2a and 2e.

[38] As also numerous features of our mystic passage of *Bacchae*.

[39] Cf. the removal of the curb in Aeschylus. Mystic liberation might be envisaged as liberation (and the mystic initiand as an animal).

[40] Plut. *fr*. 178.

enclosure, containing the throne of the hierophant, within the Eleusinian *telestērion*. The association of this enclosure with royalty persisted into the time of Aeschylus (4F2).

The *anaktoron* was opened while the initiates were in the *telestērion*, which (at least from the time of Peisistratos) contained tiers of nine steps, for standing or sitting, around three of its walls for viewing (as in a theatre).[41] Mystery-cult involved choruses[42] and spectacle (*thea*),[43] and was in some respects theatrical.[44] Clement of Alexandria, who had probably been initiated into the pagan mysteries, associated mystic revelation in a metaphor with the theatrical *ekkuklēma*.[45] The corpses of Klutaimestra and Aigisthos may well have emerged on the *ekkuklēma*.[46]

The chorus' announcement of the appearance of the light, as one of a series of mystic images, accompanied by the opening of the doors of the royal house, would surely have evoked for the audience, very many of whom would have been initiated, the memory of the high point of their initiation.[47] In the Eleusinian *aition*, after Demeter gives instructions for the people to build her a temple, 'the house was filled with brightness as of lightning, and she *went out from the palace*' (*Dem*. 280–1, my emphasis). Just as this verse marks the politically charged emergence from royal house to public space (2A), so too here in *Choephoroi* the imagined light-filled mystic opening out may seem to mark a political transition, a 'liberation of the whole polis' (1046), the completion of the movement from domestic to public space begun earlier with the death ritual.[48] Further, the hierophant brought out from the *anaktoron* the secret sacred objects (ἄρρητα ἱερά),[49] and this may have coloured the extraordinary attention given to the cloth in the scene that follows our song.

In the scene of mystic initiation in *Bacchae* the royal house is, as here in *Choephoroi*, personified. It is put into a Dionysiac frenzy and falls to

[41] Mylonas (1961) 88. See my cover illustration.

[42] E.g. Plut. *fr*. 178; Ar. *Frogs* 336, 370; Lucian, *Salt*. 15. Kowalzig (2007b) relates the initiatory character of Dionysiac choruses to tragedy. For the choral theatricality of the Samothracian mysteries see Kowalzig (2005) 62–3.

[43] E.g. Pl. *Phdr*. 250b, *Symp*. 210e.

[44] Seaford (1994a) 269–70 (esp. n. 154), to which add Dio Chrys. *Or*. 36.35 (tragedy as mystic revelation for the masses). On epigraphically prescribed dressing up as goddesses in the mysteries at Andania see Sokolowski (1969) no. 65.24–5; on the impersonation of the goddesses at Eleusis see Clinton (1992) 85–90, (2004).

[45] *Protr*. II (11P).

[46] As the scholiast on the passage supposes. Taplin (1977) 357 regards it as more likely that they were carried out perhaps by attendants; but cf. Wiles (1997) 162–3.

[47] Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 247–9 suggests that the Eleusinian *anaktoron* operated as a model for the use of the *skēnē* by Aeschylus, but without referring to this song.

[48] Cf. 973, *Ag*. 1355, 1365, 1633.

[49] Mylonas (1961) 84–5; Clinton (1974) 46–7; Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 263 n. 180.

the ground, and so does the thiasos (5a). Dionysos then emerges from imprisonment in the house, and tells the thiasos to rise from lying on the ground.[50] This expresses – more clearly than in the Eleusinian ritual and its evocation in *Choephoroi* – the victory of public space over royal domestic space.

The polluting horror of matricide is expressed as the mystic transition to purity and permanent joy. And there is another contradiction. Whereas the mystic epiphany in *Bacchae* destroys the royal house to create polis cult, in *Choephoroi* the royal house is to be *restored*, and so is imagined as the successful initiate – escaped from suffering, freed, purified, and told to rise from lying on the ground. To the extent that the mystic allusions nevertheless imply public transcendence of domestic space, there is a contradiction. But the contradiction cannot yet be resolved. As earlier in the trilogy, mystic joy (e.g. the watchman's) is short-lived. Ritual completion is – as so often – deferred. The permanent joyful transition to public cult in public space will occur only at the end of the trilogy, in another polis.

10c *Eumenides*

In *Agamemnon* the Erinues were envisaged as a drunken *kōmos* (band of revellers) that has entered a house and will not leave (1186–93). Early in *Eumenides* the Delphic priestess is horrified to find them inside Apollo's temple, besetting the suppliant Orestes at the *omphalos*. Orestes then moves from Delphi to Athens, where he supplicates the 'ancient image' (80) of Athena, but is still beset by the chorus of Erinues. Athena comes as arbitrator from afar (the Troad), as did Dionysos *Aisumnētēs* ('Arbitrator') in Patrai (2e) and the Scythian arbitrator (iron) in *Septem* (9a).

Orestes says to Athena, 'I come to your house and image' (*Eum.* 242), which may suggest her image inside her temple, and commentators agree that the scene is set inside the temple of Athena Polias on the Acropolis.[51]

Taplin thinks to solve the problem of the subsequent shift to the trial scene, 'on the Areopagus and in the open air', as follows: 'if it is accepted that in Aeschylus the scene could refocus without having overtly changed at any particular moment . . . , then the difficulty dissolves. It is impossible to pin down a particular point where the scene refocuses.'[52] But in what sense are Orestes and the Erinues 'inside' the temple of Athena? At Delphi Aeschylus chose to put them *explicitly* inside the temple, which was thereby polluted,[53]

[50] On mystic rising from the ground see Dem. 18.259, and Seaford (1996) 200 (ad *Ba.* 606–9).
[51] E.g. Sommerstein (1989) 97, 123; Taplin (1972) 68. [52] Taplin (1977) 391.
[53] 63, 164–7, 170, 195, 282.

but chose not to do so at Athens. Moreover almost all scenes of Greek tragedy occur uncontroversially under the sky. For Taplin[54] the audience of the early theatre 'would imagine, if asked, that the scene being played before them in the open air was in fact set indoors'. However, imagining that an external place is in fact internal was probably less familiar to Aeschylus' audience than it is to us, and yet in none of the (extant and fragmentary) plays cited by Taplin[55] is there any sign of Aeschylus either 'asking' them to do so[56] or indicating when 'refocusing' occurs. For instance, it would have been easy to say that the image of Athena, or Orestes, is in the temple, but nobody says it. The interior of house or temple is sometimes described or indicated in tragedy, but never in order to make us imagine that we are inside. I reject the hypothesis of a 'refocusing' also in *Choephoroi* (10B) and *Persians* (12A).

We may nevertheless want to infer that Athena's image in this scene is inside her temple. But whether or not the inference was made by the original audience, interiority is absent from both the words and the *political significance* of the scene. 'Your house and image' referred to by Orestes (242) are both in civic space, as is the image seen by the audience – under the sky – in the sanctuary of Dionysos. In this respect Orestes' supplication of the image contrasts *politically*[57] with the Homeric supplication within the house of the king, with the Danaids' supplication outside the city (8A), and with Orestes' own supplication at Delphi within the god's house. 'Your house and image' evokes traditional supplication but puts him – crucially for the plot – in civic space. Perhaps the *skēnē*, which at Delphi represented the temple of Apollo, now represents the temple of Athena.

Two other spatial inconsistencies have the same kind of explanation. Firstly, the scene is set at Athena's image but also on the Areopagos (685), which were in fact some distance apart. But the necessity and importance of Athena's devolution of authority to the Areopagos are expressed in its belonging to the same civic space as her image. In *Suppliants* (8A) and *Septem* (9A) the identity of the state constituted by the place of supplication is ambivalent, and there is tension between the supplicated mortal ruler and the community, whereas Athenian space in *Eumenides* is unambiguously that of a polis, empowered by Athena.

[54] Taplin (1972) 67–9, (1977) 45 n. 2. His argument complements his view that there was no *skēnē* building before *Oresteia*. But see my Appendix.

[55] *Persians*, *Eumenides Phrygians*, *Myrmidons*; Phrynichos, *Phoenicians*.

[56] The only such possibility offered by Taplin is *Pers.* 140 ἐνεζόμενοι (as meaning sitting 'in' not 'on'). But cf. 12A.

[57] 1C, 4B, 8A.

Secondly, the cave-cult promised to the Erinues was in fact close to the Areopagos, but is described by Athena as (855) 'by (*pros*) the house of Erechtheus' (on the Acropolis), which expresses the honour offered to the Erinues by the central position of their cult. Space is constructed ideologically.

Eumenides contains much emphasis on the extent of the wanderings of Orestes over land and sea before he arrives at Athens.[58] Taplin writes that 'the explicit lapse of time is unique in surviving tragedy', and that he has not seen it 'fully explained'.[59] Even if these wanderings belonged to the mythical tradition, Aeschylus did not have to emphasise or even mention them. A motive for doing so is – I suggest – their contrastive enhancement of the specificity, necessity and fixity of Orestes' destination. We noted this effect of the wanderings of deities to the place of what will be permanent cult sites in the Homeric Hymns,[60] as well as in *Bacchae*. In the *Demeter Hymn* journeys from the remote distance end in the permanent establishment of cult providing access to the cosmic axis. The Thesmophoria, which provided access to the cosmic axis, may have been established at the end of the Danaid trilogy, and would have provided a fitting end to the journey of the Danaids from Egypt (17C). And so too in *Eumenides* the Erinues have come from the lowest depth (Tartarus) of the underworld, to which they wish to take Orestes, and pursue him over the whole earth and over the sea in wingless flights.[61] Their cruelties are from beyond Greece.[62] At Athens they are finally incorporated, with a processional departure, into a place under the earth,[63] where as *metoikoi*, 'metics' (like the Danaids at Argos),[64] they will receive cult and exercise power in all three cosmic spheres – along with the gods above and the gods below (950–2). After their horrible penetration of interiors at Argos and Delphi, it is only by being established in the interior of the earth as recipients of cult in *civic* space that they become a means for controlling the cosmic axis for all time (836, 1031). Nor must we forget that their polluted victim Orestes swears Athens eternal good will, which his corpse will exercise from beneath the earth (*Eum.* 762–74).

[58] 75–9, 235–41, 248–51, 276–85, 451–2.
[59] Taplin (1977) 379–80.
[60] *Dem.*, *Pyth Ap.*, *Delian Ap.*; 2A.
[61] 72, 386, 395–6, 417; 267, 339; 249–50.
[62] 185–90. Most of them 'were (believed to be) practised by the Persians, and unknown or very rare among the Greeks': Sommerstein (1989) 114.
[63] 805, 1023, 1036.
[64] *Eum.* 1011, 1018; Danaids: *Su.* 609, 994; 8C; for this aspect of *Suppliants*, and its relation to Athens, see Bakewell (1997).

CHAPTER II

The unlimited in Oresteia

IIA *AGAMEMNON*: THE DEFERRAL OF RITUAL *TELOS*

The chorus of *Agamemnon* enter singing of the departure ten years ago of the Greeks for Troy, where the fighting is called *proteleia* (65) – a preliminary sacrifice, i.e. before (*pro*) the completion (*telos*). The chorus proceed:

> The matter is where it now is. It will be completed (*teleitai*) to its destined end. Neither by burning sacrifices nor by pourng libations nor < . . . > fireless offerings will one soothe aside the relentless angers. (67–71)

Despite the manuscript corruption, this clearly means that the full range of ritual offerings will not influence the completion, which is determined by divine anger. The word *proteleia* suits the ineffectiveness of ritual, because it refers to a ritual and yet implies that completion (*telos*) lies beyond its operation. The *telos* in *pro-teleia* is picked up by *teleitai*: completion will come in the way destined, not through ritual. This is the first explicit mention of ritual in the trilogy, and the emphasis on its ineffectiveness is programmatic. Next (83–96) the chorus describe the queen's control of urban and cosmic space through offerings blazing on the altars of the gods (10A). The implication is that these rituals will not be able to impose *telos* on events.

The chorus then narrate the events of ten years ago at Aulis. The Atreidai were 'sent' (111) to Troy by the eagles' 'sacrifice' (137) of a pregnant hare, which signifies the fall of Troy (126–30) but causes Artemis to *prevent* the journey there until she is appeased by 'the other sacrifice' of Iphigeneia (151), which as '*proteleia* of the ships' is imagined as a bridal journey (10A), to a war 'for a woman of many men . . . the spearshaft snapped in the *proteleia*' (62–6). But victory will not impose completion (*telos*) on events, for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is 'a maker of conflicts' (153), and the consequent violence in the trilogy – against Agamemnon, Kassandra, Klutaimestra

and Orestes – is all described in terms of animal sacrifice.[1] The sense of a concatenation of reciprocal sacrifices, of one abnormal sacrifice containing the necessity of the next, is expressed in Kassandra's fantasy that the ritual cry (*ololugē*) over the 'sacrifice' of Agamemnon is performed by 'insatiable *stasis* (internal conflict) of the clan'.[2] Similarly, the three libations at the banquet are a ritual feature that is associated with the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and then used to express the sequence of acts of violent revenge.[3]

The wedding too generally constitutes a positive completion (*telos*, *teleuta*),[4] but the chorus describe the disastrous arrival of Helen at Troy as a bridal journey that results in 'bitter completions (*teleutai*) of the wedding' (745). Then the wish uttered at the wedding for offspring resembling parents is transformed (like the three libations) to express the perpetuation of disaster: impious actions beget offspring like themselves (14B). Moments later a chariot arrives containing Agamemnon and Kassandra for an entry that contains verbal and visual evocations of the wedding (10A) and culminates in the display of their corpses lying together like lovers (1446).

The third household ritual that accompanies the murder of Agamemnon is the funeral. To bathe the body and wrap it in a garment normally expresses the loving intimacy of a wife for her dead husband, but is performed by Klutaimestra to encompass his murder (10A). This, together with the dishonourable and griefless treatment of his corpse, cannot produce the completion normally created by death ritual: Klutaimestra will in *Choephoroi* aim to appease him by sending libations, which are in the event poured by Elektra to enlist his support for revenge (129–57).

This concatenation of ritual acts of intrafamilial conflict, which extends throughout most of *Oresteia*, is initiated by Artemis' demand that Agamemnon sacrifice his daughter. Central to the meaning here is not – as generally assumed – her (seemingly irrational) motive, but rather the manifestation of a structure of opposed extremes, which can be motivated only by inscrutable divine demand. What Artemis demands is not 'another' sacrifice (as the translations all have it), but '*the* other' sacrifice: *heteran* implies *complementarity*. The eagles devouring the pregnant hare embody the natural savagery of warfare in such a way as to combine extreme

[1] *Ag.* 1037–8, 1117–18, 1503–4, *Eum.* 102, 304–5, 327–8. The motif of the corrupted sacrifice is described, from a different perspective, by Zeitlin (1965).
[2] *Ag.* 1117–18. Moreover, the intrafamilial violence also threatens exclusion from sacrifice (*Cho.* 291–4, *Eum.* 655–6) as well as its non-performance (*Cho.* 261; cf. 483–7).
[3] 17B; *Ag.* 246–7 (and Thomson (1966) ad loc.), 1385–7; *Cho.* 578, 1072–3. Cf. *fr.*55; Burian (1986).
[4] *Od.* 1.249, 20.74, 16.126; *Su.* 1051; Pi. *Pyth.* 9.66; S. *Ant.* 1241; Poll. 3.38; LSJ s.v. τέλειος 2b.

distance (one species hunts another) with extreme closeness (the hare contains her offspring). This 'sacrifice' is *complemented* by 'the other' (intrafamilial) sacrifice because they are at opposite extremes: in the wild there is extreme distance between killer and victim (different species), but within the family extreme closeness. Between these opposed extremes are warfare (uncontrolled slaughter visited on the same species) and animal sacrifice (controlled slaughter of a different species – but domesticated, i.e. within the household).[5]

It is as if one extreme requires, in the human imagination, the compensation provided by its opposite extreme. This mysterious requirement is a manifestation of the principle of the unity or combination of opposites by which the cosmos of *Agamemnon* is structured. It is also manifest even within each of the 'sacrifices', for in both of them extreme distance (violence) combines with extreme closeness.[6] We will explore this further in 13c.

But this structure is, by itself, not enough to explain Artemis' demand. It interpenetrates with another structure that is central to tragedy, namely the irruption of the public sphere into the royal household, resulting in its self-destruction. A differently configured interpenetration of these same two structures occurs in *Bacchae*, for instance, in which the irruption of Dionysos into the royal household produces the hunting and sacrifice by a mother of her own child whom she takes to be a wild animal.

In *Agamemnon* the public sphere (warfare) and the household are envisaged as opposites, both headed by the king and impossible to keep entirely apart. They are then further integrated by the description of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia as '*proteleia* of the ships': the Trojan expedition is imagined in terms of the wedding, a ritual that constitutes the household; and conversely the ritually expressed relations within the household are permeated by uncontrollable violence that has no *telos*.

11b *TELOS* AND THE UNLIMITED

Despite the subversion and perversion of ritual, the homecoming of Agamemnon is full of the vain desire for good completion (*telos*). He is conscious that the good ending (806 *eu telesasin*) of the Trojan expedition may not last, for one should call nobody blessed until he ends (*teleutēsanta*)

[5] More detail in Seaford (1989a).

[6] These opposites are enigmatically united even in a single word, αὐτοτόκον (136), which means 'with her offspring' (of the pregnant hare) but also 'his own offspring' (alluding to Iphigeneia): see further 13c.

his life in well-being (928–9). Klutaimestra then persuades him to walk on a textile (bought with the unlimited wealth of the house: 949, 958–62). When he demurs, and she asks him whether he would do it for the gods, he replies that he would, 'if an expert were to prescribe this *telos*' (934). As he walks on the textile into the house, Klutaimestra appeals to Zeus *Teleios* to fulfil (*telei*) her prayers (973).

While Klutaimentra perverts the ritual washing and wrapping of the body (IIA), the clairvoyant Kassandra proclaims from outside the house:

> Ah wretch, for will you complete (*teleis*) this? Having cleaned in the bath the partner of your bed – how shall I tell the completion (*telos*)? (1107–9)

The sense of completion in *telein* and *telos* is given point by the ritual nature of the act. But the act will not bring completion.[7] Instead, Kassandra says in her next utterance:

> let *stasis* (internal conflict) insatiable (*akoretos*) for the clan raise the *ololugē* (ritual cry) over the sacrifice to be avenged by stoning'. (1117–18)

Klutaimestra, on the other hand, maintains the hope for *telos* that she expressed as her husband entered the house. When the chorus tell her that she must pay (*tinein*) for the blow by suffering a blow herself (1429–30), she replies with an oath by

> Justice *Teleios* of my child, and Ate and Erinus, to whom [i.e. all three] I sacrificed him. (1432)

Her implication is that Justice has (as *teleios*) brought the matter to completion, contrary to the chorus' prediction of the need for further violent payment. Sacrifice is a gift or even a payment to the gods,[8] and Klutaimestra vainly desires that her sacrifice of Agamemnon has brought completion, closure. Similarly, she claims that the old *alastōr* (avenging demon) of Atreus

> paid this man (Agamemnon) full-grown (*teleon*) as an additional sacrifice to the young (τόνδ' ἀπέτεισεν τέλεον νεαροῖς ἐπιθύσας). (1503–4)

The young here are the children of Thyestes, butchered by Agamemnon's father Atreus. *Teleos* means complete or perfect, and so can mean full-grown of a sacrificial victim, as (in juxtaposition to *nearois*) it clearly does so here.[9] But in this context of payment it also implies its sense of *completion*.

[7] There may be a similar twist in τελέαν at 1459–60.
[8] So Pl. *Euthyphr.* 14c–e.
[9] Burkert (1985) 445 n. 21.

Klutaimestra's desire for completion will not be fulfilled. We are left rather with the 'insatiable' reciprocal violence sensed by Kassandra. With the dishonourable funeral of Agamemnon and the mutilation of his body Klutaimestra attempted to make the life (*aiōn*) of Orestes unbearable (*Cho.* 429–42): the word *aiōn*, which means a *whole* lifetime, establishes that the pain for Orestes will not end, until – it is implied by the context – there is revenge or the restoration of ritual normality (by making good his absence from his father's funeral).[10] *Telein*, *teleutan* and *pantelēs*, expressing the unfulfilled desire for closure, are frequently used for the revenge before and as it occurs.[11] However, before long Orestes does not know 'how it will be completed (*telei*)'. In the final lines (1065–76) the storm against the royal house has 'been brought to completion (*etelesthē*)', and yet 'where will there be fulfilment (*kranei*), where will the power of disaster be lulled to rest and cease?'

What exactly is it that is incomplete or unlimited? Most obviously, there is no prospect of an end to the reciprocal violence: there is no apparent *temporal* limit. And because one act of violence requires another, there is incompleteness of *action*. Unlimitedness of *space* is less obvious, but in this respect too there is subversion of ritual. With her sacrifices Klutaimestra seeks to control urban and cosmic space (10A). But in the end her attempts to appease by libations the lasting anger that comes from beneath the earth (*Cho.* 40, etc.) is turned against her. Subsequently the Erinues pursue Orestes – despite his purification and supplication – continuously (*aiei*) over every place of land and in wingless flight over the sea (*Eum.* 249–50), and intend to take him beneath the earth (267, 339) where they belong. I will explore this theme further in 15A. Here suffice it to say that the unlimitedness embodied in the Erinues is chronotopic (both temporal and spatial).

In the Erinues the unlimited is personified. This projection of the unlimited onto supernatural beings occurs already in *Agamemnon*. Indeed, the *process* of projection is still visible.[12] First the chorus state that at times the hope that comes from Klutaimestra's sacrifices keeps off their insatiable (*akorestos*) anxiety (*phrontis*) (101–2). Then the weight of their *phrontis* (165) is so great that not even 'all things' can outweigh it, only Zeus. The seemingly strange idea of a mental state outweighed by Zeus brings together

[10] Cf. the chorus: 'throughout my life (δι' αἰῶνος) my heart is fed with lamentations' (25) and 'pain that is hard to stop' (469–70); also S. *El.*: Seaford (1985).

[11] 212–13, 307–10, 385, 528, 541, 872, 874, 965 1067.

[12] For Greek awareness of the process of projection of (a) the human onto deity see Seaford (2004a) 11, 284, and of (b) the preoccupations of the speaker onto another person see Seaford (1998) 132–6.

mind and god (15c). There follow two personal embodiments of the reciprocal violence, first the bold personification of *stasis*, called *akoretos* by Kassandra (1117, quoted above), and then the fully fledged *daimōn*, called *akorestos* by the chorus, who then immediately express the compensating thought of the omnipotent Zeus without whom nothing is brought to completion.[13] Insatiability is in the mind (anxiety), but also projected onto the divine, where it can be reassuringly contained by Zeus.

This projection of the unlimited onto a person is a strategy for its eventual containment, for what is personal can be reconciled. The Erinues, at first called mere 'appearances' (*Cho*. 1051), mental phenomena (1055–6) visible only to the stricken Orestes, become visible in *Eumenides*, where the normality of sacrifice and wedding is eventually restored with Athena's promise to them 'for ever' of 'sacrifices πρὸ παίδων καὶ γαμηλίου τέλους', i.e. before childbirth (or for children) and marital completion (*telos*).[14] The *proteleia* implied here by πρὸ . . . τέλους will finally, in contrast to its mentions in *Agamemnon*, issue in enduring *telos*.

But *Eumenides* also sees a shift in the meaning of *telos* towards another of its senses (7a), *authority*. The Erinues repeatedly claim authority, the power of completion (*telos*), in the performance of the punitive function assigned to them.[15] But in parallel we hear of *judicial* completion (τέλος δίκης: 243, 729), and the turning point of the play is the Erinues' agreement to turn over to Athena the *telos* of their case against Orestes (434 αἰτίας τέλος).

The Erinues will be reconciled to the loss of their specific *telos* by being given a general *telos*. Their initial claim that to the murderer

> avengers [or extractors, *praktores*] of blood with final authority (*teleōs*) we are made manifest (*ephanēmen*) (319–20)

is echoed[16] in Athena's praise of their future function:

> Mistress Erinus has great power among immortals and among those beneath the earth, and concerning men they accomplish (*diaprassoussin*) manifest things (*phanera*) with final authority (*teleōs*) providing songs for some and for others a dim-sighted life of tears. (951–5)

Teleōs in both passages indicates autonomous authority, the power of completion. The Erinues maintain their power in cosmic space, but it was Zeus

[13] 1484–7 τελεῖται; 17d.
[14] 835–6; for Parker (2005): 441 n. 91 this refers to premarital sacrifices accompanied by a prayer for the birth of children. Cf. 960.
[15] 320, 382, 393, 544; cf. 361. [16] As Sommerstein (1989) points out ad loc.

whose thunderbolt provided the ultimate sanction (826–8), and ἐκράτησε Ζεὺς ἀγοραῖος (973): it was Zeus of the urban space of the agora who 'prevailed' or 'dominated'. The Erinues' chastising function among men is no longer for homicide but a general one, which goes with *preventing* the insatiability of reciprocal violence in the polis (976–83), ensuring the peace that will 'provide songs'. Their good will is obtained by the founding of their cult, the continuing performance of which will finally limit the unlimited both temporally and spatially – temporally by preventing recurrence of the reciprocal violence, spatially by establishing them in a place in the earth accessible to control through offerings and ritual.

IIC REVENGE AND THE ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH

In *Oresteia* the root *tel-* brings together the three instruments of social integration to which it refers (ritual, payment, authority: 7A), albeit without necessarily excluding interaction between them. English 'payment' has two opposite forms, positive (of money, etc.) and negative (in revenge), and the same is true of Greek terms for payment (including *tel-*). Consider for instance, from the opening of the great choral lament in *Choephoroi*,

> But oh great Fates, may there be from Zeus here an ending (*teleutān*) where justice changes. In exchange for hostile speech let hostile speech be paid (*teleisthō*). In exacting (*prassousa*) what is owed (*toupheilomenon*) Justice shouts aloud. In exchange for bloody blow let [someone] pay (*tinetō*) bloody blow. (306–13)

The words used here for revenge (*telein*, *prassein*, *opheilein*, *tinein*) can all be used also for commercial exchange.[17] This is not metaphor. Material payment and violent revenge both involve inter-personal reciprocity enforced by invisible transcendent necessity (here personified as Justice). Further, inflicting violent revenge and receiving material compensation are, in Homer for instance, equivalent responses to homicide.

In *Choephoroi* the chorus and Orestes insist on violent revenge (blood 'asks for' more blood, 401), and so Orestes rejects his mother's attempt to compensate for the homicide with libations: he calls them 'less than the offence', and maintains that even 'pouring out all things in exchange for one blood' would not work.[18] Wealth and blood can both be 'poured out',[19] and blood poured onto the ground is as irretrievable as wealth lost at sea.[20] Subsequently the Erinues appear to Orestes as *praktores* of blood . . . *teleōs*.

[17] This is true generally in Greek (e.g. ποινή). [18] 518–21; 13C.
[19] E.g. *Pers.* 826; S. *El.* 1291. [20] The implication of *Ag.* 1005–21. Cf. 9C.

Praktores were agents for exacting payment (e.g. of taxes), and *teleōs* implies the authoritative completeness of the transaction.

The identicality of each act of revenge with its predecessor is implied in the sequences 'in exchange for . . . hostile speech . . . hostile speech . . . ' and 'in exchange for bloody blow let him pay bloody blow'. Indeed, the difficulty of distinguishing them had been made explicit in *Agamemnon* (1560–2, quoted in 13A), encapsulated in the phrase φέρει φέροντ', ἐκτίνει δ' ὁ καίνων, 'he plunders the plunderer, the killer pays [i.e. by being killed]'.[21] Analogously, the money exchanged in one transaction after another is exactly the same thing,

Moreover, here again the words used for revenge (*tinein* and *ektinein*) also often refer to *material* payment. And φέρει φέροντ' means basically a cycle of *plunder*. This conjunction of murder and plunder does in fact characterise this cycle of violent revenge. Helen is plunder (534) and wealth (741), and her abduction is avenged by the plundering (342, 578, 954) as well as the destruction of Troy. Then Aigisthos and Klutaimestra in killing Agamemnon usurp his wealth, which will be used to sustain their rule (1638–9). And Orestes' violent revenge is also to regain the household's wealth.[22]

The association of revenge with the acquisition of wealth does not stop there. The perpetuation of identical acts of revenge is expressed in two ideas – begetting and insatiability – that are also used of the accumulation of wealth. The chorus hope that the violent revenge taken by Orestes will be the last: may aged *Phonos* ('Killing') not *tekoi* ('beget offspring') in the house (*Cho*. 806). The hope is that *Phonos* is now too old to have further offspring. But the reciprocal violence is personified as *akorestos*, 'insatiable' (11B). So too prosperity is *akorestos* (*Ag.* 1331) and – according to a saying – has offspring that is *akorestos* (*Ag.* 756).

This last passage comes towards the end of an ode that describes the arrival of Helen in Troy with numerous evocations of wedding ritual. Marriage is generally a positive ending (*telos*, *teleuta*),[23] but the fall of Troy is 'bitter endings (*teleutai*) of marriage' (745) that are – like the *akoreston terma* (insatiable limit or end) of health (1002–3: 17A) – not an ending at all.

In this way subversion of ritual completion is once more associated with insatiability of suffering. The chorus then evoke the hope, formally expressed at the wedding,[24] that there be offspring resembling the parents. It is said, they say, that

[21] As it does at 1582, and τίνειν at 1529.
[22] *Cho*. 301, 135–6, 801, 943, *Eum*. 757–8.
[23] E.g. *Od*. 20.74; *Eum*. 835; Pi. *Pyth*. 9.118.
[24] Source references at Seaford (1987) 126 n. 204.

the great wealth (*olbos*)[25] of a man, when it has completed its growth (*telesthenta*), has offspring and does not die childless, but from good fortune there sprouts insatiable (*akorestos*) misery for the clan. I differ from others, and am alone in my thought: it is the impious action that begets after it actions that are more in number but like to their own kind . . . ancient insolence (*hubris*) is wont to beget young *hubris* amid human misery, sooner or later, when the appointed day of birth has come . . . a black Ate (disastrous delusion) for the house, resembling her parents. (751–72)[26]

It is not *olbos* in itself that produces its opposite, claim the chorus, but impiety and *hubris* that beget more of the same. They themselves have said, 'I choose unenvied *olbos*. May I not be a sacker of cities' (471–2). It is not wealth in itself but the *excessive* (*Ag.* 377–8) or *indiscriminate* (*Eum.* 554 *pantophurta*) accumulation of wealth that is dangerous: monetised trade is essentially indiscriminate, has no interest in the specificity *per se* of its commodities.[27] It is a result of excess (*koros*) of wealth or 'seeing gain' (*kerdos*) that a man may kick the 'great altar of Justice', although punishment will follow, for 'the *telos* remains in control'.[28] The transition from good fortune to misery is not, claim the chorus, an *impersonal* transformation of something into its opposite (as in Herakleitos), without human agency (14B).

On the other hand, what Aeschylus has in mind is not just transgression but wealth gathered by transgression, as is clear from what immediately follows. Justice dwells with the poor and avoids 'gold-bespangled mansions, and does not revere the power of wealth mis-stamped with praise, and guides everything to its end (*terma*)'. After this last word, which evokes the earlier failed ending of wedding ritual and the need to limit the insatiability of wealth, Agamemnon appears in his chariot, perhaps with some of the rich spoils of war on show.[29] When, in his first words, he refers to 'the just things' (*dikaia*) that he has 'extracted' (*epraxamēn*) from Troy, we must think not only of the violent revenge but also of the inevitable plunder.[30]

To return to our choral passage, 'the appointed day of birth' (*Ag.* 766) translates the emended[31] text κύριον . . . φάος τόκου. The simple

[25] *Olbos* in Aeschylus means (concrete) prosperity, and often seems best translated as wealth.
[26] The uncertainty of the reading does not affect my point.
[27] Seaford (2004a) 155–6.
[28] *Ag.* 381–4; *Eum.* 539–44.
[29] The hypothesis to the play specifies other chariots following him with spoils. Taplin (1977) 304–5 suggests that this derives from a later production. The possibility of spoils in a chariot in the fifth-century tragedy is confirmed by E. *Tro.* 573–4.
[30] 342, 578, 954.
[31] By Ahrens, followed by Murray and Page; transmitted is νεαρὰ φάους κότον; West (1990) 200 prefers Fraenkel's φάος, κότον νεώρη, claiming that after τίκτειν three lines earlier κότον was more likely to be corrupted into τόκου than the reverse. But what immediately follows would

metaphor of birth,[32] such as we find in Solon ('*koros* begets *hubris*'), is expanded to evoke not only the wedding wish for similar offspring but also another metaphor: *tokos* meant both birth and *monetary interest*, because – Aristotle explains[33] – offspring resemble their parents, and *tokos* is 'currency the child of currency', just as here the transgression that accumulates wealth produces offspring like itself. *Kurios* can refer to the time of birth,[34] and to the fixing of a day by law. It describes a day twice elsewhere in Aeschylus, both times to mean to a day of eventual reckoning.[35] *Tokos* accrued to a loan at the end of the month.[36] It may be objected that, although the complexity of the metaphor is Aeschylean, monetary interest is a notion too banal or irrelevant to be in play here. But what is banal for us may have been mysterious in this the historical infancy of interest. *Tokos* meaning 'interest' was not wholly metaphorical, but assimilated the necessity and unlimitedness (both mysterious) of monetary interest to *nature*, to the necessity and unlimitedness of human reproduction – rather as in the next episode the mysterious unlimitedness of money is assimilated by Klutaimestra to the natural inexhaustibility of the sea.[37]

Moreover, the same financial ideas are found elsewhere in the passage. What is the dangerous transgression that is described in terms of accumulating interest and gold-bespangled mansions? The moral emerges from the disastrous marriage of Paris and Helen, but must seem to apply also to Agamemnon returning enriched from Troy. Already the herald has summed up the fall of Troy as follows:

> For neither Paris nor his *suntelēs* city can boast that their action is more than their suffering. For, convicted of robbery and theft,[38] he has both lost his plunder and cut off his paternal house with its land. Double have the sons of Priam paid (*eteisan*) for their offences. (532–7)

Suntelēs in this context has the technical sense of the paying of a joint reckoning. The Trojans have had to pay back more than they took, as was required by Athenian law on theft,[39] but also as in paying interest on a loan. Accordingly, the Greeks have made a gain.

encourage the corruption κότου (similar anagrammatic corruption occurs at e.g. 218, 1157). West's other two objections (metre; and νεαρά unlikely as a gloss) would both be met by reading φάος τόκου νεώρους (or νεῶρες).

[32] On the genealogical conception of vices in *Oresteia* see Helms (2004). [33] *Pol.* 1258b.
[34] Cf. Pi. *Ol.* 6.32; Oppian, *Kyn.* 3.156. [35] *Su.* 732, *fr.* 281a3.
[36] Ar., *Clouds* 17–18 (with Dover (1968) ad loc.), 756. [37] 958–62; Seaford (2004a) 166–7.
[38] This is a legal distinction (see Fraenkel (1950) ad loc.).
[39] See Fraenkel (1950) ad loc. Cf. *Cho.* 791–2.

The gain (*kerdos*) is victorious (*nikai*), and suffering does not outweigh it (*antirrhepei*). Why should we count accurately those who have been expended (*analōthentas*)?' (571–2)[40]

Here again, as in *Suppliants* (8B), we have the metaphor of death in battle as *expenditure*, this time in conjunction with the metaphor of scales (13C). The metaphors are no less alive than the commercial metaphor with which Agamemnon at Troy is described as 'having traded better for the most part'.[41] The positives and negatives of the Trojan war are drawn up on a balance sheet, and for the Greeks the bottom line is positive. Once again, is this – given the material prizes of warfare – entirely a metaphor? The same ambivalence – between literal and metaphorical language – obtains in Elektra's claim that she and Orestes were 'sold' by their mother, who in exchange acquired (*antēllaxato*) Aigisthos as husband.[42]

In the previous choral ode there is yet another instance of war being clothed in the (for us) banality of a commercial undertaking: at Troy the scales of battle are held not by Zeus (as in Homer) but by Ares 'gold-changer (*chrusamoibos*) of bodies' (438–9): he is a trader, like the *arguramoibos* described by Plato (*Pol.* 289e) as travelling around exchanging currency for goods or for currency. Ares 'sends from Troy to kinsmen heavy (gold) dust[43] bitterly bewailed, freighting the urns with easily stowed (*euthetou*) ash in exchange for men' (440–4). In monetised commercial transactions large items are regularly exchanged for small amounts of precious metal, and this corresponds to receiving ash in exchange for men. The homogenising effect of money is associated with the homogenising effect of death. *Euthetos* both describes the convenience of money for commerce (it takes up little space) and evokes the careful laying out of the corpse.[44] The implications are that – as stated in other fifth-century Athenian texts[45] – war is fought for gain, and even death ritual is perverted to facilitate this process. Having seen death ritual perverted by the insatiability of revenge, we now see it perverted by the insatiable accumulation of wealth. Both perversions combine the opposites of closure (of death ritual) and insatiability.

The same horrific combination, in a different form, occurs in Klutaimestra's handling of textiles. As she persuades Agamemnon to walk over a textile to the house, his anxiety about

[40] With West (1990) 192–3 *et al.* I accept the reordering of the lines (574, 570) by Elberling.
[41] *Eum.* 631–2 ἡμποληκότα τὰ πλεῖστ' ἄμεινον.
[42] *Cho.* 132–4, repeated, about himself, by Orestes (914–17).
[43] ψῆγμα, which can mean gold dust (e.g. Hdt. 1.93, 3.94).
[44] Cf. texts cited in Seaford (1998) 128 n. 82; and LSJ sv. εὔθετος.
[45] Seaford (2004a) 157–8.

wasting the wealth of the house, the textiles bought with silver (948–9)

is met by her reassurance that

the sea is there – and who shall drain it? – nourishing a gush of much purple, equal to silver, ever-renewed, for the dying of textiles . . . the house does not know how to be poor. (958–62)

The unlimited money of the household is projected spatially as the inexhaustibility of the purple dye (of the bought textiles) from the inexhaustible sea. This textile is assimilated to the one used by Klutaimestra to pervert death ritual by enclosing the living (rather than dead) body of Agamemnon (IOA). Agamemnon prudently refers to walking on the textile as something that might be a prescribed ritual (*telos*) (IIB). But Klutaimestra will boast that

a covering (*amphibtestron*) without limit (*apeiron*), like [a net] for fish, I set round him, an evil wealth of cloth. (1382–3)

The covering without limits is the shroud wrapped *around* the body (and so – like a net – trapping the living Agamemnon).[46] But it also connotes the unlimitedness of the wealth (money) with which – Klutaimestra boasts – the house buys textiles. It is as if the unlimitedness of money perverts death ritual in killing Agamemnon.[47]

Agamemnon enters the house, and then Kassandra. Just before we hear his cries from within, at the high point of dramatic intensity, the chorus raise the theme of insatiability, expressed once again with the word *akorestos*, but the insatiability not of revenge but of prosperity:

Prosperity is for all humans naturally insatiable (*akorestos*). No-one, renouncing it, keeps it away from halls pointed to by fingers [i.e. admired] by saying, 'Enter no more'. To this man too [i.e. Agamemnon] the gods have given it to take Priam's city, and he has come honoured by the gods. But now if he will pay for (*apoteisei*) the blood of those [killed] earlier and by dying pay in full, to the dead, compensation (*poinas*) for other deaths, what man could boast himself born with fortune beyond harm, on hearing this? (1331–42)

Why does Aeschylus expand *akorestos* with the image of prosperity not being prevented from entering the house? It evokes the entry of Agamemnon into the house, which the chorus have failed to prevent. But there is more. The commentators mention the formula μηδὲν εἰσίτω κακόν ('let

[46] ἀμφίβληστρον is from the verb ἀμφιβάλλειν, 'put around', which was used for dressing the corpse. Cf. *Cho*. 491–4; *Eum*. 634–5.

[47] For detail see Seaford (1998); (2004a) 148–9, 163, 166–8. See also IOA, IIB.

no evil enter') found in inscriptions. I suggest that the chorus' sub-text is that this kind of formula bans evil but not excessive prosperity.

This implies the identity of the opposites of evil and (excessive) prosperity. I suspect that 'let no evil enter', or something similar, was a ritual utterance. Plutarch (*Mor.* 693e) records a ritual at Chaeronea in which a servant is driven out of doors to the utterance 'out with Hunger, in with Wealth and Health'. That this kind of ritual was celebrated elsewhere is suggested by literary texts on inviting Wealth (Ploutos) into one's home.[48] If so, then to tell Prosperity not to enter the house would reverse the sense of the ritual utterance, by confusing the opposition that it enunciates. In any event, the chorus imply the unusual point that excessive prosperity is as harmful as hunger etc.

The identity of opposites consists not only in Agamemnon being killed at the height of prosperity. The passage's second section (beginning 'but now') locates Agamemnon's death in a series, with each death being 'paid for' by the next.[49] The structure of the passage seems to assimilate this insatiability of reciprocal violence to the insatiability of prosperity (and if 'enter no more' was a ritual formula, then here again it is *ritual* that is ineffective against insatiability). The personified *akorestos* prosperity who has entered the house will be wiped out by the debts that Agamemnon must 'pay', prefiguring the violent *akorestos daimōn* of the house (1481–4). Accordingly Klutaimestra hopes to end both forms of insatiability when, in desiring freedom from the *daimōn* of the house and from the 'frenzies of mutual slaughter', she declares herself content with 'a small part of possessions' (1569–76).

The violence and the prosperity are analogous in their insatiability, but incommensurable. As in classical Athens, no amount of wealth could compensate for the murder. To Elektra's wish for the death of her father's killers the chorus respond, 'these things are more precious than gold' (*Cho.* 372), and Orestes, noting that Klutaimestra's offerings to the murdered Agamemnon are 'less than the offence', further maintains that even 'pouring out all things[50] in exchange for one blood' would not work (*Cho.* 518–21). Nor is Aigisthos' intention to maintain his rule by using Agamemnon's wealth[51] any more successful.

The insatiability of revenge subverts ritual closure in close association with the insatiability of wealth. This helps to solve an unacknowledged

[48] So Bowie (1993b) 270–1. [49] This is so whatever the identity of the 'other deaths' (1349).
[50] For ἐκχέειν ('pouring out') of wealth in general see e.g. *Pers.* 826; S. *El.* 1291.
[51] *Ag.* 1638–9. The theme is even more prominent in Euripides' version of the story: e.g. *El.* 939–41; Seaford (1998) 139.

puzzle. *Oresteia* centres around the problem of how to end the cycle of violent revenge. However, Fiona McHardy has recently shown that in the archaic and classical period homicide as revenge for homicide is in fact rare, and that more common motives for revenge are wealth and power.[52] In Homer the only killer to be killed in revenge (outside warfare) is Aigisthos. I suggest that at the heart of *Oresteia* is the problem of the insatiable accumulation of individual wealth, an issue that has no presence in Homer[53] but rather emerged from the rapid monetisation of the polis in the century before the production of *Oresteia*.

Traditional myth, being pre-monetary, provides no narrative that deals directly with this problem (except perhaps the myth of Midas). But in Homer there is mention both of violent revenge (Orestes' praiseworthy killing of Aigisthos) and of the need to preclude revenge, as in Ajax's mention of the man who accepts material compensation for the killing of a brother or son (*Il.* 9.628–36). Aeschylus' problematisation of Orestes' revenge uses a traditional story of violent revenge to embody also the more recent problem of the unlimited accumulation of individual wealth. The seeming endlessness of violent revenge in *Oresteia* reflects not just the cycle of violent revenge in Athens but an associated and analogous process, expressed in the same vocabulary as revenge, the unlimited individual accumulation – through endless transactions – of monetary wealth. Similarly, *Septem* uses the pre-monetary mythical theme of the curse to express the terrifying new imperative of monetised isolation (9C).

The unlimitedness of monetary accumulation may seem mysterious. But individual economic transactions are – like individual acts of revenge – limited by the idea of equivalence and imbued with necessity (3A). And there is a special similarity between monetised accumulation and revenge on *kin* – not only in that both occur within the household, but also because in kin-killing closure may be precluded, whether by the unwillingness of the victim's kin to move against the killer (their own kin),[54] or – if they do so – by unending remorse (expressed in the relentless aggression of the Erinues).

The subversion and perversion of household rituals are associated with the unlimitedness both of reciprocal violence and of the individual accumulation of wealth. We would therefore expect the final establishment of public cult in public space to be associated with the limitation not only of

[52] McHardy (2008).

[53] Of course e.g. Agamemnon is accused of taking too much, and the suitors of wasting Odysseus' wealth, but *insatiability* of greed is not the issue.

[54] Cf. e.g. Isaios 1.6.

reciprocal violence but also of individual wealth. That is what we find. The recipients of the cult, the Erinues, recommend the Athenians to give joys to each other (*Eum.* 984 χάρματα δ' ἀντιδιδοῖεν), i.e. the positive reciprocity that is antithetical to the self-sufficiency associated with monetary wealth. The circularity of positive reciprocity, unlike that of commercial exchange, limits accumulation (3A), and here occurs with 'communally loving thought' (985 κοινοφιλεῖ διανοίαι).

The reciprocity displayed in the arrival of an outsider at a Homeric household (Chapter 1) is in the polis festival absorbed into the reciprocity between arriving deity and polis (Chapters 2 and 4). And the political significance of the welcoming of an outsider by the polis persists into Aeschylean tragedy (Chapter 8). In tragedy the code of reciprocity is when practiced by great individuals almost always in some way negative, for instance in the negative effects of gifts.[55] In *Septem* the breakdown of reciprocity (with men or gods) embodied in the absolutely isolated figure of Eteokles contrasts with the benign reciprocity between the citizens and the earth (9C), and the benign reciprocity celebrated in *Eumenides* is between the citizens in general, and between polis and the newly arrived Erinues.[56] The welcoming by polis of an outsider that results in the reciprocal benefit of cult for the polis belongs to our basic pattern that persists from *aition* to drama. It may well have occurred in the Danaid trilogy, and occurs in all the extant tragedies set in Attica.[57]

The possibility of unlimited individual accumulation of monetary wealth, cause and consequence of tyranny, was not entirely eliminated by Athenian democracy, which did however develop institutions, notably *leitourgiai* ('liturgies'), to divert it into public benefit. *Eumenides* does not imply a return to the pre-monetary order. Athena detects 'great gain (*kerdos*) for the citizens from the [Erinues'] fearsome faces' (990–1), giving as her reason the future mutual good will between Erinues and citizens. *Kerdos*, which can refer to *selfish* gain (9C), is here accepted as a value, but defined as the benefit that comes to all from positive reciprocity.

The Erinues in turn respond by exhorting the citizens to rejoice in their '*aisimiai* of wealth' (996). This is generally translated by such expressions as 'wealth you deserve' or 'destiny of riches'. But the original and basic sense

[55] Seaford (1994a) 389–95.

[56] See esp. 868. The transition from the cycle of reciprocal violence to benign reciprocity may itself be imagined as a gift from the gods, prefigured perhaps in *Ag.* 182 (especially if Aeschylus wrote χάρις βίαιος; but cf. Pope (1974)).

[57] *Eum.*; S. *OC*; E. *Hcld.* and *Su.*

of *aisa* (the root of *aisimia*) is *share*.[58] *Aisimiai* means something like 'fated just shares'. At *Ag.* 775 the *en-aisimos* life is contrasted with gold-bespangled mansions. *Aisimiai* of wealth preclude unlimited acquisition by individuals. Rejoicing in the right social distribution of wealth contrasts with the disastrous consequences of the *individual* desire for wealth elsewhere in Aeschylus (endophony, in *Persians* military catastrophe). So too does the positive reference to communal wealth in *Persians* (12E).

[58] It comes to mean 'fate' because the distribution of shares must have divine authority: LSJ s.v. αἶσα II 3; Seaford (2004a) 51.

CHAPTER 12

Persians

Central to *Persians*, as to the other plays of Aeschylus, is the politico-spatial control of ritual. But *Persians* is unique. The royal household is contemporary and barbarian, and it reverses the tragic norm by in the end entirely prevailing over the community.[1] The reversal occurs in the barbarian beyond, and the remote place of death from which Xerxes returns is Greece.

12A THE SETTING

Where exactly is the play set? The textual indications of space are as follows. Towards the end of their entry-song the chorus of Persian elders say (140–3), 'But come, Persians, let us – sitting in [or on][2] this ancient building (*stegos*) – think deeply . . . ' A few moments later the queen arrives from the royal house (159–60) in what she later calls *ochēmata* (607–8), which probably means a horse-drawn chariot but could mean a throne carried by servants.[3] After hearing from a messenger of the military disaster, she goes off back to the royal house, and returns from it, this time on foot (607–9), with offerings for the dead Dareios, who in the next scene appears over his tomb (684–6). The defeated King Xerxes appears in rags, and is escorted to the royal house (1069) with lament 'in the town' (1071).

What is the 'ancient building'? The tomb? The royal house? A council chamber? And what is it that motivates the various arrivals (of chorus, queen, messenger and Xerxes) in this particular place? The numerous

[1] Euripides' *Trojan Women* also (unusally) ends in catastrophe for the (*barbarian*) community, although (in contrast to *Persians*) the royal family is not coloured as barbarian and is destroyed. The only tragedy known to have centred around overthrow of a Greek polis (Phrynichos' *Capture of Miletos*) caused the tragedian to be fined.

[2] ἐνεζόμενοι could mean either: cf. Aristot. *Probl.* 881b37.

[3] Bees (1995) 88; ὄχημα refers to a wide range of things that bear or support.

discussions of these problems have come to no satisfactory conclusion,[4] because they generally ignore two closely interrelated considerations.

The first consideration is the political aspect of the space. Herodotos describes King Cyrus' contempt for the Greek agora as a space, in the middle of the polis, in which men gather for commerce: monetised, homogeneous, egalitarian, it contrasts completely with the Persian palace as the all-powerful centre of a hierarchy embodied in the arrival of tribute from throughout a great empire (3C). Crucial is that the chorus, having just entered from the side, are merely *proposing* to deliberate: this intention, and probably also their move to be seated for that purpose, is *interrupted* by the arrival of the queen on her *ochēma* (150 'But here comes . . . the queen').

This is supported by the metre. The opening anapaests (1–64), with their marching rhythm, accompany the entry of the chorus. By the beginning of the lyric song (65–139) their entry is complete. But at 140, with the words 'But come, Persians . . . ', they revert to anapaests, and this suggests that they are on the move again, towards the 'ancient *stegos*', a movement that is cut short by the arrival of the queen and their prostration before her (signalled at 152). Their movement is (I will argue) towards – and the queen's entry is from – the (central) door in the backdrop that leads towards the royal house. The moment of potential confrontation between arriving chorus and royal house is marked by this prostration.

Subsequently the autonomous action of the chorus is limited to advising the queen – in response to her request for advice – to supplicate the gods and make libations to her dead husband Dareios. Comparably, in *Agamemnon*, the chorus of local old men (also left behind by the military expedition) arrive at the royal house and – with some expressions of autonomy – express reverence for the queen, who already has the news of the impending return of the king from war, and already controls the rituals being performed in household and city (10A). Subsequently, during the coup within the house, the old men debate whether to enter it so as to intervene (1351), but fail to do so.

The second neglected consideration that can help us identify 'this ancient *stegos*'[5] is the reality of the Persian palaces. Although the play is full of

[4] E.g. that the chorus is already inside a council chamber (Taplin (1972) 67–8 and (1977) 454) is inherently implausible, unparalleled, and inconsistent with the arrival of the queen on a chariot (or consistent only by supposing tragic space of unparalleled fluidity). Implausible and unnecessary is the view that the play (without any textual indication) changes its locale (cf. 10C). See most recently Garvie (2009) xlvii–xlix.

[5] Scullion (1994) 69 argues that there is no building represented on stage, citing instances of the deictic pronoun referring to something invisible to the audience. But in none of these instances (*Eum.* 685; S. *Aj.* 862, *El.* 7, 898), even if referring to the invisible, is the identity of what is referred to in doubt. Why refer to something unidentifiable and invisible?

mentions of places in the Persian empire, its location (Sousa) is mentioned only once, late in the play and in the briefest possible way (761). In the opening it is said merely that no messenger has arrived at 'the town of the Persians' (15), suggesting – if anywhere – Persepolis, which may be alluded to also by *perseptolis* (65 to describe the army). This vagueness, unique in Greek tragedy, derives not only from the remoteness of the location but also, more specifically, from the nature of the reports that would have reached Aeschylus. The numerous kinds of contact, from the sixth century onwards, between Greeks and Persians included Greeks working on the construction of the complexes at Sousa and Persepolis,[6] and some of the experience of Greek visitors and craftsmen surely reached Greece. Aeschylus does show some knowledge of Persian royal institutions.[7] But the unreliability of reports from such a distance was no doubt compounded by Greek preconceptions and by the unfamiliar complexity of Persian political space. The Persian court was peripatetic.[8] Under Dareios not just one but two monumental centres of Persian royal power were built – early in the life of Aeschylus – at Sousa and Persepolis. Each of them was a huge walled complex, on a terrace, that included royal living quarters and an Apadana (audience hall), with space for thousands. Dareios favoured Sousa as his administrative capital,[9] and indeed for Herodotos the capital is Sousa, whereas Persepolis is not mentioned in the classical period.[10]

Aeschylus does eventually briefly commit himself to Sousa.[11] But the complex at Persepolis was perhaps more spectacular, and – more importantly – is about 4 kilometres from Dareios' tomb, which plays a central role in the play. Still identifiable by an inscription celebrating Dareios' achievements, it is the earliest of a series of impressive Achaemenid tombs carved into a rock face.[12] On the central panel of the façade is represented a palace,[13] and on the upper panel Dareios himself facing a fire altar. The tardy fleetingness of Aeschylus' identification of the city may derive from the competing claims, in the information indirectly available to him, of Sousa and Persepolis.

The terrace complexes at Sousa and Persepolis might each seem to combine palace and city in the same entity, and at any rate could hardly be more different from the Athenian polis, with its temples quite distinct from modest private houses. Both the complexes had magnificent and

[6] Miller (1997) *passim*, esp. (on the workers) 101–3; Hall (1989) 74.
[7] Tourraix (1984); Hall (1996) 6.
[8] Xen. *Cyr*. 8.6.22; Athen. 513f; Briant (1988). [9] Perrot (1981).
[10] It is the *mētropolis* of the Persian kingdom at D.S. 17.70.1; cf. Strabo 729; Arrian, *An*. 7.1.1.
[11] And ἀρχαῖος ('ancient') of the στέγος might seem appropriate for Sousa as the ancient capital of Elam. But ἀρχαῖος is also used of Dareios, the builder of Persepolis (658, 696).
[12] E.g. Root (1979) 72–6. [13] Persepolis according to Schmidt (1970) 81.

conspicuous entrances dignified with inscriptions by Xerxes.[14] I suggest that what Aeschylus had in mind with the ill-defined 'ancient *stegos*' was (reports of) this unfamiliar kind of complex (or part of it), and that the action is imagined as occurring outside its entrance.[15] On this view there is no problem in motivating any of the entrances (as there would be if there were only the tomb), and the royal house is imagined in the near distance – far enough for the queen to come in a chariot (and for Xerxes to be escorted there through the town: 1071) but near enough for her also to walk. The vague description 'this ancient *stegos*' makes sense only if it is visible (why else mention it?) and yet uncaptureable by any more specific Greek word. It may well refer to the *skēnē*, which would have had a central entrance. Because the complex contained areas for large meetings, it was appropriate for the chorus to propose to deliberate in it. In reality, as in the drama, the Persian place of assembly is within the monarchical complex and the royal tomb is outside it. In the drama the tomb is closer to the gate than in reality, and under the firm control of the monarchy.

I also suggest that the arrival of the queen on the *ochēma* – as well as all subsequent movements to and from the royal house – was through the central door in the *skēnē*. And so, for instance, Xerxes' command to the chorus, as they proceed together to the royal 'house' (1038, 1069), to cry 'in the town' (1071 κατ' ἄστυ), does not – as is commonly supposed – mean that they leave to the side. They leave through the central door of the *skēnē*, i.e. into the complex which contains both royal house and town. Having earlier attempted to do so (so as to exercise their public function of deliberation), they were stopped by the queen emerging impressively from within on her *ochēma*.[16] Finally they do enter, but only so as to confirm the power of the household in power. Such a strikingly unusual exit for a chorus, contrasting with the processional exits to the side to places of future *public* cult in *Eumenides* and *Septem*, is a perfect expression of the political uniqueness of the play.

This hypothesis solves all the difficulties that have been noted in imagining the space, as does an alternative possibility – that the setting is just

[14] At Sousa the gate was attributed by Xerxes in a trilingual inscription to his father Dareios, but was completed after Dareios' death: Perrot (1981) 86. The 'Gate of All Nations' at Persepolis 'may have been begun by Dareios, but was completed by Xerxes, who claimed in an inscription to have erected the structure': Porada (1985) 800.

[15] I have found only Harmon (1932) arguing that the action was set just outside the 'city gates', largely because this was a good place for a council (comparing the Old Testament and Herodotos). Korzeniewski (1966) 548–53 argues that the *skēnē* represented the royal house. But that would make it too close for the queen's chariot-ride and the final escort of Xerxes (esp. 1071).

[16] The space between the *skēnē* and the drop behind it may seem too narrrow, but any problem would easily be solved by using a ramp. Wiles (1997) 52 imagines a *skēnē* further forward, intersecting the *orchēstra*.

outside a public building *within* the complex, such as the Apadana (at Persepolis just within the gate of the complex), and all the entrances and exits are on one side or the other.

Another source of Aeschylus' ideas of Persian royal architecture was probably the large and complex tent (Mardonios' or Xerxes') captured by the Greeks after the battle of Plataia. It contained stables,[17] and – as a 'mobile palace' (12c) – may have seemed akin to the theatrical 'tent' (*skēnē*). Perikles' Odeion, built next to the theatre, was influenced by Persian royal architecture,[18] and there was an ancient tradition that it was modelled on the tent captured at Plataia.[19]

12b THE RETURN OF DAREIOS

In both *Agamemnon* and *Persians* a male chorus and a queen await the return of a king from war, and the chorus narrate the original departure of the army. In *Agamemnon* this includes the omen, described as a sacrifice, in which two eagles tear apart a hare. In *Persians* the queen narrates how she was about to make offerings at an altar (in response to a dream) when she saw an eagle coming to seek refuge at the 'hearth of Apollo'. A hawk then flew at the eagle and tore its head. As in *Agamemnon*, the sacrificial omen of violence between species symbolises the outcome of the war, with the eagle representing royalty. In *Persians* the queen's dream and omen lead to libations for the dead king, as does the queen's dream in *Choephoroi*. These similarities between *Persians* and *Oresteia* form the background to a remarkable contrast.

In *Agamemnon* the seer Kalchas indicates that the sacrificial omen requires 'the other sacrifice' (by a king of his daughter) that will in its turn cause yet another (of king by queen: 10a). And in *Choephoroi* the queen's dream is interpreted by 'interpreters' to mean that Agamemnon is angry with his killers (38–41), and so the queen sends him libations. But the chorus, Elektra and Orestes use the libations to enlist his help for the matricidal revenge.

In *Persians* by contrast the chorus respond to the omen by recommending libations for earth and the dead along with prayers to the gods and Dareios

[17] Hdt. 9.70, 82, 76; Miller (1997) 49–53. It probably also contained women in covered wagons: Hdt. 9.76; Broneer (1944) even argued that it came to Athens and formed the theatrical *skēnē*; but cf. Miller (1997) 235–6.

[18] Miller (1997) 236–42.

[19] Plut. *Per.* 13.9–11; Pausan. 1.20.4. This is regarded by Miller (1997) 218–42 as invented to explain the Odeion's Persoid appearance.

for good things – in particular 'for you and your son' (218, and again at 222). The eagle seeking refuge at a place of royal ritual symbolises the protective importance of ritual for the monarchy, and indeed the damage to the monarchy symbolised by the weakness of the eagle will be restored by ritual. The chorus conclude – despite their earlier premonitions[20] – that 'we judge about these things that they will turn out well for you in every way' (225). 'Favourable to my son and my household have you been as the first interpreter of these dreams', replies the queen, and agrees to follow their recommendations when she goes inside the house. The benefit to the monarchy from the queen's control of cosmic space is recommended by the choral representatives of the community, who thereby confirm the royal household's self-serving control of ritual.

The queen tells the chorus to call up Dareios (621), and converses with him while the chorus fall silent through fear. Dareios has retained authority over his kingdom. The embodiment of successful rule, his emergence expresses in the cosmic (vertical) axis the spatial and temporal solidarity of the dynastic family and reaffirms its autonomy.

There are in this scene three inconsistencies of action.

Firstly, the queen says that she will, as recommended earlier by the chorus, pray to the gods and then bring the offerings 'for earth and the dead . . . from my house' (521–5). This contradicts her earlier intention to perform all the rituals in the palace (229–30).

Secondly, she then anticipates the final escort of Xerxes into the palace by proclaiming that – if her son arrives before she does – the chorus are to 'comfort him and escort him to the house, lest he have additional suffering' (529–31). This seems premature (the queen will in fact return before Xerxes arrives), and so has been transposed to after 852.[21]

Thirdly, Dareios tells his widow to go the house to get suitable adornment and meet Xerxes, who has torn up the robes he is wearing (832–6). She says that she will take robes from the house and try to meet her son (after saying that what pains her most is the dishonour of his torn robes: 845–50). The verb used for 'meet' by both Dareios and the queen is *hupantiazein*, which implies movement (*going* to meet). But the queen does not reappear.[22]

[20] 59–64, 115–25.

[21] The best possible case for this is made by Taplin (1977) 92–8. Cf. Garvie (2009) 228–30.

[22] Thalmann (1980) is right to defend the transmitted text by emphasising the importance of the robes, but wrong to claim that Xerxes' rags mean that 'the disaster is total' and the monarchy irreparably impaired.

Such inconsistencies are often the price paid for a desired effect. We can in this way make sense of all three anomalies (without changing the text). The effect is to emphasise the solidarity of the royal family through control of ritual.

Our first inconsistency emphasises the domestic control of the rituals despite their public performance. Secondly, given what we have just heard from the messenger about the torn robes and flight of Xerxes, the prematureness of 529–31 in fact expresses the justified political anxiety of the queen and the importance of the escort. Thirdly, Xerxes' torn robes are anticipated in the queen's dream (199) and somehow known even to the dead Dareios (832–6), whose unfulfilled instruction allows Aeschylus to combine having Xerxes arrive in rags with the knowledge that he will nevertheless eventually be clothed in a new robe that embodies the power of the monarchy.[23] We shall see that this transition – from public lamentation in the final exit to the anticipated confirmation of the endangered monarchy within the secluded place of power – is crucial to the political significance of the play. The movement of the queen prefigured by *hupantiazein* will occur within the palace or palace complex. Her arrival on stage with the new robe would have destroyed the dramatic power of the subordination of chorus by lament,[24] and the reclothing of the king *within the palace* expresses the autonomous power of the royal family. Tragedy can make it clear that a significant event will occur shortly after the action represented by the drama. The endings of all Aeschylean tragedies (except *Agamemnon*) are imagined as immediately followed by specific events referred to in the text, and in *Persians*, *Septem*, *Suppliants* and *Eumenides* this involves the *installation* of one or more of those exiting.[25]

After giving her instructions at 529–31 the queen goes off to the palace, and returns just after the next choral song predicts that the monarchy will lose control of the people of Asia (584–96). She indicates her anxiety at the hostility of the gods and the perversion of ritual – the sound in her ears is 'not a *paian*' – and continues:

> Therefore (*toigar*) I have returned without my chariot and the previous luxury, bringing libations propititous for the father of my son. (607–9)

[23] 12c. Thalmann (1980) rightly defends the transmitted text by emphasising the importance of the robes, but wrongly claims that Xerxes' rags mean that 'the disaster is total' and the monarchy irreparably impaired.

[24] And perhaps she was played by the same actor who played Xerxes: Garvie (2009) l–li, 337.

[25] See also e.g. E. *Tro*. 88–91.

She then describes the libations at length, employing a series of positive terms that is unique in tragic descriptions of offerings: pure, good-to-drink, all-gleaming, virgin, unsullied, brightness, fragrant, all-bearing.

In her earlier arrival in a chariot she was called by the chorus 'a light equal to the eyes of gods' as well as wife of a god (Dareios) and mother of a god (Xerxes) (150–7). The logic of *toigar* in 607 is presumably that such excess may increase the danger. The wholesome perfection of the libations contrasts with the cosmologically confused imagined libations (involving blood and semen) expressing intrafamilial conflict in *Septem* (9D) and *Oresteia* (10A). Their purity in *Persians* may conversely suggest[26] the solidarity and immunity of the household, instigating as they do a symbolic return to the old political perfection embodied in the imminent arrival, from a cosmic extremity, of the regally attired (660–1) Dareios. The horizontal axis (the messenger arriving from a geographical extremity) is now complemented by the vertical (cosmic) axis.

The range of prayers and offerings recommended by the chorus is transformed into a ritual consisting of the queen pouring libations while the chorus, instructed by her, summon Dareios from the dead. In *Choephoroi* by contrast the libations sent by the queen, and the invocations of the dead king, are transformed into an instrument for the self-destruction of the royal household: control of the vertical axis passes from the queen to her enemies. The invocation unites living children with dead father only so as to pursue intrafamilial vengeance. But in *Persians* the same rituals unify and strengthen the royal family.

The dead may inspire feud, and so Athenian funerary legislation banned lamentation by non-relatives and at the tombs of those long-dead (10B). The Asian (423) lament in *Choephoroi* would be illegal on both counts,[27] but the dead king does not actually appear, whereas in *Persians* he appears and is – so far from being kept at a distance by funerary legislation – still in control. The cause of the chorus' terrified inability to talk to him is not his ghostliness but their '*ancient* dread', i.e. of him when he lived. This striking expression of the gap between king and subjects is repeated by Dareios himself (703), most of whose conversation is with the queen.

The dead king embodies the power, solidarity and continuity of the royal family, even its transcendence of the rupture caused by death. His

[26] While also expressing the Greek view of the fertility, plenty, and temperate climate of Asia (Hall (1996) ad loc.).

[27] Plutarch (*Sol.* 12.8–9) associates the reform of funerals with mitigating the 'barbaric' practices of women; Seaford (1994a) 74–86.

narration of the Persian monarchy from the beginning (762–80) reconnects it to its venerable and successful past, and his instructions for the future reconnect it to his own unquestionable authority. The royal household reaffirms its ritualised control of time (past, present and future) and of space (immediate, geographic and cosmic). The immediate space includes the tomb, which embodies royal authority over public space, as well as giving access to the *cosmic* axis: Dareios comes from the underworld and completes the vertical cosmic interconnection upwards by grounding the monarchy in Zeus.[28]

Zeus is mentioned only five times in *Persians* (far less than in the other extant plays of Aeschylus), three of them in this scene,[29] in which Dareios himself is thrice addressed as a god.[30] He who controlled a vast territory while *staying in the same place* is not Zeus, as in *Suppliants*, but Dareios (867).[31] Zeus is aligned with Dareios, not only in having founded the monarchy (762–4) but also in his only other role in the play – to punish the excess against which Dareios had warned Xerxes.[32] He causes the Persian disaster to punish Xerxes' yoking of the Hellespont.[33]

We shall see that elsewhere in Aeschylus the disastrous unlimitedness and unification of opposites perpetrated by the royal household are finally limited by the polis establishing ritualised control of the vertical cosmic axis. And in *Oresteia* at least, probably also in the Danaid trilogy, this resolution is associated with Zeus. In *Persians* the royal transgression of limits in the unification of (geographical) opposites, the yoking of Europe and Asia (14B), also creates disaster. But the disaster is finally limited through ritualised control of the vertical cosmic axis by the household-state (monarchy). Zeus founded the monarchy, and his cosmic and regulating role has devolved in part on King Dareios. While the Persian 'polis' is damaged,[34] the power of the royal household remains intact.

We have seen how the royal household uses ritual to re-establish its threatened control of immediate and cosmic space. But what of *geographic* space?

12C THE RETURN OF XERXES

When Aeschylus was forty-five years old, the Persian king invaded Greece. The grandeur of his entourage impressed the Greeks, and so did their

[28] Cf. a similar comprehensivenss in the queen's plan at 522–3.
[29] 532, 915; in this scene 740, 762–4, 827. [30] 643, 655, 711.
[31] He thereby contrasts with Xerxes but resembles the first king of the Medes, Deiokes (Hdt. 1.99).
[32] 783, 827–31, etc. [33] 722–6, 739–42, 827–8. [34] 117, 511, 682, 715, 946.

lamentation for Masistios (third man of Persia), with which all Boiotia resounded.[35]

There is later evidence for the political significance of the practice of escorting the Persian king into a city, with the inhabitants coming out to meet him.[36] But the king on campaign may take the seat of his power with him. Briant maintains of the royal tent that

> it has a symbolic value. Power is not separable from the person of the king: power is there where the king is. When the king moves, the royal tent – a mobile palace – becomes the centre of an itinerant power . . . The king accordingly takes with him all the symbolic markers of his power: the bow, the shield, and the royal robe (*kandys*) that he received in his enthronement. Twice Dareios abandoned them in his flight, and Alexander proclaimed that by virtue of this Dareios had in fact resigned his kingship.[37]

The case made by Tourraix that Aeschylus had a good knowledge of the Achaemenid monarchy includes symbolic *realia* (the oil, milk, honey and wine offered by the queen, the tiara and saffron-dyed shoe of the king).[38] I would add the royal robe. The royal symbols, including the robe and mobile palace, endow the king with power over geographic space. Hence the importance to Dareios and the queen of new robes for Xerxes: they symbolise the restoration of the endangered (584–94) monarchy.[39] Xerxes' new apparel is called *kosmos* (833, 849), a word that could mean political order. His old torn apparel is called *poikilos* (836). In a story told by Herodotos (9.108–13) Xerxes feels obliged, against his will, to give his *poikilos* robe to his brother's daughter (after promising anything she wants), with disastrous consequences.[40] After the battle of Plataia *poikilos* clothing was among the booty distributed among the Greek troops (Hdt. 9.80–1).

The finale of the play evokes two rituals. One is indicated by the queen's instruction to escort formally (530 *propempein*) the king to the palace. The other is a funeral procession (*propempein* in Aeschylus is elsewhere always associated with the funerary).[41] It is the interplay between these two

[35] Hdt. 7.40–1, 9.24; also 1.188, 7.55, 9.82.

[36] Much of this is based on the reports of the entry of Alexander into cities of the Persian empire: Briant (1988). But see also the ceremonial entry of Cyrus into Babylon recorded in the Nabonidus-Chronicle: Pritchard (1955) 306.

[37] Briant (1988) 269; Quint. Curt. 3.11.12, 3.17–8; Arrian, *Ann.* 3.11.5; D.S. 34.3–6; Briant (1982) 373–5.

[38] Tourraix (1984), esp. 127 (libations), 130 (shoe and tiara).

[39] Though not necessarily of the entire empire: the Ionian Greek cities mentioned in 876–900 as controlled by Dareios were at the time of the production of *Persians* free of Persia and coming under the influence of Athens.

[40] Sancisi-Weerdenberg (1993) 29 sees behind the story an attempt by the girl's father, Xerxes' brother Masistes, to replace him. Greeks unaware of the royal function of the robe have recast the story.

[41] Chapter 9, n. 28.

apparently opposed ritual functions, escort home and funeral, that gives the scene its dramatic power. They first intersect in the adjective *prosphthongos*, meaning something like 'of formal address', which elsewhere in Greek literature occurs only once – applied by the chorus earlier to their words addressed to the arriving queen (152). It is now, at the arrival of Xerxes, applied by them to their 'shout of ill omen at [your] homecoming, evil cry of a Maryandinian mourner' (935–9). The reception given by the chorus to Xerxes combines greeting and escort as well as lamentation.

The formal greeting, and escort to the palace ordered by the queen, confirm the status of the king. But what of the lament? The chorus hold Xerxes responsible for the Persian deaths (923), lament for the sufferings of the people and ask for the whereabouts of named notables. And Xerxes calls himself an evil for his family and fatherland (932–3). All this seems to threaten the status of the king. Structurally, the return of Xerxes occupies the place that in other tragedies is occupied by the report of a royal death.[42] From the beginning Xerxes laments as much for himself as for the lost army, and desires that he too should have died (908–17) – a *topos* of the lament.

This initiates a transformation of the choral grief for the Persian dead into grief for the living king. The focus of the lament shifts to the little that is left of his armour (his quiver), his isolation, his torn robe (1017–34). Then, after he states that he is 'stripped bare of escorts (*propompoi*)' (1036), everything that he subsequently utters is an order to the chorus.[43] They are to 'move to the house' (1038), and to 'cry out in response to me' (1040, 1048, 1066), to 'sing together [with me]' (1042), to lament 'for my sake' (1046), to tear their beards 'for me' (1056), and so on. He gives fourteen such orders, and to each of them the chorus respond by declaring their obedience. The traditional antiphony of the lament[44] could contain instructions, for instance when Aphrodite tells a chorus of girls to strike themselves and tear their clothes (Sappho *fr.* 140a). The tradition is used repeatedly by the king so as to establish his authority, to transform himself into the focus of grief and the chorus into escorts, who replace those he has lost.[45] The threat to the king is subtly transformed into its opposite by the lament.

Herodotos (6.58) states that the custom at the deaths of kings is 'the same' in Lakedaimon and Persia,[46] and describes (1) *compulsory* lamentation

[42] So West (1990) 6.
[43] Except 1070, which however functions like an order in that it is echoed by the chorus (so too 1074–5).
[44] Alexiou (1974) index s.v. antiphonal lamentation. [45] 530, 1036.
[46] He writes 'Asia' but in the next chapter makes it clear that he is thinking of Persia.

for people from all over Lakedaimon, and (2) the suspension there of assemblies or choosing of magistrates. A much later source[47] specifies that after the death of a Persian king there were five days of *anomia* (lawlessness), enhancing the eventual loyalty to the new king. The period of mourning was anyway likely to involve political conflict, and Briant assembles the evidence to suggest that this was indeed so.[48] Death ritual is for the monarchy a crisis overcome with the new king's receipt of the royal insignia, including the royal robe.[49]

Xerxes was also no doubt the visual focus, and may well have been on a cart, like a corpse in a funeral procession.[50] In the final line of the play the chorus say that they will 'escort (*pempsō*) you with harsh wails'. The effect is as of a funeral procession that moves – in a dual inversion of Greek practice – not from the house but towards it, escorting not a corpse but the living king. The power of grief installs the king in the palace.[51] This occurs in the same space in which Dareios earlier emerged from his tomb. Both the ritualised returns of the kings, both of them between death and life, father and son, confirm the monarchy.

Herodotos records the Greek perception of Persian lamentation:

> When the Persians saw their king (Cambyses) weeping, they all tore their garments and lamented abundantly. (3.66)[52]

The people in Sousa reacted to the disaster of Salamis thus:

> They all tore their clothes and howled and lamented insatiably, blaming Mardonios. They did this not out of concern for [what had happened to] the ships but in fear for Xerxes himself. And they continued thus until Xerxes himself arrived and stopped them. (8.99)

Similarly, in *Persians* the chorus' first anxiety was about the 'homecoming' of the king (8), and they end by lamenting the living king. The difference is that in *Persians* he encourages rather than stops the lament.

[47] Sext. Emp. *Adv. rhet.* 3.

[48] Notably after the death of Artaxerxes I: Briant (1991) 5–6.

[49] Briant (1991) 8.

[50] 1000–1 mentions the lack of followers behind the 'wheeled tent'. But Taplin (1977) 123 takes this to mean there is no wheeled tent either.

[51] Discussion has generally overlooked the finale's restorative function, perhaps because it seems incompatible with the wild lamentation. An exception is Kantzios (2004) 8. Griffith (2007) 128 suggests that the final scene 'contrives to leave open the precise degree to which élite family-oriented aspirations are being rejected or reaffirmed'. My view – that their *Athenian* rejection coexists with their imagined *Persian* reaffirmation – allows nevertheless some Athenian 'identification with the dynamics, needs, and fantasies of a dynastic household in the throes of an identity (or authority-) crisis' (Griffith), even in those numerous tragedies in which the (Greek) royal family is destroyed: Seaford (1994a) 344–60, (2000a) 43–4.

[52] For the living king (not for his imminent death, unmentioned in his announcement).

In tragedy the living are sometimes treated as if dead. Kassandra and Antigone both perform laments for themselves on their way to death. Pentheus is dressed, while alive, in his funerary attire. The Danaids sing 'living I honour myself with laments'.[53] But all these people are – in a context of intrafamilial violence – either about to die or threatening suicide. In tragedy household rituals (notably sacrifice, wedding, death ritual) generally express intrafamilial conflict, and so are perverted or at least abnormal, for instance in the employment of death ritual on the living. In *Persians* too death ritual confuses living with dead, but only – uniquely – so as to unite and strengthen the family, by establishing its awesome continuity over the division between life and death: the dead Dareios is brought to the world of the living, and Xerxes returns to power through being treated as if dead. Just as the initial royal entry from the palace halted any intended movement of the chorus towards a place of deliberation, so the final departure towards the palace reaffirms absolute royal control of both palace and 'town'. In *Agamemnon* the king returns victorious from Asia and enters the house like a barbarian monarch (919–20, 936), and with a hint of the death ritual that his wife will use to destroy him.[54] In *Persians* he enters the royal house with death ritual that confirms the solidarity and continuity of the royal family, thereby creating the closure that at the end of *Oresteia* is created by the founding of polis cult.

The final lament also encapsulates – and thereby embodies royal control of – *geographic* space. The narrative of Xerxes' return from Greece is quite different from Herodotos'. The messenger describes the robe-tearing and flight of Xerxes, and then narrates the long retreat of the army without mentioning him.[55] Elsewhere he has 'only just escaped' to Thrace (*Pers.* 565), travels the long distance 'alone, deserted, with hardly any men' (734), and arrives 'stripped of escorts' (1036). Moreover, the features picked out at the moment of his departure from Salamis – wailing, torn robes, aloneness, disorder – are precisely those that visibly and orally dominate his ritualised movement towards the house. It is as if the funeral procession began at Salamis. The geographic space is thereby imagined as both homogeneous and encapsulated in the visible ritualised space. Similarly, in *Agamemnon* and *Suppliants* imagining the bridal journey as a sea-voyage forms the basis for imagining actual sea-voyages (of Kassandra and the Danaids) as belonging to the wedding ritual evoked by their visible movement towards the royal house.

[53] *Su.* 116; Kassandra: *Ag.* 1322–3; S. *Ant.* 806–943; E. *Ba.* 857; Already in *Il.* 6.500.
[54] 10A, 11A. [55] Cf. Hdt. 8.113–20.

The encapsulation of geographic space by a procession controlled by king Xerxes implies royal control also over that geographic space. But we must be more specific. There are in the play two kinds of violence, the narrated destruction of the Persian military and the self-harm of the mourners. The women tear their garments (125). Xerxes tearing the robe that embodies his kingship is significant enough to be manifested in a dream to the queen and even in the underworld to Dareios, and is especially painful for the queen.[56]

It is only in the finale that this self-harm becomes visible. Xerxes is to be given a new robe, but appears in the robe that – he announces (1030) – he himself has torn. He then begins his instructions to the chorus, to which they declare obedience – not only to lament and escort him to the palace, but also to strike themselves, tear their robes, tear their beards, tear their hair, and to 'row, row and lament for my sake'. 'Rowing' describes rhythmical arm movements – towards the body or head – that were common in the lament. The same word is used for self-beating in the lament at the end of *Septem*: with the lament as following wind, a boat is to be rowed across the Acheron to Hades, with an allusion to the Athenian ship annually sent to Delos (9a). In *Persians* too the 'rowing' evokes actual ships, those destroyed by the Greeks.[57] If Xerxes is on a cart, then the evocation had a visual dimension (the Athenians were familiar with the arrival of a god on a cart imagined as a ship).[58] The choral self-harm imitates the disruption and suffering to which it is a response. The lament takes on the characteristics of what is being lamented, as in *Septem* (9a). Xerxes' orders ensure that the visible ritualised space encapsulates not only the geographic space between the battle of Salamis and Sousa but also the battle itself.

Such encapsulation is *political*. In telling the chorus to 'row, row and lament for my sake', Xerxes sets in motion a visual symbol of the disaster at Salamis. This self-beating is – along with scratching cheeks, tearing hair, tearing garments – the self-disfigurement that Aristotle said was in 'homoiopathy' (suffering similar things) with the dead.[59] The chorus assimilate themselves to the quasi-dead king as well as to the dead rowers of Salamis. But why should the king tell them to do this? Because in doing so they participate in the recuperation both of the military disaster and of the king. The wild expression of grief in Greek death ritual was a necessary stage in the eventual restoration of order, in the eventual incorporation of the dead into the next world and of the mourners back into this world. In

[56] 537, 468, 199, 836, 846. [57] Hall (1996) 20, 176.
[58] Chapter 8 n. 20. [59] Seaford (1994a) 86–7.

Persians too order is restored, by the merging of funerary ritual with the ritual by which the king is escorted and incorporated into his house. The Greeks associated such wild expressions of grief with Asian barbarians and with women,[60] and both these associations surely made more credible the sight of the practices functioning in *Persians* as expressions of subservience.

In all this the torn robes have a special place. They are a metaphor for the anxiety of the chorus (115), occur in the queen's dream (199), are known to the dead Dareios (833–6), and are finally strikingly visible in ritual (1060), and so – like other Aeschylean 'metaphors' (14B) – seem to acquire a metaphysical status, uniting and transcending privileged channels of experience (metaphor, mind, dream, underworld, ritual).[61] All this culminates in the tearing of the *royal* robe, which symbolises not only (as do the other forms of self-harm) the military defeat, but also the threat to the monarchy. Xerxes' order to the chorus to tear their robes uses the basic structure of funereal self-harm (temporary assimilation to the dead as a means of recuperating permanent order) to recuperate the monarchy. The Athenians who saw *Persians* were well aware that the Persian *monarchy* did not in reality suffer the irreparable blow that many critics think to see in the play.

12D PROCESSIONAL ENDINGS

Three Aeschylean plays complete their story: *Persians* as thematically self-contained, *Septem* and *Eumenides* as the final plays of trilogies. In all three, as well as in *Suppliants*, the final choral departure is *antiphonal* and *ritualised* – through lamentation (*Persians*, *Septem*), wedding song (*Suppliants*) and evocation of the procession at the Panathenaia (*Eumenides*).[62] All four escort one or more individuals to a place where they will stay, and in *Septem* and *Eumenides* it will be a place of polis cult. In *Persians*, *Septem* and *Eumenides* the person or persons escorted (*propempein*, or its noun *propompos*)[63] are ambivalent: their capacity to harm the community is or has been emphasised, but the escort is a communal honour.[64]

[60] See esp. Plut. *Sol.* 12 (the 'barbaric' practices of female lamentation); *Cho.* 423–8; Hall (1996) 169 (cf. 13); Garvie (2009) 340.

[61] Gödde (2000b) describes the the importance of this 'metaphor' for the play as a whole, but without mentioning its metaphysical or political significance.

[62] See 12C, 9A, 8A, and 15C (n. 44) respectively.

[63] *Pers.* 530; *Eum.* 1005; *Septem* 916. It is not coincidental that Aeschylus himself is at the end of Aristophanes' *Frogs* escorted (*propempein*) up out of Hades to save the polis – in a kind of funeral procession in reverse – by torchlight (cf. *Eum.*) and to the sound of his own songs (1524–7).

[64] *Pers.* 923–4, 932–4, 985; *Septem* 764–5, 882, 921–5, 995; *Eum.* 778–880.

Especially similar are the processions in *Persians* and *Septem*: the antiphony sometimes coincides with the feature of style I call form-parallelism (13AB), the chorus criticise in effect the king,[65] there is remarkable structural similarity,[66] and the lamentation fills the town.[67] But *politically* they are opposites. In *Septem* the procession takes the dead fratricides, the last of the royal line, from the royal house to a royal tomb controlled by communal cult. But in *Persians* the communal space is controlled from the royal house, and the lamenting procession escorts the living king to the royal house, somewhere within the quasi-urban complex. The confrontation – central to tragedy – of public and private space is precluded, as in the reality of Persia, by the identification of the two. Accordingly, the antiphonal form-parallelism of the final lamenting procession expresses in *Septem* the symmetrical mutuality of the royal fratricide, but in *Persians* the restored power of monarchy over mourners (13A). In this barbarian reversal of the norm a vital role is throughout played by space, which is dominated by royal entrance, chariot, tomb and procession.

12E WEALTH

In *Persians* the royal household is not so much set against the 'polis' as *inclusive* of it. In particular, the wealth (*ploutos* or *olbos*) of the Persian empire belongs – it is repeatedly stated or implied – to the king or household.[68] The royal family itself has an origin in gold.[69] And this forms a perfect opposition to the one mention of Greek wealth: the Persian queen asks whether the Athenians have sufficient wealth in their *domoi* (a term she has used of her *palace*: 159, 169), to which it is replied that the Athenians have a 'spring of silver, a treasury of the earth' (237–8), i.e. the silver mines at Laurium. As elsewhere in this passage (241, 243), the queen's question mistakenly projects Persian conditions onto Athens, and this emphasises the opposition between the (gold) wealth of Persia belonging to the royal *household* and the (silver) *communal* wealth of Athens springing from the earth. It is one of a series of political oppositions between the two societies in this play – for instance between the numerous names of great individuals in the Persian army and the absence of any name for an individual Greek.

[65] See previous note.

[66] (a) A choral act-dividing song (*Pers.* 852–907; *Septem* 822–47); (b) the arrival of Xerxes (*Pers.* 908–30) and of the corpses of Eteokles and Polyneikes (*Septem* 848–53); (c) strophic lamentation (*Pers.* 931–1001; *Septem* 854–960); (d) *antiphonal* strophic lamentation (*Pers.* 1002–77; *Septem* 961–1004). For detail, including the deletion of *Septem* 861–74, see Taplin (1977) 169–80.

[67] *Pers.* 1071; *Septem* 900.

[68] 3–4, 159, 163–9, 750–2, 754–6.

[69] 80. Zeus appeared as a shower of gold to impregnate Danae with Perseus.

The desire of the Greek tragic *turannos* for wealth and power creates intrafamilial conflict, whereas Xerxes' no less disastrous attempt to increase his family's wealth (754–6) is by the expansion of the empire. In contrast to both, the description of Athenian communal wealth from Laurium aligns it with that benevolence of the *earth* that contrasts with the dangerous acquisition of wealth through trade or warfare.[70]

[70] 9c. Nevertheless, the Athenian 'spring of silver, treasury of the earth' must have seemed no less unending than the inexhaustibility of the sea to which Klutaimestra assimilated the money of the household (11c).

PART IV

The unity of opposites

CHAPTER 13

Form-parallelism and the unity of opposites

The effect of monetisation on cosmology (in the broad sense), and the interaction of the aetiological with the monetised chronotope, were not confined to Aeschylus. I now turn to the relationship between Aeschylean and presocratic cosmology, in particular Herakleitos and Pythagoreanism. I begin with the interaction of the chronotopes in the *verbal texture* of the plays. Such interaction occurs through what the chronotopes have in common (7B): a traditional kind of utterance, which I call *form-parallelism*, expresses transition in the rite of passage, but also lends itself to the expression of the monetised chronotope, and so is an element common to the opposed chronotopes.

13A FORM-PARALLELISM[1]

By form-parallelism I mean the juxtaposition of separate semantic units (words, phrases or short sentences) that are parallel in syntax and in shape, often together with antithesis, assonance and asyndeton.

Consider part of the formula uttered by the Eleusinian initiates:[2]

> ἐκ τυμπάνου ἔφαγον, ἐκ κυμβάλου ἔπιον.
>
> From the tumpanon I ate, from the cymbal I drank.

The effect of the combination of form-parallelism and asyndeton is to convey a comprehensive unity consisting of separate actions, to encapsulate the ritual and express its completion.

From the mysteries of Attis has survived the formula that was also recited at the Athenian wedding:[3]

[1] This section builds on Seaford (2003a).
[2] Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 2.14.
[3] Dem. 18.259; Zenob. *Prov.* 3.98 (p. 82).

ἔφυγον κακόν, εὗρον ἄμεινον.

I fled from bad, I found better.

Here the comprehensive unity encapsulates transition (mystic, hymenaial). The actions are not just separate but antithetical, and yet are assimilated to each other. This implies a unity in opposition, enhanced in this case by both the sense and the *metrical* shape of the whole. Ritual form-parallelism seems to produce a subtle combination of antithesis, unity and comprehensiveness.

What is the point of this comprehensive unity-in-antithesis? Ritual may seek to create a paradigm of permanent order beyond the disordered, unstoppable flow of everyday events. One way of doing so is repetition, whether between successive performances of the same ritual or within the same performance. The symmetry or identity of separate actions, which challenges the irreversibility of change,[4] is expressed verbally in the form-parallelism. In the rite of passage, which negotiates fundamental and irreversible change, form-parallelism assimilates to each other the opposites through which mortals must move (notably death to life), using formal unity to impose completion (*telos*) on the uncontrollably linear flow of time.

This is illustrated also by the mystic formulae preserved on the famous gold leaves found in tombs, for instance:

νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου . . .

Now you died and now you were born . . .[5]

The fundamental transition of the mystic rite of passage, through death to life, is expressed in the formal equivalence between ἔθανες and ἐγένου. This form-parallelism – diluted by the metrical addition of 'and' (καὶ), but reinforced by the repetition of νῦν (now) – assimilates the opposites of dying and being born to each other.

The same mystic transition is expressed in form-parallelism by Pindar:

ὄλβιος ὅστις ἰδὼν κεῖν' εἶσ' ὑπὸ χθόνα·
οἶδε μὲν βίου τελευτάν.
οἶδεν δὲ διόσδοταν ἀρχάν·

Blessed is he who having seen those things will go beneath the earth.
He knows the ending of life.
He knows the god-given beginning. (*fr.* 137 Snell)

And on another gold leaf[6] a weaker form-parallelism (with *d'* as a metrically motivated connective) marks the mystic transition:

[4] Rappaport (1999) 187–8, 222, 225, 230–3. [5] GIJ no. 26a. [6] GIJ no. 5.

Κύκλο<ϋ δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο·
ἵμερτο<ῦ> δ' ἐπέβαν στεφάνο<ϋ> ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι·

I flew out of the painful circle of heavy grief.
I attained to the lovely crown with swift feet.

It is unclear what exactly the circle (κύκλος) is. To the extent that the escape from it is both temporal and spatial, we have a strikingly condensed embodiment of a chronotope. The escape seems to be from this world. Cosmic spatial transition is enjoined by a simple form-parallelism ὖε κύε at Eleusis (2E2).

Form-parallelism, rare in Homer, is common in tragedy and in lament. Tragic form-parallelism occurs largely in contexts of lamentation, but is influenced also by mystic form-parallelism. In both lamentation for heroes and mystic ritual there is a unity of life with death,[7] and both belong to the matrix from which tragedy emerged.[8] The mystic form-parallelism in Pindar *fr.* 137 is from a *lament*. Whereas in mystic ritual form-parallelism may express *transition*, in lamentation it goes with *antiphony*,[9] as in the final processions of *Persians* (between chorus and king) and of *Septem*. This coheres with the good reasons[10] for supposing the importance in proto-tragedy of antiphony between chorus and leading individual (*exarchōn*).[11] Further, such antiphony may already have expressed the kind of *tension* between ruler and chorus (6A) that we will discover in *Agamemnon* and *Persians*. But we start with *Septem*.

(1) In *Septem* form-parallelism occurs three times in the first, terrified, song of the chorus,[12] and frequently in their lament in the finale.[13] The only other instance expresses the inadequacy of ritual:

Τίς ἂν καθάρμους πόροι;
Τίς ἄν σφε λύσειεν; ὦ
πόνοι δόμων . . .

Who would provide purifications?
Who would release them? O
sufferings of the house . . .
(739–41)

[7] Seaford (2003a) 148. [8] Chapter 5 n. 54, 6B.
[9] In particular, dialogue between living and dead may have been important in the early lament (Alexiou (1974) 133–40): cf. the dialogue in the lament for Xerxes as if dead in *Persians*. The antiphony takes the form of question and answer in some epitaphs (Alexiou (1974) 138), and at S. *Trach.* 874–95; cf. *Cho.* 315–9, 419, 495–6, *Pers.* 955–73.
[10] Besides Aristot. *Poet.* §4 (4D), there are arguments based on the extant tragedies: Kranz (1933) 1–33; Thomson (1946) 184–7. One could lead off (ἐξάρχειν) the lament (*Il.* 18.51) as well as the dithyramb.
[11] 4D, 6A. [12] 87, 92, 135. [13] 904–5, 911–12, 961–5, 971–3, 989–95, 993, 998–1004.

From the final lament let us look at the most striking instances, firstly:

> Σιδαρόπληκτοι μὲν ὧδ' ἔχουσιν,
> σιδαρόπληκτοι δὲ τοὺς μένουσιν
> – τάχ' ἄν τις εἴποι, τίνες; –
> τάφων πατρώιων λαχαί.
>
> Struck by iron they are thus,
> Struck by iron await them
> – Someone may say, 'what?' –
> λαχαί of their paternal tombs.
> (911–14)

λαχαί is connected by the scholiast with λαχαίνω ('dig'), but also surely suggested λαγχάνω (obtain as portion; cf. 907 λαχαῖν). The brothers have inherited enough land to lie in, their grave, which is 'paternal' both because cruelly identified with their inheritance and because they will be buried along with their father (9D). The physical unity of (the fraternal blood of) this introverted family in the earth (e.g. 735–6) here seems to include even their father. And so the repeated *sidāroplēktoi* uses the solemn inevitability conveyed by ritual form-parallelism not only to assimilate the brothers to each other but also (with emphasis added by the inserted question) to assimilate their violence to (the digging of) their grave, an imaginative extension of self-harm assimilating itself to the dead (9A). Its effect is to assimilate extreme conflict to extreme unity, the fratricidal conflict to the introverted unity of their origin (paternal incest) and destination (paternal tomb). The fratricides return to the incestuous introversion of their origin (9D). The symmetry of form-parallelism, which may express the perfection of ritual, is here deployed to express the final implosion of the royal household.

It is to the same effect that – later in the lament – form-parallelism occupies almost half of the final forty-five lines of Aeschylus' play. The passage is corrupt, and at first sight may seem without substance, but is one of the most powerful in Aeschylus. It begins thus:

> – δορὶ δ' ἔκανες. – δορὶ δ' ἔθανες.
> – μελεοπόνος. – μελεοπαθής.
> – πρόκεισαι. – κατέκτας.
> – ἴτω γόος. – ἴτω δάκρυα.
>
> – With a spear you killed. – With a spear you died.
> – Having done wretchedly. – Having suffered wretchedly.
> – You are laid out. – You killed.
> – Let wailing flow. – Let tears flow. (962–5)

And before long mutual kin-killing is introduced:

– πρὸς φίλου ἔφθισο. – καὶ φίλον ἔκτανες.

– You were slain by your own. – And you killed your own. (971)

The coherence of form and content is striking. Firstly, the antithesis in each of lines 962–4 coincides with antiphony. Secondly, the antithetical form-parallelism expresses the conflict-within-unity of the fratricide. In contrast to *Choephoroi*, in which we shall soon see that form-parallelism expresses a *sequence* of killing and counter-killing, here it expresses their simultaneity (explicit at 990), even their *identity* – inasmuch as (a) being simultaneous, both killings are also counter-killings; (b) killing a brother is like killing self (9A), especially here where (c) the brothers are united by their introverted origin and by the identity of their mutual absolute violence;[14] (d) there is no differentiation whatsoever in the attitude to – or treatment of – the brothers in this lament or in the finale as a whole. It is throughout 962–4 impossible to tell which brother is being referred to, or even whether it is (despite the singular forms) in effect both simultaneously, and the same goes for much of the rest of the lament. Much would have depended on the bodily movements of the chorus. The laying out of the bodies is absorbed by form-parallelism into the overall symmetry of the fratricide,

– πρόκεισαι (you are laid out) – κατέκτας (you killed) (964),

with the result that the words

– διπλᾶ λέγειν (double to say) – διπλᾶ δ' ὁρᾶν (double to see) (972),[15]

and

– ὀλοὰ λέγειν (destructive/destroyed to say)
– ὀλοὰ δ' ὁρᾶν (destructive/destroyed to see) (993),[16]

[14] At 974 . . . ἀδέλφ' ἀδελφεῶν 'seems unavoidable' (West (1990) 124). And so the evils ('of the brothers') that once occupied the corrupt opening of the line (West suggests πέσεα δ', 'falls') are said to be themselves brothers to each other. (At the corresponding place in the antistrophe (985) we should surely read διπαλτ- not τριπαλτ-.)

[15] Cf. S. *OT* 1316–20 Oedipus: . . . οἴμοι, οἴμοι μάλ' αὖθις . . . Chorus: . . . διπλᾶ σε πενθεῖν καὶ διπλᾶ φορεῖν κακά.

[16] Ὀλοός generally means destructive, but in Aeschylus can also mean destroyed (*Pers.* 962).

express synaesthetic symmetry (this too expressed by form-parallelism) between verbal and visual symmetry. What is heard, what is seen, what has happened: all seem shaped by the power that unites identical antagonists. Even their mingled blood expresses their unity (940). The lament is assimilated to what is lamented (9A): after all, this is what had been made virtually explicit in the description of the lament as *itself* introverted,

αὐτόστονος αὐτοπήμων

self-lamenting, self-suffering.
(917)

But in the finale the conflict-within-unity acquires a perfection that is found in Herakleitos but might have been thought impossible for myth.

(2) In *Agamemnon* form-parallelism expresses the comprehensiveness of Klutaimestra's offerings:

ὑπάτων χθονίων
τῶν τε θυραίων τῶν τ' ἀγοραίων

(gods) on high, beneath the earth,
those of the doors and of the meeting-place.
(89–90)

But they have just been undermined by the negative comprehensiveness, expressed by the chorus in form-parallelism, of the ineffectiveness – in the situation – of all sacrificial offerings:

οὔθ' ὑποκαίων οὔτ' ἐπιλείβων

neither by burning sacrifices nor by libations [will you soothe divine anger].
(69)

From the beginning of the trilogy the solemnity of form-parallelism, whose normal function is to intensify the power of ritual, is used (as in *Septem*) to express its inadequacy.

Another use of form-parallelism is to greet Agamemnon:

πῶς σε προσείπω; πῶς σε σεβίξω
μήθ' ὑπεράρας μήθ' ὑποκάμψας
καιρὸν χάριτος;

How may I address you? How may I revere you,
neither overshooting nor falling short of
the mark of good will? (785–7)

Such questions (sometimes in form-parallelism), expressing hesitation, are typical of the enkomion and the lament.[17] This association with the lament may – along with other indications of death ritual in the greeting of Agamemnon[18] – seem in this context ominous.

Form-parallelism is frequent in the dialogue over the corpses of Agamemnon and Kassandra,[19] and once more the anomalous situation results in the absence or perversion of due ritual. The chorus ask

> Τίς ὁ θάψων *νιν*; τίς ὁ θρηνήσων;
>
> 'Who will bury him? Who will lament him?'
> (1541)

Here again the question evokes the funereal enkomion.[20] For his murderess to lament him will be

> ἄχαριν χάριν
>
> *charis* (benefit, benevolence) that is no *charis*.
> (1545)

Klutaimestra replies

> Πρὸς ἡμῶν
> κάππεσε κάτθανε, καὶ καταθάψομεν.
>
> By us
> he fell, he died, and we will bury [him].
> (1551–3)

And to the chorus' question,

> ἰὼ <ἰὼ> βασιλεῦ βασιλεῦ,
> πῶς σε δακρύσω;
> φρενὸς ἐκ φιλίας τί ποτ' εἴπω;
>
> Io Io my king my king,
> how shall I weep for you?
> From a friendly mind what can I say?
> (1513–15)[21]

[17] Sources: Thomson (1953) 81–2; Alexiou (1974) 161–5.
[18] 895–902: Seaford (1984b) 254.
[19] 1410, 1456, 1465, 1485–6, 1489, 1527, 1541, 1553, 1562.
[20] The form-parallelism expresses both the solemn intensity of lament and its impossibility; similar is *Cho*. 88.
[21] Repeated from 1489–91.

she replies, again with (antithetical) form-parallelism, that he is

> ἄξια δράσας, ἄξια πάσχων
>
> having done ἄξια, suffering ἄξια.
> (1527)[22]

The form-parallelism of lamentation is here extended to express the reciprocal violence that lamentation did indeed inspire.[23] The remorselessness of this reciprocity is then stated in (weak) antithetical form-parallelism as a general principle:

> ὄνειδος ἥκει τόδ' ἀντ' ὀνείδους,
> δύσμαχα δ' ἐστὶ κρῖναι.
> φέρει φέροντ', ἐκτίνει δ' ὁ καίνων.
>
> This insult has come in exchange for insult,
> and they are hard to separate/judge.
> He plunders the plunderer, the killer pays.
> (1560–2)

The insults are 'hard to separate': each is described with the same word as the one it punishes (ἄξια, ὄνειδος, φερ-). 'To separate' (κρῖναι) also means 'to judge', because judgement means distinguishing one (as justified) from another. As it is, each blow provokes an identical counter-blow, and produces the unlimitedness of the reciprocal violence embodied in the 'insatiable' (1484 *akorestos*) *daimōn* of the household. In Aeschylus form-parallelism is used to express not just the failure of ritual but even the impossibility of the closure that – when used in ritual – it affirms. The absolute unity of opposites (opposed acts of violence) is the victory of the unlimited.

(3) In *Choephoroi* too form-parallelism expresses the seemingly inevitable continuation of reciprocal violence, for instance at 306–13,[24] which I translated in IIC.

> Ἀλλ' ὦ μεγάλαι Μοῖραι, Διόθεν τῆιδε τελευτᾶν
> ᾗι τὸ δίκαιον μεταβαίνει.
> Ἀντὶ μὲν ἐχθρᾶς γλώσσης ἐχθρὰ γλῶσσα τελείσθω.
> Τοὐφειλόμενον πράσσουσα Δίκη μέγ' ἀυτεῖ.
> Ἀντὶ δὲ πληγῆς φονίας φονίαν πληγὴν τινέτω.

[22] Having got what he deserved (ἄξιος means deserving); cf. *Ag.* 1564, *Cho.* 314. On the textual problem see Seaford (2003a) 142.

[23] Seaford (1994a) 74–105. [24] Also at 461, 469–70.

The hope of closure (τελευτᾶν) expressed in the first line is immediately undermined by the symmetry of violence implied by the form-parallelism between the third and the fifth line as well as within each of them.[25] For why should the same principle not apply to each successive identical blow? The completion (τελείσθω) inherent in each act of revenge in fact *precludes* completion of the chain. The unity of lamentation with revenge and the consequent difficulty of stopping the suffering are both expressed in form-parallelism in this same lament (327–8, 469–70).

Once the murders are performed, Orestes is faced with the physical object that brings him closest to the corpse of his father, his shroud, which he now addresses with the hesitant questioning that typically initiates funereal praise of the dead (997),[26] culminating in

> νῦν αὐτὸν αἰνῶ, νῦν ἀποιμώζω παρών,
> πατροκτόνον γ' ὕφασμα προσφωνῶν τόδε.
>
> *Now* I praise him. *Now* I, being present, lament him,
> addressing this father-killing textile. (1014–15)

This too evokes the form-parallelism of funereal language, while stressing the presence (παρών) that seems to remedy his earlier complaint that he was not present (8 οὐ . . . παρὼν) to lament his father at his funeral. Ritual normality has been restored, it seems. But this shroud is also the unlimited instrument with which his mother killed his father (11C), with the result that the typical hesitancy of his question at 997 in fact expresses an anomalous aporia (as *Ag.* 785–7). There follows almost immediately the frenzy that will issue in his departure pursued by the Erinues, with final choral despair of any conclusion.

(4) *Persians* is, again, the exception. Whereas elsewhere in Aeschylus form-parallelism expresses anomalous death ritual in the context of endophony, and the subversion of *telos*, in *Persians* it is used eventually to reaffirm the authority of the undivided royal family.

After the news of defeat the chorus lament thus:

> Ξέρξης μὲν ἄγαγεν, ποποῖ.
> Ξέρξης δ' ἀπώλεσεν, τοτοῖ.

[25] Within the fifth we must speak of chiastic form-parallelism (unless we reverse the order of πληγῆς and φονίας).
[26] Thomson (1953) 81–2.

Xerxes led them, popoi.
Xerxes destroyed them, totoi.
(550–1, cf. 560–1)

Form-parallelism expresses here the central antithesis of the play: in the person of the king are united the opposites of leader and destroyer of his own people. Here, in contrast to *Oresteia*, transition is completed, albeit from proud power to nothingness, paradoxically endowed with the solemn intensity of form-parallelism. But crucially, the same intensity soon reaffirms the authority of the monarchy, in the words of the chorus before the ghost of Dareios:

σέβομαι μὲν προσιδέσθαι,
σέβομαι δ' ἀντία λέξαι.

I feel awe in looking at you.
I feel awe in speaking face to face with you.
(694–5)[27]

And in the finale the frequent use of form-parallelism[28] intensifies the emotional power of the lament. This affirms the power of Xerxes, not least when it coincides with antiphony (12c), for instance in what are almost their departing words:

Xerxes: ἰωὰ δὴ κατ' ἄστυ
Chorus: ἰωὰ δῆτα, ναὶ ναί.

Xerxes: [cry] *iōa* throughout the town
Chorus: *iōa* indeed, yes yes. (1071–2)

In general the aesthetic power of ritual language tends to preserve a narrowly defined view of the world.[29] Form-parallelism in ritual is a powerful expression of controlled symmetry and completion. But in Aeschylus it is often used to express the deferral or subversion of completion, to create anxiety about the future, to express the *unlimited*, in which the *transition* from one opposite to another is transformed into the *unity* of opposites. Eventually in *Eumenides*, by contrast, the limiting power of ritualised speech (the Erinues' binding song, the oath)[30] will yield rather to the saving power of verbal persuasion.

[27] Cf. also 647, 675, 694–5, 700–1. [28] 936, 985, 1004, 1010, 1039, 1071–2.
[29] Bloch (1989) 19–45. [30] 307–53, 432.

13B THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES

The mystic formula 'now you died and now you were born, thrice blessed, on this day' (13A) expresses the transition from death to rebirth, but its form-parallelism together with the repeated 'now' implies the simultaneity – even the unity – of the opposites of death and rebirth.[31] The same ambivalence inheres also in most of the other instances of mystic form-parallelism quoted in 13A, as well as in the fifth-century mystic formula[32] βίος θάνατος βίος, 'life death life', which could express a transition through death back to life as well as the identity of life and death. Form-parallelism may express the transition between opposites, but also their unity.

Similar is the lamenting form-parallelism in *Septem*, *Agamemnon*, and *Choephoroi*, but here the emphasis is not so much on transition as on the identity of the opposed acts of violence. The verbal expression of ritual completion is in *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* subverted by the seemingly unlimited cycle of revenge into an expression of the unity of opposites. Form-parallelism continues to express the aetiological chronotope (transition) in its form, but its content expresses the predominance of the monetised chronotope (the unlimited).

In *Septem* the unity of opposites is taken to its extreme. Not only are the opposed acts of violence *identical* (as in *Oresteia*), they are also *simultaneous*, and even the opposed *perpetrators* of the violence are assimilated to each other. The result is that whereas in *Oresteia* the seemingly endless concatenation of identical opposed acts of violence is in fact ended at Athens by the founding of lawcourt and cult, in the finale of the Theban trilogy the mutual destructiveness is unlimited and what survives of the royal family is only pollution and hero-cult. In both cases the self-destructiveness involves *temporal circularity*: in *Oresteia* the passage between identical acts is in a sense a return to the same point, and in *Septem* the fratricides are represented as returning to their incestuous origin (9D). One of our instances of mystic form-parallelism, by contrast, speaks of *escape* from the grievous circle (13A).

Let us look more closely at our instances of Aeschylean form-parallelism (13A).

> You were slain by your own. – And you killed your own.
> (*Septem* 971)

[31] Cf. S. *OT* 438, *El.* 1314–15.

[32] From fifth-century Olbia: West (1983) 17–19. For fifth-century Dionysiac initiation at Olbia see Hdt. 4.79.

Here there is antithesis both between the parallel limbs (passive/active) and within each limb (killing your own). And all four terms apply to each of the fratricides.

> He plunders the plunderer. The killer pays.
> (*Ag.* 1562)

Here there is, within each limb, both form-parallelism and antithesis. And all four terms apply equally to all participants in the cycle of revenge. The first limb, φέρει φέροντ᾽, consists of the same word repeated to express the antithesis (subject is also object). This stylistic feature, the starkest form of antithetical form-parallelism, marks another of our instances, ἄχαριν χάριν (the 'un-benevolent benevolence' of Klutaimestra lamenting her murdered husband).[33] The juxtaposition (or near-juxtaposition) of two words antithetical in sense (oxymoron) expresses antithesis but also unity. In tragedy it expresses the unity of the opposites inherent in *killing your own*,[34] and the unity of life and death.[35] Antithetical form-parallelism is the ritually derived mode of expressing the *unity of opposites*, which is largely absent from Homer but fundamental to tragedy.[36]

In the dialogue between Klutaimestra and chorus over the corpses (13A) we find the successive killings in the family attributed to a supernatural being (*daimōn* or *alastōr*), whom Klutaimestra claims to embody and whom the chorus call insatiable (*akorestos*). They immediately invoke – in striking form-parallelism – Zeus as the cause of all things, without whom nothing is brought to completion (*teleitai*) (1484–7). Comparably, in *Suppliants*, it is the lack of the prospect of completion (*telos*) that triggers invocation of the completing power of Zeus (8B). And in both plays the prospect of endless intrafamilial conflict goes with the subversion of ritual – sacrifice and death ritual in *Agamemnon*, marriage ritual in *Suppliants*.

Yet another such a crisis, also triggering invocation of Zeus, was reached earlier in *Agamemnon*. This requires a section to itself.

13C THE SCALES OF ZEUS

The choral narrative of the events at Aulis in *Agamemnon* is interrupted by three stanzas celebrating Zeus, of which the first is this:

[33] Similar content in form-parallelism: *Cho.* 88, 145–6 (cf. 44): Seaford (2003a) 149–50.
[34] *Su.* 225, *Sept.* 681, 695, 718, 940, *Ag.* 1272, *Cho.* 600; S. *El.* 1154; E. *El.* 1230, *Hel.* 690.
[35] E.g. *Cho.* 504, 886 (kin-killing); S. *Trach.* 1163, *OT* 438, *El.* 1314–5, *Ant.* 1167.
[36] Seaford (2003a) 147.

Zeus, whoever he is, if to be called by this name is pleasing to him, thus do I address him. I am unable to liken (οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι) him to anything, putting all things on the scales (πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος), except Zeus, if from my mind I am to throw off truly the vain weight. (160–6)

The passage has not been well served by the commentators, in three ways.[37]

(1) It has not been observed that the first stanza evokes the scales that in the *Iliad* decide the outcome of battle and are operated by Zeus.[38] These scales are evoked later in this play (436–7) as well as in at least some of the numerous instances of the live 'metaphor' of scales in Aeschylus,[39] and were the central theme of his (lost) *Psychostasia*.

(2) Commentators have failed to understand the 'abrupt' connection of the invocation with the preceding narrative,[40] which it interrupts after these words:

for there remains a frightening, resurgent guileful housekeeper, unforgetting, child-avenging wrath. Such fated things did Kalchas cry out with great good things for the royal house from the birds on the way. Consonant with these things say woe, woe, but may the good be victorious (αἴλινον αἴλινον εἰπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω). (156–9)

Αἴλινον is a ritual cry of lament. Its repetition, together with the antithetical imperative clauses, has the solemn effect of ritual form-parallelism. However, once again, the antithesis expresses not transition but ambivalence, the uncertainty of the outcome.

This ambivalence is 'consonant' with what Kalchas has just inferred from the omen of the eagles devouring the pregnant hare: the capture of Troy, but also the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (a 'maker of quarrels') and the resulting child-avenging wrath remaining in the house. And Kalchas calls the omen

> δεξιὰ μὲν κατάμομφα δὲ.
>
> favourable on the one hand, inauspicious on the other.
> (145)

Further, it is ambivalent not only in Kalchas' interpretation but also in his description of it, as

[37] For more detail see Seaford (2010a).

[38] Their inclination is caused either by the (weights of) the two fates put there by Zeus (8.69–72, 22.209–19) or directly by Zeus (19.223–4). Cf. 14.99, 16.658.

[39] *Pers.* 346, 437, 440, *Su.* 403, 405, 605, 823, 982, *Sept.* 21, *Ag.* 251, 349, 574, 707, 1042, 1272, *Cho.* 61, 240, *Eum.* 888; Seaford (2003a) 154.

[40] Dawe (1966) even transposes the invocation to after 217.

αὐτότοκον πρὸ λόχου μογερὰν πτάκα θυομένοισι.
(136)

For this can mean not only 'sacrificing the poor trembling hare with her young before birth', but also 'sacrificing the poor trembling girl, his own offspring, before the army'.[41] Earlier we saw that this (sacrificial) omen somehow *required* the sacrifice of Iphigeneia as in various respects its *complementary extreme opposite*. In both sacrifices the closest tie (parent with child) is violently destroyed; but in the former the uncontrolled violence in the wild is between two different species, whereas in the latter the controlled violence is within the family (11A). Now more has emerged: this mysterious unity of opposites is in fact there already in the ambivalent description of the omen.

There are then two aspects of the connection between the invocation and the narrative it interrupts. The first is that – as elsewhere in Aeschylus – intrafamilial conflict together with the subversion of ritual excludes all prospect of completion, and this requires the intervention of Zeus. This crisis of the unlimited is also a crisis of the unity of opposites (15BC). The unlimited and the unity of opposites go together (as in the monetised chronotope). The unity of opposites is imagined as equilibrium, which requires the *scales* of Zeus to end the ambivalence and uncertainty.

In *Suppliants* two appeals to the *scales* of Zeus are prompted by the two crises of the play, in which things can go either way. One is the dilemma of Pelasgos over whether to protect the suppliant Danaids: 'I am at a loss, and fear holds my mind, whether to act or not to act' (379–80). The Danaids' response includes reference to Zeus's power to incline the scales – in a rare instance of form-parallelism in the play (404). The other crisis is the aggressive arrival of the Aegyptiads, which causes the Danaids to say to Zeus: 'yours altogether is the beam of the scales. What is *teleion* (authoritative, completed) for mortals without you?' (822–4).[42]

The invocation of Zeus in *Agamemnon* projects the unity of opposites onto an instrument, the cosmic scales, by which opposites can – by Zeus inclining the scales – be differentiated. Accordingly, the two following stanzas (15C) describe temporal completion, the transition from (cosmic) conflict to the permanent rule of Zeus. The invocation implies an *interconnected cosmos*.

[41] Lawson (1932) 113.

[42] The association of scales with *telos* is already implicit in Homer. Deity may 'stretch out equally the *telos* of war' (*Il.* 20.101; cf. Hes. *Theog.* 638) and 'stretch out' the scales that decide the battle: *Il.* 8.69, 22.209; an evenly balanced conflict is compared to balanced scales: *Il.* 12.433–6; Hes. *Op.* 669.

(3) The phrase οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι (163) is generally misunderstood.[43] The invocation moves from the traditional doubt about the nature of the deity being addressed to a novel idea, that he is incomparable to anything else,[44] and then – with the idea of weighing – to the impossibility of *equivalence*.[45] To οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι there is nothing similar in Greek literature, except for when later in the same trilogy Orestes says of the libations offered by Klutaimestra to the dead Agamemnon οὐκ ἔχοιμ᾽ ἂν εἰκάσαι τάδε | τὰ δῶρα (*Cho.* 518–19). Usually this is translated 'I would not know *to what* to liken (compare) these gifts'. But this makes no sense here. It means rather 'I would not be able to liken these gifts',[46] in the sense of regarding them as *equivalent* to the blood spilt. Here too, as in the parodos, the expression is used elliptically, and the point becomes clear in the very next words:

> They [the gifts] are less than the offence. For even if someone were to pour out[47] all things (πάντα) in exchange for (ἀντί) one bloodshed, it would not work. (519–21)

That is why (a fortiori) there is no *equivalence* between Klutaimestra's offerings and the blood shed.[48] Similarly, οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι means 'I am unable to liken [Zeus to anything]' in the sense that there is nothing *equivalent* to him. Even putting all things on the scales (πάντ᾽ ἐπισταθμώμενος) is not equivalent to Zeus.

And so the positive outcome is based not so much on Zeus's (Homeric) *control* of the cosmic scales as on the novel idea that all the commodities that you might put on the scales are not *equivalent* to him, as if he weighed more than all of them put together. Ideas that may at first seem nonsensical sometimes open new vistas. The significance of this particular strange idea, and its place in an interconnected cosmos, will emerge in the next chapter.

[43] Smith (1980) resorts to claiming that the unspoken direct object of προσεικάσαι (meaning 'find an identity for') is the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. But it is about the identity of *Zeus* that they have just stated their uncertainty.

[44] There are accordingly none of the epithets, names or indications of the god's nature that are usually found along with the formula of doubt (Pulleyn (1997) 96–115).

[45] Εἰκάζειν could mean to estimate quantity or weight: *PSI* 5.522; *P.Gurob*. 8.14: both third century; cf. E. *El.* 559 (numismatic).

[46] Or, with τόδε rather than τάδε, 'liken this', but this gives an oddly postponed δέ in the next sentence.

[47] Ἐκχέω, used of wealth in general at e.g. *Pers.* 826, S. *El.* 1291.

[48] Cf. the Homeric Achilles claiming that no amount of wealth is equal in value to his own ψυχή (life, soul: *Il.* 9.401); Chapter 3 n. 16. On the relation of these passages to monetisation see Seaford (2004a) 301–5. There could be no monetary compensation for murder in classical Athens. Cf. *Cho.* 372, 733.

CHAPTER 14

Aeschylus and Herakleitos

14A THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES AND THE UNLIMITED

At the heart of *Oresteia* is the problem of the insatiable cycle of violent revenge, associated with the insatiable cycle of the accumulation of monetised wealth. Both cycles consist of continuing exchanges between two identical parties. This identity of opposed transactors is powerfully expressed in form-parallelism. In this way a ritual form is used to express the subversion, by an unlimited cycle, of the limit generally imposed by ritual.

Similarly, in Herakleitos the unity of opposites, expressed in form-parallelism, is in part a projection of the endless cycle of monetised exchange, in which the *opposition* between the parties to exchange derives in part from the ancient reciprocity of revenge. This latter, regulated by polis-enforced monetary compensation for injury, had earlier been projected onto the cosmos as an endless cycle by Anaximander. In *Oresteia*, as in Ionian presocratic philosophy, the cycles of hostile reciprocity and of the monetised accumulation of individual wealth cannot be entirely separated from each other.

Presocratic philosophy imagines an *impersonal* cosmos in a manner influenced by the cycle of violence subordinated to the newly monetised polis. *Oresteia* dramatises – also in a manner influenced by the monetised polis – a pre-monetary *myth* of cyclical violence that can be resolved only by projection onto the cosmos. In this way two forms of public wisdom – 'philosophy' and tragedy – converge, both embodying the interconnection of archaic cosmology with the social processes of the archaic polis.

Nevertheless, when Athenian tragedy is discussed in relation to philosophy, the philosophy is generally Plato and Aristotle, and – for Euripides – the sophists. In fact Aeschylus was a contemporary of Herakleitos and of early Pythagoreanism. The relationship between Aeschylus and presocratic thought is oddly underexplored, and the little work that

has been done seems to me on the whole misconceived. By far the fullest account, by Rösler,[1] is largely negative in its conclusions. His comparison of Aeschylus with Herakleitos is limited to a single passage,[2] which he rightly regards as not demonstrating influence. Others have compared other passages of Aeschylus with Herakleitos, but their attempts to demonstrate influence seem to me unsuccessful.

I have no concern with the unanswerable question of whether Aeschylus was familiar with the work of Herakleitos. It will emerge that I understand the similarities between the cosmologies of Herakleitos and Aeschylus in relation to the kind of society in which they both lived. The extent to which presocratic cosmology derives from observation or experimentation or logic is minimal. It derives rather in large part from preconceptions rooted in the changing life of the polis. Cosmological ideas reflect social formation, and city-states undergoing the same kind of socio-economic development may either themselves independently produce similar ideas or act as fertile ground for the spread of ideas.[3] In this context similarities between ideas cannot be reduced to a series of influences by one known individual on another.[4]

It has been recognised that the unity of opposites is an idea present in Aeschylus as well as Herakleitos, but the material has not been explored sufficiently to avoid the easy misconception[5] that Aeschylus evaluates the idea positively, as a basic feature of the cosmos (as Herakleitos does). Here again, I understand the *differences* between their cosmologies in relation to their different positions within the polis (16C).

Herakleitos describes and illustrates his principle of the unity of opposites as follows:

> They do not understand how in being drawn apart it agrees with itself; back-turning fitting-together (παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη) as of bow and lyre. (B51)

Bow and lyre are both constituted by opposing forces on string. They do not merely *illustrate* the principle, they also *embody* it. Numerous other fragments[6] illustrate the various ways in which the unity of opposites

[1] Rösler (1970). A short recent survey is Allan (2005). Moreau (1985) and Deforge (1986) both almost entirely ignore the presocratics, except for some remarks by Moreau (289–91) on Herakleitos, on which see n. 5 below.

[2] Of *Ag.* 160–7 with Hklt. B30.

[3] Seaford (2004a).

[4] Scholars imagine the past in terms of their own activity (the transmission of ideas from one writer to another): it has even been proposed that the notion of '(mere) seeming to be' was derived by Aeschylus (*Ag.* 988–9) from Parmenides: Kouremenos (1993).

[5] In Gladigow (1962), esp. 328, and Moreau (1985) 289–91. Accordingly Moreau characterises the struggle between Chaos and Cosmos expressed in tragedy as 'éternellement recommencé' (333).

[6] See further KRS 186–94.

pervades the Herakleitean cosmos, in which all things happen according to a single principle (B1, etc.). For instance, 'God is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger' (B67). This idea is not a Herakleitean invention. It is found in contemporary evidence for mystery-cult, for instance in the words 'peace war truth falsehood' scratched on one of the Olbian bone plates.[7]

Scales, like bow and lyre, are a simple instrument embodying opposed equal forces (unity of opposites). The inclining of scales by the Homeric Zeus has the mysterious effect of deciding combat. The interconnection this implies between human combat and divine scales is undefined, and hardly to be compared with the interconnection implied by the pervasiveness of the Herakleitean unity of opposites. But what of the frequent evocations of the divine scales in Aeschylus? In *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* (13B, 15B), as in Herakleitos, we find a pervasiveness of the unity of oppposites (from everyday objects to the cosmos as a whole) that articulates (circular) temporal *unlimitedness* and is expressed in *form-parallelism*.

All three features occur in a fragment of Herakleitos:

Τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν αὐαίνεται, καρπαλέον νοτίζεται.

The cold things are heated, hot is cooled, wet is dried, dry is wetted. (B126)

The circularity of these transformations occurs on a small scale but is also fundamental to the cosmos, and the chain of form-parallelism here assimilates the opposite transformations to each other and has the effect of implying endless circularity (Herakleitos' cosmos has no temporal limit, B30). Compare

ψυχῆισιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δε θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι· ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

For souls [it is] death to become water, for water death to become earth; and from earth water comes into being, and from water soul. (B36)

In mystic initiation the soul may pass through the cosmic elements,[8] and form-parallelism is used to express its *transition*, sometimes from death to life and in one case as *escape* from the 'circle' (13A). But Herakleitos here uses it to express the *circular* cosmic passage of the soul, which does not have spatial 'limits' (B45). The contrast becomes even clearer when we compare

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες

[7] Chapter 13 n. 32. [8] Seaford (1986).

immortals mortals, mortals immortals, living the death of those, dying the life of those. (B62)

with the (roughly) contemporary mystic formula

βίος θάνατος βίος

life death life. (13C)

They both seem to combine the unity of opposites with circularity, but the latter also implies transition.

Mystery-cult influenced the cosmology of Herakleitos in both presentation (form-parallelism, enigmatic style) and content (not least the unity of opposites).[9] And we have identified mystery-cult as contributing to emergent tragedy,[10] not least in its encapsulation of cosmic space, in which there is experienced the unity of opposites (especially of life with death, of above with below) and the interconnection of the cosmos.

However, in both Herakleitos and Aeschylus, and despite the difference of genre and theme, form-parallelism is used to express not completion (as in mystic ritual) but its opposite, unlimited circularity – in Herakleitos of the cosmic process, with each element being constantly transformed into its opposite, but in *Oresteia* of successive acts of violence, opposed but identical (13B), in which kin (*philos*) is enemy[11] and living is dead: Orestes is reported dead,[12] the dead Agamemnon is aroused,[13] and the dead Klutaimestra is vigorously present,[14] implying a unity of cosmic opposites, of below with above.

14B METAPHOR AND COSMOLOGY

Herakleitean bow and lyre, and the Aeschylean scales, are all everyday instruments that embody the balance of forces (unity of opposites). But scales also express the *predominance* of one opposed force over the other, and accordingly do not appear in the extant fragments of Herakleitos. In the parodos of *Agamemnon* Zeus's power to *incline* the scales implies a cosmology quite different from Herakleitos', for it gives hope for the permanent *resolution* of the crisis of the unlimited (unity of opposites) at Aulis (13B). To this consequence of the scales we will return.

[9] Seaford (1986). [10] 5A; Seaford (1994a) 235–327.
[11] E.g. *Ag.* 1374–5, *Cho.* 993; cf. *Ag.* 1272, *Cho.* 614–15.
[12] Giving rise to *Cho.* 886 'I say the dead are killing the living.'
[13] *Cho.* 504 'you have not died even though you died'. [14] *Eum.* 94–139.

Here we are concerned with the aspect of divine power. The scales are traditionally a divine instrument that reflects and determines human combat. Is the allusion to them in the parodos of *Agamemnon* merely metaphorical, an attempt to imagine deity in human terms, or does it imply divine control of events?

The question is unanswerable, but light can be shed on it by investigating other Aeschylean channels of interaction between gods and men: omen, dream, curse and ritual.[15]

It is an *omen* (of eagles and hare) at Aulis that leads to the invocation of the scales. It strikingly embodies the unity of opposites (13B), of familial closeness with murderous violence, and is a channel of communication between gods and men.

In Aeschylus two *dreams* are narrated. In *Persians* the queen dreams of two sisters, one in Persian dress who inhabits the 'barbarian' land, the other in Doric dress who inhabits Greece. Kinship between Greeks and Persians is implied also by the allusion to Perseus as the ancestor of the Persians at 79–80. Making Persia and Greece (or Asia and Europe) *sisters* differs from the idea of a Greek *ancestor* for the Persians, and makes the enemies oddly close. But it has the advantage of expressing the unity of opposites. The sisters come into conflict, and Xerxes 'yokes' them like horses to a chariot. The former obeys the reins but the latter struggles, with the result that the chariot crashes (179–99). This is made a reality by Xerxes' disastrous 'yoking'[16] of the Hellespont (i.e. of Asia with Europe) punished by Zeus (739–51), which is also in effect an (unlimited) unity of opposites.

In the other Aeschylean dream-narrative Klutaimestra gives birth to a snake, which sucks from her breast blood in the milk (*Cho.* 526–50). In both dreams, just as in the omen, human–animal equivalence (itself a confusion of opposites) expresses the unity of conflicting kin. In Klutaimestra's dream the (self-destructive) unity is the most intimate of all unities – between mother and newborn child.[17]

Our next privileged channel is the *curse*. Dominating the second half of *Septem* is the curse uttered by Oedipus against his sons, to be completed by the Erinus, to the effect that they should divide their inheritance by iron (*Septem* 785–91). It was probably dramatised in a preceding play of the trilogy (*Oedipus*), and – to judge from the other mentions of it in

[15] The channels may be opened by gods (omen, dream) or by men (ritual, curse). The curse deploys, and is implemented by, divine beings.

[16] Cf. 66–72, 722–5, 744–51; Taplin (1977) 78.

[17] Blood is *juxtaposed* with 'dear milk' (546). In Stesichoros (219 *PMG*) her dream contains the snake–human equivalence, but not the unity of opposites (violence between mother and child).

Septem[18] – referred to iron as *reconciling* the brothers: this means both fraternal amity and fratricide. As in omen and dreams, the reality indicated is a unity of the opposites of familial closeness and violent conflict.

The privileged channels convey a similar structure, and sometimes seem to converge or even merge. At the climax of *Septem* Eteokles, about to depart for the fratricide, associates *curse* with *dream*:

> For the curse of Oedipus has made it[19] seethe. Too true are the visions of phantasms of sleep, dividing the paternal possessions. (709–11)

Whether or not this dream was narrated earlier in the trilogy, its content overlaps with the curse. Another example of convergence is the Persian queen rising from her *dream*, and – as she prepares to make *sacrifice* – encounting an *omen* at the altar (200–10), which is yet another instance of the human–animal equivalence: a hawk attacks an eagle.

The omen at Aulis is also a 'sacrifice' (13C), i.e. a *ritual* – our remaining channel of human–divine interaction. Ritual with its *aition* often embodies the unity of basic opposites (human–animal, life–death), especially in the liminal stage of a transition. Pre-matrimonial girls become 'bears' at Brauron (2G). A mystic initiand is told that 'a ram you fell into the milk' or that he has become a god.[20] These are not so much metaphors as imagined *transformations* that unite basic opposites. The Athenian formula of betrothal 'for the ploughing of legitimate children' is not so much metaphorical as the imagining of something shared between human and agricultural reproduction.

Similarly, in Aeschylus, Aphrodite's description of the sky's sexual longing for the earth (17C) is not a metaphor. What appears metaphorical may in fact instantiate an unfamiliar cosmology. Naturally enough such instantiations congregate within channels of divine–human interaction: omen, dream, curse and ritual. But they may not be confined to such channels. The conveying of structurally similar content by convergent channels of divine–human interaction may seem to extend to what we call metaphor or even simile. For instance, Kalchas' equation of the eagles (killing a pregnant hare) with the Atreidai (in the omen at Aulis) seems to reverse the simile earlier in the same narrative (50–9), in which the Atreidai are compared with vultures who have *lost* their offspring and a god sends an Erinus to punish the offence. The simile embodies a divine principle that transcends the difference between human and animal.

[18] 709–11, 766–7, 884–6. [19] The λῆμα (desire, spirit) of Eteokles or perhaps of the *daimōn*.
[20] 13A; god: GIJ nos. 3 and 5.

Ritual in Aeschylus, like the other channels of divine human–interaction, unites the opposites of familial intimacy and murderous violence even as it confuses human with animal. For instance, the comparison of Kassandra to a captured wild animal belongs both to her assimilation to a bride and to her role along with Agamemnon in the domestic sacrifice being prepared by Klutaimestra (10A).

This is not the only comparison of bride to animal in *Agamemnon*. In the choral narrative of the arrival of Helen at Troy the chorus describe a lion-cub reared in a house. At first the cub is gentle and delightful (721–2), but eventually 'showed the character it had from its parents' (727–8) by killing many people in the house. Helen, continue the chorus, came to Troy as a 'gentle delight of wealth', but deviated to accomplish 'bitter endings of the wedding', as an Erinus that makes brides cry. Whereas the bridal animal is normally a calf or filly, here she is a lion, the animal to which *warriors* are compared. Where the bridal animal is normally tamed by marriage, here it passes from tameness to savagery. What is normally overcome in the wedding process (bridal tears, bridal savagery) prevails at its end. The symbolism of the whole reproductive process is put into reverse.

What this means is that, once again, a fundamental transition is negated by the unity of opposites. The bride is tamed, so that society can reproduce. But the lion eventually 'showed the character from its parents' (727–8). Along with the delightfulness, the savagery was always there: as a cub, the lion was simultaneously delightful and disastrous. To say that this embodies the principle of the unity of opposites might seem forced, were it not that it is precisely this principle that is at the conclusion of the narrative pursued into other spheres. The chorus report the saying that prosperity (*olbos*), when fully grown, has offspring (*teknousthai*, *blastanein*) consisting of 'insatiable suffering' (11C). They disagree, maintaining rather that impiety and *hubris* come from impiety and *hubris*: they beget (*tiktein*) offspring like themselves. This is to say that in reproduction, which extends beyond biology into prosperity and morality, the unity of opposites does *not* apply. The natural resemblance between parents and offspring trumps the unity of opposites (delight then death) that reproduction seemed to produce in the lion-cub. The point is reinforced by evoking a feature of ritualised reproduction, the hymenaial wish that the married couple produce offspring like themselves.[21] Against the Herakleitean impersonal cycle of opposites is set the transitional continuity desiderated in ritual.

[21] 11C. Such continuity may also be destructive: *Cho*. 420–2 with Garvie (1986) ad loc.

The attempt to *escape from the unity of opposites* will be central to the next chapter.

The self-contained narrative of the lion occupies a whole stanza, between stanzas describing the ambivalent effect of Helen on Troy. The comparison with Helen is merely implicit. Is it a metaphor? The comparison of the bridal Helen to a lion illustrates a principle, and so resembles an *animal fable*. The parodos of *Agamemnon* was influenced by the Archilochean fable, not least in the omen of the eagles killing the hare.[22] The Homeric simile of the lion expresses the ferocity of the warrior, but the lion narrative expresses something far more abstract, the basic principle of the unity of opposites – as does e.g. the lyre in Herakleitos, and the scales or the mixture of wine and vinegar in *Agamemnon* (15B). In most respects Helen and a lion are very different: it is their *narratives* that are analogous, by virtue of embodying a *third element*, the unity of opposites (delight and death), which – as in the omen at Aulis and the dreams of the queens – transcends the separate spheres of human and animal.

We have no space to extend this enquiry into all Aeschylean ritual and metaphor, and so will confine ourselves to five 'metaphors' that we discussed earlier from a different perspective and mention now as exemplifying the interpenetration of ritual, metaphor, and the unity of opposites.[23]

(a) The scales held in the battle by Ares as a trader are metaphorical. But they do not, as Homeric similes do, illustrate a visible feature of battle such as the ferocity of the warriors or the size of the army. The Homeric scales of battle (Zeus's) are not metaphorical but *real*, an unseen agent of divine power. To the extent that Ares' scales too are imagined as real, the universal power they embody is *economic*, implying that monetary gain controls war. The Homeric battle-*deciding* divine scales are transformed – in the fifth century – into the scales of Ares as *trader*, who in exchange for bodies gives mere (gold) dust, with *euthetos* ('orderly') evoking both efficient commerce and funerary ritual (11C).

(b) The boat that the chorus imagine themselves rowing in the funeral procession in *Septem* (9AD) is metaphorical, but embedded in ritual, and may seem more than mere metaphor. The processing chorus' rhythmic arm movements evoke the boat that crosses into Hades. But

[22] West (1979).

[23] Dionysos occurs in Aristotle's *Poetics* (1457b) only in an example of metaphor, a cup as 'Dionysos' shield'. Aristotle then associates metaphor with riddle (1458a25)). Riddling periphrases referring to Dionysiac perquisites (e.g. wine as 'blood of Dionysos') characterise dithyramb and satyric drama: Seaford (1976), (1977–8), (1984a) 41–2. The revelatory character of tragic metaphorisation perhaps owes something to the revelatory power of the riddle in tragedy's Dionysiac genesis and milieu.

it is also the boat (*theōris*) sent for Apollo to the purified island of Delos. This combination of antithetical destinations expresses a unity of cosmic opposites: the boat of Apollo, associated with purification and the sun, goes to the 'sunless' land of the dead and is 'not to be trodden by *Paiōn* [Apollo as healer and purifier]'. The cosmic unity of opposites is expressed by the identification of antithetical rituals – just as it is also in *Oresteia*, by the identification of the *paian* (associated with *Paiōn*) with the lament (15B). But the *theōris* also evokes the Athenian ritual *separation* of the cosmic opposites, of purity and life from polluting death (9D).

(c) Klutaimestra assimilates her third blow in killing Agamemnon (10A) to the third libation at the banquet for Zeus beneath the earth (17B), with the flow of blood compared implicitly to human semen that makes her rejoice, and explicitly to the fertilising rain that comes from Zeus above.[24] There is unity of erotic and murderous delight, and fertilising cosmic unity of sky and earth.

(d) The *lampadēphoria* used to describe Klutaimestra's beacon relay is ritual, metaphor, and and embodiment of the unity of opposites: 'the winner is the one who ran first and last' (10A). Once again, the unity of opposites excludes an irreversible transition (of one side to victory).

(e) In the prologue of *Agamemnon* (10A), and at *Choephori* 961–7 (10B), the light accompanying joy evoked the light in the darkness that marked the mystic transition. In the prologue the 'release from sufferings' (*Ag.* 20) is associated by the watchman with the appearance of what is generally translated 'light in the darkness' but is actually 'dark light' (ὀρφναίου πυρός), a unity of opposites specified more cosmically as (22–3) 'showing daylight νυκτός [of night, i.e. by night]'.[25] As in mystic initiation (2AE), and in the torchlit procession at the very end of the trilogy (15D), so too at its very beginning the light in the darkness has a cosmic dimension, and is symbolic but also real: here again the boundary between 'metaphor' and reality is unclear.

To conclude, the privileged channels of omen, dream, curse, ritual and (in several prominent instances) 'metaphor' all indicate a cosmos interconnected, like Herakleitos', by the unity of the opposites.

The concept of metaphor, albeit prefigured in Plato, is first found in Aristotle, who uses it to criticise as metaphorical such ideas as that

[24] 10C, 17C.

[25] *Orphnaios* is an epithet of night. The power of torchlight to reach up to the sky soon appears in the offerings of Klutaimestra: 92 οὐρανομήκης.

particulars share in the Forms (Plato), or that 'sea is the sweat of the earth' (Empedokles).[26]

But did Empedokles mean it metaphorically? He may conceivably have had in mind that both sea and sweat embody the more general and abstract phenomenon of liquid emerging from solid. Presocratic cosmology is sometimes easy to dismiss as mere metaphor, for – as Lloyd observes – their cosmological doctrines often 'appear to consist of nothing but a concrete image. So far as we know, it was Plato who first drew an explicit general distinction between an image and a demonstrative account.'[27] Empedokles almost certainly did not regard cosmic love (*philia*) as a metaphor, any more than Aeschylus did cosmic *erōs* (17C).

In the simple ancient theories of metaphor, and even in sophisticated modern ones,[28] metaphor involves only two basic entities. True, the mouth of a river differs in many respects from a real mouth, and so the abstracted mouth common to both is in a sense a third element. But basic to the metaphor is the *analogy* between *two* entities, real mouth and river mouth. To the extent that the abstracted third element is reified, or envisaged as a general principle (e.g. the emergence of liquid from solid) of which there may be other instances, the 'metaphor' ceases to be merely metaphorical.[29]

The use of the same vocabulary for revenge and commercial exchange is 'not a metaphor' (11C). To the extent that the 'metaphor' of monetary interest as *tokos* ('offspring') is understood non-metaphorically, it implies a (relatively abstract) principle instantiated by both monetary interest and biological reproduction. Helen and the lion-cub each embody the relatively abstract principle of the unity of the opposites of delight and death. The abstractions implied by several substantial 'metaphors' proliferating in the interconnected cosmos of Aeschylus share a yet more abstract principle, the unity of opposites.

In Herakleitos the shared abstraction is even more pervasive, universal even, explicitly described (e.g. as 'back-turning fitting-together'), and identified with god (14A). Might this similarity between the cosmologies of the contemporaries Aeschylus and Herakleitos owe anything to the social processes of the polis?

[26] Lloyd (1966) 363–4, 404, (1987) 172–214; Aristot. *Met*. 991a20ff., 1079b24ff.; *Mete*. 357a24ff.

[27] Lloyd (1966) 229; cf. 363–4, 403–5; and 299 'As Greek Philosophy develops, there is an increasing awareness of the distinctions between different categories of object (e.g. animate and inanimate) or between different areas of reality (e.g. Society and Nature).' Further: Lloyd (1990) 14–38.

[28] Lucidly surveyed by Soskice (1985). On ancient metaphor see Boys-Stones (2003).

[29] To reveal *how* 'twins are birds' (non-metaphorically) reveals something about Nuer cosmology. The formula expresses a *triadic* relation. 'In respect to god, twins and birds have a similar character': Evans-Pritchard (1956) 131–2.

14C MONETISATION AND ABSTRACTION

Mystic ritual may encapsulate the cosmos, combining the opposites of above and below (2CE). Herakleitos adapted mystic doctrine and mystic form-parallelism (13A) to express a new kind of cosmology influenced by the monetisation of the polis (3A). Monetised society and the Herakleitean cosmos are both informed by an unlimited cycle of constant transformation[30] governed by an abstract formula (*logos*) embodied in a single element (fire) that is exchanged into and from all things 'like goods for gold and gold for goods' (B90). The (unprecedented) semi-abstract impersonality and homogenising systematicity of the power of *logos*-in-fire in the cosmos reflects the very same (unprecedented) combination of features of the power of money. And the cosmological centrality of the unity of opposites, in Anaximander as well as in Herakleitos, expresses in part the (unprecedented) socially essential power of money not only to unite commodities (however different) in the same system of abstract value, but also to unite thereby in agreement those whose relationship – *qua* transactors in a monetised transaction – is purely antagonistic (3A).

Ritual and money each impose coherence on space and on time, on transformation and on contradiction. Each is a paradigm of durable order depending on collective confidence for its socially integrative effect. And the universality required by their social transcendence is, like that of monarchy or the polis, unconsciously projected onto the cosmos.[31] In the coherence, transformations and contradictions of the Herakleitean cosmos we can detect the influence both of mystic ritual and – more markedly – of the now even more pervasive power of money. The power of mystic ritual to mediate the opposition between life and death, linking this world with Hades, was a factor not only in the matrix of tragedy but also in the coalescence of mystic doctrine with the monetised cosmology of Herakleitos (15C). The grievous circle (*kuklos*) from which the mystic initiate has flown (13A) is a cosmic cycle (of reincarnation)[32] comparable to the monetised cycle of the passage of the soul through the elements in Herakleitos.[33] So too the grievous cycle (of violence) in *Oresteia* is associated with the accumulation of wealth (11C).

However, ritual is enacted in immediate time and space, and merely encapsulates remote time and space. By contrast, the acceptability of coined

[30] Cf. E. *HF* 671–2, an age (or lifetime) revolving (εἱλισσόμενός τις αἰών) increases only wealth.
[31] On this process see Seaford (2004a) 11–12, 208–9.
[32] In Plato's *Phaedrus*, in a passage full of allusions to mystic initiation, the soul grows wings to fly out of the cycle of reincarnation: Seaford (2009a).
[33] B36, 76, 90; etc.: Seaford (2004a) 237–8.

money with the same (abstract) value in the temporal and spatial beyond is a precondition for its functioning. Abstract value, in becoming exchangeable for ever more commodities, also creates for itself an expanding zone in which – in order to function as money – it (uniquely) *must* remain the same (homogeneous), and *must* eschew all temporal or spatial limits, and *must* be impersonal (for circulating ownership). Just like the Herakleitean *logos*-in-fire, money is transcendent, abstract but embedded in the concrete, unlimited, impersonal but all-powerful, universally inter-connective, and effective by creating unity of the opposed.

Ritual and money have influenced both Herakleitean and Aeschylean cosmology. But whereas Herakleitos directly describes the cosmos, the theme of Aeschylus is the *personal* agency narrated in *myth*. And myth, though its tragic representation is influenced by the institutions of the polis (including money), acquired its basic forms before the monetisation of the polis. The material of Aeschylean drama is – unlike that of Herakleitos – pre-monetary. However, being narrative, it may be represented in ways that reflect the influence of money on *action*.

Such reflection may be indirect (e.g. in metaphor), or direct,[34] and includes the unlimited cycle of reciprocal vengeance, the issue central to *Oresteia*, in a manner that associates it with the unity of opposites in the unlimited cycle of monetised transactions (11c). This unlimitedness will eventually be contained by the justice of the polis. The very same elements combine, albeit in a different configuration, in the earliest 'philosophical' text: the controlled cycle of transitions between opposites projected onto the cosmos of Anaximander represents integration of the antagonisms of reciprocal revenge by their assimilation, through monetary penalties imposed the polis ('justice'), to the peaceful antagonism (unity of opposites) of the monetary cycle (3a).

Yet another such instance of the expression of this antagonistic unity, of the identification of economic agreement with violent exchange, is provided by one of our privileged channels of communication with the divine, the *curse* in *Septem*. Having earlier brought out the economic individualism in the content of this curse, I now focus on its embodiment of the economic unity of opposites. The fulfilment of the curse was described as *kat-allagē*, which evokes the fulfilment of monetary debt (9c) but also prefigures the way in which the fratricide is paradoxically described by the curse as a *reconciliation* or *agreement* on how to divide their inherited possessions,[35] with iron as reconciler, *di-allaktēr* (from the verb *di-allassein*

[34] E.g. Seaford (1998). [35] 729, 788–90, 816–17, 906–8, 941.

meaning to *exchange*). It is significant that this intensified unity of opposites (agreement–antagonism, as well as brothers–enemies) is represented as an *economic* transaction. And it is therefore also significant that there is emphasis on the *equality* not only of the divided possessions (907) but also of the fratricidal *transactors* (13A): that currency equalises transactors was first pointed out by Aristotle,[36] that violence assimilates its perpetrators to each other is impressively argued by Girard.[37] Violent revenge and monetised exchange both embody an antagonistic necessity that, in an extreme form in the curse of Oedipus (or in the form-parallelism of *Choephoroi*: 13A), effaces the particular qualities of the antagonists. Indeed, the absolute unity of opposites (whether permanent or temporary) depends not just on their equality but on the complete effacement of difference between them. That opposites may nevertheless combine in such a way that one dominates the other is a theme for subsequent chapters. In what remains of this one we explore the influence of the inter-connective power of money on the interconnectedness of Aeschylean cosmology.

To identify opposites with each other is a process of abstraction. For Herakleitos to say that (B88) 'the same thing in [us?] is living and dead . . . ' is to abstract something that is neither exclusively living nor exclusively dead. The abstraction is invisible, for 'nature likes to hide itself' (B123), and indeed 'invisible harmony is superior to visible' (B54).

B88 continues 'and the waking and the sleeping, and young and old'. Each pair of opposites yields up an abstraction, and – in a further step of abstraction – this abstraction is envisaged as the same throughout each pair of opposites. This convergence is possible because the 'same thing' (unity of opposites) is invisibly abstract. In Aeschylus the unity of opposites interconnects action, metaphor, and the various channels of divine communication (14B). So too in Herakleitos a pervasive abstraction (the invisible unity of opposites in each of the various spheres) is a single entity, which he calls god.[38]

But what does he mean by god?

> One, the only wise, does and does not wish to be called by the name of Zeus. (B32)

This remarkable conception does not come out of the blue. The anthropomorphic Homeric Zeus who shakes Olympos with his *nod*[39] had been developed by Xenophanes – under the influence of monetisation[40] – into

[36] *EN* 1133a17–21. [37] Girard (1977) Chapter 2. [38] B67 (quoted in 14A).
[39] *Il.* 1.528–30. [40] Seaford (2004a) 209–16.

a god who, without moving (B26), shakes all things by his *thought* (B25). 'All of him sees, all of him thinks, all of him hears' (B24), and he is accordingly 'one god . . . not at all like mortals in body and thought' (B23). He is also, it seems, self-sufficient, unchanging, and in some sense identical with the universe.[41] Non-anthropomorphic, he is nevertheless personal by virtue of (all-pervasive) subjectivity. Similarly, the Zeus of Herakleitos is non-anthropomorphic and yet – by virtue of being 'Zeus' – personal, subjectivity ('the wise') that is somehow, as 'one', identical with the universe.[42]

What is this 'one, the only wise'? Fire and the *logos* are 'to a large degree co-extensive with, or different aspects of, this completely wise thing'.[43] The cosmos is ever-living fire (B30), which is exchanged for all things (B90), and the *logos*, which could in the fifth century mean a monetary as well as a verbal account, is a unifying abstraction.[44] But as a cosmic projection of the all-pervasive abstraction of monetary value, *logos*-in-fire lacks the *subjectivity* that accompanies all monetised transactions. This subjectivity is supplied by identifying the all-pervasive 'one' as 'the only wise' and as Zeus. Inasmuch as the all-pervasive power of the monetary abstraction seems impersonal, it 'does not wish' to be called Zeus. But inasmuch as the deployment of this impersonal power nevertheless requires (personal) understanding, the 'one' is 'the only wise' and so assimilable to the all-pervasive personal power of Zeus. Just as the non-anthropomorphic god of Xenophanes shakes all things by his *thought*, so too for Herakleitos the contradiction between the impersonal power of the all-pervasive abstraction and its personal use is mediated by imagining the abstraction in terms of the *invisible ubiquity* of subjectivity: 'the only wise' is co-extensive with all things, and the soul, composed of fire, has no spatial limits (B45).

The Aeschylean Zeus is – though generally more traditional and personal than the presocratic – similarly ambivalent, and also influenced by the powerful all-pervasiveness of money.

At Aulis a multiple crisis of the unity of opposites gives rise to the hymn to Zeus, in which his scales are evoked (13c). Just as (for Herakleitos) the visible tension of bow or lyre embodies the abstract unity of opposed forces, so (for Aeschylus) visible things in equilibrium are united by the abstraction of weight. Herakleitos identifies with god the *comprehensive* abstraction that consists of the abstract unity of opposites in each of the various spheres. But Aeschylus identifies with god the abstraction produced by the scales.

[41] Guthrie (1962) 373, 377–83; Seaford (2004a) 211. [42] All things are one: B10, B50, etc.
[43] KRS 203. [44] Seaford (2004a) 232–44.

In Homer these scales, operated by Zeus, decide fundamental conflict (battle). This is the only instance in Homer of *impersonal* divine power, the cosmic projection[45] of the comprehensive impersonal power of scales. Scales mediate commercial exchange by an abstraction (weight). But weight is merely a factor in the ultimate mediating abstraction of *value*, which by the time of Aeschylus had become – now embodied in (unweighed) coins – the all-pervasive and omnipotent medium of exchange. Commodities may still be weighed, but so as to ascertain their abstract value. In these circumstances the new and mysterious abstract medium of exchange (monetary value) may be imagined in terms of the old one (weight). The traditional divine scales may even be – as an invisible but omnipotent mediator of exchange – apt to express the invisible but omnipotent mediation performed by monetary value.[46] What is required is adaptation of their operation to the new historical reality of abstract monetary value. In Homer Zeus himself in one passage inclines the scales (*Il.* 19.223), but elsewhere he merely operates them, and the victor is he whose *kēr* is the lighter.[47] But in Aeschylus he is *himself* beyond equivalence with all that might be put on the scales, as alone able to outweigh the chorus' 'mental weight' (13c).

We can now see that this strange idea is in fact precisely to be expected in this context. Abstract monetary value is mysterious: it is a single (homogeneous) thing, and yet all the commodities that you may put on the scales will not outweigh it, and it may moreover seem omnipotent.[48] It is therefore easily imagined as divine, or rather the traditional idea of (divine) omnipotence is easily influenced by it. The overall power of Zeus is still imagined as the personal power to incline scales, but also as the transcendent power of abstract value. There is a (conscious or unconscious) synthesis of the traditional power of Zeus and his concrete scales with the new omnipotence of abstract value. Aeschylus inhabits a world in which even for philosophers it is still impossible to imagine an absolute division between concrete and abstract.[49]

The result is a Zeus who is – as in Xenophanes and Herakleitos – ambivalent between personal and impersonal, concrete and abstract, as well as between subjective and objective. Being beyond equivalence with all *concrete* things, he alone can outweigh the *mental* 'weight of anxiety'

[45] Perhaps deriving from Egypt: Dietrich (1964).
[46] In the next choral song weighing and money are both associated with the divine scales: 11c (*Ag.* 438–44).
[47] *Il.* 8.69, 22.212; cf. 14.99, 16.658. Κήρ is sometimes translated 'doom'.
[48] On the imagined omnipotence of money in the fifth century see Seaford (2004a) 162–5, 214–16.
[49] For the resulting continuum between abstract and concrete in psychological terminology see Sullivan (1997) 172.

(*Ag.* 165–6). The *kēr* whose weight on the scales generally decides the outcome of fighting in Homer is an impersonal or semi-personal *thing*. But in the one Homeric instance of *psuchē* ('soul') approaching its later meaning of the *living* consciousness it is said to be beyond equivalence *in value* with vast wealth (*Il.* 9.401). And in Aeschylus' *Psychostasia* it is *psuchai* that are put on the scales, giving rise to the paradoxical idea of mental or abstract weight inclining the divine scales, an idea that then converged in *Agamemnon* with the presocratic notion of a semi-abstract Zeus, subjectivity co-extensive with all things.

In *Suppliants* too the Danaids appeal at moments of crisis to the scales of Zeus (13c). He is eternal (574). His omnipotence (594–9) is expressed as the power to *complete* (525–6). And his desire is

> not easy to track. Dense with vegetation and shadowy do the paths of his mind extend, impossible to see. But safely and not on its back does a thing land if it is destined by the nod of Zeus to be completed (*teleion*). Everywhere it blazes forth (*phlegethei*), even in the darkness with black fortune for mortal peoples. And he hurls mortals from high-towered hopes to complete ruin, but employs no violence. The divine is all effortless. Sitting he carries out his thought somehow from where he is, from his pure seat. (87–103)[50]

In carrying out his thought effortlessly and from the same place he resembles the god of Xenophanes.[51] What he thereby completes resembles – as ubiquitous fire – the Herakleitean cosmos, which consists of fire. *Phlegethei* suggests the thunderbolt,[52] which for Herakleitos directs all things (B64). The associaton of fire with darkness combines opposites. And his mind has no boundaries (1049, 1058), like the soul in Herakleitos.

Aeschylus' Zeus can be impersonal and identified with the universe and what transcends the universe,[53] but also a (near-omnipotent) person.[54] Despite Zeus's impressive appearance in the *Iliad*, for fifth-century tragedy we have no knowledge of his presence on stage[55] or even of any description of his appearance. Even where Aeschylus describes his engendering of mortals, he remains remote. In a corrupt papyrus that may well[56] give us

[50] The order of verses 86–7, 93–5, 91–2, 88–90 is generally accepted.
[51] See also *Su.* 599, *Eum.* 650–1. For my methodology (14a) this does not mean that Aeschylus was – as many have supposed – influenced by Xenophanes.
[52] FJW ad loc. compare Hes. *Theog.* 826.
[53] *fr.* 278 Zeus is *aithēr*, Zeus earth, Zeus sky: Zeus is all things and whatever is above them.
[54] Although 'he did not make incantations [to raise the dead], all other things he turns up and down and arranges by his might, without panting' (*Eum.* 650–1).
[55] Although he may perhaps have appeared in Aeschylus' *Psychostasia* and Euripides' *Alkmene*: Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 463–4, 471–2; West (1984); cf. Taplin (1977) 431–2.
[56] Though West (2000) argues that it was by Aeschylus' son Euphorion.

a narrative from Aeschylus' *Karians or Europa*, his liaison with Europa is oddly combined with the effortless power that he has without moving, giving the impression that the bull has become merely his agent:

> An all-feeding meadow gave hospitality to the bull. Such was the effortless theft of me from my aged father that Zeus perpetrated, remaining where he was. (*fr.* 99)

Similarly, in the numerous descriptions in *Suppliants* of the physical contact between Io (in the form of a cow) and Zeus that engendered Epaphos there is no reference to the appearance of Zeus beyond the simple fact that he had the form of a bull.[57] In Aeschylus Zeus's power and engagement have reached the extreme of ubiquity and yet he is – as a corollary of this ubiquity – nowhere to be seen.

What in *Suppliants* has no boundaries is the *mind* of Zeus. How may the traditional conception of cosmic power as personal be combined with the new conception of cosmic power shaped by the all-embracing monetary abstraction? By the idea of the *mind*, which is simultaneously invisible (abstract), personal and all-embracing. An Orphic verse about Zeus absorbing everything is interpreted by the Derveni Commentator thus:

> In saying this he makes clear that mind itself being alone is worth everything (πάντων ἄξιος), as if all else were nothing. For it would not be possible for them to exist, if the things were without the mind. (column 16)[58]

The abstract all-pervasive power of money is impersonal, but facilitates conscious control of the world, and so may be projected as the divine mind, 'worth everything' and co-extensive with the cosmos.[59]

The historical individual for whom money most facilitates conscious control of the world – almost to the point of seeming to concentrate it in him alone – is the *turannos* (3c). Control of the money-supply gives him a new kind of power. Unlike Homeric gods (even Zeus) and Homeric monarchs, in principle he needs neither kin nor friends (reciprocity) nor charisma nor physical strength, but uses his intelligence to deploy from the centre the universal and self-sufficient power of money. Xenophanes' self-sufficient, motionless and non-anthropomorphic god, who nevertheless shakes all things without effort by his thought and is co-extensive with (perceiving, thinking) mind, is a projection not of past monarchy but

[57] The encounter is described in terms of 'breathing', 'touch', mixing', 'healing' and 'benign violence': 44–5, 171, 295, 301, 313, 576, 1065–7.

[58] Cf. Pythermos (sixth-century Ionian): 'the things other than gold were after all nothing' (*PMG* 910).

[59] See further Seaford (2004a) 222, 226–7, 243, 251–2, 282, 295–6.

of the abstract monied power of the tyranny that Xenophanes knew at his birthplace Kolophon and elsewhere.[60] Similar is the abstract Zeus of *Agamemnon* and *Suppliants*. *Prometheus Bound*, by contrast, projects the *personal* aspect of tyrannical power onto Zeus: the root *turann-* is applied to him twelve times, and his many tyrannical characteristics[61] include the self-sufficiency that consists of maltreating his own relative and benefactor (Prometheus).

The impersonal and personal aspects are interdependent.[62] In particular, the impersonal power of money depends also on the intelligence of its owner. The Zeus of the *Prometheus Bound* wins control of the cosmos by choosing intelligence over the physical force preferred by his enemies the Titans (204–25). For Herakleitos the subjective aspect of the one, which does and does not wish to be called by the name of Zeus, is 'the only wise'. Xenophanes maintained that most things are inferior to mind (A1), dismissed stories of the 'useless' violence of Titans, Giants and Centaurs (B1), and called the physical strength of athletes not only inferior to his own intelligence but also incapable of increasing the treasure belonging to the polis (B2.22). Socrates (Pl., *Phaedo* 69a) even calls intelligence the only right currency (*nomisma*). In Aeschylus' hymn to Zeus the monetised Zeus is repersonalised as the Zeus who, having won control of the cosmos, sets humankind on the road to *understanding* (17CD).

[60] Seaford (2004a) 209–16. [61] Seaford (2004a) 215–16, 312; Thomson (1932) 7–10; Saïd (1985).
[62] The paradox of the *turannos* as person with the invisible ubiquity of monetised power is projected also onto the barbarians Gyges, Deiokes and Midas: Seaford (2004a) 117–18.

CHAPTER 15

From the unity of opposites to their differentiation

15A AETIOLOGICAL AND MONETISED CHRONOTOPES

In Part I we investigated some social influences on Greek conceptions of space, time and cosmology, and in Parts II and III we focused the investigation onto tragedy. We isolated two basic kinds of such influence. One of them, deriving from the *code of reciprocity* in relations between individuals (or groups), is subsequently transformed by the *monetisation* of reciprocal relations. This produces the monetised chronotope, which is unlimited, cyclical, homogeneous, and pervaded by the *unity* of opposites (3A). It is to be found especially in Herakleitos, but also in his contemporary Aeschylus.

The other basic kind derives from ritual, and produces the *aetiological chronotope*, which is limited, linear and differentiated (2E). Each of these features is an aspect of the *transition* from one opposite to another: the transition is (being linear and irreversible) limited, and thereby *differentiates* the opposites.

In *Oresteia* we find a synthesis of these opposed chronotopes, on the one hand violent reciprocity in (pre-monetary) myths dramatised from the perspective of a world now thoroughly monetised, and on the other the *aition* of polis institutions – in a genre that is itself an institution of the polis and originates in polis ritual. The synthesis is made possible by the elements shared by the opposed chronotopes. The novel features of money are imagined in terms of what is both familiar and analogous – be it the cycle of revenge, the sea (11C), or the dissolution of basic distinctions (the unity of opposites) characteristic of both monetisation and the antideterminate phase of the aetiological chronotope (7B).

Furthermore, both money and the rite of passage may *isolate* the individual.[1] Parmenides, in presenting his monetised cosmology, imagines his uniqueness – as the man who knows – as the isolation of the

[1] Money: 9C; marriage ritual: 8D; mystic initiation: 2E(4).

mystic initiand.[2] The mystic isolation of the *turannos* Pentheus in *Bacchae* combines with the isolation inherent in his monetised conception of the world.[3]

The mystic initiand is eventually however integrated into the group, the bride into her new household. Monetised transactions are largely interpersonal, between individuals, whereas the rituals with which we are concerned are conducted by a group. In general the monetised chronotope is created by and co-ordinates individual activity, the aetiological chronotope communal activity. The monetised chronotope is systematically expressed in presocratic cosmology, which consists largely of the thoughts of individuals produced – to an unprecedented degree – apart from, and unmediated by, any context or tradition of (social) performance.[4]

Our synthesis of opposed chronotopes also contains conflict, in which the aetiological prevails over the monetised chronotope: the final victory of the polis[5] is the victory of limit over the unlimited, of differentiation of the opposites over their unity, of the communal over the individual. There is – so far as we know – for Herakleitos no escape from the (monetised) cosmic cycle. But from the mystic and *Oresteian* cycles there is eventually an escape – to the aetiological chronotope.

Let us now consider separately the two components of the aetiological chronotope in *Oresteia*, starting with *time*. On the one hand the movement of the trilogy – through offence, conflict, reversal, seemingly unlimited crisis, and to a final resolution that involves the foundation of cult – is (like that of most extant tragedies) roughly speaking aetiological. On the other hand, the reversals and conflict allow the influence of what we have called monetised time, notably as unlimitedness.[6] But the overall movement, to the final resolution, is linear and limited. In the end aetiological time prevails over monetised time.

The tragic representation of aetiological *space* is more complex. Tragic action (visible and imagined) often moves between the visible scene and a remote place, from which the chorus or actors may be imagined to have come. This polarity, with the internal pole at a house or altar, derived from

[2] Seaford (2004a) 185, 264, 300.

[3] Seaford (2004a) 292–315 (esp. 308), (2003c).

[4] Seaford (2004a) 292–301 (esp. 297).

[5] Morgan and Brask (1988) argue for a general anthropological theory of continuity between ritual and drama of both form (social disruption followed by crisis, redress and reintegration) and function (social integration). With the development of the state, they argue, communal ritual develops into drama because the latter is better able to perform the socially integrative function now required by a more complex society. Athenian tragedy emerges with the development of the state, and – we may add – often represents transition from disintegration to the founding of integrative polis institutions.

[6] See esp. 8B and 11B.

the entry of the god at the Dionysiac festival (Chapter 5). As in aetiological space, so in tragedy the external pole (or periphery) is often imagined as beyond civilised norms and may be a site of disaster. And yet in tragedy, unlike in aetiological space, the internal pole too is – despite being the end-point of the linear movement from the periphery – the place of crisis. In this respect all space seems homogeneous, rather than differentiated by the aetiological arrival. This may have been a development consequent on the monetised transformation of the processional dithyramb into a stationary one (6AB), which may have encouraged a shift in the commemoration of the Dionysiac myth from the external to the internal pole[7] so as to be more accessible for the growing urban population. Besides, confrontation at the internal pole of the procession, i.e. with the royal house, also answered to the political dimension of the Dionysia.

In tragedy therefore the remote space does not serve to valorise the immediate space, for the latter is no less than the former a place of crisis and reversal. Indeed the remote space may seem to bring crisis and reversal into the immediate space. Let us briefly illustrate this point from *Oresteia*.

In *Agamemnon* the beacon relay permits the space between Troy and Argos to be imaginatively absorbed into the ritual of the *lampadēphoria*. It is a *lampadēphoria* narrated and controlled by the queen, whose description of it implies the Herakleitean notion of fire as a single substance persisting continuously through a process of transformation in which opposites (first and last, victor and defeated) are one and the same (10A). We have in both authors a conception of space that combines homogeneity with the unity of opposites. And just as this unity of opposites seems to imply that the victor of Troy will also be the defeated (940–3), so too the moral lessons that the chorus draw from the destruction of Troy, not least at the moment of his arrival (782), seem to apply also to Agamemnon. It is as if Troy and Argos are interchangeable in homogeneous space.

In *Choephoroi* Orestes comes from the house of Strophios in Phokis[8] to Argos under instructions from Apollo at Delphi (also in Phokis), and of these instructions he is forcefully reminded as he wavers at the point of matricide (899–902).

In *Eumenides* the chorus of Erinues belong beneath the earth. But when the play opens they are already within the *skēnē* (the Delphic temple),[9] and will pursue Orestes continuously (*aiei*) over every place of land and – in wingless flight – over the sea,[10] with the intention of taking him eternally

[7] Seaford (1994a) 241–3. [8] *Ag.* 880–1; cf. *Cho.* 674–9.
[9] Like public evil that Solon says finds a man even in the recess of his inner chamber (*fr.* 4.29).
[10] 75–7, 240, 250–1.

beneath the earth.[11] Especially striking is that we are to imagine this pursuit as happening during the scene-change between Delphi and Athens (234–5). Besides contrastively enhancing the fixity of the Athenian destination (10C), the effect of this condensation of time and space is to imply the homogeneous ubiquity of the Erinues.[12] The *temporally* unlimited cycle of revenge is embodied in creatures who not only punish without temporal limit (225) but are also *spatially* unlimited. What contrasts with the fixed destination is not just wandering, as of Demeter in the *Demeter Hymn* (2A), but spatial homogeneity, the absence of cosmic boundaries. The Erinues even seem to bring into the world above the darkness of the underworld.[13]

But in the end the aetiological chronotope prevails. The temporal transition from the unity of opposites to permanent well-being is accompanied by limitation and differentiation also in *space*, in the cosmic interconnection created by the fixity of the Erinues in their cave at Athens (10C).

15B THE OPPOSITES COALESCE

The monetised chronotope is unlimited, homogeneous, and pervaded by the unity of opposites. Part III threw up Aeschylean instances of the unity of opposites, which has been discussed more systematically in Part IV: it acquires a cosmological dimension, transcending our distinctions between metaphor, dream, omen, curse, the power of god, and various spheres of everyday reality. In this section we turn to the attempts to *differentiate* the unity of opposites.

Klutaimestra introduces her speculation on the capture of Troy thus:

> I think that an unmixed cry is clearly heard in the city. Having poured vinegar and oil into the same vessel you would address them as standing apart not friends. And the voices of the captured and of the conquerors one may hear separately . . . (*Ag.* 321–5)

This relates the same *separateness of opposites* as obtaining in three spheres: cries, liquids and warfare.

'Cry' is generally mistranslated as plural 'cries', and 'you would address . . . as' (*prosennepois*) is generally mistranslated as 'you would describe . . . as'. Here, as so often, what the translators distort (because unfamiliar) is what is most revealing. The singular implies, despite the subsequent denial, that it is a single cry. To 'address' the liquids also seems odd,

[11] *Eum.* 175, 267–75, 339–40, 423.
[12] As if Orestes carries his guilt with him wherever he goes.
[13] Κνέφας at 378–9 and 396.

but serves to emphasise the use of language to insist on their separateness, a theme to which we will return.

These two oddities cohere. Cries expressing the opposites of joy and suffering struck the tragic imagination as identical.[14] And vinegar and oil may indeed briefly mix. In both cases Klutaimestra insists on separation. Another undesirable mixture of liquids (blood with milk: *Cho*. 533, 546) will embody the most intimate relation (mother–baby) with the most hostile (murder). For Herakleitos it is constant movement (of all things) that keeps liquids mixed: the *kukeōn*, a mixture drunk in the Eleusinian mysteries, 'separates into its component parts' (*diïstatai*), noted Herakleitos 'when it is not being moved' (B125).

The same tendency to coalesce occurs also in the third sphere, which is here the crucial one, warfare. The play contains frequent hints, beginning seven lines earlier (314: 10A), that the victory is also defeat. Indeed, in the same speech Klutaimestra fears that the Greeks, 'defeated by gains' (342 κέρδεσιν νικωμένους) will be punished by the gods on the way home, hopes that the suffering of the dead may be 'fair-spoken',[15] and concludes, 'may the good prevail, not to be seen in equilibrium (349 διχορρόπως)'. It is because opposites tend to balance each other, even to coalesce, that Klutaimestra insists on keeping them apart (in vain, as it turns out).

The attempt to separate the coalescing opposites is so pervasive in *Agamemnon* that here we can only illustrate it briefly.[16] From the hymn to Zeus onwards scales embody the unity of opposites (equilibrium) as well as its resolution (13C). For instance, the herald insists that 'gain (*kerdos*) is victorious, and suffering does not outweigh it', which is immediately undercut by his own question 'Why should we count accurately those who have been expended?' (11C). Alongside this, our series of hints that victory is disaster continues, for instance in the dialogue which begins with the herald happy to die (for joy) and ends with the chorus happy to die (from fear): 'so that now, to use your expression, even to die is much gratification' (550). Victory will turn into its opposite, and so the opposites of joy and fear are the same (they both produce readiness to die).

In the next episode the herald again immediately undercuts his own insistence on keeping the opposites apart. He opens his narrative thus:

It is not appropriate (*ou prepei*) to pollute an auspicious (*euphēmon*) day with the voice of bad news. Χωρὶς ἡ τιμὴ θεῶν (see below),

[14] E.g. *Cho*. 447–8; S. *OT* 420, *Aj*. 976; E. *El*. 756, *HF* 751, 895.
[15] Headlam's brilliant εὐήγορον (fair-spoken) in 346.
[16] See further Seaford (2003a).

but then immediately describes at length what *would* be bad news, the sack of a city. For such suffering it *is* appropriate (*prepei*) to utter 'this (*tonde*) paian of Erinues' (645). Because a city has in fact just been sacked, *tonde* is not entirely inappropriate. Greek paian means Trojan lament. A paian is for Apollo, who indeed was earlier called *Paian* (146); and the Erinues as deities of the underworld are apt recipients of lament.[17] What the 'paian of the Erinues' does in effect is to mix the cosmic opposites (Apollo and the Erinues),[18] as well as the 'voices of the captured and conquerors' that Klutaimestra has insisted are as separate as oil and vinegar in the same container (321–5).

The 'paian of the dead' (*Cho*. 151) at the tomb of Agamemnon also combines lament with the desired victory (over the usurpers). But paian and lament normally belong to different times (occasions), as well as to different gods (above and below). And the lament seems – in an obscure passage – to transcend the cosmic opposition of darkness and light.[19]

The 'paian of the dead' (or 'of Erinues') implies the antideterminate chronotope: it confuses normal temporal differentiation as well as normal spatial (cosmic) differentiation. In desiring the paian to *replace* the lament (*Cho*. 342–3) the chorus desire to establish the normal differentiation of this unity of opposites.

Returning to the herald's narrative, we find him restating his unwillingness to

> mix good with bad, by telling of a storm for the Achaians that was not without the anger of the gods. For fire and sea, being previously most hostile to each other, swore alliance . . . (648–51)

Here again the desire to keep separate good and bad is immediately thwarted by a unity of opposed cosmic elements (fire and sea) thrown up by the narrative itself. The fire is lightning, i.e. from the sky. In the Herakleitean cosmic cycle (B31) half of the sea becomes *prēstēr*, by which Herakleitos meant either lightning or – more likely – a waterspout accompanied by lightning.[20]

[17] Songs to the Erinues are indicated (in a mystic context) in the Derveni Papyrus column 2.8.

[18] For the paradoxical asociation of the paian with the chthonic in tragedy generally see Rutherford (2001) 118–20.

[19] 320–2 σκότωι φάος ἀντίμοιρον, χάριτες δ' ὁμοίως | κέκληνται γόος | εὐκλεὴς | προσθοδόμοις Ἀτρείδαις. 'To darkness light is opposed/complementary. But gratifying ὁμοίως is called the glorious lament for the Atreidai before the house.' Ὁμοίως translated 'homogenously' means that the lament transcends the cosmic opposition between (upper) light and (lower) dark, and translated 'similarly' exemplifies the pervasiveness of the unity of opposites: just as light and darkness are united opposites, so lament unites the opposites of harshness (for the living) and gratification (for the dead).

[20] Guthrie (1962) 463 n. 3.

Our interim conclusion is that in *Agamemnon*, as in Herakleitos, the manifestations of the unity of opposites pervade the cosmos, and that in the herald's narrative (636–51) the unity of opposites is – despite two explicit rejections of it – manifest in various spheres: utterance, ritual song, gods, cosmos.

This helps us to make sense of the herald's initial χωρὶς ἡ τιμὴ θεῶν, which has baffled the commentators and been variously interpreted. I favour the translation 'separate is the honour [for the gods below] from the [Olympian] gods'. It seems abrupt, perhaps because alluding to a familiar idea (the need to keep separate the two kinds of ritual), but also perhaps because the *rapid transition to the cosmic* assumes a degree of cosmic interconnection that is to us unfamiliar. The herald, intent on keeping the good news separate from the bad in the here and now, abruptly resorts to a cosmic principle. Ironically, what he desires by enunciating the cosmic principle is the *separateness* of the cosmic opposites whose unity (of Apollo with the Erinues, and of fire with sea) his narrative of the sacked city then manifests.

The herald's abjuration of the polluting power of *speech* is not the only passage in which speech is thought to fuse – or keep separate – the opposites. The ambivalent words of Kalchas are uttered 'with great goods . . . consonant with these things say woe, woe, but may the good be victorious' (157–9: 13B). The chorus then 'address' (*prosennepein*) the Zeus who resolves the equilibrium. Similarly Klutaimestra insists on the separateness of utterances of joy and of grief by saying 'you would address (*prosennepois*) oil and vinegar as separate' (322–3).

The importance of speech in keeping apart the opposites continues with the arrival of Agamemnon, who insists on being honoured as a man not a god, and adds:

> χωρὶς ποδοψήστρων τε καὶ τῶν ποικίλων
> κληδὼν ἀυτεῖ.
>
> Separately of 'footmats' and of the 'embroideries'
> the utterance [or name] proclaims. (926–7)

The controversy over this passage[21] derives from the failure to see firstly that the strong coupling (*te kai*) expresses the unity of opposite mats (for men and for gods, but both are mats), and secondly that the emphatically placed *chōris* (as in χωρὶς ἡ τιμὴ θεῶν) and the emphasis on the role of *speech* are needed to keep the opposites separate. As often in *Agamemnon*,

[21] Seaford (2003a) 153.

a seemingly cumbersome or cryptic expression makes sense as emphatic differentiation of opposites.

Now Agamemnon is in fact persuaded to walk on the textile, and thereby confuses the opposites that he himself had tried to keep separate, not just mortal–immortal (922–3) but also male–female (918) and Greek–barbarian (919), as well as opposites that the chorus urge him to separate – the loyal from the disloyal (807–8, also strongly united by *te kai*).

The unity of opposites seems in *Agamemnon* to pervade various spheres. It is to be found in everyday objects, utterances, gender and ritual. It easily acquires a spatial (*cosmological*) dimension, and often has a temporal dimension. And all the attempts we have described so far to keep separate the opposites are unsuccessful. Human efforts to differentiate the opposites fail, and what drives the plot of *Oresteia* is the temporal dimension of this failure. The victory over Troy is also (eventually) defeat (10A). The unity of opposites expressed in 'paian of the Erinues' is chronotopic: it has a cosmological implication (the Erinues are of the underworld) but also a temporal one (the Erinues are agents of future revenge).

Similarly, the Herakleitean cosmos is both pervaded by the unity of opposites and in the permanent process of opposites being transformed into each other.[22] Sleep and waking (for instance), which succeed each other, are for Herakleitos opposites and yet 'the same thing' (B88). Similarly, in *Oresteia* the successive acts of violence are opposites and yet the same. They are opposites in the sense that the perpetrator of one is the victim of the next. In

> the Erinus bringing on, from those who died before, the other (*heteran*) disaster onto disaster (*Cho*.402–4)

hēteran implies complementarity. But there is also the implication that each 'disaster' is the same.

The passion for revenge, because it seems beyond human control, is projected onto non-human agents. Justice 'shouts aloud while exacting what is owed' (*Cho*. 311), blood 'demands' (400–1), destruction 'shouts' (402). And because the passion is strikingly similar on both sides, it is projected onto the *same* non-human agents: Orestes is threatened by the Erinues of his father if he does not avenge him[23] and by the Erinues of his mother if he does so – a unity of opposites expressed also in the antithetical symmetry of stichomythia,[24] rather as the unity of opposed acts of violence is expressed also in the antithetical symmetry of form-parallelism (13A).

[22] See esp. B88, B126. [23] *Cho*. 283–4. See further Seaford (2003a) 155.
[24] *Cho*. 924–5; cf. 910–11 Moira against Moira.

The result is that – at the end of *Choephoroi* – the chorus ask despairingly where the successive acts of violence will end. The cycle of revenge seems unstoppable because the acts of reciprocal violence are indistinguishable (13A). Apollo tells Orestes to go after his father's murderers 'in the same way' (*Cho*. 274), and the display of a male and female corpse will indeed mirror the same display at the end of *Agamemnon*.[25] Each retaliation is identical to what it retaliates against, and so must generate further retaliation.

In the cosmos of *Oresteia*, as in the Herakleitean, the temporal dimension of the all-pervasive unity of opposites produces a transition between opposites that seems impelled by an *impersonal necessity*. In Herakleitos this is – in part – a projection of the impersonal necessity driving the cycle of monetised exchange: the opposed parties to an exchange are united by the power of money to be accepted in a subsequent exchange. In *Oresteia* the cycle is of revenge, represented in such a way as to connote the cycle of monetised exchange (11C), in which the successive transactions are indistinguishable in respect of involving the same homogeneous thing (money). Non-differentiation drives the cycle of violence, and the cosmological dimension both expresses the social centrality of the problem and – given the interconnection of the cosmos – provides the means of its resolution, as we shall now see.

15C THE OPPOSITES DIFFERENTIATED

The attempt to differentiate opposites does not always fail. Indeed, the cycle of violence can end, in *Eumenides*, only because the opposites are differentiated.

The idea of victory as defeat, which occurs in Klutaimestra's first speech,[26] then extends through *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*. He who defeated Troy is defeated (*Ag*. 1378 *nikē*) by the 'woman with the male-scheming heart' (11) who, persuading him to walk on the textile – i.e. to be treated as a woman (918) – says that it is seemly for him to be defeated (941 *nikasthai*), ostensibly by her persuasion. Along with victory and defeat, male and female are fatally confused. And in the cycle of violence victory is transformed into defeat by counter-violence. In *Choephoroi* the matricidal 'victory'[27] of Orestes becomes almost immediately 'defeat' (1023).

But for the sake of permanent resolution, at the end of *Eumenides*, Orestes' victory (741 *nikai*) in the trial is a defeat neither for himself nor even for his opponents the Erinues, to whom Athena says, 'you have not

[25] Taplin (1978) 125–6. [26] 10A, 15B. [27] 478, 868, 890, 1017, 1052.

been defeated (795 *nenikēsthe*)'. Even in the unity of opposites that consists in a victory (for one side) being also a defeat (for the other), the opposites are somehow separated. But how is this possible?

For two reasons. One is given immediately by Athena herself: the votes of the jury were in fact equal.[28] This tie is a unity of opposites that is useful not only aetiologically, as a precedent for Athenian practice (a tie means acquittal), but also in reconciling the Erinues. It does of course – like equilibrium on the scales (13c) – require differentiation,[29] by the casting vote of deity, which also differentiates our unity of opposed acts of violence. The trial is – it is emphasised – a 'separation',[30] to be done 'truly', *etētumōs* (*Eum*. 488), the same adverb that was used of Zeus in the parodos of *Agamemnon* inclining the divine scales. The verdict turns on the issue of whether there is a difference (in point of justification) between killing your husband and killing your mother. It is recognition that killing Agamemnon and killing Klutaimestra are 'not the same thing' (*Eum*. 625) that allows the acquittal of Orestes.

This differentiation depends in turn on differentiation of gender. The principle that it is the father (not the mother) who is the parent of the child is argued by Apollo with reference to the motherless Athena, and then endorsed by Athena referring to her own motherlessness and preference for the male in all things (except that she has not married).[31] This differentiates – in favour of the male – the visible male–female unity in herself (she probably appears in armour),[32] and permits differentiation of the murder of Agamemnon from that of Klutaimestra. Just as the opposites of victory and defeat were fatally united, along with the opposed acts of violence, and male with female, so now they are – at the cosmological level – all simultaneously differentiated.

The other reason for the victory not being also a defeat emerges subsequently, when Athena says 'there wins (*nikai*) our strife in good things forever' (*Eum.* 974–5). To this the Erinues respond by calling for the replacement of negative reciprocity in the polis by positive reciprocity (976–86). 'Let them exchange joys' (984). When people outdo each other in mutual benefactions, the 'victory' is of the polis (915, 1009). This is – in contrast to the victories earlier in the trilogy – the 'victory [that is] not

[28] It is in my view certain that Athena votes only once: Seaford (1995).

[29] Cf. from a very different (psychoanalytic) perspective Klein (1963) 52: '. . . the opposing votes show that the self is not easily united, that destructive impulses drive one way, love and the capacity for reparation and compassion in other ways'.

[30] *Eum*. 472, 488, 630, 749. [31] *Eum*. 658–66, 735–8.

[32] She has just come from the battlefield (*Eum*. 397–404, cf. 292–6), and wears armour in Homer and frequently in vase-painting.

bad' (903). And the beneficiaries of positive reciprocity include the Erinues themselves.[33]

Now this too separates lethally united opposites, for previous benefaction combined with hostility: the gifts for the dead were for an enemy, the *charis* was *acharis* (*Ag.* 1545), *acharitos* (*Cho.* 44). By contrast the (potential) retaliation of the Erinues – in the future for wickedness (*Eum.* 932–7, 990–1) – is solemnly (in *antithetical* form-parallelism) separated from the blessings they will bestow in return for cult: to some they will give songs (τοῖς μὲν ἀοιδάς), but to others tears (τοῖς δ' αὖ δακρύων . . .) (954). They are

> on the one hand to hold in check [so as to keep] separate (χωρὶς[34] κατέχειν) the disaster that comes from delusion, and on the other hand to send the profitable (*kerdaleon*) for the victory of the polis (πόλεως ἐπὶ νίκηι). (1008–9)

Kerdos occurred twice earlier elsewhere in *Eumenides*, of illicit individual gain (541, 704). And in *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* (IIC), as well as in *Septem* (9C), *kerdos* – and generally the (unlimited) accumulation of commercial wealth by individual or household – were associated with the (unlimited) *negative* reciprocity of violence. But *kerdos* is, in the ending of *Eumenides*, redefined as a communal good. The *kerdaleon* from the Erinues is associated with the victory of the polis, and 'great *kerdos*' is bestowed by the Erinues on the citizens, whom they urge to rejoice in their fated shares of wealth.[35]

In this way the unity of opposites, which generated the cycle of violence, yields to the predominance of the male and to the unequivocal, permanent victory of the polis. This involves the same transition, we shall now see, in ritual utterance and in cosmology.

Ritual utterance unites opposites. The lament described as 'paian of the dead' (*Cho.* 151) unites two opposite kinds of ritual song, as well as the upper with the lower world, and thereby impels the cycle of violence (15B). And whereas the vengeful lament looks to future as well as past, the paian celebrates *victory*. The chorus want not a continuing cycle of violence but an irreversible replacement of murder by victory, of lamentation by paian. Hence they differentiate the opposites into a *temporal sequence*: 'instead of laments at the tomb may the paian . . . ,' (*Cho.* 342–3).

[33] 868 εὖ δρῶσαν, εὖ πάσχουσαν, εὖ τιμωμένην, where form-parallelism, earlier used to express reciprocal violence (13A), is now evoked to express reciprocal benefit: cf. 992, 999.

[34] Linwood for transmitted χώρας. Transmitted κατέχειν is confirmed by *Pers.* 222–3.

[35] 984–96; IIC.

The same sequence – of lamentation reversed by victory – was implicit already in the ritual utterance 'say woe, woe, but may the good be victorious' (*Ag.* 159), embodying the transition from the narrated crisis of united opposites at Aulis to the cosmology of ritual utterance – the hymn to Zeus, in which he differentiates the unity of opposites by inclining the scales that determine victory (13c). The next stanza mentions his defeat of Ouranos and Kronos in successive cosmic conflicts (174), requiring the ritual utterance of a 'victory song' (174 *epinikia*). The victory of Zeus is permanent. And in the third and final stanza of the hymn he establishes for mortals the temporal sequence of learning by suffering (176–8). At the end of the ode we return once more to the prophecy of Kalchas:

> The arts of Kalchas are not without fulfilment, and Justice inclines the scale (*epirrhepei*) for the sufferers to learn. (249–51)

These statements prefigure the final resolution of the trilogy. Indeed the whole movement of the parodos – from the human to the divine (cosmological), from the unity of opposites to their differentiation, and from ambivalent ritual utterance to an unalloyed victory song – prefigures the same movement of the trilogy through successive conflicts to resolution.

The unity of opposites obtains in the unity of paian with lament, and of the corresponding deities of the upper (Apollo) and lower world. This cosmological unity of opposites acquires central narrative significance with the Erinues as agents of Apollo's insistence on the matricide (*Cho.* 283). The unity of opposites that drives the cycle of violence is expressed in the cosmological sphere (Apollo allied with the Erinues; the Erinues demanding and then punishing the matricide); and it is – as in the parodos of *Agamemnon* – only in the cosmological sphere that the issue can be permanently resolved. United in *Choephoroi*, Apollo and the Erinues are in *Eumenides* repeatedly and emphatically differentiated, as chthonic and Olympian.[36] So too in *Septem* the cosmological confusion created by the Theban royal family is followed by evocation of the Athenian differentiation of chthonic from Olympian in public cult (9d).

The differentiation in *Eumenides* is effected in part by the juxtaposition of Apollo and the Erinues in a visual contrast of opposites: of ugly with beautiful, female with male, old (69) with young, perhaps also of dark with bright.[37] The whole vertical axis is represented, and differentiated, in their co-existence on the stage. The earlier ambivalent power of mere

[36] *Eum.* 69–73, 185–91, 197, 350–2, 365–6, 385–6.
[37] Dark Erinues: 52, 370. Apollo's bow is golden (182).

utterance to separate and unite opposites yields to the differentiating power of poetry combined with *spectacle*.[38] Finally, the differentiation is visually made permanent. From having been homogeneously ubiquitous (16A), the Erinues are in the final torchlit procession escorted for permanent residence in a home fixed beneath the earth.[39]

This home represents more than the separation of cosmic opposites, Olympian and chthonic. The Erinues' power to 'give songs to some and tears to others' is to be exercised in all three sectors of the cosmos (951–5). Their underworld home is a cave, accessible from above – to a torchlit procession now and to cult in the future.[40] The black of the Erinues' garments, which associates them with the underworld, is replaced by purple (1028), which associates them with metics,[41] resident aliens – a symbol of their incorporation into Athens but also of their migration to an intermediate position in the cosmos.

The mere separation of opposites is no more able to resolve the crisis than is their mere unity. The cosmic opposites are here neither confused nor merely separate but *interconnected*. It is a final cosmic interconnection that is – as in the *Demeter Hymn* (2B) – presided over by Zeus, who as Zeus of the agora has 'obtained power' (11C). As the chorus take the Erinues off to their cave they sing, in the penultimate sentence of the play, 'thus have Zeus the all-seeing (*pantoptas*) and Fate (Moira) together come down with the people of Pallas' (1045–6). The two hitherto opposed[42] universal powers of Zeus and Moira have come together with each other and with the Athenians. But they are – in contrast to Erinues, Apollo and Athena – nowhere to be seen. We revert to a world of invisible deity. The predominance of Zeus within the now harmonious opposition is subtly indicated by 'all-seeing': in Aeschylus generally the frequent attribution to Zeus of adjectives beginning *pan-* establishes the universality of his power and engagement (17D) and here *pantoptas* indicates the invisibly ubiquitous power of the abstract Aeschylean Zeus who inclines the scales.

The next and final line of the trilogy is a call for a ritual utterance: 'raise the cry of triumph now in response to [our] songs' (ὀλολύξατε νῦν ἐπὶ μολπαῖς, *Eum.* 1047). Of the four stanzas of the final song, this refrain concludes the third and fourth. The first and second are concluded by

[38] Similarly, using ritual to make ghosts visible or at least present may help the attempt to appease them: Plut., *Kimon* 6; Jameson, Jordan and Kotansky (1993) 16–17 (*lex sacra* from Selinous); *SEG* IX 72 (Cyrene law on *hikesioi*). I owe this dossier to Daniel Ogden.

[39] 1007, 1023, 1036. [40] 804–7, 1004–7, 1022–3, 1036–7, 1044.

[41] Metics wore purple robes in the Panathenaic procession: Headlam (1906). Cf. μετοικ- at 1011, 1018.

[42] It is the ancient female deity Moira who assigned to the Erinues their functions: *Eum.* 334–5, 961.

a call for *euphēmia* from the whole people: because this call marks the verbal transition to ritual, it comes appropriately, here and elsewhere,[43] at the beginning of a procession. *Euphēmia* means auspicious speech, and by extension refraining from all speech except auspicious speech. Its close connection here with the *ololugmos* is not a coincidence. Of the two cries that are found as the object (or even subject) of the verb *euphēmein* one is the paian (E. *IT* 1403). The other is the *ololugmos*, at *Ag.* 28 and 595–6, celebrating the victory over Troy; but the *euphēmos* day (*Ag.* 636) was polluted by telling bad news, as if by a 'paian of Erinues' (15b).

By contrast, in *Eumenides* the victory of the polis, unequivocal and permanent because it has no losers, allows the *lasting* combination of *euphēmia* with *ololugmos* to be finally realised, by the *whole people* (the refrains seem to be addressed to the audience) – appropriately, given the evocations of the Panathenaia.[44] This *euphēmia* by the whole people *precisely excludes the unity of opposites* that for instance in *Choephoroi* united paian with lament at the tomb of Agamemnon. Another instance: whereas with 'griefless (*apenthētos*) mind' Klutaimestra evoked funerary praise of Agamemnon,[45] the race of Athenians is to be unequivocally *apenthētos* (*Eum.* 912). Cosmic interconnection replaces cosmic unity of opposites, chthonic polis cult replaces offerings at the family tomb, *euphēmia* replaces the paian-lament.

The result is the victory of the aetiological chronotope, in which the analogy with the final cosmic interconnection obtained in the aetiological *Demeter Hymn* is more precise than may at first appear. For *Oresteia*, like the *Hymn*, is influenced by – and evokes – the mystery-cult at Eleusis (10ab). The power of Eleusinian initiation to confer permanent happiness (into the next world) is evoked, in the first line of the trilogy, by ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων ('release from sufferings'). In *Eumenides* Orestes is first advised to go to the heart of Athens to obtain 'release from sufferings (ἀπαλλάξαι πόνων) for ever (εἰς τὸ πᾶν)', just as the Erinues abandon their anger only when offered cult at Athens εἰς τὸ πᾶν,[46] a cult which therefore embodies the temporal as well as the spatial (cosmic) component of the aetiological chronotope.

The Erinues' punishment of mortals extends into the underworld, to which they threatened to take Orestes. And so their permanent benevolence, obtained by the establishment of their cult with its cosmological interconnection, suggests the possibility that it had an eschatological significance. This is confirmed, I suggest, by a remarkable similarity between

[43] e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 237, 241; *Peace* 1316; Stehle (2004) 128–30.
[44] 1028, 1031: Sommerstein (1989) 281–2; Bowie (1993a) 270–31.
[45] Seaford (1984b). [46] *Eum.* 83, 891, cf. 1031.

the *Eumenides* and the Derveni papyrus. In the latter text the Erinues are mentioned in columns 1 (perhaps), 2 (in proximity to 'souls') and 4. Column 3 mentions 'the *daimones* below', and column 5 the 'terrors in Hades' (6 ἐν Ἅιδου δεινά). Column 6 begins:

> Prayers (?) and sacrifices soothe [or appease: μ[ειλ]ίσσουσι] the souls,[47] and the incantation of the magi is able to change[48] (or remove) (μεθιστάναι) the *daimones* when they impede. The impeding *daimones* are avenging souls [or hostile to souls].[49] This is why the magi perform the sacrifice, as if paying a penalty. On the offerings they pour water and milk, from which they make the libations also.

A little later in the same column (lines 9–11) we read that

> mystic initiands (μύσται) make preliminary sacrifice to the Eumenides in the same way as the magi do. For Eumenides are souls.

This ritual activity is surely a means of dealing with the terrors of Hades, to which the impeding *daimones* belong. Terrifying *daimones* who impede the passage to the underworld are known from other texts, and are sometimes said to be present in mystic initiations.[50] The '*daimones* below' are surely souls.[51] 'Erinues' and 'Eumenides' in the papyrus are probably names for *daimones*. Erinues are in general closely connected with the dead, are in the papyrus seemingly identified with righteous souls,[52] and in column 6 are perhaps imagined (as they are elsewhere)[53] as *Eumenides* (i.e. souls).[54]

Wineless χοαί ('libations') occur both in column 6 and for the Erinues in *Eumenides* (107). And the combination of μ[ειλ]ίσσουσι and μεθιστάναι in column 6.1–3 is paralleled in Aeschylus by the effect of Athena's words on the Erinues: μείλιγμα ('soothing' or 'appeasement', *Eum*. 886), and μεθιστάμαι κότου ('I am changed from anger', 900).[55] This suggests that the transformation of the Erinues may have evoked their transformation in mystic ritual. Certainly any mystic transformation of the Erinues would have belonged to the transition from fear to joy, the release from sufferings, that was at the heart of mystic initiation. More specifically, if – as has been tentatively argued by Henrichs[56] – the mystic ritual in column 6 is

[47] Reading ψυχάς after τὰ[ς in line 1.
[48] For 'change' as more likely than 'remove' see Tsantsanoglou (1997) 111–12.
[49] Reading ψ[υχαὶ τιμωρ]οί or ψ[υχαῖς ἐχθ]ροί. But the previous sentence anyway strongly implies that the *daimones* are indeed souls. For angry dead souls see Iles Johnston (1999) 127–60.
[50] Iles Johnston (1999) 130–9. [51] Betegh (2004) 85–8.
[52] Tsantsanoglou (1997) 100–1, 106–9. [53] Sommerstein (1989) 11–12.
[54] Perhaps because transformed (μεθιστάναι) by the sacrifices of the *magoi*.
[55] Tsantsanoglou (1997) 112 compared *Eum*. 900. [56] Henrichs (1984).

in fact the Eleusinian,[57] this would place Athena's transformation of the Erinues within our pattern of evocations of the Eleusinian ritual (10ab). In particular, the Erinues are to be incorporated into a subterranean 'all-torchlit house'[58] that, in the last few words of the trilogy, evoked the joyful torchlight that filled the Hades-like interior at Eleusis.

Whatever the truth of this, the transformation of the Erinues surely had eschatological significance. It is alien to our conception of political utopia to imagine it in terms of the permanent happiness of the next world. But just as the community of the Eleusinian initiated has political significance, as embodying the Athenian polis (2f), so the creation of the polis is being imagined in terms of the mystic transition through ignorant suffering to permanent well-being (15d).

To conclude, just as in the parodos of *Agamemnon* Zeus resolved the unity of opposites embodied in the cosmic scales by making one prevail over the other, and in the succession of cosmic rulers obtained permanent victory (*Ag.* 160–75), so in *Eumenides* permanent order is eventually obtained by the differentiation of the opposites united earlier in the trilogy and the prevalence in each case of one opposite over the other, in various interpenetrating spheres: conflict (victory–defeat), gender (male–female), reciprocity (positive–negative), ritual utterance (paian–lament), cosmology (Olympian–chthonic).

This transition is from one kind of *cosmology* (in the broad sense) to another. The cosmos of *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* is pervaded by the unity of opposites and the cycle of transformation from one opposite to the other. This is the kind of cosmos propounded by Herakleitos. With *Eumenides* we move not only into the aetiological chronotope but more generally into a stable cosmology pervaded by the prevalence of one opposite over the other. This is the kind of cosmology propounded by early Pythagoreanism, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Finally, the sophisticated tragic elaboration of the ambivalence characteristic of the aetiological crisis provides a socially based perspective from which to understand the ambivalence and interrogativity that has been privileged in much modern and post-modern interpretration of *Oresteia* and of Attic tragedy generally. I confine myself here to a single instance. It has been claimed that the tied vote and the maleness of Athena (as 'transgressing sexual norms') 'mark a certain continuing tension in the new social order' and that 'the triumphant civic discourse of the final scenes cannot

[57] The presence of an Erinus as one of the terrors of Eleusinian initiation is suggested by Lucian, *Cat.* 22; cf. Ar., *Frogs* 472 (16d).

[58] I accept in 1044 West's πανδᾴδ' οἶκον (for transmitted ἔνδαιδες οἴκων): West (1990) 294–5.

fully repress a sense of its own insecurities'.[59] I argue the reverse. They are both precisely what is required for the definitive differentiation of male and female along with the reconciliation of the Erinues. Any surviving anxiety is about their continuing power to punish, and has the function of ensuring the continued performance of their cult.[60]

15d democracy and eschatological community

Different conceptions of time in the same society may reflect conflict between groups.[61] On this basis Csapo and Miller (1998) distinguish two conceptions of time in a wide range of verbal and visual material in fifth-century Athens. There is 'aristocratic temporality', in which the past is privileged and time is experienced as 'unity, continuity, and eternal repetition'. A literary instance is the 'timeless present' in which the Pindaric merges his patron's glory with the glory of his ancestors. 'Democratic temporality' by contrast is linear and historical, and privileges the present. This opposition between aristocratic and democratic temporality is not the same as the opposition between chronotopes that I explore in Aeschylus, but does overlap with it.

The basis of traditional aristocratic power and identity is the continuity of the household, together with reciprocal relations with other powerful households. Monetisation increases the potential of the household for self-sufficiency but also integrates the polis, it becomes the medium by which the rich dominate the poor but also embodies communal wealth, facilitates its distribution among the citizens, and may increase the autonomy even of ordinary households. It enhances the possibility on the one hand of a polis being dominated for a long period by a single powerful household (tyranny), and on the other hand of democracy (7b).

In fifth-century Athens the democratic polis prevails over the powerful household in Dionysiac festival and in tragedy. In Aeschylus this is expressed in the self-destruction of the household (which may inspire horrified sympathy), the dependence of its survival on the polis, the final foundation of polis institutions, and so on, as well as in the shape of *time*. This is not simply the victory of linear over cyclical time, but the absorption of the monetised into the crisis of the aetiological chronotope. The importance of the monetised chronotope reflects the pervasiveness of monetised relations between citizens, and the prevalence of the aetiological chronotope reflects

[59] Goldhill (1986) 50–1. [60] Seaford (1994a) 363–7, (2003a) 161–2.
[61] For this phenomenon see Rutz (1992), who both 'emphasises the multiplicity of times within single social formations' and shows that 'time is an object of power relations'.

the desire for the quite different kind of relations enacted in communal ritual.

This prevalence is linear in the sense that it moves from (monetised) crisis to its resolution that has endured into the present. But rather than simply privileging the present, it annually locates the transition in the mythical past. And rather than simply eliminating the agents of introversion or cyclical violence, be it the Erinues or the sons of Oedipus, it incorporates them into the polis as recipients of cult. Similarly, the Athenian democracy piously preserved its monarchy, at least symbolically (4E), albeit requiring it to accept sexual union with Dionysos. And Pythagoreanism imagined how negative principles might be incorporated into stable harmony with their (dominant) opposites.

Tyranny and oligarchy may seem, to the Athenian democracy, to be the same enemy. For instance, in Thucydides' account of the events of 415 the *dēmos* suppose that the parody of the Eleusinian mysteries was for the sake of an 'oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy' (6.60.1). The parody was enacted, it was believed, in private houses by the aristocratic Alkibiades and friends. The significance of the Eleusinian mysteries as embodying the whole polis (2F) helps to explain how this might seem directed against the democracy.

About this political significance of the mysteries there is more to be said. The aetiological chronotope concerns the relationship of past with present. But what of the future? The final dispensation in *Eumenides* is for all time. The Greeks, we are often reminded, had little or no idea of social progress continuing into the future. There is only one kind of ritual that enacts a communal transition to the future, the future not of the polis but of each participant, namely the rehearsal of death in mystic initiation.

The most detailed account we have of Eleusinian initiation claims to describe experiences like those of the soul on the point of death (Plut. *fr.* 178): anxious ignorance in the darkness is ended by a wonderful light together with the reception of the initiand into choruses and the company of the pure, while the uninitiated crowd is being trampled by itself (2E).

Central to *Bacchae* is the contrast, throughout the play, between the impervious and aggressive isolation of the individual (Pentheus) and the miraculous egalitarian cohesion[62] of the mystic chorus, not least in the earthquake scene, where it corresponds in numerous details with the *transition* in Plutarch's account:[63] the contrast reflects the mystic transition

[62] 2E, 5A, 6A. [63] Seaford (1996) 201; 10B.

that King Pentheus fails to make. Dionysos brings to the Theban polis the miraculous egalitarian cohesion of his thiasos, which at Athens belonged to the matrix of tragedy. A similar contrast occurs in *Antigone*, between the monetised and isolated mind of Kreon, by which the polis is diseased, and the cosmic Eleusinian Dionysos, who is invoked to cure the disease with dance (18E). It is also worth noting that the anonymous *Prometheia* envisages the sufferings and eventual release of Prometheus, with its permanent benefit for all humankind, in terms of the passage of the soul through the cosmological elements in mystic initiation.[64]

The egalitarian cohesion of the chorus is in mystic initiation exclusively secret, cosmic in its reach, and of the community of the next world. It is above all in a comedy, Aristophanes' *Frogs*, that these features are best on display, along with their *political* significance (2F). The journey to the underworld is described as passing from the sufferings of sinners to music, beautiful light and the happy blessed *thiasoi* of the initiated (145–57). In contrast to this bliss, the individuals who enter the underworld are threatened with terrors that include the 'hounds of Kokytos' (472), whom the scholiast identifies with the Erinues.[65] The choral initiates are, as in Plutarch, *hosios* ('pure') (327, 336). They exclude the impure and the uninitiated (354–7), along with a wide range of *political* undesirables, for instance 'anyone who does not dissolve hostile civil conflict (*stasis*) and is not at ease with citizens' (359). They exclude them all by a ritual formula from the 'initiated choruses' (369–70). In the same breath they call comedy itself *teletai* of Dionysos (368), which in this context must mean mystic initiation. And their celebrations have cosmic reach.[66]

Later they claim their right, typically of a comic chorus, to offer good advice to the polis (686–7). At the start of his contest with Euripides Aeschylus prays 'Demeter, who nurtured my mind, may I be worthy of your mysteries' (886–7). And when he wins, the choral *exodos* escorts him back to Athens in a torchlit procession, urging him to 'save the polis' (1501), and praying to the gods below to benefit the polis (1530). The benefit is expressed in words[67] that echo the words of Athena as she prescribes a torchlit escort, emboding all Attica, for the Erinues *towards* their subterranean place (associated probably with Eleusinian initiation) in the finale of *Eumenides*.[68]

[64] Seaford (1986); 18E.
[65] The Erinues are like hounds: Lada-Richards (1999) 180–2.
[66] 2A, 2E(3).
[67] Ar., *Frogs* 1530 τῆι δὲ πόλει μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς ἐπινοίας. Cf. *Eum.* 1012–13 εἴη δ' ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὴ διάνοια πολίταις.
[68] *Eum.* 1021–47; 15C; 17A(5).

The community of the initiated dead is in *Frogs* a model of joyful and egalitarian coherence for the polis. Was it also an inspiration for the tragic poet from Eleusis? My mere guess is that it was. Ritual is 'a means of performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are in such a way that the ritualised perfection is recollected in the ordinary, uncontrolled course of things'.[69] The Athenian next world at Eleusis is not an unknown or hierarchical paradise to which access is controlled by a church. It is freely chosen by individuals[70] from different households and localities. It is the unforgettable experience of an unchangeable future, of the dramatic transition from the anxiety of individual isolation to the experience of social[71] and cosmic unity shaped through participation in choral song and dance.

To this experience Aeschylus could allow himself no more than allusions. It was very likely before *Oresteia*, produced two years before his death, that Aeschylus was prosecuted for profaning the Eleusinian mysteries[72] and so was probably deterred from subsequent profanation. In *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* the mystic allusions accompany – as does the perversion of funereal, hymenaial and sacrificial ritual – the self-destructiveness of the royal household (10AB). In *Eumenides* the hymenaial and sacrificial rituals are restored[73] to their positive *political* function, as is also – I suggest – mystic ritual.

In the story reported by Herodotos the ghostly Eleusinian procession embodied the Athenian polis during the Persian occupation of Athens (2F). All Aeschylus' extant plays were written in the twenty-two years after this catastrophe, a period in which the Athenians resumed cult in the city whose temples had been destroyed by the occupier. The victory over the Persians was perhaps too dangerously triumphant to be celebrated in

[69] Smith (1982) 63.

[70] 'The individualism of the mysteries . . . reflects their character as a preparation for another individual experience, death': Parker (2005) 342–3.

[71] Because mystic initation was probably influenced by 'Near-Death' Experiences (NDEs) (Seaford (2005)), compare Kellehear (1996) 110: 'Utopias are total physical and social constructions, total environments, whose goals are social order and the ultimate perfection of humanity through collective effort. This is a good description of the transcendent society revealed in many NDEs.'

[72] The report (Chapter 10 n. 12) mentions several other (lost) dramas in which he was supposed to have profaned them.

[73] This restoration has been discussed by many: for bibliography see Porter (2005), who maintains that Aeschylus' failure to right the 'twisted sexuality' prominent earlier in the trilogy means that he 'must have expected his audience to feel it as a troubling cross-current amid the resolutions with which *Eumenides* ends' (8). This is based on (a) ignoring the significance of 835–6, of the fertility ensured by the Erinues, and of the vindication of marriage in the trial, (b) modern reifying isolation of 'sexuality', (c) no explanation of *why* there is a 'troubling cross-current', (d) our post-modern antipathy to closure.

stage action, and in its detail perhaps too divisive. But the transition from existential crisis to the resumption of cult may have reinforced the appeal of the analogous but ancient aetiological transitions staged in tragedy. And the victory could be safely projected (as a reverse image) into the spatial remoteness of Sousa, where the messenger reported the Greek cry at Salamis: 'sons of the Greeks, go, free your fatherland, free your children and women and the seats of your ancestral gods and tombs of your forefathers' (*Pers.* 402–5).

PART V

Cosmology of the integrated polis

CHAPTER 16

Metaphysics and the polis in Pythagoreanism

16A VARIOUS WAYS OF BEING 'PYTHAGOREAN'

In the Herakleitean cosmos opposites are identical with each other, or ceaselessly transformed into each other. But in the cosmos constructed by fifth-century Pythagoreanism we can detect the idea that opposites retain their identities in being combined into a stable whole.

Was Aeschylus influenced by Pythagoreanism? The most recent argument to this effect was made as long ago as 1966 by George Thomson, who in his commentary on *Oresteia* adduced Pythagorean texts in thirteen places. Although this may perhaps have some cumulative persuasiveness, there is no single instance that is persuasive. Rösler criticises Thomson, and concludes that there was no Pythagorean influence on Aeschylus.[1] Both Thomson and Rösler ignore what I regard as the most compelling material, the Pythagorean table of opposites in Aristotle and the importance of the number three as mediating opposites.

An ancient tradition claimed that Aeschylus was a Pythagorean.[2] But 'Pythagorean' can be applied to ideas in different senses: (a) ideas held by people as adherents of a sect or movement with allegiance to Pythagoras; I call this adherence 'Pythagoreanism'; (b) ideas influenced by Pythagoreanism but held by non-adherents; (c) ideas identical or similar to (a), but uninfluenced by Pythagoreanism.

Plato is generally regarded as much influenced by Pythagoreanism, but he does not explicitly acknowledge it, and mentions Pythagoras only once and the Pythagoreans only once.[3] We should therefore assign his Pythagorean ideas to category (b). There are very few extant fragments of Pythagoreanism that predate Plato, and none at all that predate *Oresteia*. This is not an insuperable obstacle. These early extant fragments probably embody

[1] Rösler (1970) 36–7.
[2] Cic. *Tusc*. 3.23. Cicero had access to Greek philosophical traditions, and studied in Athens.
[3] *Rep*. 600b, 530d (here he expresses agreement only).

still earlier Pythagorean ideas.[4] And although I believe that for Aeschylus too (b) is the most likely category, my concern is not to demonstrate this, any more than it was to demonstrate the influence of Herakleitos on Aeschylus. It is rather to expound the similarity of Aeschylean cosmology to Pythagoreanism, and to ground this resemblance in the need of the polis for unity. In Aeschylus, with his concern for such issues as revenge and the individual accumulation of wealth as well as with (in the broad sense) cosmology, we have a representation of the social processes which influenced presocratic cosmology.

The reforms of the Athenian Kleisthenes should be assigned to, at most, category (c) (3c). But three Ionian contemporaries of Aeschylus – Herakleitos, Ion of Chios and Herodotos[5] – actually mention Pythagoras in their writings. The Pythagorean content of the extant fragments of Ion should be assigned to (a) or (b). He spent much time in Athens,[6] where he produced drama, and so we might anyway have inferred – without having to rely on the ancient reports[7] to that effect – that he knew Aeschylus personally. True, Ion may perhaps not have encountered Pythagoreanism until after the death of Aeschylus, but he does at least exemplify the extent to which Pythagoreanism might be taken seriously by a dramatist in fifth-century Athens.[8] Moreover, the adult life of Aeschylus coincides closely with what is reliably reported by Aristoxenos[9] and others as the period in which Pythagoreanism was powerful and successful in southern Italy.[10] If Aeschylus acquired an enthusiasm for Pythagorean ideas on the journeys that he took late in his life to Sicily, this may account for their concentration in his latest extant work, *Oresteia*. His lost *Lykourgeia* may well have dramatised reconciliation between Dionysiac and Pythagorean mystery-cults.[11] Such a reconciliation would be welcome to one who was both inspired by Dionysos (as a tragedian)[12] and impressed by the political effectiveness of the Pythagorean groups constituted by mystic initiation.[13] Of Pythagorean

[4] N. 25 below. [5] 22 B40, B129; 36 B2, B4 (= Leurini (2000) *frr.* 116, 92); Hdt. 4.95–6.
[6] Ion was born probably in the 480s. He was dead by 421 (Ar., *Peace* 834–7). For Ion generally see most recently Jennings and Katsaros (2007); material: Leurini (2000).
[7] *Fr.* 108 Leurini (=*FGrH* 392 F22) (at Isthmian games).
[8] For the later influence of Pythagorean mathematics on the design of the theatre at Epidauros see Käppel (1989).
[9] Aristoxenos (fourth century) was from southern Italy, and knew Pythagoreans personally: D.L. 8.46; Burkert (1972) 106–7.
[10] Aristox. *fr.* 11–25 Wehrli; Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 129–30, 249–51; Minar (1942) 73–5 calls it 'a golden age', which he dates from the expulsion of the tyrant Cleinias (*c.* 494) to the catastrophic defeat (perhaps in 454: Minar (1942) 77–8).
[11] Seaford (2005), developing West (1990) 26–50.
[12] For the Dionysiac inspiration of Aeschylus see Lada-Richards (1999) 234–47.
[13] Burkert (1972) 115, 119; KRS 227–8; Minar (1942) 15–35.

origin also may be the influence of mysticism (notably that manifest in the funerary gold leaves of southern Italy) on the conception of cosmic conflict and its resolution in the anonymous *Prometheia*.[14]

16B THE PYTHAGOREAN TRIAD

As a preliminary to the comparison of *Oresteia* and the lost *Danaids* with Pythagoreanism, we begin with a problem in the mathematical basis of early Pythagorean metaphysics. Athough it may at first seem remote from Aeschylus, the problem will prove to exemplify the way in which the basis of presocratic metaphysics, even of a drily mathematical kind, might be shaped by socio-political imperatives. We will in the next chapter find, in the creation of the polis represented in *Oresteia*, a (more obvious) connection of the same imperatives with the same kind of cosmology, despite the difference of medium.

For fifth-century Pythagoreanism our most valuable evidence is the account given by Aristotle.[15] He records (*Met.* 986a) the Pythagorean belief that the fundamental constituents of the world are the following ten pairs of opposites:

Limit	Unlimit
Odd	Even
One	Many
Right	Left
Male	Female
Still	Moving
Straight	Bent
Light	Darkness
Good	Bad
Square	Oblong

In the words of Guthrie, 'there are in a sense only two opposites, of which the ten listed by Aristotle are no more than different aspects or manifestations'. These 'ultimate principles are the two contraries limited and unlimited'. 'The general principle applied by the Pythagoreans to the construction of a kosmos is that of the imposition of limit (*peras*) on the unlimited (*apeiron*) to make the limited (*to peperasmenon*).'[16]

Aristotle adds a little later that 'the only things assumed are limit and the unlimited and odd and even' (990a8). These polarities, the first on

[14] Seaford (1986). [15] E.g. Burkert (1972) 90.
[16] Guthrie (1962) 246–8; Burkert (1972) 32–3; Aristot. *Met.* 987a14ff.; cf. *EN* 1106b29.

Aristotle's list, 'form the principles of the number-series which in turn is to provide the elements of all existing things'.[17] Aristotle describes the doctrine as follows:

> The elements of number are the even and the odd, and of these the latter is limited and the former unlimited. The One is composed of both of these (for it is both even and odd), and number is from the One; and numbers, as I have said, are the whole universe. (986a17)

Aristotle also says that for the Pythagoreans the limit, the unlimited and the One are the substance (not attributes) of things.[18] And so the world is composed ultimately of *three* things, two opposites and a third intermediate One constituted by their combination.

But *why* is the even unlimited and the odd limited? The ancient answers to this question[19] each contains no more than an aspect of the truth. The explanation preserved by Simplicius[20] is that division of even numbers (into equals) is unlimited, as continuable – i.e. into ever smaller integers. This is of course untrue: the progressive division of even numbers into equals will eventually produce two odd numbers. True however is the correlation he adds, that 'an odd number added (to an even number) limits it, for it prevents its division into equals'. Odd numbers are divided into unequals and so, as Aristoxenos (*fr.* 23 Wehrli) put it, 'have a middle (*meson*)' (i.e. a number left over in the middle). But when an even number is divided, then 'an empty space is left that is without a master (*adespotos*) and without number (*anarithmos*)', and so it (the even number) is lacking and incomplete (*atelēs*).[21] What an even number lacks is an *internal* limit that makes it one complete number, prevents it disintegrating into two identical numbers. The assumption is that doubleness is inconsistent with unity. The 'empty space' that separates the two identical numbers is – in contrast to the *meson* – *anarithmos* (there is no number there) and *adespotos* (there is no master there, no control).

All this taken together implies that what makes the odd number complete (in contrast to the 'incomplete' even number) is the control exercised by its *meson*, which – we have seen – prevents disintegration by *limiting*. In the doctrine preserved at Plutarch (*Mor.* 388ab) this control acquires the dimension of gender. 'Complete separation' of an even number leaves a 'receptive space' that resembles the female, whereas the *meson* left by an

[17] Guthrie (1962) 246. [18] E.g. 987a15; Guthrie (1962) 240–4.

[19] They are discussed by Burnet (1930) 288–9; Guthrie (1962) 242–3; Burkert (1972) 33–4; Ross (1924) on Aristot. *Met.* 986a18 and (1936) on *Phys.* 203a13.

[20] In Arist. *Phys.* 455.20.

[21] Pythagorean doctrine preserved in Stobaeus I p. 22.19 Wachsmuth. Imagining even and odd numbers as occupying space also underlies Aristotle's obscure 'illustration' involving gnomons at *Phys.* 203b.

odd number divided resembles the male (penis). The odd number, continues Plutarch, 'in combination always dominates and is never dominated'. Of this combination of odd with even he has in fact just given an example: the first (female) even number (two) combined with the first (male) odd number (three) makes five, which has been called 'marriage'. This is Pythagorean doctrine, alluded to already by Aristotle.[22]

Such reasoning would produce the alignment of three of Aristotle's opposites: odd, limited and male set against even, unlimited and female. Moreover, the latter group is associated with what is lacking, incomplete and uncontrolled, and is accordingly in Aristotle aligned with bad. The mathematical basis of Pythagorean metaphysics is *not simply given by mathematics*, rather it is determined by *ideology*. Fundamental is, I suggest, the need to resolve conflict, to integrate opposites into a whole, including male and female. Equality between opposed parties provides no limit, no means of resolving the conflict. Limit may be provided in principle by (a) the mediating effect of a third party, or (b) the domination of one opposite by the other. In this problem projected onto what the Pythagoreans regarded as the constituents of the world, numbers, we find both of these ways: (a) an odd number is complete because it contains a limiting *meson*, i.e. a third party between two equals;[23] (b) an odd number combined with an even number dominates it in the sense of creating an odd total number (as Plutarch in the passage we have cited points out). There is in principle no reason why (a) and (b) should not combine, why mediation should not produce the domination of one opposite by the other, as we shall soon see is indeed the case in Philolaos. Indeed, at the political level domination without mediation may be considered unsatisfactory and unstable.

These Pythagorean texts imply that completeness is composed of *three* elements (two plus a mediating *meson*). But they are late, and so would have no relevance to Aeschylus (other than as an indication of the ideological basis of Pythagorean metaphysics), were it not that we also find the same idea in early Pythagoreanism. In the words of Aristotle,

> As the Pythagoreans say, the universe and all things are defined by the number three; for end, the middle (*meson*) and beginning have the number of the whole, and their number is the triad. (*De caelo* 268a10)

But might one not equally say that the number of the whole is two (beginning and end), or one? No, because – as we have seen – a middle element is required for creating completeness out of difference or

[22] Aristot. *fr.* 203 (= Alex. Aphr. *Comm. Met.* 39.8); *fr.* 199; *Met.* 1078b23; Burkert (1972) 34 n. 31, 467 n. 8.

[23] Cf. Aristot. *Met.* 1083b28: for the Platonists the one is middle (*meson*) in odd numbers.

opposition, and middle plus the opposites of beginning and end makes three. Accordingly, threeness is required for the world to come into being. In the Pythagorean cosmogony of the *Timaios* Plato states, on the original combination of fire and earth to make the universe, that

> it is not possible for two things alone to combine well without a third, for it is necessary for there to be some bond in the middle (*meson*) to bring them together. And the fairest bond is the one that most unites itself and the things bound together. (*Tim.* 31bc)[24]

Similarly, in the complex process of creating the world-soul the creator creates intermediate (*en mesōi*) forms of being that are compounded of the opposites of divisible and indivisible being and of the opposites of sameness and difference (35ab).

A similar cosmic structure is found even earlier, among the very few fifth-century texts that are certainly Pythagorean in sense (a) or (b) as defined in 16A.

Philolaos lived from *c.* 470 to *c.* 390, but there are good reasons for supposing that the ideas he represents derive from an earlier period.[25] Among the very few fragments that have been shown to be genuine[26] are the following:

> Nature (*phusis*) in the *kosmos* ('world-order') was fitted together [or 'harmonised', *harmochthē*] from unlimiteds and limiters, both the whole *kosmos* and all the things in it. (B1)

> . . . since these beginnings (the unlimiteds and limiters) pre-existed and were neither alike each other nor even related, they could not have been ordered if *harmonia* ('fitting-together, harmony') had not come upon them (*epegeneto*) . . . (B6)

One basic opposite (limiters) dominates the other (unlimiteds) by their being fitted together by a third element, *harmonia*. If taken together with another genuine fragment,

> all things that are known have number; for nothing can be known or understood without this (B4),

this implies cosmogonical importance for the number three.

[24] The Pythagoreanising ontology of Pl. *Phileb.* contains four elements: (a) unlimited, (b) limit, (c) what is mixed out of unlimited and limit, (d) the cause of the mixture (27b). But (c) is not fundamental.

[25] Recent scholarship favours this view: Kahn (2001) 34–8; Riedweg (2005) 79.

[26] Burkert (1972); Huffman (1993).

Philolaos imagines cosmogony in terms of social space: (unlimited) fire is enclosed by the *hearth* at the centre of the cosmos.[27] I have elsewhere argued that his cosmogony reflects the (privileged) self-sufficiency of the household as it must nevertheless participate in the universal circulation of money.[28] We have seen that at Athens there were hearths at the centre of the royal household and of the polis, and an altar like a hearth (the *thumelē*) at the centre of the dramatic *orchēstra*; that all three were beset by arrivals from afar; and that in tragedy this issued into a conflictual synthesis of the unlimited monetised chronotope with the limiting aetiological chronotope. Just as the tragic chorus danced around the *thumelē*, so for Philolaos the heavenly bodies danced around the cosmic hearth that he also called an altar.[29]

Ion of Chios, tragedian and contemporary of Aeschylus at Athens, appealed – in the very little that survives from his 'Triads' (*Triagmoi*)[30] – to the authority of Pythagoras for the doctrine of rewards after death (36 B4), and stated that Pythagoras attributed some of his own writings to Orpheus (B2). We also happen to know that the opening of the *Triagmoi* was as follows:

> [This is the] beginning of my account. All things are three, and there is nothing more or less than this three. Of each one thing the virtue (*aretē*) is a triad (*trias*): understanding (*sunesis*) and power (*kratos*) and chance (*tuchē*). (B1)[31]

Ion also maintained (B3) that cleverness (*sophia*) and chance (*tuchē*) are very unlike each other and yet have very similar results. This is puzzling. How can understanding, which only animate beings have, be in each and every thing? And what does it mean to say that cleverness and chance have very similar results? These questions have never been answered.[32]

For presocratic cosmology understanding need not be confined to human action but may, like *nous* in Anaxagoras, order everything in the cosmos. Philolaos implies that knowing involves limiting,[33] and limiting – Pythagoreanism maintains – creates the cosmos. Pythagoreanism seeks a way of life based on understanding the universe.[34] Understanding aims at control, but the human mind cannot create a perfect world. It is in its activity itself limited, by the power of chance, which is by definition uncontrolled. Understanding and chance may be regarded as – in the sphere of

[27] B7; Huffman (1993) 41–2, 204–5; Seaford (2004a) 276, 278.
[28] Seaford (2004a) 278. [29] 44 A16; Csapo (2008) 264–5.
[30] Also called *Triagmos* (A1: Harpokration): Baltussen (2007) 311–15. His *Kosmologikos* was perhaps the same work.
[31] Cf. also A6; Pl. *Soph.* 242cd. [32] The best existing account is by Dover (1986).
[33] B3: Huffman (1993) 118–20. [34] Pl. *Rep.* 600b (cf. 530d); Guthrie (1962) 148.

action or virtue – aligned with the basic Pythagorean opposition between limit and unlimited. If understanding and chance 'have very similar results', it can only be because in action they must combine. In the Pythagorean cosmogony in Plato's *Timaios* (48a) the *kosmos* was created by the combination (*sustasis*) of mind and necessity, with mind ruling necessity by persuasion (*peithō*). In Ion the opposites of understanding and chance are integrated – by *kratos*, the middle term – into the triad that is the virtue of each thing. *Kratos* plays a role analogous to that played by *peithō* in the *Timaios* passage, and in the cosmogony of Philolaos by *harmonia*, which as the middle term combines limiters and the unlimited.

That the cosmos is three, that it was created by limiting the unlimited, that it was created by a third element supervening to combine opposites – these ideas do not derive from mere logic or mere observation. They express preconceptions deriving from – in particular – the need to control conflict, perhaps also from male domination of the female, or even from whatever it is that gives the number three its wide appeal in religious belief and ritual.[35]

16c pythagoreanism versus herakleitos

In the Herakleitean cosmos *harmonia* inheres in opposition or results from opposition.[36] Herakleitean opposites are 'one', 'the same',[37] or *identified* with the same thing or with each other,[38] and so do not need a third entity to unite them. But Philolaos insists that *harmonia* must have come into being *in addition to* (*epegeneto*) the opposites (unlimiteds and limiters) to combine them.[39] For Herakleitos all things happen according to the *logos* (B1), which – though somehow embodied in fire – is an abstract formula. Fire is not imagined to be third entity that brings opposites into combination. Rather, the whole cosmos is a fire, kindling and going out (B30). For Herakleitos the universe is not three. Rather 'all things are one' (B50, B10).

Along with this difference between Pythagoreanism and Herakleitos goes the no less fundamental difference that the former privileges the

[35] Burkert (1972) 469, 474–6. The number three in Greek religion: Usener (1903). Cf. e.g. Pl. *Parm.* 145a.

[36] B51 'in being at variance it agrees with itself; backward-stretching *harmonia*, as of bow and lyre'; B8 'from things at variance the finest *harmonia*'.

[37] B10, 60, 88, 103. [38] B8, 10, 48, 61, 62, 67, 84a.

[39] For Philolaos 'limiters' set boundaries within a continuum, but to produce order the combining of opposites by *harmonia* is also required. For instance, 'in itself hot is an unlimited and can cause disease, but heat that is limited in accordance with *harmonia* produces health': Huffman (1993) 48, 89, 140, 145.

limited, the latter the unlimited. Philolaos maintains that *harmonia* came into being.[40] But for Herakleitos the *kosmos* has neither beginning nor end; the conflicting opposites are ceaselessly transformed into each other; the soul has no spatial limits.[41] Early Pythagoreanism and Herakleitos seem to agree that opposites by themselves cannot enter stable combinations, but differ in that whereas Herakleitos accepts limitless conflict between them as the reality of the cosmos, the early Pythagoreans emphasise the existence of a third entity to mediate between the opposites.[42] Whereas in the Pythagorean table of opposites (16B) 'still' is aligned with limit and good ('moving' with unlimit and bad), for Herakleitos everything is in constant motion,[43] and even the opposites of justice and injustice are one and the same.[44] Small wonder that Herakleitos expressed hostility to Pythagoras.[45]

How, from my socio-political perspective, do we explain this opposition between Pythagoreanism and Herakleitos? Early Pythagoreanism was organised as a mystic association deeply engaged in governing a recently monetised society.[46] Accordingly the cosmological importance of the mediating third is (in part) a projection of the importance of the polis as mediating economic conflict (16D). Aeschylus wrote and produced drama at a festival of the whole polis in a recently monetised society, used mystic imagery, and was receptive to ideas of political coherence that were influenced by – or at least resemble – Pythagoreanism.

Herakleitos, by contrast, was regarded in antiquity as contemptuously remote from humankind, withdrew from the polis,[47] and criticised its religious practices.[48] The Herakleitean cosmos is the projection, from the perspective of an individual relatively isolated from the polis, of the newly all-pervasive and yet isolating[49] power of monetised exchange. For such an individual exchange seems precisely regulated (and the parties to the

[40] Of Pythagorean views on the ultimate cyclicality or linearity of events we have only slight indications. Events repeat themselves periodically: Porphyry, *VP* 19; Eudemos *fr.* 88 Wehrli. Perfection is not in the first principle (ἀρχή) but the result of development: Aristot. *Met.* 1072b30–34.

[41] B12, B30, B31, B36, B62, B67, B77, B88, B91, B126; B45; cf. B115.

[42] This distinction between Pythagoreanism and Herakleitos was ignored by Plato's Eryximachos (*Symposium* 186de), who describes medicine as bringing opposites into concord as does music, but foolishly maintains that this is what Herakleitos – though 'he put it badly' – meant to say. See Guthrie (1962) 435–7.

[43] B12, B91, A6 (rest and the static are for the dead).

[44] This is the implication of B102, quoted in 17A(6).

[45] B40, B81, B129; cf. B35. The criticism of Pythagoras for his *polumathiē*, 'much learning' may impute failure to understand that things happen according to a single principle (B1, B41).

[46] E.g. Burkert (1972) 115–20; Minar (1942); Seaford (2004a) 186, 268.

[47] Seaford (2004a) 184–5. He had followers, the Herakleiteioi, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (9.6) and described by Plato as individualistic, obscure, and incapable of dialogue (*Theait.* 179–80).

[48] Hklt. B5, B14, B15. [49] Seaford (2004a) 292–8.

exchange are brought into agreement) not by a third party such as the polis, but rather because the same abstract value inheres in the items exchanged. Potential opposition is transformed into unity by the all-pervasive abstraction of monetary value.[50]

16d economic and political conflict

That the interaction of cosmological opposites may be a projection of conflict within the polis is obvious from the cosmology of Anaximander: the idea of the elements paying the 'penalty' for their 'injustice' to each other, according to 'the assessment of time', is a projection of the conflict of opposed parties regulated by the polis. The projection of political conflict onto nature is manifest also at the other end of the Greek world, in fifth-century Kroton (the earliest centre of political Pythagoreanism), in the statement of Alkmaion that health is preserved by *isonomia* (equality of political rights) of powers (cold and hot, etc.) and that disease is produced by monarchy among them (B4). This resembles Pythagoreanism in implying the desirability of lasting concord between opposites and therefore the desirability of limitation (on the power of each opposite). It is nevertheless unlike Pythagoreanism and Anaximander in that (as for Herakleitos) there is no third party to create the concord.[51] But to see the *process* of such projection (rather than just the end-result), we turn to two of the three Athenian literary texts to have survived from before 450, Solon and Aeschylus (the third is the *Demeter Hymn*).

The political regulation of conflict, projected onto cosmology by Anaximander, was a practical concern for his contemporary Solon. In a period of incipient monetisation, the unlimited pursuit of wealth introduces the need for *limit* (3A). It produces destructive conflict between rich and poor, in which Solon stands 'in the middle like a boundary-marker' (3C1). The people (*dēmos*) should be restrained neither too little nor too much (*fr.* 6). 'Put your great mind in measured things (*metrioisi*)' (*fr.* 4c.3). The invisible limit (measure, *metron*) that must be imposed on the disastrous unlimitedness of wealth-accumulation (and of the consequent conflict) is in the *mind*,[52] from which it is projected onto the cosmos, as alone holding the limits of all things (3C1).

[50] 3A, 14C, 15A.

[51] On the other hand Anaximander's opposites seem to be, like those of his fellow Ionian Herakleitos, in *eternal* conflict.

[52] Cf. also the invisibility of the mind (νοῦς) of the gods (*fr.* 17).

This is not metaphor. What is socially integrative may be imagined as transcendent. Limiting the unlimited, whatever its earlier role,[53] acquires in Solon – as a result of the incipient monetisation of Athens – new and central significance: limit (and the associated idea of measure) is privileged as a near-abstraction in what we would call the economic, political, ethical, psychological and cosmological spheres. At the root of the crisis is the prospect of unlimited individual wealth provided by money, which however in Solonian Athens and elsewhere was also used – in fixed and standard penalties imposed by the state – to end conflict.[54]

This transcendent normativity of limit is – we have seen – found also in early Pythagoreanism: the cosmos is formed by limiting the unlimited, by one opposite (limit) dominating the other (unlimited). The limit–unlimited opposition is basic to other oppositions, and opposites may be *harmoniously* combined.[55] Plato, in his Pythagoreanising ontology[56] in the *Philebos*, states the view that limit (*peras*) should control the unlimited (*apeiron*). The mixture of the finite with infinite produces offspring, a 'third thing', that 'puts an end to the conflict of opposites'. By introducing limit 'this goddess' brings salvation in countless spheres, notably in health and music (25d–26c). 'Bad is of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans surmised, and good is of the limited', says Aristotle (*EN* 1106b29), and takes the Pythagorean two columns of opposites as evaluative.[57] The unlimited, which in aetiological myth is an aspect of the crisis to be ended in the new foundation,[58] is in Pythagoreanism to be controlled by its opposite. The Pythagoreans' metaphysics of number reflects, I have argued elsewhere,[59] the new dominance of society by money, and their metaphysical insistence on limit arises, in part, from the danger of the unlimitedness of money. Finally, just as for Solon it is through the *mind* that we find limits, so – Philolaos implies – even the act of *knowing* involves limiting, and Pythagoreanism seeks a way of life based on understanding the universe (16B).

In Solon we can discern the connection between monetisation, political conflict, and the need for self-limitation. In early Pythagoreanism this is less visible. True, this connection does emerge in the tradition about Cylon, the

[53] A general feature of cultural action (an insight approached by Philolaos B2: Seaford (2004a) 277 n. 52), it is found as the originating act in Greek mythical cosmogony: e.g. Orph. *frr.* 55, 56; Burkert (1972) 37–9.
[54] 3A; Seaford (2004a) 91–3. [55] N. 39 above; Huffman (1993) 139. [56] Huffman (1993) 106.
[57] Burkert (1972) 51. That may help to explain the absence of hot–cold, wet–dry.
[58] 7B, 15A. [59] Seaford (2004a) 266–83.

first citizen in birth, reputation and wealth at Kroton, who was the leading enemy of Pythagoras. He conceived unrestrained hatred after being refused admission to the Pythagorean order because of his violent and disordered character.[60] Further, the report that Ninon, the other leading enemy of the Pythagoreans in Kroton at this time, was a democrat from the ordinary people[61] may suggest that politically the Pythagoreans occupied a middle position, as Solon did. And this might correspond to the metaphysical privileging of the middle (*meson*) in early Pythagoreanism. But all this is very far from certain. It is not until the early fourth century that we have our first extant political text of Pythagoreanism: according to Archytas of Tarentum (B3) concord (*homonoia*) is created by calculation (*logismos*), which restrains *pleonexia* ('having more') and injustice.

[60] Aristoxenos *fr.* 18 Wehrli (ap. Iambl. *VP* 248; cf. Porph. *VP* 54).
[61] Iambl. *VP* 258, derived from Apollonios of Tyana, who may have derived it from Timaios: Minar (1942) 54–65; Burkert (1972) 104.

CHAPTER 17

Pythagoreanism in Aeschylus

17A THE MEDIATION OF PYTHAGOREAN OPPOSITES IN *ORESTEIA*

In general *Oresteia* moves from the (Herakleitean) pervasive unity of opposites that produces an unlimited cycle of violence to the (Pythagorean) integration of opposites on which permanent stability depends. The table of Pythagorean opposites recorded by Aristotle (16B) probably goes back to the time of Aeschylus if not before.[1] And most of them are prominent in *Eumenides*: limit–unlimited, male–female, one–many, still–moving, light–darkness, good–bad.[2] (The only ones not found in *Eumenides* are, besides right–left, the mathematical abstractions: odd–even, straight–bent, square–oblong.) In each case there is movement from that unity or confusion of opposites by which the first part of *Oresteia* is pervaded (15B) to the stable predominance of the positive opposite. It will become clear that in *Eumenides* the pairs of opposites are *interconnected*: each pair is aligned, directly or indirectly, with every other, as in the Pythagorean table in Aristotle.

(1) *Limit–unlimited*. In our reports of Pythagorean *cosmology* the word for limit is *peras*. Limit may be expressed also by *telos*.[3] But *telos* is associated with purposeful *action*: we may indeed think of it as *peras* from the perspective of action. It has a broad range of meanings (including the completion of action: 7A), exploited by Aeschylus (11B): in *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* the frequent assumption of – or hope for – completion (*telein*, *telos*) is regularly subverted by the seeming unlimitedess of the cycle of violence; but in *Eumenides* the *telos* of the case is entrusted to Athena

[1] According to Aristotle the table influenced – or was influenced by – Alkmaion of Kroton, who probably lived in the early to middle part of the fifth century: Guthrie (1962) 341–4, 357–9. Cf. Raven (1948) 11; Burkert (1972) 52, 294–5.

[2] The best account of polarity in early Greek thought is Lloyd (1966), but he entirely ignores Aeschylus.

[3] LSJ s.v. II 4. E.g. Demosthenes can call death the *peras* (18.97) – and the *telos* (57.27) – of life for all men.

(343) in expectation of the *telos* of justice (243, 729), and the Erinues will perform their new functions *teleōs* (952) as well as receiving offerings before the *telos* of marriage (835). Once agents of insatiable conflict, they now pray that it will never obtain in the polis (977–9).

(2) *Male–female*. Male and female are united within the persons of Klutaimestra, Agamemnon and Athena.[4] This unity, or confusion, is replaced by the evaluative distinction between the male as the parent of the child and the female as merely the place for the seed to grow in (15c). This principle may be described as the metaphysical distinction between substance and place, much like that made not much later by the Pythagorean Philolaos between the sperm, which 'constructs' the creature, and the womb as the 'place' in which this occurs.[5] This male act of construction in female space is aligned – at the level of the microcosm – with the limiting of the unlimited that for Philolaos is the cosmogonical event. Aristotle (*Met.* 1091a16) records a Pythagorean belief that in the cosmogonic limitation of the unlimited the first unit (One) came into being from seed (*sperma*).[6] This aligns One with Limit and with Male. In the Pythagoreanising cosmogony of Plato's *Timaios* (50cd) the forms received by the formless female are associated with the male. Pythagoreanism associates on the one hand the male with limit, odd number (with the penis as *meson*), and dominant, and on the other hand the female with unlimited (divisibility), even number (with a receptive space in the middle), and dominated (16b). The control of female by male is established by alignment with the basic opposition between unlimited (bad) and limit (male). And given the association of the female Erinues – and the womb – with darkness,[7] we may add that this polarity is aligned also with light–darkness. This evaluative distinction between male and female is accompanied by the legitimation of their *conjunction*: the Erinues will receive sacrifices before the *telos* of *marriage* (*Eum.* 835).

(3) *One–many*. The opposed parties move towards a unity that is variously expressed at the end of *Eumenides*. It is Zeus who prevailed (973), but in the penultimate sentence of the play (1045–6) 'Zeus the all-seeing

[4] Klutaimestra: *Ag.* 11; Agamemnon: *Ag.* 918; Athena: *Eum.* 737 (and she may well be wearing armour: 15c).

[5] 44 A27; Huffman (1993) 298–9. This is not confined to Pythagoreanising texts. Something like it is ascribed by Aristotle (*GA* 763b31–3) to 'Anaxagoras and other *phusiologoi*'. For the common view that both male and female contributed seed see Lloyd (1983) 86–94.

[6] This implies the not uncommon idea of the cosmos as animate: Guthrie (1962) 278.

[7] Womb: *Eum.* 665; Erinues: *Cho.* 285–6, *Eum.* 72, 322, 370, 378–80, 396, 416, 844.

(*pantoptas*) and Fate (Moira) have together come down (*sugkateba*) to support[8] the townsmen of Pallas'. Harmonious conjunction is expressed by the singular verb *sugkateba* going with *two* subjects (one male, one female), and unity by the ubiquity implied by *pantoptas*. In Pythagoreanism the number one is aligned with limit and odd (in Aristotle's table) but is also even, and is both male and female.[9]

(4) *Still–moving*. This polarity expresses, in space and in time, the basic polarity limit–unlimited. Orestes – like Agamemnon – moves from the periphery for permanent residence at the centre (hearth[10] and home). But this apparent fixity then turns into its opposite, both temporally and spatially, for Orestes is then sent wandering by the Erinues, whose function is to drive their victims from home and pursue them 'always' over land and sea.[11] The final resolution means temporal and spatial fixity not only for Orestes, who will return to Argos and 'for all time' protect Athens from his Argive tomb (764–8), but even for the Erinues, who are to remain (887 *menois*) at Athens in their honoured seat in the earth for ever,[12] to say nothing of the permanence of the newly founded court on the Areopagos (484, 684–9). More specifically their destination is – as in the *aitia* of Demeter and Dionysos arriving in Attica – the fixed centrality embodied by the *hearth* (806 *escharais*).[13]

(5) *Light–darkness*. In *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* the light that appears in darkness (literally or metaphorically) at transitions to joy evokes the mystic light that appeared in the darkness at Eleusis. But it is delusive. Indeed firelight can destroy (389) and 'deceive' (492). The beacon that appears in the prologue of *Agamemnon* is described as 'dark fire' (14B). In the great lament 'light is *antimoiron* to darkness',[14] in which *antimoiron* implies both opposition and symmetry. It is only in the final song of *Eumenides* that this unity or equality of opposites is strikingly resolved in the permanent prevalence of light. Athena (1029–31) orders the light of the fire to be put in motion to bring benefit 'for the future (*to loipon*)', as the Erinues depart for the their 'all-torchlit house' under the earth (15C), a description that may evoke the joyful torchlight that at Eleusis – perhaps on the return of Kore from the underworld – filled the darkness of

[8] The verb means this also at *Cho*. 727. [9] Burkert (1972) 36, 468.
[10] E.g. *Ag*. 968, *Cho*. 967. [11] *Eum*. 75–7, 240, 249–50, 421.
[12] *Eum*. 805–6, 854–5, 890–2, 1031.
[13] On the hearth cf. 2D, 4B; on the fixedness of the hearth in Greek religion see Vernant (2006) 157–96.
[14] Chapter 15 n. 19.

the Hades-like interior with the promise of permanent happiness.[15] This famous Eleusinian light embodies the permanent victory of one opposite over the other.

(6) *Good–bad*. In the cycle of violence justice (for the perpetrator) is injustice (for the victim), and so 'justice clashes with justice'.[16] Similarly, for Herakleitos the opposites of justice and injustice are in a sense one and the same: 'for god all things are fine and good and just, but humans assume some things as just and others as unjust' (B102). In *Eumenides* by contrast the lawcourt resolves this unity of opposites by establishing – it is repeatedly emphasised – what is just.[17] In this process the equal vote is another crisis of equal opposites (views of justice), resolved by the casting vote of the goddess. But the resulting anger of the Erinues continues the crisis, still imagined in terms of equilibrium: it would be 'unjust' for the Erinues to 'incline [*epirrhepois*, as of scales] their anger down' on the Athenians, when they can instead be 'justly' honoured for ever (888–91). Their acceptance of this offer ends the crisis, with justice for all, reminding us that Justice inclines the scales (*epirrhepei*) for sufferers to learn (*Ag.* 251; 15C).

In early Pythagoreanism the opposites of limit and unlimited are in a sense fundamental, and mediation between opposites requires a third element (16B). The ending of *Oresteia* enacts the victory of limit over unlimited, temporally in the ending of what had seemed unending conflict, and spatially in the fixing of permanent places for Orestes, Erinues and the Areopagos court. And so, if *Oresteia* is influenced by Pythagoreanism, we expect a third, mediating element. But what is it? The newly founded lawcourt (Areopagos)? Or its founder, Athena? Or perhaps it is *peithō* ('persuasion'), which is praised as a deity and used by Athena.[18] Indeed, *peithō* may be regarded as the political correlate of the cosmological mediating power of *harmonia* in Philolaos, and is itself in one version of early Pythagorean cosmogony the third element through which, in the combination of mind and necessity, the former dominates the latter.[19]

An exclusive identification may be inappropriate or impossible, but the best candidate is Zeus, whose power of completion, manifest in the outcome of *Eumenides*, is associated with the number three (17B). From its engagement in the monetised polis Pythagoreanism rose to the relatively detached level of 'philosophical' abstraction, whereas Aeschylus dramatises

[15] 2A, 10AB; Mylonas (1961) 263–9, 273, 306–7.
[16] *Cho.* 461; cf. 78, 308, 398. [17] 430, 432, 439, 468, 486, 612, 615, 619, 675.
[18] *Eum.* 829, 885, 970. [19] Pl. *Tim.* 48a; 16B.

the life of the polis in the concrete multiplicity of (mythical) narrative. In early Pythagoreanism the fundamental opposition limit–unlimited is metaphysical and abstract, and the importance of mediating opposites gives rise to the abstract idea of a middle entity (*meson*) with universal power. But in the political dramatisation of myth ultimate power belongs to personal deity, in particular Zeus, and *Oresteia* is no exception. This contradiction between the abstract and the personal is mediated by representation of Zeus in abstract terms (14C), as well as by the idea that power is *bestowed by god on an abstraction*, the middle (*meson*):

> There is a place where the *deinon* (awesome) is good and fear watching over the mind . . . Who without nourishing his heart at all with innate fear[20] would revere Justice? Approve neither an anarchic life nor one ruled by a despot. To every middle (*meson*) god (*theos*) gave power, but he oversees different things in different ways. A *summetron* (with measure) word I say. *Hubris* is child of impiety truly, but from health of mind comes prosperity that is dear to all and much prayed for. (*Eum.* 517–37)

The opposites of 'anarchic' and 'ruled by a despot' represent from a political perspective the fundamental opposition of unlimited and limit. And the *meson* here is emphatically[21] universalised. In Pythagoreanism the universality of limiting the unlimited, and of the *meson*, was an abstract principle, but may been put into practice in politics (16B), as well as in the conduct of life generally. Iamblichos (*VP* 131) preserves the tradition that in his life Pythagoras practiced μετριοπαθείας καὶ μεσότητας ('moderations and middle positions'). In Plato's Pythagoreanising *Philebos* it is in 'countless spheres' that the goddess ends the conflict of opposites by introducing limit (16D).

True, the general importance of the *meson* in practice is not exclusively Pythagorean in the narrow sense (a) as defined in 16A, and probably not even in the broader sense (b).[22] Our concern, we repeat, is with a configuration of ideas that emerges from the development of the polis and is found in the poetry of Solon as well as in Pythagoreanism. But the passage is remarkable as touching on – in language that is sometimes found also in Pythagoreanism – the application of the *meson* to what we would call the separate spheres of politics, language, ethics, psychology, wealth and health. As often in Aeschylus, its allusiveness obscures its coherence.

[20] I favour ἐμφυεῖ . . . φόβωι τρέφων (Thomson (1966)) over transmitted ἐν φάει . . . ἀνατρέφων.
[21] 'Every' (παντί) is in emphatic position.
[22] It occurs at Theogn. 335; Phocylid. *fr.* 12; Pl. *Rep.* 619a.

Firstly, politics. Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism were traditionally hostile to tyranny, on both political and ethical grounds.[23] On the other hand in Aristoxenos' account of Pythagorean ethics the greatest evil is *anarchia*. Desire leads on to the unlimited (*apeiron*); and because the human is by nature *hubristikon* ('prone to *hubris*'), respect for the divine is needed to create self-controlled moderation and order.[24] This role of respect for the divine is a Pythagorean feature that distinguishes Aeschylus from Solon.[25]

Secondly, language. The 'word I say' is *summetron* ('has measure'). This contrasts with anxiety in *Agamemnon* at the dangerous power of *utterance* to unite opposites (15B). Moreover *summetron* here is the earliest extant occurrence of the root *summetr-*, which only very rarely has evaluative content before Plato. But it is applied to Pythagorean harmonised opposites in Plato's *Philebos*, in a doxographical report of early Pythagorean doctrine, and in Aristoxenos' account of Pythagorean ethics, in which he praises *summetria* in the same passage as condemning *anarchia*.[26]

Thirdly, ethics, wealth and psychology. *Hubris* is proverbially the offspring of *koros* ('excess')[27] with which it is constantly and intimately associated, especially in the individual accumulation of wealth.[28] The idea of *hubris* as the offspring of impiety echoes *Ag.* 750–2, where the chorus reject the (Herakleitean) idea that 'insatiable disaster' is engendered by its opposite (prosperity), and instead emphasise human agency by claiming that impiety and *hubris* have offspring like themselves (14B). So too here in *Eumenides* true prosperity requires health of *mind*, in contrast to the desire for gain (*kerdos*) that in the next stanza tramples on the altar of Justice even though limit (*telos*) remains in control (544). We earlier observed the practical importance of this configuration of ideas to political coherence in the poetry of Solon, who occupies a middle position, emphasises the importance of limit, warns that with the accumulation of wealth by men of unsound mind *koros* ('excess') begets *hubris* (*fr.* 6.3–4), and for the mind recommends measure (*metron*), which holds the limit of all things. For Aeschylus the mind should have the internal limit imposed by the *deinon*.

[23] Aristox. *fr.* 16 Wehrli. In Iambl. *VP* alone see 11, 78, 133, 189, 214, 215–16, 220, 248, 266; Minar (1942) 2, 71–3.

[24] *Frr.* 33, 35, 38 Wehrli, from the *Pythagorean Precepts*, have recently been shown to be 'precisely what they purport to be, a summary of Pythagorean ethics as taught in the fourth century': Huffman (2008); Minar (1942) 99; Burkert (1972) 101 n. 17.

[25] Helms (2004), who does not mention Pythagoreanism, observes that 'Aeschylus places himself firmly in the *koros-hybris-atē* ethic proposed by Solon, but he revises that tradition by recognising the importance of piety to the sequence' (52), based esp. on *Ag.* 757–62.

[26] Pl. *Phil.* 25e1, 26a8; 58 B15; Aristox. *fr.* 35 (and 37) Wehrli.

[27] Aristot. *fr.* 57.

[28] *Hubris* and excess (*koros*): Fisher (1992) 19, 21, 72–6, 187, 212–42, 272–80, 336, 350, 375–6; *hubris* and wealth: *ibid.* 20–1, 48, 69–72, 102–4, 273–6, 337, 350, 421, 491, 496–7.

While *hubris* continues to be central to the interpretation of tragedy,[29] my focus is rather on the broad significance of the limit that *hubris* transgresses.

Finally, with the implied association of *health* with limit we should compare *Agamemnon* 1001–3. The text is corrupt, but the preserved words *hugieias* ('of health'), *akoreston* ('insatiable') and *terma* ('boundary, limit') give good sense:[30] 'the boundary of insatiable health'. This coheres well with what follows: 'for disease, wall-sharing neighbour, presses upon it'. In contrast to Alkmaion's non-Pythagorean idea of health as produced by the equality of such opposites as hot and cold, for Aeschylus the opposites are health and disease, with in the middle a third entity, limit, imagined as a wall between dwellings, to prevent the (Herakleitean) interpenetration of opposites.

True, the idea of health as 'insatiable' (and so needing to be limited) may seem odd. But excess in bodily 'well-being' (*euexia*) may be undesirable.[31] The thought then passes naturally to another illustration of the same principle. The vital dividing wall prompts the idea of the side of a ship keeping out the sea, as well as the idea of a more abstract limit (on prosperity): when the ship strikes a reef, to jettison part of the cargo preserves the rest along with the ship (*Ag.* 1005–13). Commercial prosperity (9C) may have to be limited to avoid being transformed into its opposite.[32] In the world described by Solon, in which the polis may be destroyed by the unlimited (desire for wealth), even what is good must be limited. With both wealth and health, limiting a good thing that is insatiable (*Ag.* 1331 *akoreston*) prevents encroachment on (and so unity with) its opposite. The disastrous unity of opposites is in various spheres, including revenge, created by insatiable excess.

Finally, praise of the *meson* by the Erinues seems out of character with their hitherto uncompromising devotion to their function as persecutors. Such discrepancies are often revealing. Why this one? Athena as mediator is accepted by both parties to the conflict, but the invitation to her comes from one of them (Orestes under instruction from Apollo). Praise of the *meson* then comes from the other party, because this has the advantage of suggesting symmetrical convergence by the opposites themselves. More specifically their words obviously prefigure in detail the words of Athena later in the play:

[29] On *Oresteia* see Helms (2004), on *Persians* Garvie (2009) xxii–xxxii.

[30] With the slight change to ἀκορέστου (or ἀκορέτου: West (1990) 208) to go with ὑγιείας.

[31] Hippocr., *Aphorismoi* 1.3 (much of this collection may derive from the fifth century); Dio Chrys. 1.470R; Thomson (1966) ad *Ag.* 1001–4.

[32] The transformation is beautifully expressed as simultaneity at 1012 'filled excessively with suffering', παμονᾶς γέμων ἄγαν. Schütz's πλησμονᾶς produces a pointless pleonasm.

I advise the citizens to maintain and revere what is neither anarchic nor despotic, and not to throw all the *deinon* out of the polis. For who is just if he fears nothing? (*Eum.* 696–9)

The detailed similarity between the two passages expresses convergence between chthonic (Erinues) and Olympian (Athena) deities. The Erinues will exercise their deterrent role,[33] in a cave 'under the earth' but lit by festive torchlight, integrated into polis and cosmos between the opposites of upper and lower world.

17B THE PYTHAGOREAN TRIAD IN *ORESTEIA*

The word *triagmos* occurs only once, as the title of Ion's book (16AB). What does it mean? It has been connected with the verb *agnunai*, 'break', and with the rare verb *triazein* or *triassein*, which refers to winning in wrestling (by virtue of three throws).[34] The most recent discussion is by Baltussen,[35] who rightly compares it with the noun *triaktēr*, 'victor by virtue of three throws' (in wrestling), which occurs only at A. *Ag.* 171–2.[36] But Baltussen has no interest in what might be its broader significance in Aeschylus. That is left for us to pursue.

The narrative of events at Aulis is structured to emphasise the impasse produced by opposition between equal forces, and interrupted by the Hymn to Zeus, the first stanza of which indicates the power of Zeus to resolve the impasse by inclining the scales (13C). *Triaktēr* occurs in the second stanza:

> He who before was great,
> swelling with the boldness of all kinds of fighting,
> will not even be mentioned as previously existing.
> And he who next came into being
> met his *triaktēr* and is gone.
> Anyone who with good will shouts 'Zeus' in victory-song
> Will obtain understanding completely. (*Ag.* 167–75)

This describes cosmogony, in which Zeus is the third ruler after Ouranos and Kronos. The idea of the third and decisive throw contributes to the sense that Zeus's victory is complete and unchallengeable. Conversely, in

[33] 927–37, 950–5, 990–1.
[34] Cf. *Eum.* 589. Janko (2001) 7 compares it with Protagoras' *Kataballontes logoi* ('Knock-down arguments').
[35] Baltussen (2007) 313–14.
[36] Thomson 1966 compares the wrestling contest between Kronos and Zeus at Olympia (Paus. 5.7.10; 8.2.2).

the great invocation of the dead for the cycle of revenge, *atē* ('disastrous delusion') that is *a-triaktos*, 'not to be defeated by three throws', *excludes* any prospect of complete victory (*Cho*. 339). Again, *atriaktos* occurs only here.

Triaktēr here of Zeus evokes also the third place in the cosmic succession. His rule is presented as the permanent victory of a third party supervening on two conflicting parties (Ouranos and Kronos). It is as bringing completion to the cosmos (after two conflicts) that Zeus is called *triaktēr*, a word which I suggest has – like Ion's Pythagorean *Triagmoi* – Pythagorean associations. Recognition of his victory brings complete understanding.[37]

Understanding is itself a factor in Pythagorean cosmogony (16A). In the third stanza Zeus is he who 'put mortals on the road to understanding, who established the principle of πάθει μάθος' – learning (*mathos*) by suffering (*pathos*) (176–8). The crisis of the unity of opposites at Aulis (bad and good in equilibrium) produces the appeal to the Zeus who, having inclined the scales, separates the equal opposites into successive temporal phases: the road through anxiety and *pathos* will (despite its parallel form) end in *mathos*. *Sōphronein* (self-controlled moderation, valued by the Pythagoreans) came 'even to the unwilling' (181). And Justice too, at the end of the Aulis narrative, outweighs *pathos* with *mathos*: she 'inclines the scales (*epirrhepei*) with learning (*mathein*) for the sufferers (*pathousi*)'.

Aristotle, having attributed to the Pythagoreans the belief that the universe is defined by the number three (16B), adds 'hence we have taken this number from nature, as it were one of her laws, and made use of it even for the worship of the gods'. According to Aeschylus (*fr*. 55) a first libation was poured for Zeus and Hera, the second for the heroes, and the third for Zeus Saviour (*Sōtēr*). This series of three libations – for Olympians, then (chthonic) Heroes, then Zeus Saviour – was a general practice.[38] Hence the association of 'third' with '[Zeus] Saviour'.[39] Aeschylus has the Danaids pray to 'the gods above and the honoured chthonic ones occupying tombs and Zeus Saviour third' (*Su*. 24–6).

According to Iamblichos[40] Pythagoras recommended a tripartite pre-meal libation, for Zeus Saviour, Herakles and the Dioskouroi. And according to Philochoros 'the third krater was for Zeus *Teleios*[41] *Sōtēr* because

[37] 174–5, in metrical corresponsion with the weight of anxiety at 165–6.
[38] Schol. Pi. *Isthm*. 6.10a; Schol. Pl. *Phil*. 66d; Pollux, *Onom*. 6.15; Thomson (1966) on *Ag*. 246–7.
[39] Examples in Thomson (1966) on *Eum*. 759–60.
[40] *VP* 28.155.
[41] Zeus *Teleios* is invoked at *Ag*. 973 and evoked at *Eum*. 214. It seems that *Sōtēr* was identified with *Teleios* in Euripides' *Andromeda* and Aristophanes' *Tēganistai*: schol. Pl. *Phileb*. 66d.

three is the first *teleios* (complete) number, having beginning and end (*telos*) and middle (*mesa*)'.[42] Might this connection between the ritual and the Pythagorean privileging of the number three[43] have been already known to Aeschylus? The frequent evocation of this very ritual is a striking feature of *Oresteia*.[44] For instance, Klutaimestra's third blow to Agamemnon is given for 'Zeus beneath the earth, Saviour of the dead' (*Ag.* 1387).

Threeness in *Oresteia* sometimes expresses a vain desire for *completion*, as when Klutaimestra calls the *daimōn* of the clan, whom she subsequently desires to leave the house (1572), *tripachuntos*, 'thrice-gorged' (1476): this may express her hope that now, after the third killing, he will want no more blood. Orestes appeals to Power and Justice 'with the third, greatest of all, Zeus' (*Cho.* 244–5), and his description of his proposed killing of Aigisthos as the Erinus drinking 'unmixed blood, a third drink' (578) implies the hope of completion.[45] Each perpetrator of a violent act sees it as the final one in a series of three.[46] But *atē* remains undefeatable – we observed – by three throws, and in the final words of the *Choephoroi* remains active: the chorus mention the killings first of Thyestes' children, then of Agamemnon, and continue:

> but now there came from somewhere a third saviour (*sōtēr*) – or should I say a doom? Whither indeed will there be completion, whither will the power of *atē* be brought to rest and cease? (1073–6)[47]

The completion desired in evoking the libation to Zeus *Sōtēr* turns out to be merely the third killing in the seemingly unstoppable cycle of violence in a world of the Herakleitean unity of opposites (salvation may be doom). In the last words of the final play, by contrast, Zeus and Moira are harmoniously conjoined.

The idea of the completing third libation to Zeus is in *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* perverted by the horrors of violent revenge, as a third blow, a third drink of blood, a third killing. But in *Eumenides* it is transferred to a wider sphere prefigured in the role of Zeus *triaktēr* in the parodos

[42] *FGrH* 328 F87.

[43] Detectable also perhaps in the recapitulation that concludes the (Pythagoreanising) *Philebos*: introduced as 'the third for the *Sōtēr*' (66d3), it states that thought is superior to pleasure, that neither thought nor pleasure is the good itself, and that 'when a third appeared more powerful than either of these, thought appeared infinitely more closely related and naturally connected with the form of the victor' (67a10–12). Cf. the binding power of the Pythagorean supervening third (16B), and the third as athletic victor in the Hymn to Zeus.

[44] The best and most comprehensive discussion of this theme is Burian (1986), but he mentions Pythagoreanism only briefly in a footnote.

[45] Cf. Zeitlin (1965) 484. [46] As observed by Clay (1969) 3.

[47] Whereas if Klutaimestra had three specific killings in mind, they may be those of Thyestes' children, of Iphigeneia, and of Agamemnon.

of *Agamemnon*. Orestes, once acquitted, refers to his salvation as 'by the will of Pallas and of Loxias and of the third Saviour who completes all things (*Eum*. 758–60 τοῦ πάντα κραίνοντος τρίτου | Σωτῆρος)'. The completing function of Zeus Saviour is perhaps why there were sacrifices to him on the last day of the Athenian year.[48]

'Third' here combines ritual propriety (Zeus Saviour is third in the list) with his power to 'complete all things' – here through the polis institutions (lawcourt and cult) that integrate the opposed positions expressed in the trial. This 'third' Zeus is similar in effect to the Zeus who in the three stanzas of the Hymn ended the equilibrium, emerged victor in wrestling against Ouranos and Kronos, thereby became ruler of the whole cosmos,[49] and put men on the road to understanding. Just as the conclusion of this cosmogony is that Zeus, *triaktēr* and third ruler, rules permanently and everywhere, so too the three libations have a cosmological reach: they move – we have seen – from the Olympian to the chthonic, and then to the 'third' Zeus who is 'Saviour', even 'Saviour of the dead'.[50]

Such a third Zeus unites Olympian with chthonic, the upper with the lower world,[51] as does also in its way the introduction of festive light into the Erinues' cave 'beneath the earth'.[52] In the figure of Zeus political unity is expressed cosmologically.[53] His power to mediate between opposites (in cosmological space) and to transform equilibrium into transition (in cosmological time) qualifies him to preside as all-seeing and all-completing 'third Saviour' over the final resolution of the trilogy. The clearly defined form of the *trilogy* itself is analogous to the Pythagorean triad: the violence of the first play is met by counter-violence in the second, and this seemingly unlimited opposition is mediated in the third. Ritual utterance, dramatic form, narrative, polis and cosmology finally cohere in the Saviour who – I suggest – personifies the universality of the completing function of three in early Pythagoreanism.

[48] Lys. 26.6.

[49] It may be irrelevant that Ouranos personifies the sky and Kronos was imprisoned in the underworld.

[50] Scullion (2005) argues that Aeschylus is influenced by the combination of Olympian and chthonic in the cult of the *Hausgott* Zeus *Sōtēr*.

[51] Tripartite cosmic unity is radically personified by Zeus in fragment 70 of Aeschylus: 'Zeus is *aithēr*, Zeus is earth, Zeus is sky. Zeus is all things, and what is above them.' The idea of god as the beginning, middle and end of all things at Pl., *Laws* 715e may have been influenced by Pythagoreanism (*pace* Burkert (1972) 467 n. 6), or alternatively may perpetuate an ancient preconception (of the kind referred to in the final sentence of 16B) that may have influenced Pythagoreanism. Plato's remark may derive from Orphic poetry (*Orph. frr.* 21, 21a; Derveni papyrus 17.12): for the connections between Pythagoreanism and Orphic doctrine see Burkert (1972) 125–33.

[52] *Eum*. 1007, 1023.

[53] For this phenomenon in Orphic texts see Seaford (2004a) 221–2.

17c Pythagoreanism in the Danaid trilogy

The loss of two plays of the Danaid trilogy has deprived us of the representation of the Danaids' murder of their cousin-husbands and of what came thereafter. But the ten surviving lines (in two fragments from *Danaids*) are revealing. Firstly:

> Κἄπειτα δ' εὖτε λαμπρὸν ἡλίου φάος
> ἕως ἐγείρῃι, πρευμενεῖς τοῖς νυμφίοις
> νόμους μεθέντων σὺν κόροις τε καὶ κόραις.[54]

And then, when dawn arouses the bright light of the sun, let them sing songs, with the boys and girls, to propitiate the bridegrooms. (*fr.* 43)

This refers, it is generally agreed, to the waking song (*diegertikon*)[55] sung by the friends of the bride the morning after the wedding. If this is an instruction[56] for what the Danaids should do the morning after murdering their husbands, then *preumeneis* ('propitiatory') is appropriate: while the boys and girls[57] come to sing the *diegertikon*, the Danaids are to sing songs to appease the bridegrooms whom they have just slain. Intrafamilial conflict expressed in perverted ritual (including wedding ritual)[58] is common in tragedy, and the anomaly sometimes takes the form of songs opposed in mood. In Euripides' *Phaethon* a subsidiary chorus of girls singing a wedding song comes to a house in which the bridegroom lies dead and is being lamented.[59] The story had been dramatised in Aeschylus' *Heliades*, by which Euripides may well have been influenced. So too in *Danaids* the boys and girls arrive to sing the joyful[60] *diegertikon* that is presumably met with lamentation from within the royal house. The unity of opposites – of bloody hostility with the extreme intimacy of the new union – is expressed in opposed ritual songs.

The opposition has a (vertical) cosmic dimension. 'When the [female] dawn arouses (*egeirēi*) the [male] sun' is analogous to the *diegertikon*, which derives from the same verb (*egeirein*), but contrasts with the female lamentation addressed to the bridegrooms in the underworld. The same cosmic opposition, of upper and lower world, inheres in juxtaposed forms of ritual song – paian (associated with Apollo) and lament – in *Choephoroi*

[54] I have emended a corrupt text: Seaford (1987) 115.
[55] Cf. Theokr. 18 (and the scholiast ad loc.); Sappho *fr.* 30.
[56] For instance by Danaos in the prologue.
[57] Cf. the alternating females and males in the wedding song at the end of *Suppliants* (8a); and cf. Sappho *fr.* 30. A *diegertikon* for the Danaids may be hinted at in Hor., *Odes* 3.11.37–8.
[58] For such perversion in Athenian tragedy generally see Seaford (1987).
[59] E. *Phaeth.* 178–327. Cf. e.g. E. *IT* 365–8, *Tro.* 351–2; S. *fr.* 725; Seaford (1987) 115 n. 104.
[60] To judge from the only completely surviving example, Theokr. 18.

(15b). In *Suppliants* too the Danaids unite the cosmic opposites, in their threat to go down to supplicate the 'Zeus of the dead' if they do not get help from the Olympians (8a). And so in the Danaid trilogy we have the same interconnected series of united opposites as in *Oresteia*: in personal relations (closeness–violence), ritual utterance (paian/*diegertikon*–lament) and cosmos (upper–lower).

If the analogy with *Oresteia* extended into the ending of the Danaid trilogy, what we would expect is that the confused opposites are eventually recombined and stabilised by a third element. And indeed that is what the other surviving fragment of *Danaids* provides us with.

It is spoken by Aphrodite:

> The pure sky longs (*erai*) to penetrate[61] the earth,
> and longing (*erōs*) seizes the earth for sexual union.
> Rain falling from the . . . [62] sky
> impregnates the earth. And she gives birth, for mortals,
> to the pasturage of sheep and Demeter's sustenance.
> And the flourishing of trees is made complete (*teleios*)
> by the watering sexual union. Of these things I am in part the cause.
> (*fr.* 44)

In classical Athens marriage was for 'the ploughing of legitimate children' (14b), and Aphrodite was imagined as present at the wedding ceremony, characteristically in the role of persuading the bride or bringing her to the groom.[63] In the passage containing the formula ὕε κύε[64] Proclus also states that 'the laws of the Athenians, aware that the Heaven–Earth union was the first marriage, used to assign to Heaven and Earth the preliminary ceremonies (*protelein*) of marriages'. The cosmic power of sexual desire, notably in bringing together heaven and earth, was a theme of the wedding ceremony, at least later in antiquity.[65] If this was so in classical Athens, then it would give point to the praise of the cosmic power of *erōs* that introduces the bridal procession of Sophokles' Antigone to her tomb (*Ant.* 781–892). And it suggests that Aphrodite's praise of the Heaven–Earth union here was an endorsement of marriage.

In *Suppliants* the Danaids wished fertility on the Argive crops and animals (689–91), and in the final wedding song[66] praised the 'rivers that through the land pour their gentle drink, producing many children, with

[61] Reading τρῆσαι (Grotius). [62] The adjective is lost.
[63] *ARV*² 1317.1 and 3 (probably a bride with Aphrodite and Peitho, 'Persuasion'), cf. also 1325.27, 1328.99; E. *Hipp.* 553, *Hel.* 1120–1; also Sappho *fr.* 194, and several later texts: Seaford (1987) 117.
[64] Procl. *In Tim.* III 176.28 Diehl: 2e(2), 13a. [65] Seaford (1987) 117 n. 115.
[66] Seaford (1987) 114–15.

their rich streams soothing the land'.[67] In their next breath, however, they rejected the *telos* of Aphrodite. In response,[68] the men of Argos praised Aphrodite as having, along with Hera, power 'nearest to Zeus', and as having Desire in her train. Aphrodite, Hera and Zeus are the deities who preside over marriage, e.g. at *Eum.* 214–16. And so the association of the fertility of the land with human reproduction affirmed in *Danaids* by Aphrodite was implicit already in *Suppliants* in the Danaids' rejection of marriage.

All this may have been meant to prefigure the future role of the Danaids in the irrigation of Argos.[69] Such a role could hardly have been ignored in cult, and indeed Herodotos (2.171) tells us that the Danaids brought the Thesmophoria to Greece from Egypt. The Thesmophoria was a festival of the polis, concerned with the fertility of the earth, and for married women only. The case made by Robertson[70] that the play ended with the founding of the Thesmophoria can be supplemented. Cult *aitia* may have been not uncommon in Aeschylus.[71] The festival[72] and the trilogy share the same paradoxical combination of an 'emphatic anti-sexual ethos'[73] on the part of women (sexual abstinence, violence against males) with the subsequent[74] association of human sexuality with agricultural fertility. As elsewhere in tragedy, the negative aspect of the ritual is in its aetiological narrative explored by being taken to the bloody extreme that cannot be actually enacted in the ritual founded at the end of the play. For instance,[75] the cult of the Erinues founded at Athens left them with the power to inflict the violence that they exercised in the trilogy (but now only as a threat, to transgressors in general). Similarly, the Thesmophoria left women with the power to inflict the violence that the Danaids exercised in the trilogy – but now only as a threat, against male intruders into their celebrations.[76] And rather as in *Eumenides* the Erinues were persuaded by Athena to accept polis cult as compensation for their defeat in the new order, so

[67] 1026–9; cf. also 688–93.
[68] Perhaps playfully implying erotic interest in the Danaids: cf. Catullus 62.43; Seaford (1987) 114.
[69] Already in Hes. *Cat. fr.* 128 Merkelbach–West; also Schol. Call. *Lav. Pall.* 47–8; Eustath. ad *Il.* 4.171.
[70] Robertson (1924); also Seaford (1987) 115–6; Zeitlin (1992) 234–8; Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) 216–17.
[71] Parker (2005) 142 n. 27 lists as attested cases *Eum.*, *Su.* 268–70, *frr.* 6, 202; as uncertain *Prometheus Luomenos*, *Ixion*, *Danaids*, *Nemea*, *Eleusinioi*, *Herakleidai*, *Oreithuia*; and as of a different kind *frr.* 312–13.
[72] At Athens, from which most of our information about it comes.
[73] Parker (1983) 81; Burkert (1985) 244; Detienne (1977) 78–81.
[74] Implied by the order of the days, named ἄνοδος ('going up' – i.e. the separation of the women from their men), νηστεία (fasting), and καλλιγένεια (fair birth).
[75] Cf. also E. *Hipp.* 1423–30. [76] Aelian *fr.* 44; Pausan. 4.17.1 Ar. *Thesm.*; Bowie (1993b) 212–14.

in *Danaids* the Danaids may have been persuaded by Aphrodite, who mentions Demeter in her praise of reproduction, that the Thesmophoria (in honour of Demeter) compensated the subordination of women in marriage.[77] The Athenian Thesmophoria involved an unusual degree of autonomy for the community of women,[78] and for a married citizen woman 'participation in the festival was, indeed, a defining experience . . . Marriage made a woman, for the first time, a *thesmophoriazousa*.'[79] Finally, the title *Thesmophoros* (of Demeter) meant to the Greeks 'bringer of laws', and so founding the Thesmophoria may have implied the kind of transition to the order of the polis that occurred at the end of *Eumenides*.

In this way components of the aetiological crisis – the rejection of marriage, the intrafamilial violence between genders, the confusion of cosmic opposites – would be reversed in an ending in which the Danaids' acceptance of marriage was associated with the harmonious and productive relationship between sky and earth described by Aphrodite, a relationship that will be present in both marriage ceremony and Thesmophoria. The ritualised control of cosmic space in one fragment of *Danaids* (as the unity of opposites at the royal household) is then – in the other surviving fragment – appropriated for the polis by Aphrodite as the harmony of opposites. As in both *Eumenides* and the *Demeter Hymn*, the final reordering of relations between male and female in marriage is associated with the agricultural fertility and harmony of cosmic opposites provided by a new polis cult.

The Erinues – like the Danaids – invoke fertility of land and animals on the polis to which they have come,[80] and will receive wedding sacrifices in connection with marriage and childbirth (*Eum.* 835). The earth is to 'drink the divine gift' of rain, not the blood of the citizens (9D). We are reminded of the threefold association of spurting blood, fertilising rain and human seed in Klutaimestra's account of killing her husband.[81] This *topos*, uniting sexual intimacy with violence, occurs also twice in Sophocles.[82] If it also embellished Danaids' murder of their bridegrooms, then Aphrodite's identification of fertilising rain with human seed in the loving mediation of opposites was precisely what was required to restore order. In any event, her speech powerfully combines the subjective with the objective aspect of universal productive concord. In this it

[77] Emphasised by Zeitlin in her application of the Thesmophoria to 'many of the problems posed by the situation of the Danaids' (1992: 234–8).
[78] Parker (2005) 276. [79] Parker (2005) 270–1. [80] *Eum.* 921–6, 941–7, 903–9.
[81] *Ag.* 1388–92; 14B, 9D, 15B; cf. 1533–4 the house falls, destroyed by bloody rain.
[82] *OT* 1277–84, *Ant.* 1237–41: Seaford (1987) 119–20. Cf. also the Danaids' prayer that the Argive ground be not bloodied and that Ares, lover of Aphrodite, should not pluck the flower of youth (*Su.* 661–6).

resembles the idea of Aeschylus' contemporary Empedokles that love (*philotēs*) pervades the universe (alternately with strife), bringing all things into unity, as well as being 'innate even in mortal limbs, by whom they think friendly thoughts and perform harmonious deeds, calling her by name Joy and Aphrodite' (B17.22–4).

Empedokles was much influenced by Pythagoreanism, and indeed imagining cosmogony in terms of human reproduction is an idea we have found in early Pythagoreanism (17A2). Did *Danaids*, like *Eumenides*, move to a conclusion comparable with Pythagorean ideas of concord? Here again the issue is not direct influence but a shared basic pattern: in Aphrodite's speech the productive harmony of the cosmic opposites (sky and earth) is brought about by a *third, mediating element* – whether that entity be Aphrodite herself, or the *erōs* (sexual longing), or the fertilising liquid that is strikingly common to human and agricultural reproduction.

Or is it the persuasion exercised by Aphrodite, like that of Athena in *Eumenides*? Persuasion (*peithō*) was in early Pythagoreanism a mediating third (16B). The importance of persuasion to the democratic polis is expressed in its elevation to deity.[83] The hymenaial soothing Persuasion (1040 θέλκτορι Πειθοῖ) praised in *Suppliants*, together with the streams soothing the earth (1029), seem to have prefigured her (or its) importance – to judge from Aphrodite's speech – in the resolution of the crisis in *Danaids* (8B). In reconciling the Erinues Athena associates the soothing power (*thelktērion*)[84] of her persuasiveness with the goddess Peitho.[85]

And so Aphrodite's invocation of cosmic erotic harmony in *Danaids* may have played a similar role: consent is crucial in marriage, polis and cosmos.[86]

We may also conjecture that, just as in *Eumenides* the outcome created by Athena was the victory of her father Zeus[87] whose completing role was prefigured in *Agamemnon*, so too in *Danaids* the outcome created by Aphrodite was probably – given his role in *Suppliants* (8B) – associated with her father Zeus.[88]

[83] At Athens she was associated in cult with Aphrodite *Pandēmos* ('of all the people'): Parker (1996) 234, (2005) 408.

[84] 886, 900 θέλξειν μ' ἔοικας.

[85] *Eum*. 885–6, 970. Athenian persuasion ended conflict in Aeschylus' *Eleusinians* (Plut. *Thes*. 29.4–5). His Achilles trilogy contained reconcilation through – in part at least – Priam's persuasion.

[86] On persuasion in *Danaids* as both erotic and political see Zeitlin (1992) 214–15.

[87] 415, 664, 826–8, 850, 973.

[88] Justifying retrospectively the Danaids' initial appeals to his (obscure) completing authority. Cf. the crucial initial granting by the Erinues of *telos* to Athena (*Eum*. 434–5).

The missing piece in the jigsaw is the early Pythagorean view of marriage. Of this we have only two slight indications.

Firstly, we have a Pythagorean doctrine (*akousma*), probably from the archaic period,[89] to the effect that because a wife is a suppliant (*hiketis*) she must not be persecuted.[90] Reconciliation of the Danaids to marriage may have been achieved not only by Aphrodite's persuasiveness but also by the polis agreeing to protect the bride from – or compensate her for (with the Thesmophoria?) – the isolation that took its extreme (mythical) form in the Danaids' supplication in *Suppliants* (18B). If so, this was analogous to the reconciliation of the Erinues in *Eumenides* by the persuasiveness of Athena and the gift of cult. At any rate, the concern to protect the suppliant-like bride was also a concern of Pythagoreanism. Of the early Pythagorean community Kahn writes that 'the protected and even egalitarian position of women and the emphasis on strictly conjugal sex and the begetting of children seem to reflect a family policy designed to enhance the prospects of the community for physical survival'.[91]

The second indication of the early Pythagorean view of marriage is their alignment of the odd with the male (and limit) and the even with the female (and the unlimited). This is first indicated by Aristotle, who also alludes to the Pythagorean identification of marriage with a number, which was presumably five (16AB).

We may infer that for early Pythagoreanism marriage constituted a limiting (by the male) of the unlimited (embodied in the female). Conversely, the cosmogonic limitation of the unlimited was envisaged by at least some early Pythagoreans in terms of biological reproduction. Perhaps it is here that *Danaids* provided resolution of the other main component of the aetiological crisis, the spatial and temporal unlimitedness produced by the Danaids' rejection of marriage (8B). Long deferred completion (*telos*) may have occurred in the celebration (or proclamation) of a marriage, whether the remarriage of the Danaids or the marriage of the sole surviving Aigyptiad (Lynceus) with Hypermestra as endogamous founders of a new royal line of Argos.[92] To the arguments advanced by others in favour of this hypothesis we can add our earlier demonstration that a wedding would provide a perfect context for Aphrodite's speech.[93]

[89] Gould (1973) 98. [90] 58 C4 (Iambl. *VP* 84) and C5 ([Aristot.] *Oec.* 134a9–10); cf. D.L. 8.21.
[91] Kahn (2001) 10.
[92] Pi. *Pyth.* 9.111–16, *Nem.* 10.1–10; Hyg. *Fab.* 170; etc. For bibliography and (brief and sceptical) discussion of these suggestions see Garvie (1969) 226–7.
[93] Though the context is generally thought to be a trial: bibliography and sceptical discussion in Garvie (1969) 205–11.

If there was a marriage, then *Danaids* may have ended, like *Suppliants*, with an amoebean wedding song by the departing choruses of men and women. If so, then the opposition that remained unresolved in the processional wedding song at the end of *Suppliants* – between male persuasion and female resistance – was now resolved with the gentle victory of male persuasion. The Danaids' new bridegrooms may even have been the Argive soldiers[94] who (probably) sang the earlier amoebean song. Another component of the aetiological crisis, the combination of opposed ritual utterances (*diegertikon* and lament), would find some resolution in a (now unequivocally joyful) processional wedding corresponding with the (now unequivocally joyful) processional song that concludes *Eumenides* (16c). And this may have been presented as an aetiology, as founding the practice of the wedding song. Hyginus, much of whose material derives from tragedy, writes that the wedding song derives from the song sung at the wedding of the Danaids at Argos.[95] Here too – as we suggested for the Thesmophoria – female autonomy in ritual would in its *aition* take an extreme form.

If alternatively the play ended with the founding of the Thesmophoria, the finale may have been a procession like the one concluding *Eumenides*.[96] But whatever form it took, we have seen that it was probably prefigured by the final processional song of *Suppliants*. Another such prefiguring element of this song is from the very last sentence, sung by the Danaids:

> May he [Zeus] assign power (*kratos*) to women. I assent to (*ainō*) the better part of bad (τὸ βέλτερον κακοῦ) and the double part (*to dimoiron*) [i.e. of bad]. (1068–70)

This is at first puzzling. But FJW show that *to dimoiron* is proverbial for two parts of bad out of three,[97] which accords with it having here the partitive genitive *kakou* (of bad) as understood complement. They also compare Pi. *Pyth.* 3.80–2:

> . . . you know, learning from former men: the immortals apportion for mortals one good alongside two sufferings.

Currie[98] has demonstrated the influence of mystery-cult on the context of these words, and that they allude not to Zeus's *two* jars (of

[94] Suggested by Sommerstein (1996) 151.

[95] Seaford (1987) 116; Hyg. *Fab.* 273; cf. Pi. *Pyth.* 9; Pausan. 3.2.2; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.1.5; Hymenaios is associated with Argos at Schol. *Il.* 18.493; Tzetz. *Chil.* 13.599.

[96] All the other extant Aeschylean dramas that conclude their story (*Persians*, *Septem*, *Eumenides*) end with a departing procession (12d). The Athenian Thesmophoria contained a procession, and the entry of women into subterranean chambers – for ritual to ensure fertility, associated aetiologically with the rape of Kore: Parker (2005) 271–4.

[97] As at Schol. rec. *Pers.* 435.

[98] Currie (2005) 387–405 (and 346, 348).

good and evil) in the *Iliad*[99] but rather to mystic doctrine, probably about the afterlife bestowed on initiates. I add that – given the close connection in Magna Graecia between mystery-cult and Pythagoreanism – the basic triadic structure of the mystic doctrine (with the third good element permanently prevailing) may derive from the latter. The immortals assign one good ('alongside two sufferings'). In accepting the double part of bad the Danaids demand from Zeus the (eventual) good third part, *kratos*, which is the third integrating element in Ion's Pythagorean triad (16b).

But *Danaids* is lost, and so we cannot know whether it was influenced by the Pythagorean triad in the way that *Eumenides* was. Certainly the trilogy unites opposites. The Danaids are barbarians (e.g. 234–7) who claim to be Argives (274–5), and women who as killers act like men. Their claim for protection creates a crisis for the Argive polis, which is required as a third entity to mediate between monarch and *dēmos* (in *Suppliants*), and perhaps between female and male (in *Danaids*, 18b).

These two forms of mediation are connected by the alignment of the two oppositions with a third opposition, between Egypt and Argos. The Egyptian royal brides are aligned with the monarchical extreme: they tell Pelasgos that he is absolute monarch (*Su.* 370–5)), and – like their male cousins – display an arrogant autonomy incompatible with a Greek polis.[100] And yet they are also in a sense Argives, descended from Io, and their incorporation into Argos mediated the opposition between Greek and barbarian. They were eventually probably both reconciled to marriage and incorporated into the polis, perhaps as *metoikoi*, like the reconciled outsiders in *Eumenides*.[101]

Outsiders supplicating the polis were not confined to myth (4b), and their occurrence in several Athenian tragedies crystallises a basic dilemma of foreign policy. For instance, when the Spartans were faced with a revolt of helots, the Spartan Pericleidas supplicated at Athenian altars, probably in 462, 'begging for an army' (Ar. *Lys.* 1141). Whether this was shortly before or shortly after the production of *Suppliants*,[102] what interests us are two metaphors used – in the consequent controversy in Athens – of the relationship between Athens and Sparta. Ephialtes, urging rejection of the Spartan appeal, uses the terminology of wrestling, and Kimon, urging acceptance, imagines a yoked pair. Whereas the former metaphor implies unremitting struggle, the latter implies stable and effective complementarity.[103]

[99] Rather than three: see Richardson (1993) ad loc.
[100] Farenga (2006) 368–423. [101] 10c; *Su.* 609, 994; *Eum.* 1011, 1018.
[102] Sommerstein (1997) 76–9; Farenga (2006) 406–9.
[103] Conversely Aeschylus used the metaphor of wrestling to express permanent victory (17b), and the metaphor of the yoke to express disastrous conflict (15b).

Kimon's metaphor of the yoke was reported – Plutarch tells us – by none other than Ion of Chios, Pythagoreanising friend of both Kimon and Aeschylus.[104]

17D ZEUS

On the Aeschylean Zeus we have found three influences: the traditional Zeus (as in Homer), the power of money (15C), and the Pythagorean completing third (17B). The combination exploits shared elements, for instance the divine scales, or the power to unite opposites (shared, in different ways, by money and the Pythagorean third); or the completing power of the Pythagorean third may be imagined in terms of such traditional functions of Zeus as third saviour or as 'completing' (*Teleios*).

Understanding deity depends on understanding the need that creates it. What is the point of this Aeschylean Zeus?

The transition in *Oresteia* from a Herakleitean to a Pythagorean cosmos is also the absorption of the monetised into the aetiological chronotope, whereby the group asserts its control over the disorder that threatens it. Because the power of money is universal and impersonal, controlling it is socially necessary but difficult. It may seem stronger than even the intelligent personhood of traditional religion.[105] What is required is a *synthesis* of the personal with the impersonal, of the personal completing power of the traditional (wise) ruler of the world with the new kind of ubiquitous omnipotence (within the household and beyond the borders) embodied in money. And that is what we find in the ubiquitous Zeus of Aeschylus.

Zeus's new ubiquitous omnipotence must involve him in responsibility even for the horrors of the monetised chronotope. He is invoked as supporting the principle of revenge.[106] And even his completing power, so central to the ending of *Oresteia*, is assumed to have been at work already in the murder of Agamemnon and Kassandra. Mention of the house's 'insatiable' *daimōn* is followed immediately, as if to neutralise it (and in solemn form-parallelism), by

> ἰὼ ἰή, διαὶ Διὸς
> παναιτίου πανεργέτα·
> τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται;
> τί τῶνδ᾽ οὐ θεόκραντόν ἐστιν;
> alas, alas, through Zeus

[104] Plut. *Kimon* 16.10; 16AB; Jennings and Katsaros (2007) 2.
[105] Seaford (2004a) 147–72, esp. 159–65, 172. [106] E.g. *Ag.* 1563–4, *Cho.* 307, 382.

all-causing, all-doing.
For what is brought to completion for mortals without Zeus?
What of these things is not god-fulfilled?[107] (*Ag.* 1485–8)

Zeus is in Aeschylus frequently associated with words beginning *tel-*[108] or *pan-* (all): he is all-powerful, all-seeing, greatest of all, doer of all, cause of all, everywhere, with all authority, all-revered, all-devising.[109] The havoc wreaked by the insatiable *daimōn* will not after all be unlimited, because it belongs to the completion of Zeus's plan. And yet the cycle of violence is far from complete. Similarly, it is while in the grip of unlimited space and time that the Danaids put their trust in the completing power of Zeus (8B). The mind of Zeus is unlimited but creates *telos* (limit, completion). The same paradox is true of money (7A).

In *Suppliants* it is the unfathomability of Zeus's mind that reconciles his completing omnipotence with the horrors of the monetised chronotope. In some myths the sufferings of the aetiological crisis are imposed by deity as punishment for human offence. But in *Oresteia* the aetiological transition, inasmuch as it is prefigured in *Agamemnon* (167–83) by Zeus coming to cosmic power and concluded with his victory or domination in *Eumenides* (973), is assimilated rather to *cosmogony*. Pythagorean cosmogony is a transition to harmonious order with implications for the present (16B).

In what eventually emerges as his plan, cosmogony is brought to completion by a Zeus who transforms opposition into transition, who is finally both 'all-seeing' and embedded in the life of the polis. His domination in *Eumenides* is associated with the establishment of the Areopagos and the general acceptance of its verdict.[110] The Erinues say that they will respect 'the polis which all-powerful Zeus and Ares hold as a fortress of gods' (917–18), and hail the 'people of the town (ἀστικὸς λεώς)' as 'seated close to Zeus'. The new order is guaranteed by Zeus's thunderbolt (826–8). And the Zeus who 'prevailed' (*ekratēse*) is Zeus *Agoraios* (973). *Agora* could mean both assembly and space (the central public space of the polis). Zeus *Agoraios* had an altar not only in the agora (in Athens and elsewhere) but also

[107] -κραντον here should be translated 'fulfilled', not (as it sometimes is) 'ordained'. Κραίνειν always has at the least an implication of fulfilment, and *pace* Fraenkel (ad *Ag.* 369) does not mean 'ordaining' at *Ag.* 1424 and *Su.* 92. Cf. esp. *Cho.* 1075, *Eum.* 759.

[108] *Pers.* 740, *Su.* 18, 92, 138–9, 211, 526, 624, 688–9, *Sept.* 116, 161–3, *Ag.* 1487, *Eum.* 28.

[109] *Su.* 816, *Sept.* 255, *Eum.* 918, *fr.* 168.14–15; *Su.* 139, *Eum.* 1045; *Cho.* 245; *Cho.* 384, *Ag.* 1486; *Su.* 88; *Sept.* 116; *Cho.* 644, *Su.* 594.

[110] He is closely associated with Apollo (19, 149, 229, 618, 621, 640, 713) and with Athena (415, 664, 850), opposed to the Erinues (365, 797), and the saviour of Orestes (759–60).

on the Athenian Pnyx, where the Athenian assembly met, and he was a patron of politicians.[111]

The agora returns us to the significance of the dominant third. After the reforms of Solon power in Attica was disputed by two regional factions, based on plain and coast, before Peisistratos created a third regional party (the 'hill-men') and became tyrant. When – as Aeschylus approaches manhood – the tyranny is finally expelled, the democratic reforms of Kleisthenes locate in each of the three regions of Attica a third part (*trittus*) of each of the ten tribes,[112] thereby creating cohesion by 'mixing' the citizens and limiting the autonomous power of each region. Of the three regions the dominant and unifying one is the site of democratic political power, the urban centre, and more specifically – with its statues of the eponymous heroes of the ten tribes encapsulating all Athenian citizens – the newly delimited agora (3c).

The transition completed by Zeus from the monetised to the aetiological chronotope is also a transition from household to polis. He is *Ktēsios*, protector of household possessions (*Ag.* 1038), as well as eventually *Agoraios*, and even within *Eumenides* presides over household, polis and cosmos.[113] In the *Demeter Hymn* the crisis, at once familial and cosmic, transformed the power of Zeus into something like promotion of the polis (2b). And in *Suppliants* the Zeus on whom the Danaids repeatedly express their dependence (8c) is assimilated to their father Danaos[114] and indeed even called by them – as their ancestor – 'father'.[115] But their insistence on his unfathomable omnipotence no doubt prefigures another role for him later in the trilogy: we may guess that here too the familial crisis with cosmic implications (8a) required him to sanction the new institutions of the polis. If so, it is through the cosmic medium of father Zeus that introverted paternal authority (of Danaos) is replaced by the authority of the polis.

Finally, we must confront a possible objection. The obvious optimism of the Hymn to Zeus has – perhaps inevitably[116] – elicited the undoubted originality of arguing that it is in fact 'pessimistic'. I must confine myself

[111] Sommerstein (1989) 269. His altar is a place of supplication at E. *Hcld.* 70.

[112] Wilson (2000) 19 suggests that the three factions and *trittues* may have influenced the decision to have three competing tragic choruses at the Dionysia.

[113] *Eum.* 214, 974, 1045. [114] Zeitlin (1992) 220.

[115] 139, 592, 811: FJW 162 (on 811); Caldwell (1974) 53–4.

[116] This derives in part from cold-war aversion to grand narratives of political progress, and from once fashionable warnings against Christian preconceptions, warnings which – though often anti-Christian – tended to assume that Christianity brought something entirely new into the world.

here to the single example of Pope,[117] who quotes with approval the comment of Denniston and Page (1957) on the phrase πάθει μάθος in the Hymn to Zeus, that in fact the sacrifice of Iphigeneia makes Agamemnon neither wiser nor better. Quite so. However, it is not Agamemnon but 'mortals' who are put on the road to understanding. Who those mortals might be (or include) is indicated by the importance of *sōphronein*, self-controlled moderation, at the culmination of the Hymn (*Ag.* 181) together with its reappearance at the end of *Eumenides*: the reconciled Erinues hail the Athenians as having this virtue in time or eventually (1000 σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνωι). Similarly, in the parodos of *Suppliants* (139) the Danaids pray that the endings (*teleutai*) of their voyage be made favourable by Zeus *en chronōi*.[118] Pope doubts that *sōphronein* in the Hymn 'connotes wisdom in anything resembling the way we are accustomed to use the term'.[119] Perhaps. But he ignores its enormous ethico-political significance.[120] *Phronein* (176) he oddly takes to mean that 'men have become men'.

[117] Pope (1974), of whom more detailed refutations are by Booth (1976) and Conacher (1976).

[118] 8A. This passage supports the transmitted χρόνωι at *Eum.* 1000; κόρωι (Herwerden (1878–9) 159, adopted by West, gives odd meaning, and is inadequately motivated ('*sōphrosunē* non interdum sed semper tempestiva est').

[119] Pope (1974) 107.

[120] North (1966).

CHAPTER 18

Household, cosmos and polis

The arrival of an outsider from afar produces a crisis in a ruling household that ends with the foundation of cult in which the polis has some control of vertical (cosmic) interconnection. It has emerged that this aetiological pattern is – roughly speaking – common to the *Demeter Hymn*, *Bacchae*, *Septem*, Danaid trilogy and *Oresteia*. In the tragic instances the crisis includes endophony, along with cosmological confusion that (except in *Septem*) arises from ritualised access to the cosmic (vertical) axis. Only in *Persians* does the ruling family use this access to ensure its survival. The endophony arises directly (*Septem*), indirectly (Danaid trilogy) or in part (*Oresteia*) from the pursuit of wealth, and in *Septem* and the Danaid trilogy is accompanied by endogamy.

The polis is created by power that – required as it is to transcend the potential introversion of the (ruling) household – is readily imagined as cosmic, and accessible to control by communal ritual. The cosmic confusion of thunderbolt and earthquake, with which in *Bacchae* Dionysos destroys the house of Pentheus, probably inhered in the mystery-cult founded at the end of the play for all Thebans. In *Oresteia* ritualised access to the underworld – such as the invocations of Agamemnon and of the Erinues – tears apart the household and is itself finally needed, as the cult of the Erinues, for the creation of a fertile and cohesive polis. In *Septem* the endogamous endophony is accompanied by cosmological confusion, but is followed by the contrasting cosmological practice of polis cult. In the Danaid trilogy the endogamous endophony is accompanied by cosmological confusion that yields – we argued – to the cosmic interconnection of fertility in polis cult.

Marriage ritual constitutes a household but also embodies a cosmic principle, and so its perversion may destroy a household but also impact on the cosmic axis – as it does in the hymenaial suicide threatened by the Danaids (8A), for instance, or the hymenaial murder flaunted by Klutaimestra (10A). But in the end – in *Demeter Hymn*, *Oresteia* and (probably) Danaid

trilogy – marriage survives (with a new concession to the female) along with the rearticulation of the cosmic axis in polis cult. The cosmological dimension of marriage transcends the household to shape the polis.

It remains to locate this pattern within the development of Attic literature, between the *Demeter Hymn* and Sophocles, and to differentiate it according to dramatic setting (Athens, Argos (with Egypt), Thebes and Persia).

18A *DEMETER HYMN* AND DANAID TRILOGY

Historically the *Demeter Hymn* occupies a place between Homer and tragedy. The cosmic axis is articulated by the family of the gods, as in Homer. But the marriage of Hades with the Olympian Persephone creates familial *contradiction* that produces temporary cosmic separation and finally lasting cosmic *interconnection*. Persephone in the *Demeter Hymn* embodies the cosmic interpenetration of human and agricultural fertility that informs Greek marriage (17C). This gives mortals a stake in her story, and Demeter visits a mortal household, which she leaves to found a temple and ritual of the polis. Whereas the tension manifest in the cosmic narrative expresses no more than tension *within* the household or *between* households, the polis develops as a *transcendent* organisation in tension with the autonomy of the household (especially of any ruling household). The departure of Demeter from the royal household expresses this new kind of tension, and the polis ritual she founds celebrates the cosmic resolution (the return of Persephone/Kore).

These differences from Homer bring the *Demeter Hymn* closer to the basic pattern described in our first paragraph, and to Aeschylus. For the basic pattern persists into the drama that developed out of ritual in a Dionysiac festival. For instance, the Aeschylean Danaids arrive from afar, are taken into the royal house, and with their resistance to marriage cause cosmological confusion that in the end was in all likelihood resolved along with the establishment of a polis cult.

In *Demeter Hymn* and Danaid trilogy marriage is resisted by the long journeys of Demeter and the Danaids, who are finally received into a ruling household, where resistance to a rite of passage (marriage, immortalisation by fire) leads to action by the whole community, i.e. transition from monarchy to polis. The vertical axis is embodied in the *Demeter Hymn* by Hades taking off Persephone to the underworld and in *Suppliants* by the Danaids threatening to go down to the underworld, with a preference for Hades as their lord (8B). If we are right about the ending of *Danaids*,

then yet another shared element is a final dispensation containing three interpenetrating benefits: (a) the resolution of the fundamental problem (of marriage) by a male concession to reduce the isolation of the female, (b) (vertical) cosmic interconnection ensuring the fertility of the earth, to be enacted by (c) a communal but secret cult for Demeter involving emergence from beneath the earth (Eleusinian mysteries, Thesmophoria). Finally, Zeus plays a dual role, first as father (giving away Persephone, begetting Epaphos) but subsequently with the broader role of transcending the conflict by presiding over the new dispensation that limits male power within the family (17CD).

So too in *Oresteia* ritual (including wedding ritual) fails to effect completion, with a final concession to the female in a reaffirmed patriarchal order under Zeus together with the foundation of a communal cult that ensures both cosmic interconnection and general fertility.

On the other hand, tragedy belongs to a later stage of the development of the polis than does the *Demeter Hymn*. In the *Hymn* the transition from household to polis is no more than an episode contained within the cosmic narrative. But in *Oresteia* and the Danaid trilogy it is fundamental, and contains the cosmological crisis and its resolution as a strand: the originating tension is – in contrast to the *Hymn* – within the *mortal* family, and is eventually integrated into the tension between household and polis. One consequence of this can be seen by comparing the role of *endogamy* in *Hymn* and Danaid trilogy.

In both *Hymn* and Danaid trilogy the resisted marriage is endogamous, and in both the endogamy described by *auto-* compounds.[1] In the *Hymn* the endogamy (Hades marries his niece) seems to be an inevitable result of the fact that a single family is projected onto the cosmos, and if it has any effect at all it is perhaps to enhance the isolation of Persephone. But endogamy is central to the Danaid trilogy, as an extreme form of the household autonomy that must be transcended by the polis. It is resistance to endogamy, and the resulting endophony, that requires the intervention of the polis – as we shall now see in more detail.

18B ENDOGAMY AND POLIS

In *Oresteia* it is conflict within the Argive royal family that eventually causes the Athenian polis to intervene. The lawcourt is established with

[1] *Dem.* 31, 81, 85, 366. For *Su.* see 8C. Foley (1993) 107 claims that Persephone is subjected to 'an extreme form of virilocal exogamy' because Hades is inaccessible. But the isolation of the wife is precisely a problem of endogamy (8D).

the right to intervene in conflict within the household. In *Suppliants* the Argive polis intervenes in the conflict within the Egyptian royal family, and it is very likely that in *Danaids*, after the mass murder at Argos, the polis continued its intervention – perhaps, as in *Eumenides*, through the lawcourt.

In *Eumenides* the problem (of whether Orestes' matricide was justified) is resolved by the principle of patriliny. In *Danaids* the cause of the intrafamilial violence was female hostility to cousin marriage. Now cousin marriage was a regular practice at Athens, and its benefit (the retention of wealth within the kinship group) is mentioned in *Suppliants* by Pelasgos (8D). Whatever the outcome of the trilogy, it surely did not include condemnation or prohibition of normal Athenian practice. On the other hand, in *Suppliants* both we and the Argives sympathise with the girls' resistance to cousin marriage being forced on them by the barbarian brutality of their cousins.

A clue to how this contradiction may have been resolved is provided by the Danaids' response to Pelasgos' mention of the advantage of cousin marriage. Divorce, they say, is easy. Where the natal and marital kin of a woman are the same, among her problems is that divorce is easy for her husband and undesirable for her (8D). However, at Athens the *epiklēros* (heiress without father or brothers), who was required to be married to her nearest male relative, was protected by the polis: among the handful of abuses listed as requiring the judicial intervention of the chief magistrate in the family is the maltreatment of *epiklēroi*, over whom he also exercised a general oversight, with the duty to protect them from all abuses and the power to impose summary fines or take the offenders to court.[2] Moreover anyone may, without fear of penalty for themselves, bring a prosecution against maltreatment of *epiklēroi*.[3] This is significant. For the communalisation of the right to prosecute was recognised – at least as early as the fourth century – as the second most *dēmotikos* ('favourable to the *dēmos*') feature of Solon's constitution (*Ath. pol.* 9.1). Its promotion of political cohesion, in encouraging citizens to act against the wrongs done to other citizens, is reported in Plutarch's *Life of Solon* (18.6).

The polis intervenes to protect the female who would otherwise, because her natal and marital kin are the same, be unprotected (8D). If the conclusion of *Danaids* contained some such provision, then this would resolve our contradiction. Endogamy would be preserved, but in the more acceptable form consequent on its barbarian abuses being prevented by the polis.

[2] *Ath. pol.* 56.6–7; [Dem.] 43.75. [3] Isaios 3.46; Dem. 37.46.

Such a conclusion was prefigured in *Suppliants* by Pelasgos both praising cousin marriage and acquiring the democratic agreement of the polis to protect the Danaids. Athenian male anxiety about the treatment of isolated women is allayed by projection of its extreme form (brutal and autonomously introverted) onto barbarians in the remote past. Moreover autonomous introversion, besides being a characteristic danger of 'historical tyranny' (7B), would if widespread remove the social cement provided for the polis by exogamy. The resolution of the trilogy affirmed the polis, but as a political compromise with the tendency of the household to introversion.

Just as Klutaimestra's relatives are also Orestes', and are accordingly not there to avenge her,[4] so the male relatives of the brotherless Danaids are their husbands, and so cannot be their protectors against their husbands. Just as in *Oresteia*, so in the Danaid trilogy it is only the polis that is able to intervene within the family so as to end introverted violence and reconcile the female to the patriarchal order. Moreover, the Athenian law of the heiress both brought the heiress various benefits[5] and may have served the public interest in preserving households.[6] If such intervention was established at the end of *Danaids*, this would have added a political dimension to Aphrodite's praise of marriage, thereby creating the promise of communal well-being that also marks the ending of *Eumenides*.

The Athenian audience of the Danaid trilogy would be familiar with the need for the polis to intervene in the regulation of endogamy. But they would also be familiar with the dramatic representation, in normal wedding ritual, of the isolation of the bride. At the heart of the Danaid trilogy is the convergence of these two familiar themes, ritualised bridal resistance and the intervention of the polis in the introverted family. The convergence is promoted by the tendency of aetiological myth to imagine the negative elements of the ritual in extreme form: the barbarian brides murder their husbands.

It was though specifically the isolated introversion inherent in endogamy that required the intervention of the polis. Endogamy is often expressed by spatial confinement of the female, not least in tragedy,[7] whereas arrival

[4] Similarly, Orestes almost withdraws from avenging his father (*Cho*. 899).

[5] Notably the benefit of being married (with her sons eventually inheriting her estate) rather than being kept unmarried by her *kurios* while he (as *kurios*) managed her estate (Schaps (1979) 40–2).

[6] Schaps (1979) 32–3 argues against this widely held view; but cf. Patterson (1998) 100–1; Cox (1998) 95–9; further bibliography in Parker (2005) 33.

[7] Seaford (1990b).

from afar is a magnetic focus for communal cult. This polarity is expressed in myths of the arriving Dionysos extracting women from introverted households,[8] and strikingly embodied in the choral invocation of Dionysos in Sophokles' *Antigone* (18e).

18c chronotopic variation according to location

Our persistent pattern of tragic action varies according to the variously interacting chronotopes. How does this relate to the variety of the places in which the dramatic action is imagined to occur? The unsurprising answer is that distant places – Persia, Egypt, Argos, Thebes – were from the perspective of the centre (Athens) associated with differing chronotopes. In Athens itself the limit to the autonomy of household embodied in the divine assault on marriage is merely symbolic (Dionysos has unresisted sex with the 'king's' wife). But it is imagined that elsewhere[9] Dionysos is *resisted* as lover or as bringer of cult, combats the extreme expression of household autonomy (endogamy), and inspires the self-destruction of the household. In tragedy the horrors of endogamy and endophony are, with aetiological logic, projected onto the elsewhere, as is also the monetised chronotope.[10] Accordingly in the *Demeter Hymn*, set in Attic Eleusis, the conflict between deity and royal household is relatively mild. The absence from the *Hymn* of the monetised chronotope, on the other hand, cannot be attributed to its Attic locality, for it is significantly earlier than the tragedies and contains no mention of money.

Both Persia and Thebes were historical enemies of Athens, and they each function in Aeschylus as the aetiological opposite of where the dramas are performed (Athens). But they are also antithetical to each other, for although in both the royal household remains entirely autonomous, in Persia it remains in control of the polis whereas in Thebes it destroys itself. In the Danaid trilogy Egypt is the aetiological antithesis of where the drama is performed (Athens) but also of where it is set (Argos). In barbarian Egypt the royal household is – as in barbarian Persia – entirely autonomous, but the mobile resistance of its women causes the curtailment of this autonomy in Argos, which – we shall see – stands for Greece as a whole. In *Oresteia* Argos functions as the aetiological antithesis of the ideal polis of Athens, by virtue of the lawcourt at Athens and the cycle of

[8] Though *Bacchae* has no more than a hint of endogamy, Chapter 8 n. 88.
[9] The story of the Athenian people initially rejecting Dionysos occurs only once in a late source: 4a, 5a.
[10] Cf. Kreon projecting corrupting gold onto Sardis and India: S. *Ant.* 1037–9.

revenge in the Argive monarchy, which nevertheless (as almost certainly also in *Danaids*) survives.

(1) Persia

Persians was performed at Athens but set in a distant place, Sousa, that is in a sense the political opposite of Athens. In this it resembles *Septem*. We might accordingly expect Sousa to function as the aetiological other of Athens, as does Thebes in *Septem*. And indeed Persia is – it is repeatedly[11] said – a 'polis', which is devastated, whereas Athens, the polis against which the Persian expedition is directed (233–4), is saved. But the arrival at Sousa from afar results in the royal *household* preserving both itself and its mastery over the devastated polis – antithetically to *Septem*, in which the household destroys itself and the polis is saved.

In *Septem* and *Oresteia* the aetiological crisis (in Thebes and Argos) is marked by the monetised chronotope and the unity of opposites within the household, resulting in the former case in the self-destruction of the household (to the benefit of the polis), and in the latter case in the salvation of the self-destructive household but only through the foundation of polis institutions with which the trilogy culminates. But in *Persians* such tension as there is between household and polis fails to produce a transition. There is neither conflict within the household nor aetiology.

The distinction reflects a historical reality. Monetisation united the Greek polis but also enhanced the potential autonomy of the household, thereby making inescapable the tension between polis and household (especially the tyrannical household). But the Persian king, who according to Herodotos despised the commercial nature of the Greek polis, commanded from his (unmonetised)[12] empire tribute for a royal household that defined the state. The ritualised incorporation of the arrival from afar does not subvert the royal household but confirms it. Elsewhere in Aeschylus cosmological *confusion* requires a role for Zeus or resolution in polis ritual. But in *Persians* Zeus is infrequent and without cosmological role (12B), with the household using ritual to affirm its own control of cosmic *interconnection* (the raising of Dareios).

This absolute *opposition* between Greece and Persia co-exists with their *unity*. Besides the emphasis on Persia being a polis, the Greeks and Persians have a common origin. But the unity of opposites expressed in the dream of their yoking by Xerxes[13] is no more stable than it is elsewhere in Aeschylus.

[11] *Pers.* 213, 219, 511, 556, 682, 715, 781, 946.
[12] Seaford (2004a) 128–9, 241. [13] 8A, 15B.

(2) From Egypt to Argos

The Danaid trilogy is set at Argos,[14] and the arrival from afar is from Egypt. Although the problem of endogamy is Greek, it is projected – in its brutal form – onto dark-skinned barbarians. As Thebes and Persia are each in its different way an aetiological other of Athens, so Egypt is the aetiological other of Argos. Within the aetiological other, whether Greek (Thebes) or barbarian (Persia, Egypt),[15] the royal household is all-powerful.

However, Egypt and Argos were not enemies of Athens, like Thebes and Persia, but rather either allies or soon to become allies. Athens entered an alliance with Argos (462) and sent an expedition to fight along with the Egyptians against the Persian occupation of Egypt in about 460.[16] In the Danaid trilogy the aetiological opposition is mediated by the Danaids' descent from the Argive Io, which forms the basis for their incorporation into Argos. Whereas Thebes and Persia are – each in its different way – *absolute* opposites of Athens, the crisis in the Egyptian royal family produces its transformative incorporation into the Argive polis.

Nevertheless, the Theban aetiological crisis and the Egyptian are similar. In each endogamy produces conflict within a royal family, which results in both endophony and a war between the polis and outsiders. But whereas Argos is represented as democratic and able to resolve the conflict, presumably through polis institutions (as in *Eumenides*), the Theban *enemy* of Athens has no such capacity.

This does not mean that Aeschylus recognised Argos as a polis equal in its civilising power to Athens. In *Oresteia* Argos is the aetiological other of Athens. And the aetiological other of Argos in *Suppliants* is a whole barbarian land (Egypt). Correspondingly, the kingdom of Pelasgos is described in *Suppliants* as including much of the Greek mainland (254–9). The description seems out of place, unless we realise that not only does it complement geographically the area described as traversed by Io and the Danaids between Argos and Egypt (8a), it also suggests the claim of Argos to embody Greece as a whole. Pelasgos introduces the description as of the land occupied by those named after him, Pelasgians, soon perhaps to be renamed after Danaos.[17] The Pelasgians are in other fifth-century texts identified with the earliest population of Greece as a whole (including the

[14] For Argos in tragedy see Saïd (1993).

[15] Mitchell (2006) discusses *Suppliants* in relation to changing Greek attitudes to the barbarians.

[16] It is difficult to ascertain the previous relations of Athens to these places. The Danaid trilogy was probably produced at some time in the 460s. Argos' long-term rivalry with Sparta may have inclined her towards Athens; and the Greeks had a long history of good relations with – and settlement in – Egypt.

[17] 253 with FJW ad loc.; also at 345, 616, 624, 967, 1023.

Athenians), and accordingly Pelasgos says that his father was born from the earth (250). Whereas *Eumenides* represents Athenian patriotism, the Danaid trilogy contains an element of panhellenism.

(3) From Argos to Athens

Oresteia, like the Danaid trilogy, ends with the survival of the royal family at Argos. But whereas in the Danaid trilogy Argos embodies the power of the Greek polis to incorporate the barbarian aetiological other, in *Oresteia* Argos is – in relation to Athens – itself the aetiological other. In *Eumenides* the arrival from afar (of Orestes, with the Erinues) gives rise to an institution of the polis in which the conflict is mediated, and to a cult of the polis in which cosmological interconnection is established and the potentially dangerous visitors are incorporated. In *Oresteia* the (Herakleitean) unity of opposites that prevailed at Argos is at Athens transformed into the (Pythagorean) integrative mediation of opposites.

The places in which the monetised chronotope prevails are Greek city-states, Argos (in *Oresteia*) no less than Thebes.

A schema is emerging with which to think about the variety of place in Aeschylean drama. The two persistent enemies of Athens in Aeschylus' lifetime were Thebes (5B) and Persia. The otherness of each of them is represented by Aeschylus as, in relation to Athens, absolute: i.e. each is the *opposite* of the ideal polis of Athens by virtue of the perfect autonomy of the ruling household, and correspondingly the absence of a political role for the polis. But they are also the opposite of each other in that whereas in Greek Thebes the endogamous household controls the polis but destroys itself, in barbarian Persia the household remains both united and in complete control of the polis. Each is also *independent* of Athens, in contrast to the recourse to Athens from elsewhere in several tragedies that include *Eumenides*.[18]

In the Danaid trilogy violent endogamy is projected onto Egyptians, and resolved in Argos, which nevertheless in *Oresteia* becomes the place of introverted violence and monetisation to be resolved in Athens. In both trilogies the household is preserved by the polis (Argos, Athens), which accordingly adopts permanent institutions to accommodate the danger presented by the household. Whether or not Argos had a democratic constitution at this time (it probably did),[19] its representation in *Suppliants*

[18] Also S. *OC*; E. *Med.*, *Hcld.*, *Su.*, *HF*.
[19] Tomlinson (1972) 192–9; Forrest (1960); Kowalzig (2007a) 161 n. 84.

as democratically defending suppliants (as Athens was proud of doing), together with its association with Greece as a whole, affirmed a connection with Athens – as did *Eumenides*, in which Athens benefits Argos by saving its royal household and Orestes reciprocally promises permanent good will, even from the tomb.[20] The otherness of Argos, and even of Egypt, is relative rather than absolute.

18D AESCHYLEAN THEBES

In Athenian tragedy the horrors of endogamy and endophony are projected, by the logic of aetiology, onto the distant past and onto the elsewhere, especially Thebes.[21] Why Thebes? We identified three factors: the *aition* of the City Dionysia, the memory of Thebes supplying money for the Athenian tyranny, and persistent hostility between Athens and Thebes (5B).

In *Septem* the fratricides return to their incestuous origin, a circularity that is one aspect of the maximisation of homogeneity. Three generations of a family are assimilated to a single homogeneous mass. The central opposition, between Eteokles and Polyneikes, is in the finale endowed with as much unity as it is possible to endow human beings with. This combination of the unity of opposites with spatio-temporal homogeneity and circularity resembles the monetised chronotope to be found in Herakleitos.[22]

But there is a significant difference. The family narrative ends at a temporal limit, for the blood in the earth produces no offspring (828 'childless'),[23] and in a confined space – the grave that is all the land they have inherited (818). Here, as elsewhere, endogamy expressed by *auto-* compounds is associated with spatial confinement.[24] This is also the ending of the narrative in the sense that it is the fulfilment or completion (*telos*) of the monetised self-destruction imposed by the curse. The family ends in spatio-temporal fixity. The unity of opposites is not reconfigured into a lasting domination of one over the other, as in *Oresteia*. Rather, of the

[20] 762–77. On these lines see Macleod (1982) 126–7.

[21] That the tragic Thebes is an 'anti-Athens' was influentially argued by Zeitlin (1990), some of whose conclusions, from a different perspective, overlap with mine: 'For the tragic poets Thebes represents the closed system that vigorously protects its psychological, social and political boundaries . . . Once we grasp the importance of autochthony and incest as the underlying patterns at Thebes, we can diagnose the malaise of this city, which has no means of establishing a viable system of relations and differences, either within the city or without, or between the self and other' (148). 'Time in Thebes returns always and again to its point of departure, since it can never generate new structures and new progeny that can escape the paradigmatic patterns of its beginning' (153).

[22] 9D, 13A. [23] See Chapter 9 n. 86. [24] 8BC, 11B, 9D; Seaford (1990b).

three elements of the monetised chronotope, one (the unity of opposites) produces – by the maximisation of unity – another (homogeneity, the dissolution of internal limits), but with emphatic reversal of the third (spatio-temporal unlimitedness).

True, for the polis there is a future, in the form of aetiological transition to public ritual in civic space. But although the narrative of the family is steered by the same divine powers as in *Oresteia* (Curse, Erinues, Delphic Apollo) the conclusion has – unless it were in a lost ending – neither cosmic mediation[25] nor a significant role for Zeus.[26] In contrast to the transformation of the Erinues in *Eumenides*, the *daimōn* who overpowered the brothers 'ceased',[27] like the family to which it belonged. *Septem* ends neither with a fully Herakleitean cosmology nor with a transition – as in *Oresteia* – to a Pythagorean cosmology.[28]

As a strategy for the accumulation of wealth and strength, endogamy is reinforced by monetisation, which promotes the possibility of self-sufficient independence from external relations of reciprocity (7B). And since money has abstract value, self-sufficiency goes with abstraction. The endogamy of the royal family of *Septem* contrasts with the reciprocity of communal reproduction (just as commercial gain and possessions contrast with agriculture) and excludes reciprocity even with the gods (9C). But money may increase the self-sufficiency not only of the household but also of the individual, and so increases the possibility of conflict *within* the household. *Septem* represents – in the pre-monetary but extremist medium of myth – the socially disastrous monetised self-sufficiency of the household (endogamy) together with the individual monetised self-sufficiency that divides the household (endophony).

The centrality of the unity of opposites in the Herakleitean cosmos, and in *Septem*, reflects the unified opposition of the parties to monetised exchange. But in Herakleitos this unity of opposites is constantly transformed into a cycle by the cosmic *logos*-in-fire, and all things are one (fire): this reflects the power of *socially circulating* abstract value to homogenise all differences (between transactors and between goods). But in *Septem* the monetised chronotope is *within a single introverted household*, and so the homogenisation is accompanied not by spatio-temporal unlimitedness (as

[25] Except at 854–60: 7C.
[26] He is mentioned in appeals to save the polis and then, after the battle, only once, as having helped to save it (*Sept.* 822).
[27] 960: 9B.
[28] Although in 854–60 the implied prevalence of light, life and purity over their opposites (in Athenian public cult) is analogous to Pythagorean belief.

in the social circulation projected onto the cosmos by Herakleitos), but by spatio-temporal limit.

Here we must consider another presocratic cosmology, that of Parmenides. His abstract, homogeneous, unchanging, but self-sufficient, fixed and limited 'One' reflects (necessarily unchanging) monetary value that is – in contrast (and perhaps opposition) to Herakleitean fire – abstracted from all goods and even – out of unconscious desire for (illusory) self-sufficiency – from social circulation. The association of this universal abstract One with extreme individualism is illustrated by Parmenides' claim to unique understanding of it. But this argument cannot be set out here.[29] My point is to indicate another instance of the analogy between the chronotopes of such different creations as tragic myth and the 'philosophical' imagination.

The monetised unity of opposites is Herakleitean, but in an extreme form becomes its opposite, mere unity, the absolute permanent homogeneity of the Parmenidean One. The unity of opposites in *Septem* has a Herakleitean perfection (13A), and the self-sufficiency, spatio-temporal homogenisation and eventual permanent fixedness of the Theban royal family are as Parmenidean as a myth can be. Whereas the Parmenidean One expresses – from an individualist perspective – a positive view of self-sufficiency, the self-sufficiency of the royal family ends – from the political perspective of tragedy – in self-destruction, for it is no less dangerous to the polis than is its opposite, the all-powerful circulation expressed in the Herakleitean chronotope.

18E SOPHOKLEAN THEBES

The Theban chronotopes of Sophokles are similar but not identical to those of Aeschylus. But the significance of some of the features we have identified in *Septem* will be clarified or confirmed by their reappearance in more explicit or emphatic form in Sophokles.

(1) Antigone

In *Antigone* the endogamy of the royal family is emphasised, and again closely associated with spatial confinement and with endophony. There are in the royal family three instances of suicide, which – as introverted violence – resembles kin-killing (8C). Antigone is confined by her uncle

[29] See 3A, 15A; Seaford (2004a) 231–65.

Kreon in an underground bridal chamber, where she kills herself and her betrothed Haimon tries to kill his father Kreon before killing himself. I have described the importance of money in the play, in particular the obsession of Kreon with it.[30] It remains here to insert a missing piece of the jigsaw, the monetised chronotope, and to delineate the presence of our basic pattern. The result will be to reveal the same combination of elements as we found in *Septem*, albeit differently configured.

Antigone on the way to her confinement declares, 'o tomb, bridal chamber, eternally guarded deep-dug dwelling, to which I am going to my own [people]', i.e. to the dead of her *natal* family, the father, mother and brother for whom she has performed death ritual (891–903). Her eternal bond with her brother she earlier described in terms suggestive of incest (73–6) and now explicitly privileges above any *marital* relation (905–12). Her death 'before the time' she calls a gain (462 *kerdos*), where the association of *kerdos* with monetary gain is made inevitable by the preceding tirade by Kreon against the pernicious desire for money and *kerdos* (295–312). Antigone seems to mean that her imminent premature death is (in contrast to money) true gain. But we are reminded of the family curse that recommended to her brother Eteokles the selfish *kerdos* that is worth imminent premature death (9c).

The mythical parallels for endogamic spatial confinement offered by the chorus include Danae confined in a 'tomb-like *thalamos*' as treasurer (950 *tamieueske*) of the 'gold-flowing' seed of Zeus. *Thalamos*, a word applied also to Antigone's tomb (804), meant both bridal chamber and store-room for valuables. The physical confinement of the brotherless Danae at Argos was accompanied by an endogamous union with her father's brother,[31] but produced offspring (Perseus) through the intervention from afar of Zeus. In Euripides' lost *Danae* it is said that the pleasure given by gold is greater than that of parents and children in each other, and like Aphrodite's look inspires innumerable passions (*fr.* 324). This may have been in the context of the power of external money (the gold of Zeus) to open up the introverted family.[32]

This reminds us of the paradox of money, that by its accumulation it may intensify the introverted self-sufficiency of the household while by its circulation it integrates the polis. Although the power of the *turannos* is based on his individual control of the supply of money, money is effective

[30] Seaford (1998). [31] Pi. *fr.* 248 Snell; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.1; Seaford (1990a) 153–4, 164.
[32] Endogamy in Euripides: Seaford (1990a) and (1990b).

only by circulating, by being owned by others. Money seems to provide the *turannos* with omnipotence. He has wealth (1068–9), and can do and say what he likes (507). But it is an omnipotence that money must also constantly qualify and endanger, by bestowing some power on all who have money. If, as Kreon claims, the polis belongs to him as ruler, then – replies Haimon – he would be ruling a deserted polis (736–9). In response to a similar kind of contradiction, any household that is proud of its monetised (illusory) self-sufficiency may – despite the necessity of money to circulate – imagine abstract value as abstracted even from circulation: this, we saw, underlies the Parmenidean 'One'. Haimon wisely urges his father, 'do not carry within yourself one mentality[33] only' (705).

The seeming omnipotence bestowed on the tyrant by the accumulation of money co-exists with the threat to him posed by its circulation. Hence the projection by Kreon of his own attitude to money onto others. Teiresias accuses him, with great subtlety,[34] of precisely this. The wealthy tyrant believes that the opposition to him is motivated by money, which is the worst of all human institutions (296), destroying poleis and driving men from their homes, making good men bad (298–9) and teaching impiety in 'every action' (301), the thing for which – Kreon maintains – the guard has even betrayed his own life (322, 221–2). People want to make a profit (*kerdainein*) out of 'everything' (312). It is money that corrupts seers like Teiresias (1054–5). Much if not all of this will prove to apply to Kreon himself.

Kreon's claim to own the polis (738), based though it is on the reality of monetised tyrannical power, confuses polis with household. Accordingly he both declares that his primary loyalty is to polis rather than family (187–92, 486–9) *and* states that the purpose of a man having offspring is for them to be allies against his enemies.[35] He bans burial for a nephew, on pain of a punishment (stoning) inflicted by the whole polis (36). But with the culprit revealed as his niece, he changes the punishment to the spatial confinement associated with endogamous introversion. Characteristically of the Theban tyranny, Kreon is simultaneously too close and too distant from his family, and finally both destroys his family and pollutes the polis.

Irritated by the accusation of venality, Teiresias first accuses Kreon of projecting his own tyrannical shameful desire for gain (*aischrokerdeia*) onto

[33] In translating ἦθος as 'mentality' I follow Griffith (1999). [34] 1062: Seaford (1998) 131–7.

[35] 641–7. A unity of opposites is exquisitely expressed in ὅσια πανουργήσασα (74), guilty of a holy (from the introverted family perspective) crime (from the polis perspective). Antigone emphasises the former (ὅσια), refusing to differentiate between her brothers.

others, and then predicts that Kreon will give Haimon as 'one' corpse 'in exchange' for the corpses that he 'has' – of Antigone kept alive below and Polyneikes kept dead above (1066–72). Teiresias represents this as economic profit,[36] and then stresses that 'gods above' have no business with the unburied corpse.

Kreon's crime thus embodies simultaneously all four of our tyrannical characteristics (7B), for it is represented as killing kin with endogamic enclosure and perverting ritual to make profit. Keeping the dead above and the alive below is represented as both economic transaction and *cosmological confusion*. The unlimited power of the tyrant is imagined as making a profit from the dual perversion of death ritual that encapsulates the monetised *chronotope*: a confusion or homogenisation of opposites, of kin with enemy, of the cosmic above with the cosmic below, and of living with dead, which Kreon even unites within himself, as a 'corpse with a soul' (1167). In the end his only gain (1326 *kerdos*) is to be led away in isolated lamentation.

It is in this context that we must understand the otherwise mysterious dust cloud that precedes Antigone's attention to the corpse. A 'divine disease', it is raised from the ground up to the sky and fills the *aithēr* (417–21). In the following choral song 'bloody dust of the gods below' is used metaphorically of what is now destroying the house of Oedipus,[37] along with another metaphor of cosmic confusion: when the house is shaken by the god (i.e. by thunderbolt or earthquake), suffering lasts over many generations, and this is like the swell rushing over the darkness (*erebos*) under the sea and churning up the black sand from the bottom (584–91).

The cosmological confusion is causing disastrous cosmological *separation*, for the altars are full of the flesh of Polyneikes carried there by birds, with the result that gods are rejecting sacrifice (1016–20). In the *Demeter Hymn* too cosmological confusion (Persephone taken off to Hades) causes disastrous cosmological separation that includes the suspension of sacrifices (2A).

Kreon responds to Teiresias' account of the polluted altars thus:

> I have been traded away [by seers] and made into cargo long ago.
> Make your gains, import electrum from Sardis, if you wish, and Indian
> gold. You will not cover that man in burial,
> not even if eagles wish to seize him

[36] Seaford (1998) 131–7 and (2004a) 159–60. Profit from death ritual: e.g. *Ag.* 438–44 (12C).
[37] 599–602: text and precise meaning are uncertain.

and carry him as food to the thrones of Zeus.
Nor even then will I in fear of this pollution
allow him burial, for well I know that
no man is strong enough to pollute the gods. (1036–41)

Faced with the cosmological confusion, Kreon abstracts from it – as beyond its reach – the gods. But this is an illusion. He lives inescapably in the (Herakleitean) world of pervasive monetised circulation, in which money is able to obtain the 'seat, nearest to the gods, of highest tyranny' (Sophokles *fr.* 88). The remote self-sufficient deity first proposed by Xenophanes is – like the Parmenidean universe of unchanging abstract value – merely a projection of the illusion of monetised self-sufficiency.[38] It is Kreon's (monetised) *mind* that is causing the 'disease of the polis', cosmological confusion (1015–17). And he projects the negativity of money even onto Asia (rather as we have claimed that Athenian tragedy projected it onto Thebes), and so it seems to be everywhere: geographic space is no less homogenised than cosmic space.

The 'disease' of the polis is picked up in the following choral hymn to Dionysos: he is asked to come from afar to purify by dance[39] the 'polis with its whole people' of its 'disease'. Disease expresses social disorder.[40] The ode evokes the cosmic light in the darkness of the mysteries (2AE): the 'maternal thunderbolt' at Thebes (1139) is the thunderbolt that unites heaven with earth in his mystery-cult (5A), and Dionysos from Eleusis (1120, 1146–52) is called 'chorus-leader of the stars', on which the scholiast comments 'according to a certain mystic *logos*' (2E3). The Eleusinian light in the darkness was associated with the joyful annual return of Kore from her subterranean marriage with Hades, and this is just one of several reasons[41] to suppose an analogy here with the concurrent attempt to release Antigone from her subterranean 'bridal chamber of Hades' (1204–5). Endogamic confinement, as if in the underworld, is to be countered by the arrival from afar of a god who extracts women from introverted confinement in the home for public cult.[42] In *Septem* too Dionysiac liberation in an Attic festival is evoked in the midst of endogamic endophony at Thebes.[43]

Here then is the final element of our basic pattern. Dionysos is invoked from afar to break open the introversion of the household, to transcend the monetised chronotope by means of the power of cosmic resolution in polis

[38] Seaford (2004a) 211–16, 246–9. [39] Scullion (1998).
[40] E.g. in the Erinues' threats in *Eumenides*: Seaford (1994a) 102–3.
[41] Seaford (1990b) 88–9. [42] Seaford (1990b). [43] 699–701; 9A.

cult. But the invocation is in vain. In contrast to *Eumenides* and (almost certainly) *Danaids*, but as in the other extant tragedies set in Thebes, the family is destroyed. Kreon has lost his wife, two sons (1303) and a niece, and calls himself 'less than nothing' (1325).

(2) Oedipus

The account of the blood flowing from Oedipus' eyes, with the dead Jokasta lying on the ground, evokes both sexual union and rain – like the boast of Klutaimestra.[44] The adjective *summigēs* in this passage both describes their sufferings and evokes (fertilising) liquids and incestuous sexual union[45] – the three meanings that the same adjective combines in *Septem* (9D). Also typical of tragic Thebes are the description of incest in terms of agriculture,[46] the return to origin (circularity),[47] the emphasis on the collapse of intrafamilial differentiation,[48] and the unresolved unity of opposites.[49] Circularity, familial non-differentiation and the unity of opposites are all expressed in the single phrase 'the marriage not a marriage, long since procreating and being procreated' (*OT* 1214–15 τὸν ἄγαμον γάμον πάλαι | τεκνοῦντα καὶ τεκνούμενον). As in *Septem*, but without the evocations of polis cult, we do not proceed beyond the perfect unity of opposites. Communal celebration seems confined to the Dionysiac ritual framing of the performance,[50] and there is no absorption of the monetised into the aetiological chronotope.

It is in this context that we must understand the fact that Oedipus is a *turannos* who associates both tyranny and its acquisition with money, and regards everything reprehensible (the murder of Laios, the accusations of Teiresias, the supposed conspiring by Kreon) as motivated by money.[51] Then there is the famous phrase of the chorus (*OT* 873) ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον (MSS), 'hubris generates the tyrant', or ὕβριν φυτεύει τυραννίς (conjectured by Blaydes), 'tyranny generates *hubris*'. On either reading it evokes the incestuous procreation of the Theban tyranny. And so the next words – 'if *hubris* is overfilled vainly with many things' – associates

[44] S. *OT* 1276–81; 9D; 14B. [45] Seaford (1987) 120. [46] *OT* 1211, 1257, 1485, 1497–8.
[47] *OT* 1208–11, 1215, 1250, 1359, 1361–2, 1404, 1485, 1498–9.
[48] *OT* 425, 457–60, 1208, 1215, 1250, 1256–7, 1361–2, 1404–7.
[49] E.g. *OT* 415–16, 423, 438, 1214, 1256.
[50] Goldhill (1987) demonstrates that ceremonials of the Great Dionysia affirm civic values, but describes its relationship with the 'questioning' and 'problematisation' of the same values in the tragic texts as simply one of 'tension'. I attribute it rather to the tragic elaboration of the aetiological crisis of civic ritual: see further Seaford (1994a) 363.
[51] *OT* 124–5, 380–8, 541–2.

this incestuous procreation with its illegitimate enrichment. The chorus then sing of gain (*kerdos*) that is unjust and impious and 'gets hold of the untouchable' – perhaps, given the context, implying incest.[52]

Given all this, the first words of the chorus reacting to the revelation of the incest are instructive:

> Alas generations of mortals, How *enarithmō* you as living equal to nothing. (1186–8)

Enarithmō means 'I number or reckon among' and so 'I value'. 'Equal to nothing' brings out the sense of 'number': tyrannical procreation, earlier assimilated to the accumulation of wealth, is now – by virtue of the circular undifferentiatedness of incest – numbered at zero. The introversion of tyrannical endogamy is reduced to nothingness, for the generations have only '*seemed*' (1191–2) to acquire happiness, in fact returning to their starting point (circularity, undifferentiatedness), and Oedipus – like his sons (brothers) in *Septem* and Kreon in *Antigone* – has lost everything.

The undifferentiatedness of incest means producing offspring like yourself. This is like using money to make money – an analogy that would seem trivial, were it not for the combination of the following factors:

(a) The Greeks recognised that money tends to efface the distinction between people as well as between things.[53]
(b) The Greeks called (and still call) monetary interest 'offspring' (*tokos*).
(c) According to Aristotle, 'as offspring are similar to their parents, so *tokos* is currency from [the child of] currency.[54] And so of the modes of acquisition this is the most unnatural.'[55] Closest to the (unnatural) perfectly homogeneous reproduction of monetary interest is incest.
(d) Females and money on the one hand circulate together (the dowry) but on the other hand both may be introvertedly confined in an inner chamber (*thalamos*).[56]

We have seen that in *Antigone* the procreative and economic functions of the *thalamos* combined – as also in the words of Oedipus: 'the same great harbour sufficed for son and father as *thalamēpolos*' (*OT* 1207–10). *Thalamēpolos*, generally translated here 'bridegroom' (i.e. with *thalamos* as the wedding chamber), in fact means this nowhere else, but rather generally means an attendant of a *thalamos*: e.g. in its only other fifth-century occurrence it means attendant of a *storeroom* (*Septem* 359). The ambivalence of *thalamos* expresses familial introversion also in Sophokles' *Elektra* (8B).

[52] 889–96; Seaford (2007b). [53] Seaford (2004a) 150–2. [54] Νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος.
[55] *Pol.* 1258b1–8; Seaford (2004a) 313–14. [56] Seaford (2004a) 313–14.

What is unfamiliar about the new phenomenon of money tends to be assimilated to what is natural and familiar – its homogeneous unlimitedness, for instance, to the sea, and its power to increase itself to biological reproduction (11c). Money has a strange and 'unnatural' ability to reproduce itself identically, seeming somehow to do without the *exchange* normally embodied in human and economic reproduction (i.e. in marriage, gift-exchange, trade). Whereas the Homeric (pre-monetary) household creates and maintains links by marriage and gift-exchange, subsequently the dangerous potential for self-sufficiency of the household (expressed already in pre-monetary myth by endogamy) is enhanced by the seeming self-sufficiency of money (7b). The extreme forms of reproductive self-sufficiency are incest and interest, and the tragic representation of the former was influenced by the latter. Oedipus accordingly resembles the modern man not only psychoanalytically but also *economically*.[57]

As for the Dionysiac antithesis to familial introversion, the chorus imagine the opposite extreme to endogamy – that the birthplace of Oedipus was Mt Kithairon, and that his father was Pan, or Apollo, or Hermes, or Dionysos (*OT* 1086–1109). This corresponds to the vain invocation of Dionysos from afar in *Antigone*, and at the same moment of optimism before the disaster. The Dionysos of Mt Kithairon was familiar to the Athenians, for the god of the dramatic festival was from Eleutherai, on its southern slopes. But the ode contains no mention of any place in Attica.

The relation of the Theban absolute other to Attic cult is explored rather in Sophokles' *Oedipus at Colonus*. As in *Eumenides*, a cyclical chronotope of the self-destructive dynasty from elsewhere is absorbed into the aetiological chronotope of a polis cult in Attica. On the one hand the incest, violent hostility and intimacy of the Theban dynasty are throughout much of the play recalled or enacted, and Oedipus has come from afar, after what seem unlimited wanderings.[58] But now the specificity of the place where he will stay, and the eternity of his stay there, are elaborately emphasised and divinely guaranteed.[59] Indeed the specificity of the place (of future cult) and the permanence of its benefit for the polis are strikingly combined (1519–21). The benefit the cult will bring to the polis is associated with the

[57] And epistemologically: he wins merely by the intellect, and without the help of the gods: *OT* 396–8 (Goux (1993)).

[58] *OC* 7, 20, 88, 104–5, 347–52, 441, 746 ('always').

[59] 44–6, 88–91 644, 1519–21, 1525, 1532, 1545, 1555.

Erinues' guardianship of the land.[60] There is mention of the Eleusinian mysteries.[61] And Oedipus rejects Theseus' suggestion that he come to his house: rather, 'this is the place', he says (643–4). It is not the king but the Eumenides whom Oedipus supplicates (44), thereby implying that Athens is a polis rather than a monarchy (cf. 8A).

This gives us some of the elements of our basic pattern, which is completed by the cosmic (vertical) axis that marks the end of his wandering: it is marked firstly by arrival at the sanctuary of the 'daughters of earth and darkness' (40), the Eumenides, and secondly by a sign consisting of 'earthquake, or thunder, or lightning of Zeus' (95). In the event there is thunder from the *aithēr* (1456), and finally, at the place of his disappearance, a sound attributed to Zeus below the earth (1606 *chthonios*), which surely means – or at least evokes – the subterranean roar that accompanies earthquakes: hence Oedipus' earlier 'thunder will lead me to Hades' (1460–1). The roar of Zeus unites the world above with the world below, as does – at the same place – Theseus' final prayer (1654–5). It is as part of a mystic pattern[62] that at the end of *Prometheus Bound* there is an earthquake as Prometheus is enveloped in cosmological confusion to the sound of Zeus's underground thunder.[63] So too in *Bacchae* the house of Pentheus is destroyed by thunderbolt from above and earthquake from below. The theatrical gong (*bronteion*, 'thunderer') had mystic associaitons (5A).

The temporal circularity is described by Oedipus himself (607–23): only the gods do not age and die; the strength of earth and body declines, and relations between individuals and between city-states is always changing; when Thebes attacks Athens, my corpse 'will drink their warm blood, if Zeus is still Zeus and Phoibos the son of Zeus speaks clear truth' (621–2). Oedipus here implicitly aligns the cultic benefit from his corpse with the permanence of the gods, just before breaking off to say (624–8) that he does not want to speak of secrets, and that Theseus will 'never' say that Oedipus is a useless inhabitant of this land, prefiguring the permanence[64] of his cult. However, and even though we are in Athens, circularity is

[60] 458–9; Seaford (1994a) 132–3. The communality of chthonic benefit from the cult is expressed also at 1752–3, where there is no reason to suspect the transmitted text: Seaford (1994a) 135 n. 141, (2000a) 38 n. 37.

[61] 1050–3. Aeschylus was said to have revealed secrets of the Eleusinian mysteries (T93 Radt) in his (lost) *Oedipus*. Another lost play that may have contained the absorption of Theban cyclicality into an Attic aetiological chronotope was his *Eleusinians*, which dramatised the events leading up to the burial (denied them by Thebes) of the famous seven heroes, at Eleusis.

[62] Seaford (1986). [63] *PV* 992–4, 1043–52, 1080–93. [64] 1033, 1518–19, 1765.

not here brought to an end in the permanence of cult, as in *Oresteia*, but merely contrasts with it, somewhat as in *Septem*. This relationship between Herakleitean circularity and mere hints of cultic permanence is typical of Sophokles.[65]

[65] Ajax describes universal cyclicality while also hinting at his own eternal salvation, in a speech which by evoking mystic doctrine may prefigure his Attic cult (*Aj.* 646–92: Seaford (1994b)). The chorus of *Trachiniai* describe, in relation to anxiety about Herakles, the cyclicality of nature, of the cosmos, and of suffering and joy (94–140), but here too there are hints of permanent well-being: cyclicality is a reason for always (αἰέν) having hope, Herakles sees 'splendid coherence' in his death being a release from suffering (1169–74), and there are (as in *Oedipus at Colonus*, *Ajax*, and *Philoktetes*) hints of future hero-cult (Seaford (1994a) 276).

APPENDIX

Was there a skēnē *for all the extant plays of Aeschylus?*

In *Oresteia* there was a backdrop representing the house, through the door of which occurred exits and entrances. This was no doubt the *skēnē* we hear of in later texts, which was not given stone foundations until well after the time of Aeschylus.

Two questions arise: (a) When was a permanent *skēnē* introduced? (b) What kind of backdrop do the three earliest plays have? We cannot answer (a). Nor can we ascertain the relation of any early *skēnē* to the dancing area.

My account of the genesis of tragedy follows Sourvinou-Inwood (2003a) in the belief that there was from the beginning either a permanent structure (modifiable to represent house, shrine, backdrop for statues, etc.) or – perhaps more likely – the regular practice of constructing a temporary one. And the word *skēnē* may derive from the use of the *skēnē* for ritual dining in the festival (4B).

However, it has been skilfully and influentially argued by Taplin ((1977) 452–9) that the *skēnē* was an innovation of the late 460s, before *Oresteia* but after the three earlier plays of Aeschylus, in which he claims that that there is no sign of a *skēnē*. This is true for *Suppliants*, but misleading for *Persians* and untrue for *Septem*.

About *Suppliants* and *Persians* I here do no more than emphasise that the choice of a location away from the royal house is *not* because there was no *skēnē* or no tradition of a house as backdrop. Rather the location of each play is precisely chosen for the political reasons I set out in 8A and 12A. In *Persians* I argue that the *skēnē* represented the entrance to the whole palace complex.

In *Septem*, as in *Suppliants*, the chorus supplicate statues of the gods, but – I believe – in front of the royal house. There are several factors not considered by Taplin. Firstly, the house *is* mentioned. It is transmitted in the manuscripts at 915, and the passage has been since Taplin wrote convincingly restored by West (1990) as

The sounding, rending, itself-lamenting, itself-suffering lament sends them forth from the house. (915–17)

The Greek is quoted in 9A. West adds 'we are now in a kommos which will end in the bodies being taken away for burial, and it may have seemed natural to assimilate it to a normal funeral procession, which would start from the house, and therefore to speak as if the bodies had come from there'. (122–3) But why so, if the bodies have *not* in fact come from the house? West is driven to imply *ex silentio* that they were in fact taken there en route ('we have not been told that they were brought non-stop from the place of the battle to the stage', ibid.). But how much better that the bodies should be laid out for lamentation just outside the house, as was actual practice.[1] We may add that a visible house would, as in *Oresteia*, express the centrality of the household to the drama, for instance when Eteokles refuses to expel the Dionysiac Erinus from it (9A), or when the fratricides are lamented as having ruined its walls (881).

However, and in contrast to *Oresteia*, there is no mention of exits or entrances through a house door, and the play is set before images of deities on the Acropolis. Are these considerations not decisive?

They are not. Eteokles enters to speak the first words of the play (probably from the house), and so there can be no comment on his entry.[2] And he eventually departs for the city gate. There is no need, in this plot, for anybody else to go in or out of the house, which *is* mentioned on the one occasion when the house is engaged in the action, in the lament.

As for the location on the Acropolis, the Athenians were aware that at Thebes the ancient royal house was on the Kadmeia, i.e. the Acropolis (4F3). This, the third play of the trilogy (corresponding to *Eumenides*) stages the final transition from household to polis cult, and it is accordingly appropriate that the location should embody the ambivalence of the state's identity, as it does in different ways in *Suppliants* and *Persians*. There is in *Septem* no difficulty in having the set represent house and statues, just as in *Choephoroi* it represents house and tomb or in *Eumenides* statue (of Athena) and Areopagos.[3]

[1] Boardman (1955). But Solon restricted it to 'inside', i.e perhaps to courtyards. This however indicates a tendency to have it outside, which may well have been imagined as ancient and heroic practice. The lament for Agamemnon in *Choephoroi* also transgresses the funerary legislation (12B).

[2] Not even the initial entrance of Klutaimestra from the house is commented on in *Agamemnon*, even though the chorus is there to make the comment.

[3] Cf. e.g. S. *El.* 4–10.

Hamilton has argued that the elaborate form of the cries from within the house in *Oresteia* presuppose an earlier simpler model.[4] He also offers a critique of Taplin's claim that his case is supported by the infrequency of evidence for a *skēnē* in the fragments of Aeschylus, relatively to those of Sophokles and Euripides. Among Aeschylus' lost plays there are several that one would expect to be located at a house, hut or temple, and some which certainly were,[5] and among the fragments there are several mentions of a house.[6] I confine myself to three examples that are independently of interest to us. In Aeschylus' *Edonians* 'the house is indeed possessed, the building is in a bacchic frenzy' (*fr.* 58). As this is one of a number of similarities with *Bacchae*, we may infer that, as in *Bacchae*, the house was the backdrop also of *Edonians*. Secondly, the main event of *Danaids*, the murder of the sons of Aigyptos on their wedding night, surely occurred within a house, and contained a reference to the *digertikon*, sung the morning after the wedding to wake the couple. Similarly, a choral wedding song for a dead bridegroom outside the house occurred in Euripides' *Phaethon*, quite likely under the influence of Aeschylus' *Heliades* (17c).

[4] Hamilton (1987). Most recently, Librán Moreno (2002) has argued on the basis of tragic fragments and vase-paintings that there was a *skēnē* in the theatre from the beginning, and Pöhlmann (2003) 321 insists that a building was required for early one-actor plays to conceal the actor changing his mask.

[5] *Theoroi*, *Hieraiai*, *Myrmidons (*and almost certainly *Nereids* and *Phrygians*).

[6] *frr.* 36b21.9, 58, 78a.16, 96, 124?, 132a8.7?, 154a.16, 160, 281.4, 292, 362.3, 388.

Bibliography

Accame, S. (1961) 'La concezione del tempo nell'età omerica e arcaica', *RIFC* 39.359–94.

Alcock, S. and Osborne, R. (eds.) (1994) *Placing the Gods*. Oxford University Press.

Alexiou, M. (1974) *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*. Cambridge University Press.

Algra, K. (ed.) (1994) *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought*. Leiden: Brill.

Allan, W. (2005) in Gregory, J. (ed.) *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*, 71–82. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bakewell, G. W. (1997) 'Μετοικία in the *Supplices* of Aeschylus', *ClAnt*. 16.209–28.

Baltussen, H. (2007) in Jennings and Katsaros (2007), 295–318.

Bees, R. (1995) in Pöhlmann, E. (ed.) *Studien zur Bühnendichtung und zum Theaterbau der Antike*, 73–6. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Berger, P. (1969) *The Social Reality of Religion*. London: Faber.

Betegh, G. (2004) *The Derveni Papyrus*. Cambridge University Press.

Bloch, M. (1989) *Ritual, History and Power: Selected Papers in Anthropology*. London: Athlone Press.

Blok, J. (2000) in Sancisi-Weedenburg, H. (ed.) *Peisistratus and the Tyranny: A Reappraisal of the Evidence*, 17–48. Amsterdam: Gieben.

Blok, J. H and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.) (2006) *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden: Brill.

Boardman, J. (1955) 'Painted Funerary Plaques and Some Remarks on Prothesis', *ABSA* for 1955, 51–66.

Boardman, J. and Hammond, N. G. L. (eds.) (1982) *The Cambridge Ancient History* (2nd edn.). Vol. III.3. Cambridge University Press.

Bollack, J. and Judet de la Combe, P. (1981–2) *L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle: le texte et ses interprétations*. 3 vols. Presses Universitaires de Lille.

Bömer, F. (1952) in *RE* XXI.2 s.v. Pompa, 1978–94.

Bond, G. (1981) *Euripides: Heracles*. Oxford University Press.

Booth, N. (1976) 'Zeus *Hypsistos Megistos*: An Argument for Enclitic *pou* in Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 182', *CQ* 26.220–28.

Bowie, A. M. (1993a) 'Religion and Politics in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *CQ* 42.10–31.

(1993b) *Aristophanes: Myth, Ritual and Comedy*. Cambridge University Press.

Boys-Stones, G. R. (2003) *Metaphor, Allegory and the Classical Tradition*. Oxford University Press.
Bracht Banham, R. (ed.) (2002) *Bakhtin and the Classics*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
Bremmer, J. (ed.) (1987) *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*. London: Routledge.
Briant, P. (1982) *Rois, tributs et paysans*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
(1988) 'Le nomadisme du grand roi', *Iranica Antiqua* 23.253–74.
(1991) in Kellens, J. (ed.) *Le Religion iranienne à l'époque Achéménide* (Iranica Antiqua, Suppl. 5), 1–11. Gent: Iranica Antiqua 5.
Broneer, O. (1944) 'The Tent of Xerxes and the Greek Theater', *University of California Publications in Classical Antiquity* 1.12.305–11.
Brown, C. G. (1991) 'Empousa, Dionysus and the Mysteries: Aristophanes, *Frogs* 285ff.', *CQ* 41.41–50.
Burian, P. (1986) 'ΣΩΤΗΡ ΤΡΙΤΟΣ and some Triads in Aeschylus' Oresteia', *AJP* 107.332–42.
Burkert, W. (1972) *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
(1983) *Homo Necans.* Transl. of *Homo Necans* (de Gruyter, 1972). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
(1985) *Greek Religion*. Oxford: Blackwell.
(1987) *Ancient Mystery Cults*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Burnet, J. (1930). *Early Greek Philosophy*. London: Black.
Calame, C. (2009) *Poetic and Performative Memory in Ancient Greece: Heroic Reference and Ritual Gesture in Time and Space*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Caldwell, R. S. (1974) 'The Psychology of Aeschylus' *Supplices*', Arethusa 7.45–70.
Cameron, H. D. (1971) *Studies on the Seven Against Thebes of Aeschylus*. The Hague: Mouton.
Campbell, D. A. (1991). *Greek Lyric Poetry*. Vol. III. (Loeb Classical Library). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Carpenter, T. H. (1986) *Dionysian Imagery in Archaic Greek Art*. Oxford University Press.
Carter, D. M. (ed.) (2010) *Why Athens? A Reappraisal of Tragic Politics*. Oxford University Press.
Casadio, G. (1987) in *Atti del* V *settimana di studi sangue e antropologia: riti e culto*, 191–260. Rome.
Casevitz, M. (1992) in Letoublon, F. (ed.) *La Langue et les textes en grec ancien*, 193–9. Amsterdam: Gieben.
Clay, D. (1969) 'Aeschylus' Trigeron Mythos', *Hermes* 97.1–9.
Clinton, K. (1974) *The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
(1986) 'The Author of the Homeric Hymn to Demeter', *Opuscula Atheniensia* 16.43–49.
(1992) *Myth and Cult: The Iconography of the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Stockholm: Svenska Instituet i Athen.

(2004) 'Epiphany in the Eleusinian Mysteries', *ICS* 29.85–109.
Cole, S. G. (2004) *Landscapes, Gender, and Ritual Space*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
Collard, C., Cropp, M. J. and Gibert, J. (2004) *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays*. Vol. II. Warminster and Oxford: Aris and Phillips.
Colomo, D. (2004) 'Herakles and the Eleusinian Mysteries. P. Mil. Vogl. I 20, 18–32 revisited', *ZPE* 148.87–98.
Conacher, D. (1976) 'Comments on an Interpretation of Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 182–183', *Phoenix* 30.328–36.
Connor, W. (1985) 'The Razing of the House in Greek Society', *TAPA* 115.79–102
(1987) 'Tribes, Festivals, and Processions: Civic Ceremonial and Political Manipulation in Archaic Greece', *JHS* 107.40–50.
(1989) 'City Dionysia and Athenian Democracy', *C&M*. 40.7–32.
Cook, A. B. (1925) *Zeus*. Vol. II. Cambridge University Press.
Cox, C. A. (1998) *Household Interests: Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens*. Princeton University Press.
Csapo, E. (2003) in Csapo, E. and Miller, M. (eds.), *Poetry, Theory, Praxis: The Social Life of Myth, Word and Image in Ancient Greece. Essays in Honour of William J. Slater*, 69–98. Oxford: Oxbow.
(2008) in Revermann and Wilson (2008), 262–90.
Csapo, E. and Miller, M. (1998) in Boedeker, D. and Rauflaub, K. (eds.) *Democracy, Empire and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens*, 87–125. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Csapo, E. and Miller, M. (eds.) (2007) *The Origins of Theater in Ancient Greece and Beyond: From Ritual to Drama*. Cambridge University Press.
Csapo, E. and Slater, W. (1995) *The Context of Ancient Drama*. University of Michigan Press.
Currie, B. (2005), *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes*. Oxford University Press.
d'Angour, A. (1997) 'How the Dithyramb got its Shape', *CQ* 47.331–51.
Darcque, P. (1981) 'Les Vestiges mycéniens découverts sous le Télestérion d'Éleusis', *BCH* 105.593–605.
Dawe, R. D. (1966) 'The Place of the Hymn to Zeus in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', *Eranos* 64.1–21.
de Jong, I. and Nünlist, R. (eds.) (2007) *Time in Ancient Literature*. Leiden: Brill.
de Polignac, F. (1994) in Alcock and Osborne (1994), 3–18.
(1995) *Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the City-State*. Transl. of a revised version of *La Naissance de la cité grecque* (La Découverte, 1984). University of Chicago Press.
Deforge, B. (1986) *Eschyle: poète cosmique*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Denniston, J. (1954) *The Greek Particles* (2nd edn). Oxford University Press.
Denniston, J. and Page, D. (1957) *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. Oxford University Press.
Depew, D. (2007) in Csapo and Miller (2007), 126–49.
Depew, M. (2000) in Depew, M. and Obbink, D. (eds.) *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society*, 59–80. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Detienne, M. (1977) *The Gardens of Adonis*. Transl. of *Les Jardins d'Adonis* (Gallimard, 1972). Hassocks: Harvester Press.
Dietrich, B. C. (1964) 'The Judgement of Zeus', *RhM* 107.97–125.
Diggle, J. (2004) *Theophrastus: Characters*. Cambridge University Press.
Dodds, E. R. (1960) *Euripides: Bacchae*. Oxford University Press.
Dontas, G. S. (1983) 'The True Aglaurion', *Hesperia* 52.48–63.
Dougherty, C. (1993) *The Poetics of Colonization*. Oxford University Press.
Dover, K. J. (1968) *Aristophanes: Clouds*. Oxford University Press.
(1986) in Boardman, J. and Vaphopoulou-Richardson, C. E. (eds.) *Chios: A Conference at the Homereion in Chios 1984*, 1–12. Oxford University Press.
(1988) *The Greeks and their Legacy: Collected Papers*. Vol. II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Durkheim, E (1976 [1915]) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (2nd edn). Transl. by J. W. Swain of *Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse* (Alcan, 1912). London: Allen and Unwin.
Easterling, P. (2004) in Yatromanolakis and Roilos (2004), 149–60.
Edney, J. (1976) 'Human Territories: Comment on Function and Properties', *Environment and Behaviour* 8.43.
Edwards, M. (1991) *The Iliad: A Commentary*. Vol. V. Cambridge University Press.
Ekroth, G. (2002) *The Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Hero-Cults in the Archaic to the Early Hellenistic Periods* (KERNOS Suppl. 12. Liège: Centre International d'Etude de la Religion Greeque Antique).
Engelmann, H. (1967) 'Der Schiedsrichter aus der Fremde', *RhM* 110.97–102. Reprinted in Hommel (1974) II 48–54.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1956) *Nuer Religion*. Oxford University Press.
Farenga, V. (1998) 'Narrative and Community in Dark Age Greece: A Cognitive and Communicative Approach to Early Greek Citizenship', *Arethusa* 31.179–206.
(2006) *Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge University Press.
Ferrari, G. (2008) *Alcman and the Cosmos of Sparta*. University of Chicago Press.
Figueira, T. J. (1998) *The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Fischer, U. (1965) *Der Telosgedanke in den Dramen des Aischylos*. Hildesheim: Olms.
Fisher, N. R. E. (1992) *Hybris*. Oxford and Warminster: Aris and Phillips.
Foley, H. P. (1993) in Sommerstein *et al.* (1993), 101–43.
Föllinger, S. (2003) *Genosdependenzen: Studien zur Arbeit am Mythos bei Aischylos*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
Forrest, W. G. (1960) 'Themistokles and Argos', *CQ* 10.221–41.
Foucart, P. (1899) 'La Course aux flambeaux', *RPh*. 23.112–16.
Fowler, R. (1987) *The Nature of Early Greek Lyric: Three Preliminary Studies*. University of Toronto Press.
Fraenkel, E. (1950) *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. 3 vols. Oxford University Press.
Fränkel, H. (1955) *Wege und Formen Frühgriechischen Denkens*. Munich: Beck.
Furley, W. D. and Bremer, J. M. (2001) *Greek Hymns*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Garvie, A. F. (1969) *Aeschylus' Supplices: Play and Trilogy*. Cambridge University Press.
(1986) *Aeschylus: Choephori*. Oxford University Press.
(2009) *Aeschylus: Persae*. Oxford University Press.
Geertz, C. (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.
Gernet, L. (1939) 'L'Institution des arbitres publics à Athènes', *REG* 52.389–414.
(1981) *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece*. Transl. of *Anthropologie de la Grèce Antique* (Maspero, 1968). Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Giordano-Zecharya, M. (2006) 'Ritual Appropriateness in *Seven against Thebes*', *Mnemosyne* 59.53–74.
Giovannini, A. (1969) *Étude historique sur les origines du catalogue des vaisseaux*. Berne: Éditions Francke.
Girard, R. (1977) *Violence and the Sacred.* Transl. of *La Violence et le sacré* (Grasset, 1972). Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gladigow, B. (1962) 'Aischylos und Heraklit: Ein Vergleich religiöser Denkformen', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 44.225–39. Reprinted in Hommel (1974) 1 312–29.
Gödde, S. (2000a) *Das Drama der Hikesie: Ritual und Rhetorik in Aischylos Hiketiden*. Münster: Aschendorff.
(2000b) in Gödde, S. and Heinze, T. (eds.) *Skenika: Beiträge zum antiken Theater und seiner Rezeption*. Darmstadt: Wissenshaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Goldhill, S. (1984) 'Two Notes on τέλος and Related Words in the *Oresteia*', *JHS* 104.169–76.
(1986) *Reading Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge University Press.
(1987) 'The Great Dionysia and Civic ideology', *JHS* 107.58–76.
Gould, J. (1973) 'Hiketeia', *JHS* 73.74–103.
Goux, J.-J. (1993) *Oedipus Philosopher*. Stanford University Press.
Gow, A. S. F. (1912) 'On the Meaning of the Word THYMELE', *JHS* 32.213–38.
Graf, F. (1974) *Eleusis und die Orphische Dichtung Athens*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
Green, J. R. (2007) in Csapo and Miller (2007), 96–107.
Grethlein, J. (2003) *Asyl und Athen*. Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler.
Griffith, M. (1999) *Sophocles: Antigone*. Cambridge University Press.
(2007) in Lloyd, M. (ed.) *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Aeschylus*, 93–140. Oxford University Press.
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962) *A History of Greek Philosophy*. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.
Hall, E. (1989) *Inventing the Barbarian*. Oxford University Press.
(1996) *Aeschylus: Persians*. Warminster and Oxford: Aris and Phillips.
Hamilton, R. (1987) 'Cries Within and the Tragic Skene', *AJP* 108.585–99.
Hammer, D. (2002) *The Iliad as Politics*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hardie, A. (2004) in Murray and Wilson (2004), 11–38.

Harmon, A. M. (1932) 'The Scene of the Persians of Aeschylus', *TAPA* for 1932, 7–19.
Harrison, T. (2000) *The Emptiness of Asia*. London: Duckworth.
Hartog, F. (2001) *Memories of Odysseus: Frontier Tales from Ancient Greece*. Edinburgh University Press.
Haubold, J. (2000) *Homer's People*. Cambridge University Press.
Headlam, W. (1906) 'The Last Scene of *Eumenides*', *JHS* 26.268–77.
Hedreen, G. (2004) 'The Return of Hephaistos, Dionysiac Processional Ritual, and the Creation of a Visual Narrative', *JHS* 124.38–64.
Hellwig, B. (1964) *Raum und Zeit im homerischen Epos*. Hildesheim: Olms.
Helms, J. J. (2004) 'Aeschylus' Genealogy of Morals', *TAPA* 134.23–54.
Henrichs, A. (1984) in *Atti del XVII congresso internazionale di papirologia*, 255–68. Vol. II. Naples.
(1995) 'Why Should I Dance? Choral Self-Referentiality in Greek Tragedy', *Arion* 3.1.56–111.
Herwerden, H. van (1878–9) 'Emendationes Aeschyleae', *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, Suppl.* 10.119–63.
Heubeck, A. West, S. and Hainsworth, B. (1988) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*. Vol. I. Oxford University Press.
Hollis, A. S. (2009) *Callimachus: Hecale* (2nd edn). Oxford University Press.
Holquist, M. (ed.) (1981) *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Hölscher, T. (1991) in Molho, A., Rauflaub, K. and Emlen, J. (eds.) *City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, 355–80. Stuttgart: Steiner.
Holwerda, D. (1963) 'TELOS', *Mnemosyne* 16.337–63.
Hommel, H. (1974) *Wege zu Aischylos*. 2 vols. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Hope Simpson, R. and Lazenby, J. F. (1970) *The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad*. Oxford University Press.
Huffman, C. (1993) *Philolaos of Croton*. Cambridge University Press.
(2008) 'The *Pythagorean Precepts* of Aristoxenos: Crucial Evidence for Pythagorean moral philosophy', *CQ* 58.104–19.
Hurwit, J. (1999) *The Athenian Acropolis*. Cambridge University Press.
Hutchinson, G. O. (1985) *Aeschylus: Seven against Thebes*. Oxford University Press.
Ieranò, G. (1992) 'Arione e Corinto', *QUCC* 41.39–52.
Iles Johnston, S. (1999) *Restless Dead*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jaccottet, A.-F. (2003) *Choisir Dionysos*. Zurich: Akanthus.
Jameson, M., Jordan, D. and Kotansky, R. D. (1993) *A Lex sacra from Selinous* (Greek, Roman and Byzantine Monographs). Duke University Press.
Janko, R. (2001) 'The Derveni papyrus', *CP* 96.1–32.
Jenkins, I. (1983) 'Is There Life after Marriage? A Study of the Abduction Motif in Vase Paintings of the Athenian Wedding Ceremony', *BICS* 30.137–45.
Jennings, V. and Katsaros, A. (2007), *The World of Ion of Chios*. Leiden: Brill.
Jong, I. and Nünlist, R. (2007) *Time in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Vol. II. Leiden: Brill.

Judet de la Combe, P. (2001) *L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle: commentaire des dialogues*. 2 vols. Presses Universitaires de Lille.
Kahn, C. (1960) *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*. New York: Columbia University Press.
(1985) in *Festschrift Ernst Kapp*, 19–29. Hamburg: von Schröder.
(2001) *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: A Brief History*. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett.
Kaimio, M. (1985) 'Theme of Victory in Aeschylus' *Oresteia* and *Agamemnon* 314–16', *Arctos*, Suppl. 2 (*Studies in honorem Iro Kajauto*), 79–97.
Kantzios, I. (2004) 'The Politics of Fear in Aeschylus' *Persians*', *CW* 98.8.
Käppel, L. (1989) 'Das Theater von Epidauros', *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archaeologischen Instituts* 194.83–106.
Kavoulaki, A. (1999) in Goldhill, S. and Osborne, T. (eds.) *Performance Culture*, 293–320. Cambridge University Press.
(2000) in *Dorema: A Tribute to the A. G. Leventis Foundation on the Occasion of its 20th Anniversary*, 145–58. Nicosia: A. G. Leventis Foundation.
Kay, G. and Mott J. (1982) *Political Order and the Law of Labour*. London: Macmillan.
Kellehear, A. (1996) *Experiences near Death*. Oxford University Press.
Kennedy, R. F. (2006) 'Justice, Geography and Empire in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*', *ClAnt* 25.35–72.
Kertzer, D. I. (1988) *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. Yale University Press.
Kiefner, W. (1965) *Der religioser Allbegriff des Aischylos*. Hildesheim: Olms.
Kirk, G. S. (1985) *The Iliad: A Commentary*. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press.
Klein, M. (1963) *Our Adult World and Other Essays*. London: Heinemann. Reprinted in *Envy, Gratitude, and Other Works 1946–63* (Hogarth Press, 1975), Virago Press.
Kolb, F. (1981) *Agora und Theater, Volks- und Festversammlung*. Berlin: Mann.
Korzeniewski, D. (1966) 'Studien zu den Persern des Aischylos', *Helikon* 6.548–96.
Kouremenos, T. (1993) 'Parmenidean Influences on the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus', *Hermes* 121.3.
Kowalzig, B. (2005) in Elsner, J. and Rutherford, I (eds.) *Pilgrimage in Greco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity*. Oxford University Press.
(2006) in Davidson, J., Muecke, F. and Wilson, P. (eds.) *Greek Drama III: Essays in Honour of Kevin Lee* (BICS Suppl. 87). London: Institute of Classical Studies.
(2007a) *Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Oxford University Press.
(2007b) in Csapo and Miller (2007), 221–54.
Kranz, W. (1933) *Stasimon*. Berlin: Weidmann.
Kroll, J. H. and Waggoner, N. M. (1984) 'Dating the Earliest Coins of Athens, Corinth and Aegina', *AJA* 88.325–40.
Kron, U. (1976) *Die zehn Attischen Phylenheroen*. Berlin: Mann.
Kurke, L. (1991) *The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.

(1999) *Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold*. Princeton University Press.
Lacey, W. K. (1968) *The Family in Classical Greece*. London: Thames and Hudson.
Lada-Richards, I. (1999) *Initiating Dionysos*. Oxford University Press.
Lalonde, G. *et al.* (1991) *The Athenian Agora*. Vol. XIX. Princeton University Press.
Lateiner, D. (1992) 'Heroic Proxemics: Social Space and Distance in the Odyssey', *TAPA* 122.133–63.
Lavecchia, S. (2000) *Pindari dithyramborum fragmenta*. Rome and Pisa: Ateneo.
Lawson, J. C. (1932) *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*. Cambridge University Press.
Lenz, L. (1975) *Der homerische Aphroditehymnus und die Aristie des Aineias in der Ilias*. Bonn: Habelt.
Leurini, A. (2000) *Ionis Chii testimonia et fragmenta* (Classical and Byzantine Monographs. Vol. XXIII). (2nd edn). Amsterdam: Hakkert.
Lévêque, P. and Vidal-Naquet, P. (1996), *Cleisthenes the Athenian.* Transl. of *Clisthène l'Athénien* (Macula, 1964). New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Librán Moreno, M. (2002) 'La SKHNH en los fragmentos trágicos anteriores a la *Orestía*', *Myrtia* 17.57–85.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1966) *Polarity and Analogy*. Cambridge University Press.
(1983) *Science, Folklore, and Ideology*. Cambridge University Press.
(1987) *The Revolutions of Wisdom*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
(1990) *Demystifyng Mentalities*. Cambridge University Press.
Macleod, C. W. (1982) 'Politics and the *Oresteia*', *JHS* 102.124–44.
Mazarakis Ainian, A. (1997) *From Rulers' Dwellings to Temples: Architecture, Religion, and Society In Early Iron Age Greece (1100–700 BC)*. Jonsered, Sweden: Paul Aström.
McHardy, F. (2008) *Revenge in Athenian Culture*. London: Duckworth.
McInerney, J. (2006) in Rosen, R. and Sluiter, I (eds.) (2006) *City, Countryside and the Spatial Organisation of Value in Classical Antiquity*, 33–69. Leiden: Brill.
Mendelsohn, D. (1992) 'ΣΥΓΚΕΡΑΥΝΟΩ: Dithyrambic Language and Dionysiac Cult', *CJ* 87.105–24.
Miller, M. (1997) *Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century BC*. Cambridge University Press.
Miller, S. (1978) *The Prytaneion*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Minar, E. L. (1942) *Early Pythagorean Politics*. Baltimore: Waverly Press.
Mitchell, L. G. (2006) 'Greeks, Barbarians and Aeschylus' *Suppliants*', *G&R* 53.205–23.
Möller, A. (2000) *Naukratis: Trade in Archaic Greece*. Oxford University Press.
Moreau, A. (1985) *Eschyle: la violence et le chaos*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Morgan, W. and Brask, P. (1988) 'Towards a Conceptual Understanding of the Transformation from Ritual to Theatre', *Anthropologica* 30.175–202.
Murray, P. and Wilson, P. (eds.) (2004) *Music and the Muses*. Oxford University Press.
Mussche, H. F. (1994) in Coulson, W. D. E. (ed.) *The Archaeology of Athens and Attica under the Democracy*, 211–15 (Oxbow Monograph 37.211–15). Oxford: Oxbow.

Mylonas, G. (1961) *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Princeton University Press.
Nagy, G. (1990) *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
(2000) *Pindar's Homer*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Nilsson, M. P. (1967) *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion*. Vol. I. (3rd edn). Munich: Beck.
North, H. (1966) *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Oakley, J. H. (2004) *Picturing Death in Classical Athens*. Cambridge University Press.
Oakley, J. H. and Sinos, R. (1993) *The Wedding in Ancient Athens*. University of Wisconsin Press.
Ober, J. (1985) *Fortress Attica*. Leiden: Brill.
Ogden, D. (1997) *The Crooked Kings of Ancient Greece*. London: Duckworth.
Oppenheim, A. L. (1977) *Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilisation* (2nd edn). University of Chicago Press.
Osborne, R. (1985) *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attika*. Cambridge University Press.
(1994) in Alcock and Osborne (1994), 143–60.
Osborne, R. and Hornblower, S. (eds.) (1994) *Ritual, Finance, Politics*. Oxford University Press.
Ostwald, M. (1969) *Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy*. Oxford University Press.
Pariente, A. (1990) 'Chronique de fouilles et découvertes archéologiques en Grèce en 1989', *BCH* 114.703–850.
Parker, R. (1983) *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*. Oxford University Press.
(1987) in Bremmer (1987), 187–214.
(1991) 'The *Hymn to Demeter* and the *Homeric Hymns*', *G&R* 38.1.1–17.
(1996) *Athenian Religion: A History*. Oxford University Press.
(2005) *Polytheism and Society at Athens*. Oxford University Press.
Patterson, C. B. (1998) *The Family in Greek History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Peppas-Delmousou, D. (1988) in Hägg, R. *et al.* (eds.) *Early Greek Cult Practice*. Stockholm: Aström.
Perrot, J. (1981), 'L'Architecture militaire et palatiale des Achéménides à Suse', in *150 Jahre Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, 1827–1979*. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern.
Peterson, E. (1926) ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
Phillips, D. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) (2003) *Sport and Festival in the Ancient Greek World*. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.
Pickard-Cambridge, A. (1962) *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy* (2nd edn rev. T. B. L. Webster). Oxford University Press.
(1968) *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*. Oxford University Press.

Pöhlmann, E. (2003) 'New Arguments for a Skene Building in Early Greek Tragedy', *Platon* 53.31–40.
Pope, M. (1974) 'Merciful Heavens? A Question in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', *JHS* 94.100–113.
Porada, E. (1985) in Gershevitch, I. (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Vol. II, 793–827. Cambridge University Press.
Porter, D. H. (2005) 'Some Inversions not Righted: A Note on Aeschylus' *Eumenides*', *CJ* 101.1.1–10.
Pritchard, J. B. (ed.) (1955) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*. Princeton University Press.
Pulleyn, S. (1997) *Prayer in Greek Religion*. Oxford University Press.
Purves, A. (2010) *Space and Time in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Cambridge University Press.
Rappaport, R. (1999) *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity*. Cambridge University Press.
Raubitschek, A. E. (1969) in *Opus nobile: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Ulf Jantzen*, 129–30. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
Raven, J. E. (1948) *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*. Cambridge University Press.
Rehm, R. (2002) *The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy*. Princeton University Press.
Revermann, M. (2008) in Revermann and Wilson (2008), 326–61.
Revermann, M. and Wilson, P. (eds.) (2008) *Performance, Iconography, Reception: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin*. Oxford University Press.
Rhodes, P. J. (1981) *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*. Oxford University Press.
Rice, E. (1983) *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus*. Oxford University Press.
Richardson, N. J. (1974) *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. Oxford University Press.
(1993) *Iliad: A Commentary*. Vol. VI. Cambridge University Press.
Riedweg, C. (1987) *Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon, und Klemens von Alexandrien*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
(2005) *Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and Influence*. London.
Robertson, D. S. (1924) 'The End of the *Supplices* Trilogy of Aeschylus', *CR* 38.51–3.
Rohde, E. (1925). *Psyche*. Transl. of the 8th German edn of *Psyche* (Mohr, 1921). London: Kegan Paul.
Rohweder, C. (1998) *Macht und Gedeihen: Eine politische Interpretation der Hiketiden des Aischylos*. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Lang.
Root, M. C. (1979) *The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*. Leiden: Brill.
Rosenbloom, D. (2006) *Aeschylus: Persians*. London: Duckworth.
Rösler, W. (1970) *Reflexe vorsokratischen Denkens bei Aischylos*. Meisenheim: Hain.
Ross, W. (1924) *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press.
(1936) *Aristotle's Physics*. Oxford University Press.

Rousset, D. (1994) 'Les Frontières des cités grecques: premières réflexions à partir du recueil des documents épigraphiques', *CCG* 5.97–126.
Ruschenbusch, E. (1966) *Solonos nomoi, die Fragmente des solonischen gesetzeswerkes*. Wiesbaden: Steiner.
Rutherford, I. (2001). *Pindar's Paeans*. Oxford University Press.
Rutz, H. J. (ed.) (1992) *The Politics of Time*. Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association.
Sack, R. D. (1986) *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*. Cambridge University Press.
Saïd, S. (1985). *Sophiste et tyran*. Paris: Klincksieck.
(1993) in Sommerstein *et al.* (1993), 167–89.
Sancisi-Weerdenberg, H. (1993) in Cameron, A. and Kuhrt, A. *Images of Women in Antiquity*, 20–33. London: Routledge.
Schachter, A. (1994), in Osborne and Hornblower (1994), 291–306.
Schadewaldt, W. (1974) in Hommel (1974) I, 104–47.
Schaps, D. (1979) *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece*. Edinburgh University Press.
Schmidt, E. F. (1970) *Persepolis*. Vol. III. University of Chicago Press.
Schnurr, Ch. (1995) 'Zur Topographie der Theaterstätten und der Tripodenstrasse in Athen', *ZPE* 105.139–53.
Scullion, S. (1994) *Three Studies in Athenian Dramaturgy*. Leipzig: Teubner.
(1998) 'Dionysos and Katharsis in *Antigone*', *ClAnt* 17.96–122.
(1999–2000) in Cropp, M., Lee, K. and Sansone, D. (eds.) *Euripides and the Tragic Theatre in the Late Fifth Century*, 217–33 (*Illinois Classical Studies* 24–5).
(2002) 'Tragedy Misconceived as Ritual', *CQ* 52.102–37.
(2005) in Hägg, R. and Alroth, B. (eds.) *Greek Sacrificial Ritual, Olympian and Chthonian*, 23–36. Stockholm: Svenska Instituet i Athen.
Seaford, R. (1976) 'On the Origins of Satyric Drama', *Maia* 28.209–21.
(1977–8) 'The "Hyporchema" of Pratinas', *Maia* 29.81–94.
(1981) 'Dionysiac Drama and the Dionysiac Mysteries', *CQ* 31.252–75.
(1984a) *Euripides: Cyclops*. Oxford University Press.
(1984b) 'The Last Bath of Agamemnon', *CQ* 34.247–54.
(1985) 'The Destruction of Limits in Sophokles' *Elektra*', *CQ* 35.315–23.
(1986) 'Immortality, Salvation, and the Elements', *HSCP* 90.1–26.
(1987) 'The Tragic Wedding', *JHS* 107.106–30.
(1988) 'The Eleventh Ode of Bacchylides: Hera, Artemis, and the Absence of Dionysos', *JHS* 108.118–36.
(1989a) 'Homeric and Tragic Sacrifice', *TAPA* 119.87–95.
(1989b) 'The Attribution of Aeschylus, *Choephoroi* 691–9', *CQ* 39.302–6.
(1990a) in Powell, A. (ed.) *Euripides, Women and Sexuality*, 151–76. London: Routledge.
(1990b) 'The Imprisonment of Women in Greek Tragedy', *JHS* 110.76–90.
(1991) 'Il dramma satiresco in Euripide', *Dioniso* 61.75–89.
(1993) in Carpenter, T. H. and Faraone, C. (eds.) *The Masks of Dionysus*, 115–46. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

(1994a) *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State*. Oxford University Press.
(1994b) 'Sophokles and the Mysteries', *Hermes* 122.275–88.
(1995) in Goff, B. (ed.) *History, Tragedy, Theory*, 202–21. Austin: University of Texas Press.
(1996) *Euripides: Bacchae*. Oxford and Warminster: Aris and Phillips.
(1997) in Blundell, S. and Williamson, M. (eds.) *The Sacred and the Feminine*, 128–46. London: Routledge.
(1998) 'Tragic Money', *JHS* 108.119–39.
(2000a) 'The Social Function of Attic Drama: A Reply to Jasper Griffin', *CQ* 50.1.30–44.
(2000b) 'The Dionysiac Don Responds to Don Quixote: Rainer Friedrich on the New Ritualism', *Arion* 8.2.74–98.
(2003a) 'Aeschylus and the Unity of Opposites', *JHS* 123.141–63.
(2003b) in Morgan, K. (ed.) *Popular Tyranny*, 95–116. Austin: University of Texas Press.
(2003c) 'Dionysos, Money, and Drama', *Arion* 11.2.1–19.
(2004a) *Money and the Early Greek Mind*. Cambridge University Press.
(2004b) in Yatromanolakis and Roilos (2004), 71–93.
(2005) 'Mystic Light in Aeschylus' *Bassarai*', *CQ* 55.602–6.
(2006) *Dionysos*. London and New York: Routledge.
(2007a) in Csapo and Miller (2007), 379–401.
(2007b) in Baier, T. (ed.) *Generationskonflikte auf der Bühne*, 23–8. Tübingen: Narr.
(2008) in Harris, W. V. (ed.) *The Monetary Systems of the Greeks and Romans*, 49–65. Oxford University Press.
(2009a) in Dill, U. and Walde, C. (eds.) *Antike Mythen: Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen*, 406–14. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
(2009b) in Cousland, J. C. R. and Hume, J. R. (eds.) *The Play of Texts and Fragments: Essays in Honour of Martin Cropp*, 221–34. Leiden: Brill.
(2010a) in Bremmer, J. N. and Erskine, A. (eds.), *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations*, 178–82. Edinburgh University Press.
(2010b) in Carter (2010), 85–91.
(2012) in Hitch, S. and Rutherford, I. (eds.) *Animal Sacrifice in the Greek World*. Cambridge University Press.
(forthcoming) in Petridou, G. and Platt, V. (eds.) *Epiphany: Encountering the Divine in the Ancient World*. Leiden: Brill.
Shapiro, H. A. (1989) *Art and Cult under the Tyrants in Athens*. Mainz: von Zabern.
Simon, E. (1963) 'Ein Anthesterien-Skyphos des Polygnotos', *Antike Kunst* 6.6–22.
(1982) *The Ancient Theatre*. Transl. of *Das antike Theater* (Kehrle, 1972). London: Methuen
(1983) *Festivals of Attica*. University of Wisconsin Press.
Sinn, U. (1993) in Marinatos, N. and Hägg, R. (eds.) *Greek Sanctuaries: New Approaches*, 88–109. London: Routledge.

Smith, J. Z. (1982) *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*. Chicago University Press.
Smith, P. M. (1980) *On the Hymn to Zeus in Aeschylus' Agamemnon*. Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press.
Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978) *Intellectual and Manual Labour*. London: Macmillan.
Sokolowski, F. (1969) *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*. Paris: de Boccard.
Sommerstein, A. (1989) *Aeschylus: Eumenides*. Cambridge University Press.
(1996) *Aeschylean Tragedy*. Bari: Levante.
(1997) in Pelling, C. (ed.) *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, 63–79. Oxford University Press.
(2008) *Aeschylus*. Vol. 1 (Loeb Classical Library). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Sommerstein, A. *et al.* (eds.) (1993) *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis*, 101–43. Bari: Levante.
Soskice, J. (1985) *Metaphor and Religious Language*. Oxford University Press.
Sourvinou-Inwood, C. (1997) in Golden, M. and Toohey, P. (eds.) *Inventing Ancient Culture*, 132–64. London: Routledge.
(2003a) *Tragedy and Athenian Religion*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
(2003b) in Cosmopoulos, M. (ed.) *Greek Mysteries*, 25–49. London: Routledge.
Spineto, N. (2005) *Dionysos a teatro: il contesto festivo del dramma greco*. Roma: 'L'Erma' di Bretschneider.
Stehle, E. (2004) in Murray and Wilson (2004), 121–56.
Stern, M. (1986) 'Das Haus des Erechtheus', *Boreas* 9.51–64.
Sullivan, S. D. (1997) *Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Swift, L. (2006) 'Mixed Choruses and Marriage Songs', *JHS* 126.125–40.
Symeonoglou, S. (1985) *The Topography of Thebes from the Bronze Age to Modern Times*. Princeton University Press.
Tandy, D. (1997) *Warriors Into Traders: The Power of the Market in Early Greece*. University of California Press.
Taplin, O. (1972) 'Aeschylean Silences and Silences in Aeschylus', *HSCP* 76. 57–97.
(1977) *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus*. Oxford University Press.
(1978) *Greek Tragedy in Action*. London: Methuen.
Thalmann, W. G. (1978) *Dramatic Art in Aeschylus' Seven against Thebes*. Yale University Press.
(1980) 'Xerxes' Rags', *AJP* 101.260–82.
Thompson, W. E. (1967) 'The Marriage of First Cousins in Athenian Society', *Phoenix* 21.273–81.
Thomson, G. (1932) *Aeschylus: The Prometheus Bound*. Cambridge University Press.
(1946) *Aeschylus and Athens* (2nd edn). London: Lawrence and Wishart.
(1953) 'From Religion to Philosophy', *JHS* 73.77–83.
(1966) *The Oresteia of Aeschylus*. Amsterdam: Hakkert, and Prague: Academia.
Tomlinson, R. A. (1972) *Argos and the Argolid*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Tourraix, A. (1984) 'L'Image de la monarchie achéménide dans les *Perses*', *REA* 86.123–43.
Travlos, J. (1988) *Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Attika*. Tübingen: Wasmuth.
Tsantsanoglou, K. (1997) in Laks, A. and Most, G. W. (eds.) *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*, 93–128. Oxford University Press.
Tsouni, K. (ed.) (2002) *Mesogaia: History and Culture of Mesogaia in Attica*. Athens: Idea.
Tucker, T. G. (1908) *The Seven against Thebes*. Cambridge University Press.
Unger, E. (1935) 'Ancient Babylonian Maps and Plans', *Antiquity* 9.311–12.
Usener, H. (1903) 'Dreiheit', *RhM* 58.1–47, 161–208, 321–62.
Van der Weiden, M. J. H. (1991) *The Dithyrambs of Pindar: Introduction, Text and Commentary*. Amsterdam: Gieben.
Ventris, M. and Chadwick, J. (1973) *Documents in Mycenean Greek* (2nd edn.) Cambridge University Press.
Vernant, J.-P. (1990) *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece.* Transl. of *Mythe et tragédie in Grèce ancienne* (Maspero, 1973) and of *Mythe et tragédie in Grèce ancienne deux* (La Découverte, 1986). New York: Zone Books.
(2006) *Myth and Thought among the Greeks.* Transl. of *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Maspero, 1965). New York: Zone Books.
Vidal-Naquet, P. (1960) 'Temps des dieux, temps des hommes', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 157.55–80.
Waanders, F. J. W. (1983) *The History of ΤΕΛΟΣ and ΤΕΛΕΩ in Ancient Greek*. Amsterdam: Grüner.
West, M. L. (1966) *Hesiod: Theogony*. Oxford University Press.
(1974) *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.
(1978) *Hesiod: Works and Days*. Oxford University Press.
(1979) 'The Parodos of *Agamemnon*', *CQ* 29.1–6.
(1983) *The Orphic Poems*. Oxford University Press.
(1985a) 'Ion of Chios', *BICS* 32.71–8.
(1985b) *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women*. Oxford University Press.
(1989) 'The Early Chronology of Attic Tragedy', *CQ* 39.251–3.
(1990) *Studies in Aeschylus*. Stuttgart: Teubner.
(2000) '*Iliad* and *Aethiopis* on stage: Aeschylus and son', *CQ* 50.338–52.
West, S. (1984) 'Io and the Dark Stranger (Sophocles, *Inachos* F269a)', *CQ* 34.292–302.
Whitehead, D. (1986) *The Demes of Attica*. Princeton University Press.
Widzisz, M. (2010) 'The Duration of Darkness and the Light of Eleusis in the Prologue of Agamemnon and the Third Stanza of *Choephoroi*', *GRBS* 50.4.461–89.
(2012) *Chronos on the Threshold: Time, Ritual, and Agency in the Oresteia*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Wiles, D. (1997) *Tragedy in Athens*. Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, P. (2000) *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia*. Cambridge University Press.

(2003) in Phillips and Pritchard (2003), 163–96.
(2010) in Carter (2010), 19–43.
Winkler, J. and Zeitlin, F. (1990) *Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context*. Princeton University Press.
Wycherley, R. E. (1978) *The Stones of Athens*. Princeton University Press.
Yatromanolakis, D. and Roilos, P. (eds.) (2004) *Greek Ritual Poetics*. Harvard University Press.
Zeitlin, F. (1965), 'The Motive of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *TAPA* 96.463–508.
(1990) in Winkler and Zeitlin (1990), 130–67.
(1992) in Hexter, R. and Selden, D. (eds.) *Innovations of Antiquity*, 203–53. London: Routledge.

General index

abstraction, 19, 57, 60, 62, 69, 240, 290, 297
Acheron, 165
Acropolis, 67, 76, 82, 83, 85, 88, 119, 162, 187, 338
Adrastos, 115, 117
Aeschylus, *passim*
  Agamemnon, 168, 170, 178–82, 192, 194, 207, 210, 218, 230–2, 236–9, 260, 261–3
  Aiguptioi, 153
  Bassarai, 26, 41
  Choephoroi, 182–7, 191, 196, 210, 213, 232–3, 260, 266
  Danaid trilogy, 143, 189, 204, 214, 304–12, 317–18, 323–4
  Danaids, 319, 339
  Edonians, 89, 109, 339
  Eumenides, 45, 174, 176, 187–9, 195, 221, 260, 269–74, 306, 307, 319
  Heliades, 304, 339
  Karians or *Europa*, 256
  Lykourgeia, 159, 282
  Oedipus, 244
  Oresteia, 119, 120, 165, 178–89, 196–205, 235, 240, 258, 259, 305, 318–21, 322, 323–5, 337
  Persians, 139, 143, 206–22, 233–4, 244, 322, 337
  Psychostasia, 237, 255
  Septem, 118, 158–77, 203, 220, 230, 244, 322, 325–7, 331, 337
  Suppliants, 137–57, 158–60, 164, 167, 218, 220–1, 238, 255, 256, 337
aetiological chronotope, 5, 6, 8–10, 24–51, 52, 75, 100, 103, 118–20, 125, 132, 159, 235, 258–61, 271, 273, 274, 275, 287, 312, 314, 332, 334
aetiological myth, 5, 38, 39, 40, 47, 50, 96, 99, 100, 103, 105, 110, 113, 125, 134, 291
aetiological space, 39, 52, 53, 63, 259
aetiological time, 39, 113, 259
Agamemnon, 21, 146, 174, 181, 191, 192, 199, 210, 231, 264, 302, 315
agora, 47, 68, 69, 79–82, 90, 97, 138, 207, 313, 314
agriculture, 33, 170, 171, 172, 173, 305–8, 332
Aigisthos, 185, 197, 200, 202
Aigyptos, sons of, 137–57, 238
Ajax, 203
Alkibiades, 275
Alkmaion, 70, 290, 299
Alkmaionids, 94
Alkman, 108
altar of the twelve gods, 47, 69, 79, 80, 97, 137, 138
Althaia, 86, 117
Amphiaraon, 50
Amphiaraos, 172
Amphiktyon, 80, 85
Anaxagoras, 287
Anaximander, 3, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 240, 250, 251, 290
Anaximenes, 59
Anthesteria, 86, 87, 101, 102, 116, 133
antideterminate chronotope, 5, 132, 174, 263
Antigone, 134, 162, 177, 218, 305, 328, 330, 331
Antiope, 91
antiphony, 216, 220, 221, 227, 229
Apadana, 208, 210
apeiron (unlimited), 53–4, 55, 60, 61, 63, 283, 291
Aphrodite, 147, 148, 216, 245, 305–8
Apollo, 165, 177, 248, 260, 263, 266, 267, 269
arbitration, 159
Archilochos, 97, 107
Archytas of Tarentum, 292
Areopagos, 188, 295, 313
Ares, 200, 247
Argos, 97, 103, 138, 139, 148, 158, 189, 306, 309, 311, 321, 323–5
Ariadne, 87
Arion, 106, 110
Aristagoras, 101
aristocratic temporality, 274
arkteia, 140
Artemis, 48, 49, 132, 190, 191
Athena, 66, 67, 147, 187, 195, 266, 267, 293, 295, 299, 306, 308
Atreus, 193

Attis, 225
Aulis, 190, 244, 245, 253, 269, 300

Bakhtin, Mikhail, 1, 2, 4
Baltussen, Han, 300
Bellerophon, 21
blood, 173, 174–6, 182, 196, 239, 248, 307, 332
Boukoleion, 83, 85–7, 92
bouleuterion, 68, 69
Brauron, 48, 67, 245
Brauronia, 48
Briant, Pierre, 215, 217

cannibalism, 151
Carpenter, Thomas, 104
catalogue of ships, 15–17
chorēgos, 109, 111, 112
chronotope, *passim*; *see also* aetiologial chronotope, antideterminate chronotope, Homeric chronotope, monetised chronotope, polis chronotope, reciprocal chronotope
chthonic, 165, 269, 270, 271, 300, 301, 303
circularity, 52, 103, 204, 235, 242, 243, 250, 332, 335
City Dionysia, 73, 121, 125, 138, 260
Cleanthes, 26
coinage, 55, 56, 63, 64, 69, 70, 112, 127, 172
Corinth, 97, 106, 108
cosmisation, 3
cosmological confusion, 269, 316, 317, 322, 330, 331, 335
Csapo, Eric, 274
curse, 160, 161, 167, 168, 170, 172, 244, 245, 251
Cyrus, 68, 207

Danae, 328
Danaids, 137–57, 158, 164, 188, 218, 238, 301, 304–12, 313, 314, 315, 317, 319, 320, 323
Danaos, 139, 155, 156, 314, 323
Dareios, 206, 208, 211, 213, 214
death ritual, 65, 128, 134, 163, 182, 183, 184, 191, 200, 201, 216, 217, 218, 219, 228, 233–4, 330
debt, 168, 172
Delos, 47, 68, 165, 177, 248
Delphi, 16, 47, 173, 187, 188, 189, 260
Demeter, 24, 27, 29, 30, 33, 36, 89, 186, 307, 317
Demeter Hymn, 6, 9, 24–51, 75, 80, 90, 91, 93, 100–1, 118, 126, 134, 189, 314, 317–18, 321, 330
Demetrios Poliorketes, 79
democracy, 87, 93, 104, 129, 138, 139, 148, 204, 274–8, 314, 325
democratic temporality, 274
dēmos, 30, 32, 33, 290
Derveni papyrus, 256, 272
diegertikon (waking song), 304, 339
Diomedes, 21
Dionysia, City, 57
Dionysos, 29, 34, 36, 42, 44, 46, 51, 67, 70, 73, 121, 125, 126, 132, 133, 134, 155, 161, 163, 177, 182, 184, 187, 192, 276, 282, 321, 331, 334
dithyramb, 39, 79, 84, 86, 97–102, 103, 106–18
divorce, 153
dream, 143, 210, 244, 245
drums, 98–101
Durkheim, Émile, 2, 3

earthquake, 27, 89, 91, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 335
Egypt, 137, 142, 143, 154, 311, 321, 323–4
Elektra, 109, 183, 184, 191, 200, 202, 210
Eleusinion, 44
Eleusis, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 44, 45, 49, 65, 66, 79, 89, 277, 321, 331
Eleutherai, 50, 78, 91, 102, 161, 334
Empedokles, 249, 308
endogamy, 91, 131, 133, 144, 152–7, 162, 164, 318–21, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 331
enkomion, 231, 233
Ephialtes, 311
epiklēros (heiress), 154, 319
Epimenides, 102
epiphany, 27, 34, 39, 40, 42, 43, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 110, 187
Erechtheion, 88, 89
Erechtheus, 88, 89
Erinues, 135, 147, 161, 162, 169, 174, 176, 183, 187, 189, 194–6, 203–4, 260, 261, 263, 265–73, 276, 294–5, 296, 299, 300, 303, 306, 307, 308, 313, 315, 335
eschara, 80; *see also* hearth
Eteokles, 158, 159, 160, 161, 166–70, 204, 245, 328, 338
Eumolpos, 90
euphēmia, 271
Euripides
  Antiope, 103
  Bacchae, 17, 41, 42, 43, 45, 84–5, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 99–105, 109, 116, 129, 134, 143, 184, 186, 192, 259, 335
  Cyclops, 41, 86, 109, 117
  Erechtheus, 89, 95
  Herakles, 89
  Ion, 43
  Iphigeneia in Tauris, 47
  Phaethon, 304, 339
Europa, 256

fable, 247
festivals, 16, 73, 105, 177, 306

fire, 58, 59, 91, 100, 101, 179, 250, 255, 260, 263, 287
form-parallelism, 10, 221, 225–34, 237, 238, 240, 242–3, 265, 268

gain, 168, 169, 170, 200, 328, 330; see also *kerdos*
Garvie, Alex, 182, 184
Girard, René, 252
Glaukos, 21
gold leaves, funerary, 41, 226, 283
Guthrie, W. K. C., 283

Hades, 14, 25, 26, 29, 41, 142, 145, 161, 165, 177, 250, 272, 317, 331
Haimon, 177, 328, 329
Halai, 48, 49
Hamilton, Richard, 339
harmonia, 286, 288, 289, 296
hearth, 23, 37, 38, 47, 53, 79–82, 137–9, 287; see also *eschara*
Helen, 181, 197, 246, 249
Henrichs, Albert, 272
Hephaistos, 110
Hera, 15, 140, 306
Herakleitos, 58, 59, 179, 180, 198, 230, 250–7, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 265, 273, 288–90, 296, 325, 326, 327, 331, 336
Herakles, 27
hero-cult, 68, 165, 175, 176
Hesiod, 13, 24
Hestia, 80
Hipparchos, 69, 104, 111, 114
Hippias, 64, 112
Hippomenes, 92
Homer, 3, 6, 13–23, 24, 29, 34, 36, 37, 38, 80, 88, 126, 138, 156, 203, 247, 254, 255, 317
Homeric chronotope, 22, 24, 38
Homeric Hymn to Apollo, 28, 29, 114
Homeric Hymn to Demeter, see *Demeter Hymn*
house, royal, 83–95, 99, 101, 113, 133, 162, 164, 168, 178, 182, 184, 192, 206, 209, 335
household, 19, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 46, 73–95, 100, 126, 128, 156, 164, 228, 274, 314, 316–36
hubris, 110, 198, 246, 298, 299, 332
Hutchinson, Gregory, 163, 165
Hypermestra, 309

Iakchos, 27, 42–5, 100
Ikarion, 77
Ikarios, 85
incest, 164, 173, 174, 175, 228, 328, 333–4
individualism, 65, 129, 131, 327; *see also* isolation, individual
insatiability, 195, 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 232, 236, 299
Io, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 158, 323
Ion of Chios, 282, 287, 300, 311, 312
Iphigeneia, 48, 181, 190, 191, 192, 237, 238, 315
isolation, individual, 131, 134, 169, 176, 275, 277; *see also* individualism
isonomia, 53, 54, 55, 70, 290

Jokasta, 161, 173, 175
justice, 59, 184, 193, 198, 269, 289, 294, 296, 297, 301

Kadmeia, 90, 338
Kadmos, 172
Kahn, Charles, 309
Kalchas, 210, 237, 245, 264, 269
Kant, Immanuel, 2
Kassandra, 181, 191, 193, 194, 195, 201, 218, 231, 246
Katagōgia, 84
Keleos, 24, 30, 36, 37
  daughters of, 29, 38
kerdos, 110, 161, 168, 169, 198, 200, 204, 262, 268, 298, 328, 330, 333; *see also* gain
Kimon, 311
kin-killing, 131, 133, 143, 149, 156, 158, 161, 162, 173, 203, 236
Kleisthenes of Athens, 68–71, 94, 117, 282, 314
Kleisthenes of Sikyon, 115, 117
Kleobis and Biton, 65, 132
Klutaimestra, 128, 162, 174, 178, 180, 181, 183, 185, 191, 193, 197, 201, 202, 230, 231, 236, 244, 248, 261, 262, 264, 271, 302, 307
Kore, *see* Persephone
Kowalzig, Barbara, 102
Kreon, 130, 327–32
Kroisos, 65, 66, 132
Kronos, 300
Kroton, 70, 290
Kylon of Croton, 291

Laios, 165, 167, 173, 332
lamentation, 117, 140, 151, 158–67, 182, 184, 213, 215, 216–20, 221, 227, 230, 231, 233–4, 263, 268, 269, 304, 338
lampadēphoria, 179, 248, 260
Lasos of Hermione, 111
Laurium, 63, 112, 221, 222
libation, 182, 184, 191, 210, 213, 239, 248, 302, 303
light, mystic, 27, 42, 185, 186, 248, 276, 295, 331
lightning, 42, 89, 92, 93, 101, 263
liminality, 125, 146
limit, 65, 125–7, 283, 285, 288, 291, 293, 297, 298, 299, 327

lion, 246–7
liturgies, 112
Lloyd, Geoffrey, 249
logos, 58, 250, 251, 253, 288, 326
Lykos, 91
Lykourgos, 99
Lynceus, 309

maenadism, 29, 84, 103, 161, 162
Maiden Well at Eleusis, 29
map, 60, 143
Mardonios, 210, 217
marriage, 25, 29, 31, 48, 86, 87, 135, 140, 141, 142, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 294, 305, 309, 317, 321
Masistios, 215
mathematics, 283
Mazarakis Ainian, Alexandros, 90
McHardy, Fiona, 203
Medea, 152
Melanaigis, Dionysos, 161
Melanippos, 115, 117
meson (middle), 284, 285, 286, 292, 297, 299
metaphor, 245–9
Midas, 203
Miletos, 61, 64
Miller, Meg, 274
Moira, 270
monarchy, 21, 22, 38, 55, 82, 87, 138, 139, 144, 160, 166, 206–22, 311
monetised chronotope, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 52–71, 119, 120, 132, 225, 235, 238, 258–61, 274, 287, 312, 314, 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 328, 330, 331, 332
monetised space, 59, 63
monetised time, 259
money, 3, 4, 6, 52–71, 106–21, 127–36, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 250, 251, 256, 257, 258, 266, 289, 291, 312, 322, 326, 328–31, 332, 333–4
Muse, 115
mystery-cult, *see also* mystic ritual
  Dionysiac, 27, 97, 104, 135, 316, 331
  Eleusinian, 24–51, 90, 91, 97, 100, 132, 185, 225, 262, 271, 273, 275, 277, 296, 335
mystic doctrine, 250, 311
mystic ritual, 26, 27, 32, 40–6, 98, 100, 101, 102, 105, 119, 121, 134, 135, 181, 187, 226, 227, 235, 242, 248–50, 272, 275, 276, 282; *see also* mystery-cult

Naxos, 102, 104
necessity, 56, 57, 59, 149, 196, 199, 203, 252, 266
Nestor, 19, 21
Nile, 144
Ninon of Kroton, 292

Odeion, 210
Odysseus, 15, 22, 37
Oedipus, 141, 150, 161, 162, 167, 168, 172, 173, 174, 175, 252, 327
Oineus, 85, 86
Oinomaos, 92
Okeanos, 14, 15, 21, 61
Olbian bone plates, 242
Olympos, 13, 14, 25, 32, 34
omen, 210, 237, 244, 245
opposites, Pythagorean, 283–8, 291, 300
Orestes, 48, 182–9, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 210, 260, 265, 266, 267, 295, 302
Orpheus, 287
Oschophoria, 39, 47, 103, 125
Ouranos, 300

paian, 158, 159, 166, 248, 263, 268, 271, 304
Panathenaia, 111, 112, 114
panhellenism, 16, 17, 50, 115, 118, 324
Paris, 199
Parmenides, 59, 258, 327, 329, 331
payment, 56, 58, 62, 107, 125, 126, 127, 148, 149, 196, 197, 202
Peisistratos, 63, 66–8, 104, 112, 114, 119, 130, 156, 314
peithō (persuasion), 148, 288, 296, 308
Pelasgos, 15, 139, 142, 152, 238, 311, 319, 320, 323
Peleus, 89
Pentheus, 41, 42, 43, 85, 109, 116, 134, 162, 218, 259, 276
Periander, 106, 108, 115
Persephone, 24, 25, 27, 29, 40, 140, 161, 317, 331
Persepolis, 208
Perseus, 97, 244
Persia, 321–2, 324
perversion of ritual, 67, 115, 120, 129, 131, 133, 135, 167, 181, 200, 201, 203, 212, 231, 236, 304, 330
Phaeacia, 80
Philolaos, 285–9, 291, 294, 296
  Triagmoi, 287
Phue, 66
Pindar, 97, 103, 111
Plataia, battle of, 210, 215
Plato, 14, 281
Ploutos, 32
polis chronotope, 52
pollution, 109, 137, 148, 166, 175, 176, 177
Polycrates, 130
Polyneikes, 166, 167, 330
Pope, Maurice, 315
Poseidon, 14
postmodernism, 273
Pratinas, 108, 109

procession, 18, 29, 30, 34, 39, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 75–9, 83, 84, 86, 98, 107, 138, 141, 163, 164, 166, 183, 184, 215, 217, 219, 220–1, 276, 310, 338
Proitids, 5, 132, 140
projection, 4, 35
Prometheia, 276, 283
Prometheus, 2, 25, 257, 276
Prometheus Bound, 10, 92, 141, 257, 335
Pronomos vase, 87
proteleia, 190, 192, 195
Prutaneion, 37, 77–84, 85, 87, 116, 117, 138
psuchē, 255
Pythagoras, 64, 281, 282, 287, 289, 292
Pythagoreanism, 64, 70, 240, 273, 275, 281–92, 293–315

rain, 41, 170, 171, 174, 175, 182, 248, 305, 307, 332
reciprocal chronotope, 4, 6, 8, 13–23, 24, 53, 75, 118
reciprocal violence, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 203, 232, 251, 266
reciprocity, 4, 6, 9, 19, 21, 22, 23, 34, 36, 37, 53, 56, 129, 169, 172, 175, 196, 204, 232, 240, 258, 267, 326
Rehm, Rush, 8
revenge, 54, 57, 58, 94, 127, 191, 194, 196–205, 213, 233, 235, 251, 265, 266, 301, 312
Rhamnous, 77
Rharian plain, 34
rhombos, 98
ritual, 2, 3, 4, 5, 22, 37, 39, 40, 46, 65, 67, 75, 85, 92, 105, 113, 115, 125–8, 159, 161, 211, 226, 245, 246, 250, 277
robe, 219, 220
Robertson, D. S., 306
robes, 211, 212, 215
Rösler, Wolfgang, 241, 281

sacrifice, 2, 18, 46, 126, 134, 161, 169, 191, 192, 193, 195, 238, 245
Salamis, 278
satyric drama, 86, 87, 107, 109
satyrs, 86–7, 93
scales, 200, 236–9, 242, 243, 244, 247, 253–5, 262, 267, 270, 296, 300, 301
Scythia, 15
self-sufficiency, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 169, 274, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 334
Semele, 90–2, 97, 100, 103
shield of Achilles, 14, 15, 18, 60
Sikyon, 117
Simon, Erika, 89
Simonides, 111, 115
skēnē, 82, 84, 94, 188, 209, 210, 260, 337–9
Socrates, 257
Solon, 56, 58, 63–6, 69, 70, 71, 132, 199, 290, 291, 292, 297, 298, 314, 319
Sophokles
  Antigone, 109, 174, 177, 276, 327–32
  Oedipus at Colonus, 336
  Oedipus Tyrannus, 174, 332–4
  Trachiniai, 117
Sourvinou-Inwood, Christiane, 77, 78, 80, 81, 337
Sousa, 208, 217, 278, 322
Spartans, 311
spartoi, 172
Stern, Marianne, 89
Stesichoros, 114
street of the Tripods, 77, 82, 83
suicide, 137, 152, 163, 176, 177, 218, 327
supplication, 23, 80, 134, 138, 140, 142, 158, 188, 309
Symeonoglou, Sarantis, 90, 91

Taplin, Oliver, 7, 187, 189, 337
Tartaros, 14, 25, 189
Teiresias, 329, 332
Telemachos, 22, 37, 62
Telestagoras, 102
telestērion at Eleusis, 33, 39, 89, 90, 186
Tellos, 65, 66, 132
telos, 65, 66, 126, 127, 132, 145–9, 166–8, 190, 192–6, 197, 198, 226, 293, 298, 306, 313, 325
temenos, 20
temple, 17, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 83, 88, 134, 187, 188
Tereus, 151
territoriality, 52, 53, 62, 63, 119
thalamos, 90, 91, 328, 333
Thales, 63
Thebes, 50, 90–3, 102–4, 119, 120, 158, 162, 169, 174, 321, 323, 324, 325–7, 332–6, 338
Theognis, 59
Theseus, 79, 87, 103, 125, 335
Thesmophoria, 189, 306, 307, 309, 310
Thomson, George, 281
Thorikos, 28, 77
three, the number, 281, 289, 296, 303, 311, 314
thumelē, 80, 82, 287
thunderbolt, 91, 92, 95, 97–101, 255, 313, 335
Thyestes, 193, 302
Titans, 14, 25, 41, 257
tokos, 133, 199, 249, 333
tomb, 182, 184, 208, 214, 228, 295, 328
torch-race, 179–80

Tourraix, Alexandre, 215
transcendence, 2, 3, 35, 43, 57, 146, 196
Troy, 15, 16, 178, 181, 184, 190, 191, 197, 199, 237, 260, 261
tyranny, 68, 91, 92, 104, 106–18, 120, 129, 130, 131, 156, 179, 256, 257, 275, 298, 328, 329, 330, 332

underworld, 14, 25–7, 32, 33, 34, 40, 45, 261, 271
unity of opposites, 10, 58, 93, 150, 174, 180, 192, 202, 214, 225, 278, 288, 290, 293, 296, 299, 301, 302, 304, 307, 311, 322, 324–7, 332
unlimitedness, 56, 62, 64, 66, 120, 125, 128, 130, 131, 132, 135, 145, 146, 171, 192–6, 199, 201, 203, 214, 232, 238, 240–3, 251, 259, 283, 289, 291, 293, 299, 309, 326

Vernant, Jean-Paul, 53, 54, 60
vote of Athena, 267, 273, 296

wandering, 28, 40, 141, 189, 295, 335
wealth, 19, 20, 64, 109, 128, 130, 156, 170, 190, 221, 240, 299
wedding ritual, 18, 22, 29, 134, 140, 149, 155, 158, 161, 167, 181, 183, 191, 192, 195, 197, 218, 225, 246, 304, 305, 316
wedding song, 140, 141, 148, 310, 339
West, Martin, 102, 337, 338
Wiles, David, 8, 77
Wilson, Peter, 112
wrestling, 300, 303, 311

xenismos, 78, 85
Xenophanes, 252–7, 331
Xerxes, 179, 184, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214–20, 244

Zeus, 14, 25, 31, 35, 91, 92, 99, 144–8, 166, 167, 170, 193, 194, 195, 214, 236–9, 248, 252–7, 269, 270, 294, 296, 297, 300–3, 306, 308, 310, 312–15, 318, 322, 335

Index of principal passages

Aeschylus
Agamemnon
1: 271
20–3: 248
65–71: 190
69: 230
83–96: 178, 180, 190
89–90: 230
101–2: 194
136: 238
145: 237
156–9: 237, 264
159: 269
160–6: 237, 254–5
160–75: 273
163: 239
167–75: 300, 313
174–8: 269
176–81: 301
227: 181, 192
249–51: 269, 296, 301
282: 179
312–14: 178, 179, 248, 260
321–5: 261, 263, 264
381–4: 198
438–44: 200, 247
518–21: 196
532–7: 199
571–2: 200, 262
636–45: 262–3
648–51: 263
721–49: 246–7
745: 191, 197
751–72: 197, 298
766: 198–9
776–82: 198
785–7: 230, 233
918–23: 265
926–7: 264
941: 180, 260, 266
948–9: 201
958–62: 201
973: 193, 313
1000: 315
1002–3: 197, 299
1005–13: 299
1008–9: 171
1014–21: 170, 174
1107–9: 193
1117–18: 191, 193, 195
1186–93: 187
1190: 161
1235: 162
1331–42: 201
1350–1: 182, 207
1378: 180, 266
1382–3: 201
1385–7: 182, 248, 302
1389–92: 174, 307
1390–2: 182
1429–32: 193
1476: 302
1486–7: 146, 195, 236, 312–13
1503–4: 193
1513–15: 231
1527: 232
1541: 231
1545: 231, 268
1548–54: 183
1551–3: 231
1560–2: 197, 232
1562: 236
1569–76: 202
1638–9: 197, 202
Choephoroi
132–4: 200
151: 263, 268
152–3: 164
306–13: 196, 232
320–2: 263, 295
342–3: 263, 268
400–4: 265

Choephoroi (*cont.*)
431–2: 183
446: 183
486–8: 183
518–21: 202, 239
526–50: 244
698: 162
942–5: 185
961–7: 185, 248
1014–15: 233
1065–76: 194
1073–6: 302
Danaids
fr. 43: 304
fr. 44: 305
Edonians
fr. 58: 89, 339
Eumenides
12–14: 47
242: 187–8
249–50: 189, 194
319–20: 195
434: 147, 195
517–37: 297
539–44: 198, 298
553–5: 171, 198
631–2: 200
696–9: 300
758–60: 303
826–8: 196, 313
835: 183, 195, 294, 307
886: 272
900: 272
951–5: 195, 270
954: 268
973: 196, 279, 294
974–86: 267
978–95: 135
984–5: 204
996: 204–5, 268
1008–9: 268
1029–31: 295
1045–6: 270, 294
fr. 55
fr. 99: 256
fr. 278: 255
Persians
140–3: 206
237–43: 221
238: 64
529–31: 211, 212, 215
550–1: 233–4
607–9: 206, 212, 213
694–5: 234
739–51: 244
832–6: 211, 212, 215, 220
1017–66: 216, 219
1069–71: 206
1071: 209, 234
Septem
6–8: 160, 166
16–19: 172
265–70: 159, 166
287–368: 159
333–5: 167
367: 167
412–6: 172
463: 158
591–4: 172
654–7: 160
679–82: 161
680–1: 175
684: 168
696–7: 160, 161, 168–9
699–700: 161, 162, 164, 331
702–3: 161, 169
709–11: 245
718: 173
727–30: 159, 164
734–5: 164
734–40: 161, 166, 173
738–9: 177
739–41: 227
745–52: 160
749: 165, 167
751–5: 173
754–5: 171, 172
760–71: 170, 171
766–7: 168
787–90: 168, 244
792–821: 166
817–18: 171, 325
836: 162
840: 168
854–60: 165, 177, 247–8
855: 164
911–14: 228
915–17: 163, 338
917: 230
929–31: 164
929–41: 173
937–44: 164
941: 159
948: 147
953–5: 166
962–5: 228
964: 229
971: 235
972: 229
993: 229

994–5: 165
1003–4: 162, 165
1004: 177
Suppliants
5–10: 149
62–4: 151
65–6: 149, 152
79–80: 145
87–103: 146, 255
138–9: 142, 145–6, 148, 315
156–61: 142, 145
223–6: 151, 155
254–9: 15, 143, 323
256: 142
335–9: 152
339: 153
365–9: 139
370–3: 139, 311
387: 154
387–91: 153
388: 150
393–4: 142
472–6: 148–9
482–4: 138
525–6: 146, 255
546: 142–3
548–55: 143
564: 141, 255
574–8: 146
604: 148
615–24: 139
624: 148
789–91: 142, 145
823–4: 146, 238
957–63: 139
970–4: 139
1009–11: 139
1018–51: 141–2
1026–39: 305–6
1048–51: 147
1053: 150
1057–8: 147
1067: 148
1068–70: 310
Alkmaion
B4: 70, 290
Anaximander
B1: 53–4, 59, 290
anonymous
Prometheus Bound
204–25: 257
648–68: 92
665–6: 141
855–6: 150
Apollodorus
FGrH 110: 27
Apollodorus
Against Neaira 73: 86–7
Apuleius
Metamorphoses
II: 26
Archilochos
fr. 120: 97, 107, 117
Aristophanes
Clouds
202–17: 60
Frogs
145–57: 276
155–8: 34
339–44: 42
359: 276
368–70: 276
450–6: 43
454–6: 26
886–7: 276
Lysistrata
640–5: 48
1141: 311
Aristotle
De caelo
268a10: 285
Metaphysics
986a: 283–4
990a8: 283
1091a16: 294
Nicomachean Ethics
1106b29: 291
1133a17–21: 59, 252
Poetics
Chapter 4: 84, 87, 107
Politics
1258b1–8: 333
1322b28: 84
[Aristotle]
Athenaion politeia
3: 83, 85–6
9: 319
16: 68
21: 68
Oeconomica
1347a: 112
Aristoxenos
fr. 23: 284

Callimachus
fr. 85: 87
Cleanthes
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
1.538: 26

Critias
Peirithous
fr. 4: 98

Demosthenes
Against Meidias 52: 70
Derveni papyrus
columns 1–6: 272
column 16: 256

Empedokles
B17: 308
Euripides
Bacchae
6–11: 90–1, 99
61: 84
69: 84, 144
72–6: 99
85: 84
206–9: 87–8
519–603: 99
587–633: 89
605–6: 187
608–9: 43
623–5: 101
726–7: 99
918–24: 41
1043–52: 17
Cyclops
37–40: 117
63–75: 109
203–5: 109
578–9: 41
Danae
fr. 324: 328
Erechtheus
fr. 370: 89
Helen
1326–3: 98
Ion
1074–9: 43
IT
1435–74: 48
1459–60: 49
Medea
232–4: 152

Herakleitos
B10: 288
B30: 59, 253, 288
B32: 252–3, 257
B36: 242
B45: 59, 253
B50: 288
B51: 241
B54: 252
B60: 59
B62: 242–3
B64: 255
B67: 242
B80: 59
B88: 252, 265
B90: 58, 250, 253
B102: 296
B123: 252
B125: 262
B126: 242
Herodotos
1.23–4: 106
1.30–1: 65, 130
1.59: 67
1.60.2–5: 66
1.61: 68, 104
1.64: 112
1.153: 68
2.171: 306
3.66: 217
4.36: 61
4.100–2: 15
5.67–9: 117
5.92: 115
6.58: 216–17
8.65: 45
8.98: 179
8.99: 217
9.80–1: 215
9.108–13: 215
Hesiod
Theogony
535–6: 25
726: 25
729: 14
732–3: 25
772–3: 25
868: 14
Hippolytos
Refutation of All Heresies
5.7.34: 41
Homer
Iliad
2.101–8: 22
2.494–877: 15
2.546–51: 88
6.150–211: 21
6.218–20: 21
6.490–3: 160
7.467–75: 61
8.16: 14

9.189–90: 20
9.401: 255
9.628–36: 203
11.670–83: 19
11.670–761: 21
11.768–80: 22
14.203–4: 21
14.246: 21
15.79–83: 15, 20
15.187–93: 13
18.478–608: 14, 15
18.492–6: 18
19.95–131: 38
20.215–41: 22
Odyssey
7.54–63: 22
7.80–1: 88
7.169: 80
8.390–1: 37
11.36–7: 14
11.36–43: 34
21.11–41: 20, 21
Homeric Hymn to Apollo
514–17: 29
Homeric Hymn to Demeter ('Demeter Hymn')
99: 30
150–1: 38
174–7: 29
270–1: 30
278–80: 42, 101
280–1: 186
377–85: 27
386: 29
450: 34
471–7: 32
480: 32

Iamblichos
de Vita Pythagorica
131: 297
Ion of Chios
B1–4: 287
Isocrates
Antidosis
166: 111
Panegyricus
28: 27

Lactantius
Epitome
18.7: 27
Lucian
Cataplus
22: 26–7

Pap. Univ. Milan
1.20.18–32: 27
Pausanias
1.2.5: 80, 85
1.18.2: 82
1.20.1: 82
1.26.5: 89
1.38.8: 50
9.12.3: 90, 162
9.16.6: 91
9.18.3: 162
Philochoros
F87: 301–2
Philolaos
B1: 286
B4: 286
B6: 286
Pindar
fr. 70a: 97
fr. 70b: 97
fr. 70c: 97
fr. 75: 79, 97, 103
fr. 85: 97, 99
fr. 137: 226, 227
fr. 346: 97, 100
Isthmians
2.6–8: 115
Olympians
1.90–3: 175
2.61–3: 26
Pythians
3.80–2: 310
11.41–4: 115
Plato
Laws
700a–701a: 113
700b: 97
Lysis
205cd: 37
Phaedo
108a: 26
Phaedrus
250bc: 41, 42, 43
Philebus
25d–26c: 291, 297
Politicus
289e: 200
Timaeus
31bc: 286
35ab: 286
48a: 288
50cd: 294

Plutarch
Demetrius 12: 79
fr. 178: 26, 28, 42, 275
Kimon 16: 312
Moralia
81de: 42, 185
388ab: 284–5
693e: 202
Solon 18: 319
Pratinas
fr. 1: 108–9
Proclus
In Tim. II 176.28: 41, 305

Sappho
fr. 140a: 216
Solon
fr. 4a: 64
fr. 4c: 290
fr. 6: 65, 290, 298
fr. 13: 56
fr. 16: 63, 290
fr. 36: 58
Sophokles
Antigone
73–6: 328
296–301: 329
417–21: 330
462: 328
584–91: 330
781–892: 305
891–912: 328
1016–20: 330
1036–41: 330–1
1066–72: 329–30
1146–7: 42
1146–52: 331
1220–41: 177
Elektra
187–90: 183
fr. 88: 330
OC
607–28: 335
621–2: 175, 335
1519: 175, 334
OT
873: 332
895–6: 110
1086–1109: 334
1186–8: 333
1207–10: 333
1214–15: 332
1275–81: 174
1281: 175
Trachiniai
145: 152
202–3: 117

Thucydides
1.5: 19
2.15: 79
6.54.5: 68, 112
6.59: 115
6.60.1: 275

Xenophanes
A1: 257
B1–2: 257
B23–6: 253
Xenophon
Hipparchos
3.2: 76–7